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Payir A, Corriveau KH, Harris PL. Children's beliefs in invisible causal agents-Both religious and scientific. ADVANCES IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 2023; 65:1-34. [PMID: 37481295 DOI: 10.1016/bs.acdb.2023.05.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 07/24/2023]
Abstract
Against the proposal that children have a natural disposition for supernatural or religious beliefs, we review the decades-old evidence showing that children typically invoke naturalistic causes-even in the face of unusual outcomes. Instead, we propose that children's tendency to endorse supernatural agents reflects their capacity for cultural learning rather than an inherent inclination to believe in divine powers. We support this argument by reviewing the findings that religious exposure in childhood, not individual cognitive or personality factors, is the major determinant of religiosity in adulthood. We highlight the role of cultural learning in children's endorsement of invisible divine agents by drawing on cross-cultural evidence that children are equally receptive to claims regarding the existence of invisible natural agents. We end by introducing a hypothesis to explain how children come to endorse religious beliefs despite their bias toward naturalistic explanation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ayse Payir
- Boston University, Boston, MA, United States
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2
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van Elk M. Proximate and ultimate causes of supernatural beliefs. Front Psychol 2022; 13:949131. [DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.949131] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/20/2022] [Accepted: 07/15/2022] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
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3
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Andersen BP. Autistic-Like Traits and Positive Schizotypy as Diametric Specializations of the Predictive Mind. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2022; 17:1653-1672. [PMID: 35816687 DOI: 10.1177/17456916221075252] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/17/2022]
Abstract
According to the predictive-processing framework, only prediction errors (rather than all sensory inputs) are processed by an organism's perceptual system. Prediction errors can be weighted such that errors from more reliable sources will be more influential in updating prior beliefs. It has previously been argued that autism-spectrum conditions can be understood as resulting from a predictive-processing mechanism in which an inflexibly high weight is given to sensory-prediction errors that results in overfitting their predictive models to the world. Deficits in executive functioning, theory of mind, and central coherence are all argued to flow naturally from this core underlying mechanism. The diametric model of autism and psychosis suggests a simple extension of this hypothesis. If people on the autism spectrum give an inflexibly high weight to sensory input, could it be that people with a predisposition to psychosis (i.e., people high in positive schizotypy) give an inflexibly low weight to sensory input? In this article I argue that evidence strongly supports this hypothesis. An inflexibly low weight given to sensory input can explain such disparate features of positive schizotypy as increased exploratory behavior, apophenia, hyper theory of mind, hyperactive imagination, attentional differences, and having idiosyncratic worldviews.
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4
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Vehar N, Potheegadoo J, Blanke O. Linking Agent Detection of Invisible Presences to the Self: Relevance for Religious and Spiritual Experiences. Front Behav Neurosci 2022; 16:952736. [PMID: 35836488 PMCID: PMC9274283 DOI: 10.3389/fnbeh.2022.952736] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/25/2022] [Accepted: 06/07/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Neza Vehar
- Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience, Center for Neuroprosthetics and Brain Mind Institute, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Geneva, Switzerland
| | - Jevita Potheegadoo
- Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience, Center for Neuroprosthetics and Brain Mind Institute, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Geneva, Switzerland
| | - Olaf Blanke
- Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience, Center for Neuroprosthetics and Brain Mind Institute, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Geneva, Switzerland
- Department of Clinical Neurosciences, Geneva University Hospital, Geneva, Switzerland
- *Correspondence: Olaf Blanke
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5
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Turpin HD, Willard AK. Credibility Enhancing Displays, religious scandal and the decline of Irish Catholic orthodoxy. EVOLUTIONARY HUMAN SCIENCES 2022; 4:e20. [PMID: 37588905 PMCID: PMC10426033 DOI: 10.1017/ehs.2022.21] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022] Open
Abstract
Credibility Enhancing Displays have been shown to be an important component in the transmission of empirically unverifiable cultural content such as religious beliefs. Decreased Credibility Enhancing Displays are a major predictor of religious decline. However, because declines in belief are often paired with the decreasing importance of religious institutions, existing research has not yet shown the effect of Credibility Enhancing Displays as separate from this institutional decline. Here, we assess the role of past Credibility Enhancing Display exposure among the baptised Catholic population of Ireland in predicting who retains a Catholic identity and religious beliefs among those who reject the Catholic Church. We find that leaving Catholicism outright (i.e. 'ex-Catholicism') is predicted by low Credibility Enhancing Display exposure, but rejecting the Church while retaining a Catholic identity (i.e. 'liminal Catholicism') and theistic belief is not. High perceived prevalence of clerical paedophiles (i.e. religious hypocrisy) predicts both groups similarly. Higher exposure to Credibility Enhancing Displays predicts higher orthodox Catholic beliefs and Catholic morality among Catholics, but with inconsistent and even negative effects among the other groups. High perceived prevalence of clerical paedophiles predicts the rejection of orthodox Catholic beliefs, but not the rejection of theism or a Catholic identity.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hugh D. Turpin
