Public faith in science in the United States through the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic

Objectives

Given the centrality of science over the course of the COVID-19 crisis, we evaluate changes in people’s beliefs in the power of science in the United States over the first four months of the pandemic.

Study design

Post-hoc analysis of cross-sectional survey data.

Methods

A convenience sample of 1327 participants was recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service for three surveys carried out in 14–25 January, 27 March to 1 April, and 28–29 May of 2020. Respondents completed a ten-item instrument measuring different aspects of their perceptions of science including trust, interest, and faith (answer to the question: “How much do you agree with the following statement: Science can sort out any problem.”). We conducted multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) with faith, interest, and trust as dependent variables, time as the independent variable, and political orientation and religiosity as between-subjects covariates.

Results

The data revealed that public levels of faith in science increased between January (M ​= ​3.2) and both March (M ​= ​3.42) and May (M ​= ​3.4). By contrast, we observed no changes in interest and trust in science over the same time period.

Conclusions

We speculate that increases in faith in science during the first four months of the pandemic helped people cope with the uncertainty and existential anxiety resulting from this public health crisis.

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We observed public faith in science increase in the United States throughout the first four months of the Covid-19 pandemic.

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Trust and interest in science did not shift over the same time period.

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Increases in faith may have helped people cope with the uncertainty and existential anxiety from this public health crisis.

Does Perceived Lack of Control Lead to Conspiracy Theory Beliefs? Findings from an online MTurk sample

It is widely believed that conspiracy theory beliefs are the product of perceived lack of control. However, to date there is mixed evidence, at best, to support this claim. We consider the reasons why conspiracy theory beliefs do not appear to be based in any straightforward way on control beliefs, interrogating existing findings and presenting new data that call the relationship into question. Across six studies conducted online using MTurk samples, we observed no effect of control manipulations on conspiracy theory beliefs, while replicating previously reported correlational evidence of their association. The results suggest that conspiracy beliefs are not suitable for compensating for threats to control. We discuss possible reasons for the discrepancy between experimental and correlational effects and examine the limitations of the studies.

An Evaluation of the Belief in Science Scale

The Belief in Science Scale (BISS) is a unidimensional measure that assesses the degree to which science is valued as a source of superior knowledge. Due to increased academic interest in the concept of belief in science, the BISS has emerged as an important measurement instrument. Noting an absence of validation evidence, the present paper, via two studies, evaluated the scale’s factorial structure. Both studies drew on data collected from previous research. Study 1 (N = 686), using parallel analysis and exploratory factor analysis, identified a unidimensional solution accounting for 56.43% of the observed variance. Study 2 (N = 535), using an independent sample, tested the unidimensional solution using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Data-model fit was good (marginal for RMSEA): CFI = 0.93, TLI = 0.91, RMSEA = 0.09 (90% CI of 0.08 to 0.10), SRMR = 0.04. Invariance testing across gender supported invariance of form, factor structure, and item intercepts for this one-factor model. BISS at the overall level correlated negatively with the reality testing dimension of the Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO-RT), demonstrating convergent validity. Researchers often use the IPO-RT as an indirect index of preference for experiential processing (intuitive thinking). In this context, only BISS scores above the median (second quartile) produced a reduction in experiential-based thinking. The authors discuss these findings in the context of belief in science as a psychometric construct.

The role of magical thinking in forecasting the future

This article explores the role of magical thinking in the subjective probabilities of future chance events. In five experiments, we show that individuals tend to predict a more lucky future (reflected in probability judgements of lucky and unfortunate chance events) for someone who happened to purchase a product associated with a highly moral person than for someone who unknowingly purchased a product associated with a highly immoral person. In the former case, positive events were considered more likely than negative events, whereas in the latter case, the difference in the likelihood judgement of positive and negative events disappeared or even reversed. Our results indicate that this effect is unlikely to be driven by participants' immanent justice beliefs, the availability heuristic, or experimenter demand. Finally, we show that individuals rely more heavily on magical thinking when their need for control is threatened, thus suggesting that lack of control represents a factor in driving magical thinking in making predictions about the future.

Many faces of dogmatism: Prejudice as a way of protecting certainty against value violators among dogmatic believers and atheists

In this article, we suggest that dogmatic beliefs, manifested as strong beliefs that there is no God (i.e., dogmatic atheism) as well as strong beliefs in God (i.e., religious orthodoxy), can serve as a cognitive response to uncertainty. Moreover, we claim that people who dogmatically do not believe in religion and those who dogmatically believe in religion are equally prone to intolerance and prejudice towards groups that violate their important values. That is because prejudice towards these groups may be an efficient strategy to protect the certainty that strong beliefs provide. We tested these assumptions in two studies. In Study 1 and Study 2, we demonstrated that dogmatic beliefs mediate the relationship between intolerance to uncertainty and both, religious orthodoxy and dogmatic atheism. In addition, in Study 2 we showed that both the religiously orthodox and dogmatic atheists become prejudiced towards groups that violate their values and that these effects are especially strong under experimentally induced uncertainty. In this study, we focused on atheists and homosexuals as groups that pose a threat to Christian's religious worldviews, and Catholics and pro-life supporters as groups that pose a threat to the values of atheists. The results are discussed in relation to past research on dogmatism and religion, as well as with reference to what this means for the study of prejudice.

