Suggestion of self-(in)coherence modulates cognitive dissonance

A global neuronal workspace model of functional neurological disorders

We introduce here a general model of Functional Neurological Disorders based on the following hypothesis: a Functional Neurological Disorder could correspond to a consciously initiated voluntary top-down process causing involuntary lasting consequences that are consciously experienced and subjectively interpreted by the patient as involuntary. We develop this central hypothesis according to Global Neuronal Workspace theory of consciousness, that is particularly suited to describe interactions between conscious and non-conscious cognitive processes. We then present a list of predictions defining a research program aimed at empirically testing their validity. Finally, this general model leads us to reinterpret the long-debated links between hypnotic suggestion and functional neurological disorders. Driven by both scientific and therapeutic goals, this theoretical paper aims at bringing closer the psychiatric and neurological worlds of functional neurological disorders with the latest developments of cognitive neuroscience of consciousness.

Memory and decision making interact to shape the value of unchosen options

The goal of deliberation is to separate between options so that we can commit to one and leave the other behind. However, deliberation can, paradoxically, also form an association in memory between the chosen and unchosen options. Here, we consider this possibility and examine its consequences for how outcomes affect not only the value of the options we chose, but also, by association, the value of options we did not choose. In five experiments (total n = 612), including a preregistered experiment (n = 235), we found that the value assigned to unchosen options is inversely related to their chosen counterparts. Moreover, this inverse relationship was associated with participants' memory of the pairs they chose between. Our findings suggest that deciding between options does not end the competition between them. Deliberation binds choice options together in memory such that the learned value of one can affect the inferred value of the other.

Cognitive dissonance resolution depends on executive functions and frontal lobe integrity

The free choice paradigm constitutes one of the most explored paradigms of cognitive dissonance research. Typically, once asked to choose between two similarly rated items, subjects subsequently exhibit an increased preference for chosen items and a decreased preference for rejected ones. Recent studies have demonstrated that such choice-induced preference change (CIPC) occur exclusively for remembered choices, suggesting a mechanism that ensures subjective coherence across time. In the present work we predicted that in order for CIPC to occur, not only must past choices be remembered, but executive networks responsible for detecting and solving conflicts must also be functioning. We confirmed this prediction in a group of patients with frontal lobe lesions. While non-dysexecutive (NODYS) patients behaved as their matched controls did, dysexecutive (DYS) patients failed to change their subjective preferences even when they could remember their previous choices. We have therefore demonstrated the crucial role of executive functions mediated by the frontal lobe in cognitive dissonance resolution.

When Not Choosing Leads to Not Liking: Choice-Induced Preference in Infancy

The question of how people's preferences are shaped by their choices has generated decades of research. In a classic example, work on cognitive dissonance has found that observers who must choose between two equally attractive options subsequently avoid the unchosen option, suggesting that not choosing the item led them to like it less. However, almost all of the research on such choice-induced preference focuses on adults, leaving open the question of how much experience is necessary for its emergence. Here, we examined the developmental roots of this phenomenon in preverbal infants (N = 189). In a series of seven experiments using a free-choice paradigm, we found that infants experienced choice-induced preference change similar to adults'. Infants' choice patterns reflected genuine preference change and not attraction to novelty or inherent attitudes toward the options. Hence, choice shapes preferences-even without extensive experience making decisions and without a well-developed self-concept.