Reframing Single- and Dual-Process Theories as Cognitive Models: Commentary on De Neys (2021)

Further advancing fast-and-slow theorizing

The 34 commentaries on the target article span a broad range of interesting issues. I have organized my reply around five major themes that seemed to emerge: Remarks about the generalizability of the empirical findings, links with other models, necessary extensions, the utility of dual-process models, and more specific points. This allows me to clarify possible misconceptions and identify avenues for further advancement.

The "Effort Elephant" in the Room: What Is Effort, Anyway?

Despite decades of research in the fields of judgment and decision-making, social psychology, cognitive psychology, human-machine interaction, behavioral economics, and neuroscience, we still do not know what "cognitive effort" is. The definitions in use are often imprecise and sometimes diametrically opposed. Researchers with different assumptions talk past each other, and many aspects of effort conservation remain untested and difficult to measure. In this article, we explain why effort is so difficult to pin down and why it is important that researchers develop consensus on precise definitions. Next, we describe major "hidden" sources of miscommunication: areas in which researchers disagree in their underlying assumptions about the nature of effort without realizing it. We briefly review a number of methods used to both measure and manipulate the effortfulness of thinking and highlight why they often produce contradictory findings. We conclude by reviewing existing perspectives on cognitive effort and integrating them to suggest a common framework for communicating about effort as a limited cognitive resource.

Advancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking

Human reasoning is often conceived as an interplay between a more intuitive and deliberate thought process. In the last 50 years, influential fast-and-slow dual-process models that capitalize on this distinction have been used to account for numerous phenomena - from logical reasoning biases, over prosocial behavior, to moral decision making. The present paper clarifies that despite the popularity, critical assumptions are poorly conceived. My critique focuses on two interconnected foundational issues: the exclusivity and switch feature. The exclusivity feature refers to the tendency to conceive intuition and deliberation as generating unique responses such that one type of response is assumed to be beyond the capability of the fast-intuitive processing mode. I review the empirical evidence in key fields and show that there is no solid ground for such exclusivity. The switch feature concerns the mechanism by which a reasoner can decide to shift between more intuitive and deliberate processing. I present an overview of leading switch accounts and show that they are conceptually problematic - precisely because they presuppose exclusivity. I build on these insights to sketch the groundwork for a more viable dual-process architecture and illustrate how it can set a new research agenda to advance the field in the coming years.