How Large Is the Role of Emotion in Judgments of Moral Dilemmas?

The effects of explicit reasoning on moral judgements

We report four experiments that investigate explicit reasoning and moral judgements. In each experiment, some subjects responded to the "footbridge" version of the trolley problem (which elicits stronger moral intuitions), whereas others responded to the "switch" version (which elicits weaker moral intuitions). Experiments 1-2 crossed the type of trolley problem with four reasoning conditions: control, counter-attitudinal, pro-attitudinal, and mixed reasoning (both types of reasoning). Experiments 3-4 examine whether moral judgements vary based on (a) when reasoners engage in counter-attitudinal reasoning, (b) when they make the moral judgement, and (c) by the type of moral dilemma. These two experiments comprised five conditions: control (judgement only), delay-only (2-minute wait then judgement), reasoning-only (reasoning then judgement), reasoning-delay (reasoning, then 2-minute delay, then judgement), and delayed-reasoning (2-minute delay, then reasoning, then judgement). These conditions were crossed with the type of trolley problem. We find that engaging in some form of counter-attitudinal reasoning led to less typical judgements (regardless of when it occurs), but this effect was mostly restricted to the switch version of the dilemma (and was strongest in the reasoning-delay conditions). Furthermore, neither pro-attitudinal reasoning nor delayed judgements on their own impacted subjects' judgements. Reasoners therefore seem open to modifying their moral judgements when they consider opposing perspectives but might be less likely to do so for dilemmas that elicit relatively strong moral intuitions.

Negative emotionality downregulation affects moral choice but not moral judgement of harm: a pharmacological study

Previous neuroscientific research has expounded on the fundamental role played by emotion during moral decision-making. Negative emotionality has been observed to exert a general inhibitory effect towards harmful behaviors against others. Nevertheless, the downregulation of negative affects at different levels of moral processing (e.g. impersonal versus personal moral dilemmas) alongside its possible interactions with other factors (e.g. perspective taking) hasn't been directly assessed; both of which can assist in predicting future moral decision-making. In the present research, we empirically test (Study 1, N = 41) whether downregulating negative emotionality through pharmacological interventions using lorazepam (a GABA receptor agonist), modulate the permissibility of harm to others -i.e. if participants find it more morally permissible to harm others when harm is unavoidable (inevitable harm moral dilemmas), than when it may be avoided (evitable harm moral dilemmas). Furthermore, using another sample (Study 2, N = 31), we assess whether lorazepam's effect is modulated by different perspective-taking conditions during a moral dilemma task -e.g. "is it morally permissible for you to […]?" (1st person perspective), relative to "is it morally permissible for [x individual] to […]?" (3rd person perspective)-, where the outcome of the different scenarios is controlled. The results of both studies converge, revealing an emotion-dependent, rather than an outcome-dependent, pharmacological modulation. Lorazepam only influenced interpersonal moral judgments when not modulated by the evitable/inevitable condition. Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between perspective-taking and drug administration, as lorazepam exerted a larger effect in modulating moral choices rather than moral judgements.

The role of empathy in trolley problems and variants: A systematic review and meta-analysis

The role of empathy in morality is a subject of ongoing scientific debate due to the lack of systematic reviews and meta-analyses on this topic. To address this gap, we conducted a PRISMA-based systematic quantitative review to investigate the role of empathy in moral judgements, decision-making, and inclinations using trolley problems and variants, which are popular types of moral dilemmas that explore utilitarianism and deontology. We searched for articles in four databases (PsycINFO, Pubmed, WorldWideScience, and Scopus) and performed citation searches. Out of 661 records, we selected 34 that studied the associations between empathy and moral judgements, moral decision-making, and/or moral inclinations. Six meta-analyses and systematic reviews of these records consistently showed small to moderate associations between affective empathy and these moral parameters, particularly in personal moral dilemmas involving intentional harm (although some approaches highlighted more complex associations between these parameters). Regarding other empathy domains, most studies found limited or insignificant links between cognitive empathy domains and moral judgements, decision-making, and inclinations. We discuss the nuances and implications of these results.

