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Kazmierska-Grebowska P, Żakowski W, Myślińska D, Sahu R, Jankowski MM. Revisiting serotonin's role in spatial memory: A call for sensitive analytical approaches. Int J Biochem Cell Biol 2024; 176:106663. [PMID: 39321568 DOI: 10.1016/j.biocel.2024.106663] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/14/2024] [Revised: 09/17/2024] [Accepted: 09/17/2024] [Indexed: 09/27/2024]
Abstract
The serotonergic system is involved in various psychiatric and neurological conditions, with serotonergic drugs often used in treatment. These conditions frequently affect spatial memory, which can serve as a model of declarative memory due to well-known cellular components and advanced methods that track neural activity and behavior with high temporal resolution. However, most findings on serotonin's effects on spatial learning and memory come from studies lacking refined analytical techniques and modern approaches needed to uncover the underlying neuronal mechanisms. This In Focus review critically investigates available studies to identify areas for further exploration. It finds that well-established behavioral models could yield more insights with modern tracking and data analysis approaches, while the cellular aspects of spatial memory remain underexplored. The review highlights the complex role of serotonin in spatial memory, which holds the potential for better understanding and treating memory-related disorders.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Witold Żakowski
- Department of Animal and Human Physiology, Faculty of Biology, University of Gdansk, Gdansk, Poland
| | - Dorota Myślińska
- Department of Animal and Human Physiology, Faculty of Biology, University of Gdansk, Gdansk, Poland
| | - Ravindra Sahu
- BioTechMed Center, Multimedia Systems Department, Faculty of Electronics, Telecommunications and Informatics, Gdansk University of Technology, Gdansk, Poland
| | - Maciej M Jankowski
- BioTechMed Center, Multimedia Systems Department, Faculty of Electronics, Telecommunications and Informatics, Gdansk University of Technology, Gdansk, Poland.
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2
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Moskovitz T, Miller KJ, Sahani M, Botvinick MM. Understanding dual process cognition via the minimum description length principle. PLoS Comput Biol 2024; 20:e1012383. [PMID: 39423224 PMCID: PMC11534269 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1012383] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/04/2023] [Revised: 11/04/2024] [Accepted: 08/01/2024] [Indexed: 10/21/2024] Open
Abstract
Dual-process theories play a central role in both psychology and neuroscience, figuring prominently in domains ranging from executive control to reward-based learning to judgment and decision making. In each of these domains, two mechanisms appear to operate concurrently, one relatively high in computational complexity, the other relatively simple. Why is neural information processing organized in this way? We propose an answer to this question based on the notion of compression. The key insight is that dual-process structure can enhance adaptive behavior by allowing an agent to minimize the description length of its own behavior. We apply a single model based on this observation to findings from research on executive control, reward-based learning, and judgment and decision making, showing that seemingly diverse dual-process phenomena can be understood as domain-specific consequences of a single underlying set of computational principles.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ted Moskovitz
- Gatsby Computational Neuroscience Unit, University College London, London, United Kingdom
- Google DeepMind, London, United Kingdom
| | - Kevin J. Miller
- Google DeepMind, London, United Kingdom
- Department of Ophthalmology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Maneesh Sahani
- Gatsby Computational Neuroscience Unit, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Matthew M. Botvinick
- Gatsby Computational Neuroscience Unit, University College London, London, United Kingdom
- Google DeepMind, London, United Kingdom
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3
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Arumugam D, Ho MK, Goodman ND, Van Roy B. Bayesian Reinforcement Learning With Limited Cognitive Load. Open Mind (Camb) 2024; 8:395-438. [PMID: 38665544 PMCID: PMC11045037 DOI: 10.1162/opmi_a_00132] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/29/2023] [Accepted: 02/16/2024] [Indexed: 04/28/2024] Open
Abstract
All biological and artificial agents must act given limits on their ability to acquire and process information. As such, a general theory of adaptive behavior should be able to account for the complex interactions between an agent's learning history, decisions, and capacity constraints. Recent work in computer science has begun to clarify the principles that shape these dynamics by bridging ideas from reinforcement learning, Bayesian decision-making, and rate-distortion theory. This body of work provides an account of capacity-limited Bayesian reinforcement learning, a unifying normative framework for modeling the effect of processing constraints on learning and action selection. Here, we provide an accessible review of recent algorithms and theoretical results in this setting, paying special attention to how these ideas can be applied to studying questions in the cognitive and behavioral sciences.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Mark K. Ho
- Center for Data Science, New York University
| | - Noah D. Goodman
- Department of Computer Science, Stanford University
- Department of Psychology, Stanford University
| | - Benjamin Van Roy
- Department of Electrical Engineering, Stanford University
- Department of Management Science & Engineering, Stanford University
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4
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Lai L, Gershman SJ. Human decision making balances reward maximization and policy compression. PLoS Comput Biol 2024; 20:e1012057. [PMID: 38669280 PMCID: PMC11078408 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1012057] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/27/2023] [Revised: 05/08/2024] [Accepted: 04/08/2024] [Indexed: 04/28/2024] Open
Abstract
Policy compression is a computational framework that describes how capacity-limited agents trade reward for simpler action policies to reduce cognitive cost. In this study, we present behavioral evidence that humans prefer simpler policies, as predicted by a capacity-limited reinforcement learning model. Across a set of tasks, we find that people exploit structure in the relationships between states, actions, and rewards to "compress" their policies. In particular, compressed policies are systematically biased towards actions with high marginal probability, thereby discarding some state information. This bias is greater when there is redundancy in the reward-maximizing action policy across states, and increases with memory load. These results could not be explained qualitatively or quantitatively by models that did not make use of policy compression under a capacity limit. We also confirmed the prediction that time pressure should further reduce policy complexity and increase action bias, based on the hypothesis that actions are selected via time-dependent decoding of a compressed code. These findings contribute to a deeper understanding of how humans adapt their decision-making strategies under cognitive resource constraints.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lucy Lai