Cultural Beliefs About Societal Change

People’s beliefs about where society has come from and where it is going have personal and political consequences. Here, we conduct a detailed investigation of these beliefs through re-analyzing Kashima, Shi, et al.’s (Study 2, n = 320) data from China, Australia, and Japan. Kashima, Shi, et al. identified a “folk theory of social change” (FTSC) belief that people in society become more competent over time, but less warm and moral. Using three-mode principal component analysis, an under-utilized analytical method in psychology, we identified two additional narratives: Utopianism/Dystopianism (people becoming generally better or worse over time) and Expansion/Contraction (an increase/decrease in both positive and negative aspects of character over time). Countries differed in endorsement of these three narratives of societal change. Chinese endorsed the FTSC and Utopian narratives more than other countries, Japanese held Dystopian and Contraction narratives more than other countries, and Australians’ narratives of societal change fell between Chinese and Japanese. Those who believed in greater economic/technological development held stronger FTSC and Expansion/Contraction narratives, but not Utopianism/Dystopianism. By identifying multiple cultural narratives about societal change, this research provides insights into how people across cultures perceive their social world and their visions of the future.

Scientific faith: Belief in science increases in the face of stress and existential anxiety

Growing evidence indicates that religious belief helps individuals to cope with stress and anxiety. But is this effect specific to supernatural beliefs, or is it a more general function of belief - including belief in science? We developed a measure of belief in science and conducted two experiments in which we manipulated stress and existential anxiety. In Experiment 1, we assessed rowers about to compete (high-stress condition) and rowers at a training session (low-stress condition). As predicted, rowers in the high-stress group reported greater belief in science. In Experiment 2, participants primed with mortality (vs. participants in a control condition) reported greater belief in science. In both experiments, belief in science was negatively correlated with religiosity. Thus, some secular individuals may use science as a form of "faith" that helps them to deal with stressful and anxiety-provoking situations.

Perceived control qualifies the effects of threat on prejudice

People sometimes show a tendency to lash out in a prejudiced manner when they feel threatened. This research shows that the relationship between threat and prejudice is moderated by people's levels of perceived control: Threat leads to prejudice only when people feel concurrently low in control. In two studies, terrorist threat was associated with heightened prejudice among people who were low in perceived control over the threat (Study 1; N = 87) or over their lives in general (Study 2; N = 2,394), but was not associated with prejudice among people who were high in perceived control. Study 3 (N = 139) replicated this finding experimentally in the context of the Global Financial Crisis. The research identifies control as an important ingredient in threatening contexts that, if bolstered, can reduce general tendencies to lash out under threat.

Loss of control increases belief in precognition and belief in precognition increases control

Every year thousands of dollars are spent on psychics who claim to “know” the future. The present research questions why, despite no evidence that humans are able to psychically predict the future, do people persist in holding irrational beliefs about precognition? We argue that believing the future is predictable increases one’s own perceived ability to exert control over future events. As a result, belief in precognition should be particularly strong when people most desire control–that is, when they lack it. In Experiment 1 (N = 87), people who were experimentally induced to feel low in control reported greater belief in precognition than people who felt high in control. Experiment 2 (N = 53) investigated whether belief in precognition increases perceived control. Consistent with this notion, providing scientific evidence that precognition is possible increased feelings of control relative to providing scientific evidence that precognition was not possible. Experiment 3 (N = 132) revealed that when control is low, believing in precognition helps people to feel in control once more. Prediction therefore acts as a compensatory mechanism in times of low control. The present research provides new insights into the psychological functions of seemingly irrational beliefs, like belief in psychic abilities.

Step by Step

People are motivated to maintain the belief that they live in an orderly world in which things are under control. Previous research has shown that perceptions of order can be maintained via two routes: affirming personal control over one’s life and future outcomes, and bolstering one’s belief in external systems or agents that exert control over the world. Both religion and sociopolitical institutions can provide subjective and socially sanctioned security in the context of low personal control or disorder in one’s environment. In this article, we argue that belief in science and progress could serve a similar function. Science is not only assumed to simplify people’s lives; it also creates a sense of order and predictability. We show that perceiving order (regardless of external agency) can be sufficient to combat lack of control, and that perceptions of order can be derived from science and from more general beliefs about progress. We also discuss findings from our research addressing the processes underlying these effects and the functionality of compensatory beliefs and perceptions. We conclude that endorsing scientific theories and beliefs in societal and scientific progress helps people regulate threats to order and control, as long as these theories and beliefs suggest that the world is (or will be) an orderly place.

Collective Futures: How Projections About the Future of Society Are Related to Actions and Attitudes Supporting Social Change

We identified the active ingredients in people’s visions of society’s future (“collective futures”) that could drive political behavior in the present. In eight studies ( N = 595), people imagined society in 2050 where climate change was mitigated (Study 1), abortion laws relaxed (Study 2), marijuana legalized (Study 3), or the power of different religious groups had increased (Studies 4-8). Participants rated how this future society would differ from today in terms of societal-level dysfunction and development (e.g., crime, inequality, education, technology), people’s character (warmth, competence, morality), and their values (e.g., conservation, self-transcendence). These measures were related to present-day attitudes/intentions that would promote/prevent this future (e.g., act on climate change, vote for a Muslim politician). A projection about benevolence in society (i.e., warmth/morality of people’s character) was the only dimension consistently and uniquely associated with present-day attitudes and intentions across contexts. Implications for social change theories, political communication, and policy design are discussed.

On Social Stability and Social Change

More than a decade of research from the perspective of system-justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994) has demonstrated that people engage in motivated psychological processes that bolster and support the status quo. We propose that this motive is highly contextual: People do not justify their social systems at all times but are more likely to do so under certain circumstances. We describe four contexts in which people are prone to engage in system-justifying processes: (a) system threat, (b) system dependence, (c) system inescapability, and (d) low personal control. We describe how and why, in these contexts, people who wish to promote social change might expect resistance.