The computational relationship between reinforcement learning, social inference, and paranoia

Conspiracy beliefs and perceptual inference in times of political uncertainty

Sociopolitical crises causing uncertainty have accumulated in recent years, providing fertile ground for the emergence of conspiracy ideations. Computational models constitute valuable tools for understanding the mechanisms at play in the formation and rigidification of these unshakeable beliefs. Here, the Circular Inference model was used to capture associations between changes in perceptual inference and the dynamics of conspiracy ideations in times of uncertainty. A bistable perception task and conspiracy belief assessment focused on major sociopolitical events were administered to large populations from three polarized countries. We show that when uncertainty peaks, an overweighting of sensory information is associated with conspiracy ideations. Progressively, this exploration strategy gives way to an exploitation strategy in which increased adherence to conspiracy theories is associated with the amplification of prior information. Overall, the Circular Inference model sheds new light on the possible mechanisms underlying the progressive strengthening of conspiracy theories when individuals face highly uncertain situations.

Dopamine and serotonin in human substantia nigra track social context and value signals during economic exchange

Dopamine and serotonin are hypothesized to guide social behaviours. In humans, however, we have not yet been able to study neuromodulator dynamics as social interaction unfolds. Here, we obtained subsecond estimates of dopamine and serotonin from human substantia nigra pars reticulata during the ultimatum game. Participants, who were patients with Parkinson's disease undergoing awake brain surgery, had to accept or reject monetary offers of varying fairness from human and computer players. They rejected more offers in the human than the computer condition, an effect of social context associated with higher overall levels of dopamine but not serotonin. Regardless of the social context, relative changes in dopamine tracked trial-by-trial changes in offer value-akin to reward prediction errors-whereas serotonin tracked the current offer value. These results show that dopamine and serotonin fluctuations in one of the basal ganglia's main output structures reflect distinct social context and value signals.

Value Representations of Spite Sensitivity in Psychosis on the Minnesota Trust Game

BACKGROUND

Spite sensitivity provides a valuable construct to understand persecutory ideation and its underlying neural mechanisms. We examined the relationship between persecution and spite sensitivity in psychosis to identify their neural substrates.

METHODS

In a 3T magnetic resonance imaging scanner, 49 participants with psychosis played the Minnesota Trust Game, in which they decided whether to take a small amount of money or trust a partner to choose between fair and unfair distributions of money. In some conditions, the partner benefited from the unfair option, while in others, the partner lost money. Participants who were untrusting in the second condition (suspiciousness) showed heightened sensitivity to spite. Behavioral measures included mistrust during the 2 conditions of the game, which were compared with Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale persecution and computational modeling. Functional connectivity and blood oxygen level-dependent analyses were also conducted on a priori regions during spite-sensitive decisions.

RESULTS

Behavioral results replicated previous findings; participants who experienced more persecutory ideation trusted less, specifically in the suspiciousness condition. Functional connectivity findings showed that decreased connectivity between the orbitofrontal cortex-insula and the left frontoparietal network was associated with increased persecutory ideation and estimated spite-guilt (a marker of spite sensitivity). Additionally, we found differences between conditions in caudate nucleus, medial prefrontal cortex, and lateral orbitofrontal cortex activation.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings provide a new perspective on the origin of positive symptoms by identifying primary brain circuits that are related to both spite sensitivity and persecutory ideation.

Cross-cultural validation of the revised Green et al., paranoid thoughts scale

BACKGROUND

With efforts increasing worldwide to understand and treat paranoia, there is a pressing need for cross-culturally valid assessments of paranoid beliefs. The recently developed Revised Green et al., Paranoid Thoughts Scale (R-GPTS) constitutes an easy to administer self-report assessment of mild ideas of reference and more severe persecutory thoughts. Moreover, it comes with clinical cut-offs for increased usability in research and clinical practice. With multiple translations of the R-GPTS already available and in use, a formal test of its measurement invariance is now needed.

