The impact of hypocrisy on opinion formation: A dynamic model

Opinion dynamics: public and private

We study here the dynamics of opinion formation in a society where we take into account the internally held beliefs and externally expressed opinions of the individuals, which are not necessarily the same at all times. While these two components can influence one another, their difference, both in dynamics and in the steady state, poses interesting scenarios in terms of the transition to consensus in the society and characterizations of such consensus. Here we study this public and private opinion dynamics and the critical behaviour of the consensus forming transitions, using a kinetic exchange model. This article is part of the theme issue 'Kinetic exchange models of societies and economies'.

Agent-based neutral competition in two-community networks

Competition between alternative states is an essential process in social and biological networks. Neutral competition can be represented by an unbiased random drift process in which the states of vertices (e.g., opinions, genotypes, or species) in a network are updated by repeatedly selecting two connected vertices. One of these vertices copies the state of the selected neighbor. Such updates are repeated until all vertices are in the same "consensus" state. There is no unique rule for selecting the vertex pair to be updated. Real-world processes comprise three limiting factors that can influence the selected edge and the direction of spread: (1) the rate at which a vertex sends a state to its neighbors, (2) the rate at which a state is received by a neighbor, and (3) the rate at which a state can be exchanged through a connecting edge. We investigate how these three limitations influence neutral competition in networks with two communities generated by a stochastic block model. By using Monte Carlo simulations, we show how the community structure and update rule determine the states' success probabilities and the time until a consensus is reached. We present a heterogeneous mean-field theory that agrees well with the Monte Carlo simulations. The effectiveness of the heterogeneous mean-field theory implies that quantitative predictions about the consensus are possible even if empirical data (e.g., from ecological fieldwork or observations of social interactions) do not allow a complete reconstruction of all edges in the network.

Dynamics of opinion expression

Modeling efforts in opinion dynamics have to a large extent ignored that opinion exchange between individuals can also have an effect on how willing they are to express their opinion publicly. Here, we introduce a model of public opinion expression. Two groups of agents with different opinion on an issue interact with each other, changing the willingness to express their opinion according to whether they perceive themselves as part of the majority or minority opinion. We formulate the model as a multigroup majority game and investigate the Nash equilibria. We also provide a dynamical systems perspective: Using the reinforcement learning algorithm of Q-learning, we reduce the N-agent system in a mean-field approach to two dimensions which represent the two opinion groups. This two-dimensional system is analyzed in a comprehensive bifurcation analysis of its parameters. The model identifies social-structural conditions for public opinion predominance of different groups. Among other findings, we show under which circumstances a minority can dominate public discourse.

The impact of hypocrisy on opinion formation: A dynamic model

Humans have a demonstrated tendency to copy or imitate the behavior and attitude of others and actively influence each other’s opinions. In plenty of empirical contexts, publicly revealed opinions are not necessarily in line with internal opinions, causing complex social influence dynamics. We study to what extent hypocrisy is sustained during opinion formation and how hidden opinions change the convergence to consensus in a group. We build and analyze a modified version of the voter model with hypocrisy in a complete graph with a neutral competition between two alternatives. We compare the process from various initial conditions, varying the proportions between the two opinions in the external (revealed) and internal (hidden) layer. According to our results, hypocrisy always prolongs the time needed for reaching a consensus. In a complete graph, this time span increases linearly with group size. We find that the group-level opinion emerges in two steps: (1) a fast and directional process, during which the number of the two kinds of hypocrites equalizes; and (2) a slower, random drift of opinions. During stage (2), the ratio of opinions in the external layer is approximately equal to the ratio in the internal layer; that is, the hidden opinions do not differ significantly from the revealed ones at the group level. We furthermore find that the initial abundances of opinions, but not the initial prevalence of hypocrisy, predicts the mean consensus time and determines the opinions’ probabilities of winning. These insights highlight the unimportance of hypocrisy in consensus formation under neutral conditions. Our results have important societal implications in relation to hidden voter preferences in polls and improve our understanding of opinion formation in a more realistic setting than that of conventional voter models.