- Centre for the Study of Social Cohesion, School of Anthropology and Museum Ethnography, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
| | - Aiyana K. Willard
- Centre for Culture and Evolution, Division of Psychology, Department of Life Sciences, Brunel University, London, UK
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6
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Ståhl T. The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, and their implications for morality. PLoS One 2021; 16:e0246593. [PMID: 33626046 PMCID: PMC7904147 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0246593] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/04/2020] [Accepted: 01/22/2021] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
There is a widespread cross-cultural stereotype suggesting that atheists are untrustworthy and lack a moral compass. Is there any truth to this notion? Building on theory about the cultural, (de)motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, the present research investigated whether there are reliable similarities as well as differences between believers and disbelievers in the moral values and principles they endorse. Four studies examined how religious disbelief (vs. belief) relates to endorsement of various moral values and principles in a predominately religious (vs. irreligious) country (the U.S. vs. Sweden). Two U.S. M-Turk studies (Studies 1A and 1B, N = 429) and two large cross-national studies (Studies 2-3, N = 4,193), consistently show that disbelievers (vs. believers) are less inclined to endorse moral values that serve group cohesion (the binding moral foundations). By contrast, only minor differences between believers and disbelievers were found in endorsement of other moral values (individualizing moral foundations, epistemic rationality). It is also demonstrated that presumed cultural and demotivational antecedents of disbelief (limited exposure to credibility-enhancing displays, low existential threat) are associated with disbelief. Furthermore, these factors are associated with weaker endorsement of the binding moral foundations in both countries (Study 2). Most of these findings were replicated in Study 3, and results also show that disbelievers (vs. believers) have a more consequentialist view of morality in both countries. A consequentialist view of morality was also associated with another presumed antecedent of disbelief-analytic cognitive style.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tomas Ståhl
- Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, United States of America
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7
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White CJM, Willard AK, Baimel A, Norenzayan A. Cognitive Pathways to Belief in Karma and Belief in God. Cogn Sci 2021; 45:e12935. [PMID: 33448015 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12935] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/18/2020] [Revised: 11/26/2020] [Accepted: 12/08/2020] [Indexed: 01/08/2023]
Abstract
Supernatural beliefs are ubiquitous around the world, and mounting evidence indicates that these beliefs partly rely on intuitive, cross-culturally recurrent cognitive processes. Specifically, past research has focused on humans' intuitive tendency to perceive minds as part of the cognitive foundations of belief in a personified God-an agentic, morally concerned supernatural entity. However, much less is known about belief in karma-another culturally widespread but ostensibly non-agentic supernatural entity reflecting ethical causation across reincarnations. In two studies and four high-powered samples, including mostly Christian Canadians and mostly Hindu Indians (Study 1, N = 2,006) and mostly Christian Americans and Singaporean Buddhists (Study 2, N = 1,752), we provide the first systematic empirical investigation of the cognitive intuitions underlying various forms of belief in karma. We used path analyses to (a) replicate tests of the previously documented cognitive predictors of belief in God, (b) test whether this same network of variables predicts belief in karma, and (c) examine the relative contributions of cognitive and cultural variables to both sets of beliefs. We found that cognitive tendencies toward intuitive thinking, mentalizing, dualism, and teleological thinking predicted a variety of beliefs about karma-including morally laden, non-agentic, and agentic conceptualizations-above and beyond the variability explained by cultural learning about karma across cultures. These results provide further evidence for an independent role for both culture and cognition in supporting diverse types of supernatural beliefs in distinct cultural contexts.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Aiyana K Willard
- Department of Life Sciences, Centre for Culture and Evolution, Brunel University London
| | - Adam Baimel
- Department of Psychology, Health and Professional Development, Oxford Brookes University
| | - Ara Norenzayan
- Psychology Department, The University of British Columbia
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8
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Uzarevic F, Coleman TJ. The psychology of nonbelievers. Curr Opin Psychol 2020; 40:131-138. [PMID: 33069981 DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.08.026] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/08/2020] [Revised: 08/29/2020] [Accepted: 08/31/2020] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
Contrary to some conceptualizations, nonbelievers are more than simply those scoring low on religiosity scales. They seem to be characterized by analytic, flexible, and open-minded social-cognitive attributes, although this may interact with sociocultural levels of religiosity. This paper demonstrates that nonbelief, at least in the West, tends to coincide with specific worldviews, namely valuing rationality and science, as well as humanistic and liberal values. Furthermore, nonbelievers seem to parallel believers in various indicators of health. Finally, as all ideologists, nonbelievers may hold prejudicial attitudes toward groups perceived as threatening their (secular) worldviews, although this has some limits. Global increases in secularity make the nascent psychological study of nonbelievers and nonreligious worldviews an important research programme.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Thomas J Coleman
- Coventry University, Brain, Belief, and Behaviour Research Laboratory, and the Centre for Trust, Peace, and Social Relations, UK; Society & Cognition Unit, University of Bialystok, Bialystok, Poland.
