From cones to color vision: a neurobiological model that explains the unique hues

A Bayesian observer model reveals a prior for natural daylights in hue perception

Incorporating statistical characteristics of stimuli in perceptual processing can be highly beneficial for reliable estimation from noisy sensory measurements but may generate perceptual bias. According to Bayesian inference, perceptual biases arise from the integration of internal priors with noisy sensory inputs. In this study, we used a Bayesian observer model to derive biases and priors in hue perception based on discrimination data for hue ensembles with varying levels of chromatic noise. Our results showed that discrimination thresholds for isoluminant stimuli with hue defined by azimuth angle in cone-opponent color space exhibited a bimodal pattern, with lowest thresholds near a non-cardinal blue-yellow axis that aligns closely with the variation of natural daylights. Perceptual biases showed zero crossings around this axis, indicating repulsion away from yellow and attraction towards blue. These biases could be explained by the Bayesian observer model through a non-uniform prior with a preference for blue. Our findings suggest that visual processing takes advantage of knowledge of the distribution of colors in natural environments for hue perception.

Unique yellow shifts for small and brief stimuli in the central retina

The spectral locus of unique yellow was determined for flashes of different sizes (<11 arcmin) and durations (<500 ms) presented in and near the fovea. An adaptive optics scanning laser ophthalmoscope was used to minimize the effects of higher-order aberrations during simultaneous stimulus delivery and retinal imaging. In certain subjects, parafoveal cones were classified as L, M, or S, which permitted the comparison of unique yellow measurements with variations in local L/M ratios within and between observers. Unique yellow shifted to longer wavelengths as stimulus size or duration was reduced. This effect is most pronounced for changes in size and more apparent in the fovea than in the parafovea. The observed variations in unique yellow are not entirely predicted from variations in L/M ratio and therefore implicate neural processes beyond photoreception.

Cone-Opponent Ganglion Cells in the Primate Fovea Tuned to Noncardinal Color Directions

A long-standing question in vision science is how the three cone photoreceptor types-long (L), medium (M), and short (S) wavelength sensitive-combine to generate our perception of color. Hue perception can be described along two opponent axes: red-green and blue-yellow. Psychophysical measurements of color appearance indicate that the cone inputs to the red-green and blue-yellow opponent axes are M vs. L + S and L vs. M + S, respectively. However, the "cardinal directions of color space" revealed by psychophysical measurements of color detection thresholds following adaptation are L vs. M and S vs. L + M. These cardinal directions match the most common cone-opponent retinal ganglion cells (RGCs) in the primate retina. Accordingly, the cone opponency necessary for color appearance is thought to be established in the cortex. While neurons with the appropriate M vs. L + S and L vs. M + S opponency have been reported in the retina and lateral geniculate nucleus, their existence continues to be debated. Resolving this long-standing debate is necessary because a complete account of the cone opponency in the retinal output is critical for understanding how downstream neural circuits process color. Here, we performed adaptive optics calcium imaging to noninvasively measure foveal RGC light responses in the living Macaca fascicularis eye. We confirm the presence of L vs. M + S and M vs. L + S neurons with noncardinal cone opponency and demonstrate that cone-opponent signals in the retinal output are more diverse than classically thought.

Color appearance and the end of Hering's Opponent-Colors Theory

Hering's Opponent-Colors Theory has been central to understanding color appearance for 150 years. It aims to explain the phenomenology of colors with two linked propositions. First, a psychological hypothesis stipulates that any color is described necessarily and sufficiently by the extent to which it appears reddish-versus-greenish, bluish-versus-yellowish, and blackish-versus-whitish. Second, a physiological hypothesis stipulates that these perceptual mechanisms are encoded by three innate brain mechanisms. We review the evidence and conclude that neither side of the linking proposition is accurate: the theory is wrong. We sketch out an alternative, Utility-Based Coding, by which the known retinal cone-opponent mechanisms represent optimal encoding of spectral information given competing selective pressure to extract high-acuity spatial information; and phenomenological color categories represent an adaptive, efficient, output of the brain governed by behavioral demands.