What language does your heart speak? The influence of foreign language on moral judgements and emotions related to unrealistic and realistic moral dilemmas

Emotional attenuation in a second language is believed to be one of the main causes of the Moral Foreign Language effect (MFLe). However, evidence on the mediating role of emotion in the relationship between language and moral judgements is limited and mainly derives from unrealistic moral dilemmas. We conducted two studies to investigate (1) whether the MFLe is present in both unrealistic (Study 1) and realistic (Study 2) moral dilemmas, and (2) whether this effect can be attributed to reduced emotionality. In Study 1, the MFLe was found in the moral judgements made by Spanish-English bilinguals. However, the same pattern was not observed in Greek Cypriot-English bilinguals' moral judgements, and this result was attributed to the prominent role of English in Cyprus. In Study 2, the MFLe extended to realistic moral dilemmas when the outcome of the action entailed the violation of a social norm. Study 1 and Study 2 also revealed that these bilinguals experienced a wide range of emotions in their L1 and L2, which did not differ significantly across languages. Mediation analyses further indicated that the MFLe was not mediated by emotional blunting, which made us consider alternative explanations for the MFLe.

Moral Decision-Making in Trolley Problems and Variants: How Do Participants' Perspectives, Borderline Personality Traits, and Empathy Predict Choices?

The aim of the present study was to demonstrate and extend the causal effect of participants' perspectives on moral decision-making using trolley problems and variants. Additionally, we investigated whether empathy and borderline (BDL) personality traits predicted participants' choices in these scenarios. We used both a classical trolley problem (a causing harm scenario) and an everyday trolley-like problem (a causing inconvenience scenario). Participants (N = 427, women: 54%) completed BDL traits and empathy questionnaires and, randomly, the two types of trolley problems, presenting both three different perspectives. Our study provided strong evidence that the perspective from which participants were enrolled in the trolley problem caused significant changes in their moral decision-making. Furthermore, we found that affective empathy and BDL traits significantly predicted participants' decisions in the causing inconvenience scenario, while only BDL traits predicted choices in the causing harm scenario. This study was original in providing new experimental materials, causal results, and highlighting the significant influence of BDL traits and affective empathy on moral decision-making. These findings raised fundamental questions, which are further developed in the discussion section.

The needs of the many: Exploring associations of personality with third-party judgments of public health-related utilitarian rule violations

Safeguarding the rights of minorities is crucial for just societies. However, there are conceivable situations where minority rights might seriously impede the rights of the majority. Favoring the minority in such cases constitutes a violation of utilitarian principles. To explore the emotional, cognitive, and punitive responses of observers of such utilitarian rule transgressions, we conducted an online study with 1004 participants. Two moral scenarios (vaccine policy and epidemic) were rephrased in the third-party perspective. In both public health-related scenarios, the protagonist opted against the utilitarian option, which resulted in more fatalities in total, but avoided harm to a minority. Importantly, in vaccine policy, members of the minority cannot be identified beforehand and thus harm to them would have been rather accidental. Contrariwise, in epidemic, minority members are identifiable and would have needed to be deliberately selected. While the majority of participants chose not to punish the scenarios' protagonists at all, 30.1% judged that protecting the minority over the interests of the majority when only accidental harm would have occurred (vaccine policy) was worthy of punishment. In comparison, only 11.2% opted to punish a protagonist whose decision avoided deliberately selecting (and thus harming) a minority at the cost of the majority (epidemic). Emotional responses and appropriateness ratings paralleled these results. Furthermore, complex personality × situation interactions revealed the influence of personality features, i.e., trait psychopathy, empathy, altruism, authoritarianism, need for cognition and faith in intuition, on participants' responses. The results further underscore the need to consider the interaction of situational features and inter-individual differences in moral decisions and sense of justice.

Relationship between Moral Values for Driving Behavior and Brain Activity: An NIRS Study

Although there are clear moral components to traffic violations and risky and aggressive driving behavior, few studies have examined the relationship between moral values and risky driving. This study aimed to examine the relationship between moral views of driving behavior and brain activity. Twenty healthy drivers participated in this study. A questionnaire regarding their moral values concerning driving behavior was administered to the participants. Brain activity was measured using near-infrared spectroscopy while eliciting moral emotions. Based on the results of the questionnaire, the participants were divided into two groups: one with high moral values and the other with low moral values. Brain activity was statistically compared between the two groups. Both groups had significantly lower activity in the prefrontal cortex during the self-risky driving task. The low moral group had significantly lower activity in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex than the high moral group, while it had lower activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in the self-risky driving task than in the safe driving task. Regardless of their moral values, the participants were less susceptible to moral emotions during risky driving. Furthermore, our findings suggest that drivers with lower moral values may be even less susceptible to moral emotions.