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9
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White CJ, Baimel A, Norenzayan A. How cultural learning and cognitive biases shape religious beliefs. Curr Opin Psychol 2020; 40:34-39. [PMID: 32896727 DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.07.033] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/01/2020] [Revised: 07/31/2020] [Accepted: 07/31/2020] [Indexed: 01/02/2023]
Abstract
What explains the ubiquity and diversity of religions around the world? Widespread cognitive tendencies, including mentalizing and intuitive thinking, offer part of the explanation for recurrent features of religion, and individual differences in religious commitments. However, vast diversity in religious beliefs points to the importance of the cultural context in which religious beliefs are transmitted. Cultural evolutionary theory provides the basis of a unified explanation for how cognition and culture interact to shape religious beliefs, in ways that are uniquely adapted to local ecological pressures. These insights lay the groundwork for future research regarding how cultural learning interacts with other evolved aspects of human psychology to generate the recurrent and the diverse forms of religious commitments observed around the world.
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Affiliation(s)
- Cindel Jm White
- Psychology Department, The University of British Columbia, Canada.
| | - Adam Baimel
- Department of Psychology, Health and Professional Development, Oxford Brookes University, UK
| | - Ara Norenzayan
- Psychology Department, The University of British Columbia, Canada
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10
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Łowicki P, Zajenkowski M, Van Cappellen P. It's the heart that matters: The relationships among cognitive mentalizing ability, emotional empathy, and religiosity. PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 2020. [DOI: 10.1016/j.paid.2020.109976] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/30/2022]
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11
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Hoogeveen S, Snoek L, van Elk M. Religious belief and cognitive conflict sensitivity: A preregistered fMRI study. Cortex 2020; 129:247-265. [PMID: 32535377 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2020.04.011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/08/2020] [Revised: 03/23/2020] [Accepted: 04/03/2020] [Indexed: 12/16/2022]
Abstract
In the current preregistered fMRI study, we investigated the relationship between religiosity and behavioral and neural mechanisms of conflict processing, as a conceptual replication of the study by Inzlicht et al., (2009). Participants (N=193) performed a gender-Stroop task and afterwards completed standardized measures to assess their religiosity. As expected, the task induced cognitive conflict at the behavioral level and at a neural level this was reflected in increased activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). However, individual differences in religiosity were not related to performance on the Stroop task as measured in accuracy and interference effects, nor to neural markers of response conflict (correct responses vs. errors) or informational conflict (congruent vs. incongruent stimuli). Overall, we obtained moderate to strong evidence in favor of the null hypotheses that religiosity is unrelated to cognitive conflict sensitivity. We discuss the implications for the neuroscience of religion and emphasize the importance of designing studies that more directly implicate religious concepts and behaviors in an ecologically valid manner.
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Affiliation(s)
- Suzanne Hoogeveen
- University of Amsterdam, Department of Social Psychology, 1001, NK Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
| | - Lukas Snoek
- University of Amsterdam, Department of Brain and Cognition, 1001, NK Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
| | - Michiel van Elk
- University of Amsterdam, Department of Social Psychology, 1001, NK Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
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12
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Roberts AJ, Wastell CA, Polito V. Teleology and the intentions of supernatural agents. Conscious Cogn 2020; 80:102905. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2020.102905] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/31/2019] [Revised: 01/25/2020] [Accepted: 02/27/2020] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
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13
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Seitz RJ, Angel HF. Belief formation - A driving force for brain evolution. Brain Cogn 2020; 140:105548. [PMID: 32062327 DOI: 10.1016/j.bandc.2020.105548] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/02/2019] [Revised: 02/06/2020] [Accepted: 02/06/2020] [Indexed: 01/10/2023]
Abstract
The topic of belief has been neglected in the natural sciences for a long period of time. Recent neuroscience research in non-human primates and humans, however, has shown that beliefs are the neuropsychic product of fundamental brain processes that attribute affective meaning to concrete objects and events, enabling individual goal setting, decision making and maneuvering in the environment. With regard to the involved neural processes they can be categorized as empirical, relational, and conceptual beliefs. Empirical beliefs are about objects and relational beliefs are about events as in tool use and in interactions between subjects that develop below the level of awareness and are up-dated dynamically. Conceptual beliefs are more complex being based on narratives and participation in ritual acts. As neural processes are known to require computational space in the brain, the formation of inceasingly complex beliefs demands extra neural resources. Here, we argue that the evolution of human beliefs is related to the phylogenetic enlargement of the brain including the parietal and medial frontal cortex in humans.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rüdiger J Seitz
- Department of Neurology, Centre of Neurology and Neuropsychiatry, LVR-Klinikum Düsseldorf, Medical Faculty, Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany; Florey Neuroscience Institutes, Melbourne, Australia.