METHODS

Using data from a multinational cross-sectional online survey in the UK, USA, Australia, Germany, and Hong Kong (N = 2510), we performed confirmatory factory analyses on the R-GPTS and tested for measurement invariance across sites.

RESULTS

We found sufficient fit for the two-factor structure (ideas of reference, persecutory thoughts) of the R-GPTS across cultures. Measurement invariance was found for the persecutory thoughts subscale, indicating that it does measure the same construct across the tested samples in the same way. For ideas of reference, we found no scalar invariance, which was traced back to (mostly higher) item intercepts in the Hong Kong sample.

CONCLUSION

We found sufficient invariance for the persecutory thoughts scale, which is of substantial practical importance, as it is used for the screening of clinical paranoia. A direct comparison of the ideas of reference sum-scores between cultures, however, may lead to an over-estimation of these milder forms of paranoia in some (non-western) cultures.

Relationships between cognitive biases, decision-making, and delusions

Multiple measures of decision-making under uncertainty (e.g. jumping to conclusions (JTC), bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), win-switch behavior, random exploration) have been associated with delusional thinking in independent studies. Yet, it is unknown whether these variables explain shared or unique variance in delusional thinking, and whether these relationships are specific to paranoia or delusional ideation more broadly. Additionally, the underlying computational mechanisms require further investigation. To investigate these questions, task and self-report data were collected in 88 individuals (46 healthy controls, 42 schizophrenia-spectrum) and included measures of cognitive biases and behavior on probabilistic reversal learning and explore/exploit tasks. Of those, only win-switch rate significantly differed between groups. In regression, reversal learning performance, random exploration, and poor evidence integration during BADE showed significant, independent associations with paranoia. Only self-reported JTC was associated with delusional ideation, controlling for paranoia. Computational parameters increased the proportion of variance explained in paranoia. Overall, decision-making influenced by strong volatility and variability is specifically associated with paranoia, whereas self-reported hasty decision-making is specifically associated with other themes of delusional ideation. These aspects of decision-making under uncertainty may therefore represent distinct cognitive processes that, together, have the potential to worsen delusional thinking across the psychosis spectrum.

Assumed shared belief about conspiracy theories in social networks protects paranoid individuals against distress

Paranoia is the belief that others intend you harm. It is related to conspiracy theories, wherein those others represent an organized faction, coordinating the harm against self and others, and violating societal norms. Current psychological studies of paranoid conspiracy theorizing focus either on the individual or their broader social network. Likewise, theories of belief formation and updating often contain individual level processes as well as broader interpersonal and organizational factors. Here we examine paranoia and conspiracy theorizing in terms of individual behavioral predictors (performance on a probabilistic reversal learning task which assays belief updating) as well as social sensing: we ask participants to report the features of their social network, including whether their friends and acquaintances share their paranoid conspiratorial beliefs. We find that people who believe paranoid conspiracy theories expect more volatility during the task. They also assume that members of their social network share their paranoid beliefs. Critically, those participants with larger social networks and greater assumed shared belief tend to harbor their conspiratorial beliefs with less emotional distress and expect less volatility in the task. This is evidence that, like political and religious beliefs, conspiracy theories may flourish under a sacred canopy of belief consensus. These data suggest that friends and acquaintances may serve as sources of credulity and moving between them may sustain conspiracy beliefs when there is detraction. This hybrid individual/social account may shed light on clinical paranoia and persecutory delusion, wherein disability is defined normatively, and social supports are fewer.

Formalising social representation to explain psychiatric symptoms

Recent work in social cognition has moved beyond a focus on how people process social rewards to examine how healthy people represent other agents and how this is altered in psychiatric disorders. However, formal modelling of social representation has not kept pace with these changes, impeding our understanding of how core aspects of social cognition function, and fail, in psychopathology. Here, we suggest that belief-based computational models provide a basis for an integrated sociocognitive approach to psychiatry, with the potential to address important but unexamined pathologies of social representation, such as maladaptive schemas and illusory social agents.