Moral Cognition About Harm in Anxiety Disorders: The Importance of Experienced Emotion

Recent work has shown that emotional arousal influences decision-making in sacrificial moral dilemmas, with heightened levels of arousal associated with increased aversion to committing moral transgressions to maximize utilitarian outcomes. Patients with anxiety disorders experience pathologically heightened states of arousal and thus may be expected to exhibit reduced utilitarian responding on such dilemmas. Extant evidence has been mixed, however, regarding whether anxious patients differ in their moral decisions from controls, and no study has conducted a careful examination of emotions experienced during decision-making. We administered sacrificial moral dilemmas to a cohort of 95 patients from across the spectrum of anxiety disorders to test whether they differed from matched controls on a) utilitarian decision-making, and b) ratings of experienced emotion during the moral deliberative process. Results showed no group differences between patients and controls on endorsement of utilitarian sacrificial action or on reported experience of emotionality during the experiment. Additionally, exploratory analysis revealed that specific emotions were correlated with utilitarian judgments. These results are in line with the Dual Process Theory model's prediction that decreased utilitarian responding will be concomitant with an increased emotional arousal. Our findings support past work indicating that moral cognition is intact in anxiety disorders despite the emotional dysregulation characteristic of anxious psychopathology. Future work would benefit from the use of process-dissociation techniques to further clarify whether emotional or cognitive processes may differ in anxiety disorders during moral cognition.

When the killing has been done: Exploring associations of personality with third-party judgment and punishment of homicides in moral dilemma scenarios

Killing people is universally considered reprehensible and evokes in observers a need to punish perpetrators. Here, we explored how observers' personality is associated with their cognitive, emotional, and punishing reactions towards perpetrators using data from 1,004 participants who responded to a set of fifteen third-party perspective moral dilemmas. Among those, four scenarios (architect, life boat, footbridge, smother for dollars) describing deliberate killings were compared to investigate the role of the content features "motive for killing" (selfish vs. utilitarian) and "evitability of victims' death". Participants' moral appropriateness ratings, emotions towards perpetrators, and assigned punishments revealed complex scenario-personality interactions. Trait psychopathy was associated with harsher punishments in all scenarios but also with less concern about killing in general, an increased moral appreciation of utilitarian motives for killing, and a reduced concern about the killing of avoidable victims. Need for cognition was associated with considering a utilitarian motive for killing as a mitigating factor, while intuitive/authority-obedient thinking was linked to a strong focus on avoidability of harm as an aggravating factor when assigning punishments. Other-oriented empathy, trait anxiety, and justice sensitivity did not account for differences in third-party punishments. Our explorative findings highlight the importance of inter-individual differences for moral decision making and sense of justice.

Moral judgment as reasoning by constraint satisfaction

May's careful examination of empirical evidence makes a compelling case against the primacy of emotion in driving moral judgments. At the same time, emotion certainly is involved in moral judgments. We argue that emotion interacts with beliefs, values, and moral principles through a process of coherence-based reasoning (operating at least partially below the level of conscious awareness) in generating moral judgments and decisions.

Effect of the Contents in Advance Directives on Individuals' Decision-Making

Completing an advance directive offers individuals the opportunity to make informed choices about end-of-life care. However, these decisions could be influenced in different ways depending on how the information is presented. We randomly presented 185 participants with four distinct types of advance directive: neutrally framed (as reference), negatively framed, religiously framed, and a combination. Participants were asked which interventions they would like to receive at the end of life. Between 60% and 70% of participants responded "accept the special interventions" on the reference form. However, the majority (70%-90%) chose "refuse the interventions" on the negative form. With respect to the religious form, 70% to 80% chose "not decided yet." Participants who refused special life-sustaining treatments were older, female, and with better prior knowledge about advance directives. Our findings imply that the specific content of advance directives could affect decision-making with regard to various interventions for end-of-life care.

Will I Regret It? Anticipated Negative Emotions Modulate Choices in Moral Dilemmas

We tested if post-decisional emotions of regret, guilt, shame, anger, and disgust can account for individuals’ choices in moral dilemmas depicting the choice of letting some people die (non-utilitarian option) or sacrificing one person to save them (utilitarian option). We collected participants’ choices and post-decisional emotional ratings for each option using Footbridge-type dilemmas, in which the sacrifice of one person is the means to save more people, and Trolley-type dilemmas, in which the sacrifice is only a side effect. Moreover, we computed the EEG Readiness Potential to test if the neural activity related to the last phase of decision-making was related to the emotional conflict. Participants reported generally stronger emotions for the utilitarian as compared to the non-utilitarian options, with the exception of anger and regret, which in Trolley-type dilemmas were stronger for the non-utilitarian option. Moreover, participants tended to choose the option that minimized the intensity of negative emotions, irrespective of dilemma type. No significant relationship between emotions and the amplitude of the Readiness Potential emerged. It is possible that anticipated post-decisional emotions play a role in earlier stages of decision-making.