| | - Hans-Ferdinand Angel
- Karl Franzens University Graz, Institute of Catechetic and Pedagogic of Religion, Graz, Austria
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14
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van Elk M, Snoek L. The relationship between individual differences in gray matter volume and religiosity and mystical experiences: A preregistered voxel-based morphometry study. Eur J Neurosci 2020; 51:850-865. [PMID: 31465601 PMCID: PMC7079225 DOI: 10.1111/ejn.14563] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/03/2019] [Revised: 08/18/2019] [Accepted: 08/27/2019] [Indexed: 01/03/2023]
Abstract
The neural substrates of religious belief and experience are an intriguing though contentious topic. Here, we had the unique opportunity to establish the relation between validated measures of religiosity and gray matter volume in a large sample of participants (N = 211). In this registered report, we conducted a confirmatory voxel-based morphometry analysis to test three central hypotheses regarding the relationship between religiosity and mystical experiences and gray matter volume. The preregisterered hypotheses, analysis plan, preprocessing and analysis code and statistical brain maps are all available from online repositories. By using a region-of-interest analysis, we found no evidence that religiosity is associated with a reduced volume of the orbito-frontal cortex and changes in the structure of the bilateral inferior parietal lobes. Neither did we find support for the notion that mystical experiences are associated with a reduced volume of the hippocampus, the right middle temporal gyrus or with the inferior parietal lobes. A whole-brain analysis furthermore indicated that no structural brain differences were found in association with religiosity and mystical experiences. We believe that the search for the neural correlates of religious beliefs and experiences should therefore shift focus from studying structural brain differences to a functional and multivariate approach.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michiel van Elk
- Department of PsychologyUniversity of AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition CenterUniversity of AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands
| | - Lukas Snoek
- Department of PsychologyUniversity of AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition CenterUniversity of AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands
- Spinoza Center for NeuroimagingRoyal Netherlands Academy of Arts and SciencesAmsterdamThe Netherlands
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15
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van Elk M. Socio-cognitive biases are associated to belief in neuromyths and cognitive enhancement: A pre-registered study. PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 2019. [DOI: 10.1016/j.paid.2019.04.014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/27/2022]
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16
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Willard AK, Cingl L, Norenzayan A. Cognitive Biases and Religious Belief: A Path Model Replication in the Czech Republic and Slovakia With a Focus on Anthropomorphism. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PERSONALITY SCIENCE 2019. [DOI: 10.1177/1948550619841629] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
We examined cognitive biases that underlie individual differences in supernatural beliefs in nationally representative samples from the Czech Republic and Slovakia (total N = 2,022). These countries were chosen because of their differing levels of religious belief despite their cultural similarity. Replicating a previous study with North American samples, we found that anthropomorphism was unrelated to belief in God but was consistently related to paranormal beliefs. Living in a highly religious area was related to a lower tendency to anthropomorphize. We examined this relationship further to find that anthropomorphism was related to belief in God for nonreligious participants, was inversely related to belief in God among religious Slovaks, and not related for religious Czechs. These findings suggest that anthropomorphism predicts belief in God for people who are unaffiliated, but this relationship disappears or is reversed for religious believers participating in a Christian religious tradition.
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Affiliation(s)
- Aiyana K. Willard
- Centre for Culture and Evolution, Brunel University London, United Kingdom
- Department of Life Sciences, College of Health and Life Sciences, Brunel University London, Middlesex, United Kingdom
- School of Anthropology and Museum Ethnography, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
| | - Lubomír Cingl
- Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Economics, Prague, Czech Republic
| | - Ara Norenzayan
- Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
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17
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Belief in karma: How cultural evolution, cognition, and motivations shape belief in supernatural justice. ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2019. [DOI: 10.1016/bs.aesp.2019.03.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/02/2022]
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18
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