Rethinking medical device regulation

Patients' perspectives on quality and patient safety failures: lessons learned from an inquiry into transvaginal mesh in Australia

BACKGROUND

Transvaginal mesh (TVM) surgeries emerged as an innovative treatment for stress urine incontinency and/or pelvic organ prolapse in 1996. Years after rapid adoption of these surgeries into practice, they are a key example of worldwide failure of healthcare quality and patient safety. The prevalence of TVM-associated harms eventually prompted action globally, including an Australian Commonwealth Government Senate Inquiry in 2017.

METHOD

We analysed 425 submissions made by women (n = 417) and their advocates (n = 8) to the Australian Senate Inquiry, and documents from 5 public hearings, using deductive and inductive coding, categorisation and thematic analysis informed by three 'linked dilemmas' from healthcare quality and safety theory. We focused on women's accounts of: a) how harms arose from TVM procedures, and b) micro, meso and macro factors that contributed to their experience. Our aim was to explain, from a patient perspective, how these harms persisted in Australian healthcare, and to identify mechanisms at micro, meso and macro levels explaining quality and safety system failure.

RESULTS

Our findings suggest three mechanisms explaining quality and safety failure: 1. Individual clinicians could ignore cases of TVM injury or define them as 'non-preventable'; 2. Women could not go beyond their treating clinicians to participate in defining and governing quality and safety; and. 3. Health services set thresholds for concern based on proportion of cases harmed, not absolute number or severity of harms.

CONCLUSION

We argue that privileging clinical perspectives over patient perspectives in evaluating TVM outcomes allowed micro-level actors to dismiss women's lived experience, such that women's accounts of harms had insufficient or no weight at meso and macro levels. Establishing system-wide expectations regarding responsiveness to patients, and communication of patient reported outcomes in evaluation of healthcare delivery, may help prevent similar failures.

Nerve guidance conduit development for primary treatment of peripheral nerve transection injuries: A commercial perspective

Commercial nerve guidance conduits (NGCs) for repair of peripheral nerve discontinuities are of little use in gaps larger than 30 mm, and for smaller gaps they often fail to compete with the autografts that they are designed to replace. While recent research to develop new technologies for use in NGCs has produced many advanced designs with seemingly positive functional outcomes in animal models, these advances have not been translated into viable clinical products. While there have been many detailed reviews of the technologies available for creating NGCs, none of these have focussed on the requirements of the commercialisation process which are vital to ensure the translation of a technology from bench to clinic. Consideration of the factors essential for commercial viability, including regulatory clearance, reimbursement processes, manufacturability and scale up, and quality management early in the design process is vital in giving new technologies the best chance at achieving real-world impact. Here we have attempted to summarise the major components to consider during the development of emerging NGC technologies as a guide for those looking to develop new technology in this domain. We also examine a selection of the latest academic developments from the viewpoint of clinical translation, and discuss areas where we believe further work would be most likely to bring new NGC technologies to the clinic. STATEMENT OF SIGNIFICANCE: NGCs for peripheral nerve repairs represent an adaptable foundation with potential to incorporate modifications to improve nerve regeneration outcomes. In this review we outline the regulatory processes that functionally distinct NGCs may need to address and explore new modifications and the complications that may need to be addressed during the translation process from bench to clinic.

Lessons from the vaginal mesh scandal: enhancing the patient-centric approach to informed consent for medical device implantation

The vaginal mesh scandal, in which thousands of women were irreversibly maimed by polypropylene mesh, revealed multilevel failures in medical device regulation and implantation, demonstrating that patient-centric care has not yet fully transcended from policy into practice. In law, informed consent is considered by a two-stage test: reasonable treatment and patient information disclosure. The standard of reasonable treatment is determined according to what is deemed acceptable in accordance with a body of medical opinion. However, such bodies of medical opinion were vulnerable to external influence from device manufactures. Vaginal mesh manufacturers were found to have had financial links to research, royal colleges, and influential clinicians, which then influenced the basis of the evidence-based practice that often guides such bodies of medical opinion. According to the Independent Medicines and Medical Device Safety Report, patients' mesh complications were also frequently under-reported and patient-based evidence of harm disregarded. Patients were also not sufficiently informed of the material risks or reasonable alternatives to mesh, which is required of the second stage of informed consent pertaining to information disclosure. This paper makes the following recommendations: that conflict of interest disclosure be mandated, that greater value be afforded to patient-based evidence to improve evaluation of treatments, and that information disclosure for informed consent should relate to the risks, benefits, and alternatives to the surgical procedure and medical device. This will ensure that patients can evaluate whether surgeons are offering unbiased treatment options and are also informed of the potential long-term risks associated with device implantation.

Linking the Regulatory and Reimbursement Processes for Medical Devices: The Need for Integrated Assessments

Much criticism has been directed at the licencing requirements for medical devices (MDs) as they often result in a lack of robust evidence to inform health technology assessment (HTA) decisions. To better understand the current international decisional framework on MD technologies, we undertook three linked research studies: a review of the device regulatory procedures, a survey of current HTA practices and an empirical comparison of HTA reports of drugs versus MDs. Our review confirms that current device regulatory processes across the globe are substantially less stringent than drugs. As a result, international HTA agencies report that they face a number of challenges when assessing MDs, including reliance on suboptimal data to make clinical and cost-effectiveness decisions. Whilst many HTA agencies have adapted their processes and procedures to handle MD technology submissions, in our comparison of HTA reports we found little evidence of the application of methodologies that take account of device-specific issues, such as incremental development. Overall, our research reinforces the need for better linkage between licencing and HTA and the development and application of innovative HTA methodologies with the objective of securing faster patient access for those technologies that can be shown to represent good value for money. © 2017 The Authors. Health Economics Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

How many testers are needed to assure the usability of medical devices?

Before releasing a product, manufacturers have to follow a regulatory framework and meet standards, producing reliable evidence that the device presents low levels of risk in use. There is, though, a gap between the needs of the manufacturers to conduct usability testing while managing their costs, and the requirements of authorities for representative evaluation data. A key issue here is the number of users that should complete this evaluation to provide confidence in a product's safety. This paper reviews the US FDA's indication that a sample composed of 15 participants per major group (or a minimum of 25 users) should be enough to identify 90-97% of the usability problems and argues that a more nuanced approach to determining sample size (which would also fit well with the FDA's own concerns) would be beneficial. The paper will show that there is no a priori cohort size that can guarantee a reliable assessment, a point stressed by the FDA in the appendices to its guidance, but that manufacturers can terminate the assessment when appropriate by using a specific approach - illustrated in this paper through a case study - called the 'Grounded Procedure'.