Who cries wolf, and when? Manipulation of perceived threats to preserve rank in cooperative groups

Theory toolbox for historical explanation: An essay in analytic sociology

Merton proposed middle range theories, not as ends in themselves, but as bases for a consolidation to explain broader phenomenon. More than a half century has passed since Merton’s consolidation proposal and in that time a number of experimentally tested middle range theories have been developed. Certainly, the next step should be a consolidation. Yet, to our knowledge, no one has previously offered a consolidation of experimentally tested theories and applied it for explanation. This paper offers a consolidation of middle range theories formulated to explain the rise of the pristine state. Two theories of this consolidation, Status Characteristics Theory and Elementary Theory, form the core of what Analytic Sociologists have called a toolbox of theories. Our toolbox forms an integrated consolidation in two ways. First, the social structures modeled by the theories form a path-dependent process of increasing benefits gained by the elites of the structures. Second, the end conditions of each step of the process are the initial conditions of the next. Whereas the theories in our toolbox have previously been seen as applying exclusively to microstructures, we have encountered no difficulties in scaling them up to apply to macrostructures. While we hope the consolidation has validity in explaining the occurrence of pristine states, this paper’s significance lies in its demonstration that today social theories can be consolidated and applied for explanation.

Do Multiple I-Deals in a Team Help or Hinder Team Outcomes? A Resource Scarcity Perspective

Idiosyncratic deals (i-deals) are individualized employment arrangements negotiated and agreed upon by individual employees and their organization. This study addresses an emerging conundrum in i-deals research—whether the prevalence of i-deals in teams helps or hinders team outcomes. Because teams in which i-deals are prevalent receive more resources and status, they may be more cohesive and engage in more supportive behaviors. On the other hand, because i-deals differentiate among team members, teams in which i-deals are prevalent may be less cohesive and less inclined to engage in OCB. To solve this puzzle, we draw from a resource scarcity perspective to posit that understanding intra-team i-deal dynamics requires taking into account both organizational-level (i.e., organizational i-deal scarcity) and team-level (i.e., team power structure) factors. Using data from 40 organizations, 166 teams, and 1016 employees, we disentangle the complex interplay among the prevalence of i-deals in a team, organizational i-deal scarcity, and intra-team power structure in predicting both team cohesion and intra-team OCB.

The effects of social vs. asocial threats on group cooperation and manipulation of perceived threats

Individuals benefit from maintaining the well-being of their social groups and helping their groups to survive threats such as intergroup competition, harsh environments and epidemics. Correspondingly, much research shows that groups cooperate more when competing against other groups. However, 'social' threats (i.e. outgroups) should elicit stronger cooperation than 'asocial' threats (e.g. environments, diseases) because (a) social losses involve a competitor's gain and (b) a strong cooperative reaction to defend the group may deter future outgroup threats. We tested this prediction in a multiround public goods game where groups faced periodic risks of failure (i.e. loss of earnings) which could be overcome by sufficient cooperation. This threat of failure was framed as either a social threat (intergroup competition) or an asocial threat (harsh environment). We find that cooperation was higher in response to social threats than asocial threats. We also examined participants' willingness to manipulate apparent threats to the group: participants raised the perceived threat level similarly for social and asocial threats, but high-ranking participants increased the appearance of social threats more than low-ranking participants did. These results show that people treat social threats differently than asocial threats, and support previous work on leaders' willingness to manipulate perceived threats.

Local Competition Amplifies the Corrosive Effects of Inequality

Inequality is widely believed to incite conflict, but the evidence is inconsistent. We argue that the spatial scale of competition-the extent to which individuals compete locally, with their interaction partners, or globally, with the entire population-can help settle the question. We built a mathematical model of the evolution of conflict under inequality and tested its predictions in an experimental game with 1,205 participants. We found that inequality increases conflict, destroys wealth, and engenders risk taking. Crucially, these effects are amplified by local competition. Thus, inequality is at its most damaging when it arises between close competitors. Indeed, at the extremes, the combined effects of inequality and the scale of competition are very large. More broadly, our findings suggest that disagreements in the literature may be the result of a mismatch between the scale at which inequality is measured and the scale at which conflict occurs.

Local competition increases people's willingness to harm others

Why should organisms incur a cost in order to inflict a (usually greater) cost on others? Such costly harming behavior may be favored when competition for resources occurs locally, because it increases individuals' fitness relative to close competitors. However, there is no explicit experimental evidence supporting the prediction that people are more willing to harm others under local versus global competition. We illustrate this prediction with a game theoretic model, and then test it in a series of economic games. In these experiments, players could spend money to make others lose more. We manipulated the scale of competition by awarding cash prizes to the players with the highest payoffs per set of social partners (local competition) or in all the participants in a session (global competition). We found that, as predicted, people were more harmful to others when competition was local (Study 1). This result still held when people "earned" (rather than were simply given) their money (Study 2). In addition, when competition was local, people were more willing to harm ingroup members than outgroup members (Study 3), because ingroup members were the relevant competitive targets. Together, our results suggest that local competition in human groups not only promotes willingness to harm others in general, but also causes ingroup hostility.

Asymmetry within social groups: division of labour and intergroup competition

Social animals vary in their ability to compete with group members over shared resources and also vary in their cooperative efforts to produce these resources. Competition among groups can promote within-group cooperation, but many existing models of intergroup cooperation do not explicitly account for observations that group members invest differentially in cooperation and that there are often within-group competitive or power asymmetries. We present a game theoretic model of intergroup competition that investigates how such asymmetries affect within-group cooperation. In this model, group members adopt one of two roles, with relative competitive efficiency and the number of individuals varying between roles. Players in each role make simultaneous, coevolving decisions. The model predicts that although intergroup competition increases cooperative contributions to group resources by both roles, contributions are predominantly from individuals in the less competitively efficient role, whereas individuals in the more competitively efficient role generally gain the larger share of these resources. When asymmetry in relative competitive efficiency is greater, a group's per capita cooperation (averaged across both roles) is higher, due to increased cooperation from the competitively inferior individuals. For extreme asymmetry in relative competitive efficiency, per capita cooperation is highest in groups with a single competitively superior individual and many competitively inferior individuals, because the latter acquiesce and invest in cooperation rather than within-group competition. These predictions are consistent with observed features of many societies, such as monogynous Hymenoptera with many workers and caste dimorphism.