- Program in Neuroscience, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
- Theoretical Sciences Visiting Program, Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology Graduate University, Onna, Okinawa, Japan
| | - Samuel J. Gershman
- Department of Psychology and Center for Brain Science, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
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Lancia GL, Eluchans M, D’Alessandro M, Spiers HJ, Pezzulo G. Humans account for cognitive costs when finding shortcuts: An information-theoretic analysis of navigation. PLoS Comput Biol 2023; 19:e1010829. [PMID: 36608145 PMCID: PMC9851521 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010829] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/22/2022] [Revised: 01/19/2023] [Accepted: 12/19/2022] [Indexed: 01/09/2023] Open
Abstract
When faced with navigating back somewhere we have been before we might either retrace our steps or seek a shorter path. Both choices have costs. Here, we ask whether it is possible to characterize formally the choice of navigational plans as a bounded rational process that trades off the quality of the plan (e.g., its length) and the cognitive cost required to find and implement it. We analyze the navigation strategies of two groups of people that are firstly trained to follow a "default policy" taking a route in a virtual maze and then asked to navigate to various known goal destinations, either in the way they want ("Go To Goal") or by taking novel shortcuts ("Take Shortcut"). We address these wayfinding problems using InfoRL: an information-theoretic approach that formalizes the cognitive cost of devising a navigational plan, as the informational cost to deviate from a well-learned route (the "default policy"). In InfoRL, optimality refers to finding the best trade-off between route length and the amount of control information required to find it. We report five main findings. First, the navigational strategies automatically identified by InfoRL correspond closely to different routes (optimal or suboptimal) in the virtual reality map, which were annotated by hand in previous research. Second, people deliberate more in places where the value of investing cognitive resources (i.e., relevant goal information) is greater. Third, compared to the group of people who receive the "Go To Goal" instruction, those who receive the "Take Shortcut" instruction find shorter but less optimal solutions, reflecting the intrinsic difficulty of finding optimal shortcuts. Fourth, those who receive the "Go To Goal" instruction modulate flexibly their cognitive resources, depending on the benefits of finding the shortcut. Finally, we found a surprising amount of variability in the choice of navigational strategies and resource investment across participants. Taken together, these results illustrate the benefits of using InfoRL to address navigational planning problems from a bounded rational perspective.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gian Luca Lancia
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy
- University of Rome “La Sapienza”, Rome, Italy
| | - Mattia Eluchans
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy
- University of Rome “La Sapienza”, Rome, Italy
| | - Marco D’Alessandro
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy
| | - Hugo J. Spiers
- Institute of Behavioural Neuroscience, Department of Experimental Psychology, Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, United Kingdom
| | - Giovanni Pezzulo
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy
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Meister M. Learning, fast and slow. Curr Opin Neurobiol 2022; 75:102555. [PMID: 35617751 DOI: 10.1016/j.conb.2022.102555] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/18/2022] [Revised: 04/18/2022] [Accepted: 04/18/2022] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
Animals can learn efficiently from a single experience and change their future behavior in response. However, in other instances, animals learn very slowly, requiring thousands of experiences. Here, I survey tasks involving fast and slow learning and consider some hypotheses for what differentiates the underlying neural mechanisms. It has been proposed that fast learning relies on neural representations that favor efficient Hebbian modification of synapses. These efficient representations may be encoded in the genome, resulting in a repertoire of fast learning that differs across species. Alternatively, the required neural representations may be acquired from experience through a slow process of unsupervised learning from the environment.
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Affiliation(s)
- Markus Meister
- Division of Biology and Biological Engineering, Tianqiao and Chrissy Chen Institute for Neuroscience, California Institute of Technology, United States.
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Karayanni M, Nelken I. Extrinsic rewards, intrinsic rewards, and non-optimal behavior. J Comput Neurosci 2022; 50:139-143. [PMID: 35122189 DOI: 10.1007/s10827-022-00813-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/05/2021] [Revised: 01/20/2022] [Accepted: 01/25/2022] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
Abstract
The optimality of behavior in experimental settings is usually determined with respect to an extrinsic reward defined by the experimenters. However, actions that do not lead to reward are ubiquitous in many species and in many experimental paradigms. Modern research on decision processes commonly treat non-optimal behaviors as noise, often excluding from analysis animals that do not reach behavioral performance criteria. However, non-optimal behaviors can be a window on important brain processes. Here we explore the evidence that non-optimal behaviors are the consequence of intrinsically motivated actions, related to drives that are different from that of obtaining extrinsic reward. One way of operationally characterizing these drives is by postulating intrinsic rewards associated with them. Behaviors that are apparently non-optimal can be interpreted as the consequence of optimal decisions whose goal is to optimize a combination of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards. We review intrinsic rewards that have been discussed in the literature, and suggest ways of testing their existence and role in shaping animal behavior.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mousa Karayanni
- Edmond and Lily Safra Center for Brain Sciences, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel.
| | - Israel Nelken
- Edmond and Lily Safra Center for Brain Sciences, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
- Department of Neurobiology, Silberman Institute of Life Sciences, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
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Lai L, Gershman SJ. Policy compression: An information bottleneck in action selection. PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 2021. [DOI: 10.1016/bs.plm.2021.02.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
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