Lie prevalence, lie characteristics and strategies of self-reported good liars

Autistic adults' inclination to lie in everyday situations

LAY ABSTRACT

Differences in social communication and understanding others' mental states may mean that autistic adults are less likely to deceive others than non-autistic individuals. We investigated whether autistic and non-autistic adults differ in their inclination to lie and which psychological factors are involved in the inclination to lie. We found that autistic and non-autistic groups reported a similar inclination to lie, and the extent to which participants viewed lying as acceptable helped to explain their inclination to deceive others. However, the other underlying psychological factors associated with deception inclination differed between autistic and non-autistic groups. Autistic adults' belief about their ability to lie and also how quickly they could lie helped to explain whether they were more or less inclined to lie. For non-autistic adults, their memory and ability to understand others' mental states helped to explain their lie inclination. We discuss these findings and recommend areas for future research.

Lying about money and game points by men and women and its relation to the Self-Reported Lying Scale

Introduction

The present study was designed to examine the effect of monetary and non-monetary endowment on lying by men and women in the Ultimatum Game. Another goal was to examine to what extent the Self-Reported Lying Scale (SRLS), described here for the first time, predicts lying in the Ultimatum Game.

Methods

Examinees (162, 82 women) were allocated to four experimental conditions in a 2 × 2 factorial design. Two endowment conditions (money and game points) were crossed with two sex conditions (men and women). Participants underwent an Ultimatum Game in which they were permitted to conceal part of the endowment from an unidentified partner. Finally, participants completed the SRLS.

Results

The results indicated that more cash than points were concealed from the partner, and men concealed more of their endowment than women. We further defined fake fairness in sharing that combined hiding a more significant portion of the endowment from the partner while presenting fair sharing of the remaining award. We found more fake fairness when money was shared than when points were concealed. Fake fairness is more significant for men than for women. For money and points alike, concealment was predicted by the global score of the SRLS and its five subscales (self-assessed lying ability, lie detection ability, the use of reason in lying, lie acceptability, and lie frequency).

Discussion

It was suggested that a monetary endowment is more sensitive to lying than game points and involves more fake fairness. Nevertheless, the differences are quantitative, and the same response pattern exists in the two endowment conditions. Replacing money with points is a proper solution whenever a monetary endowment presents difficulties. It was further suggested that sex differences exist in lying using an asymmetric information UG, where proposers were permitted to mislead responders about their endowment. Finally, the SRLS may contribute to a better understanding of the question of who lies.

External and internal influences yield similar memory effects: the role of deception and suggestion

In legal cases, testimonies can become contaminated because of an amalgam of external and internal influences on memory. It is well-established that external influences (e.g., suggestive interviews) can hurt memory. However, less focus has been placed on the impact of internal influences (e.g., lying) on memory. In the current review, we show that the available evidence suggests that both external and internal influences exert similar effects on memory. That is, we review studies showing that suggesting non-occurrences and suggesting non-experiences can lead to omission errors and false memories, respectively. Likewise, these memory effects are also observed when focusing on internal influences. That is, false denials, feigning amnesia and fabrication have been shown to affect memory in terms of forgetting (i.e., omissions) and false memories (i.e., commissions). Also, we show that both external and internal influences can lead to changes in the belief that an event occurred. We argue that in legal cases, triers of fact should concentrate on whether both types of influences might have affected testimonial accuracy in witnesses, victims, and suspects.

Effects of Mood on Psychophysiological Detection of Concealed Information and the Relation to Self-Assessed Lying Ability

The present study examined the effects of mood on physiological responses in the Concealed Information polygraph Test and the relation to self-assessed lying ability. One hundred and eight undergraduate students self-assessed their lie-telling ability, committed a mock theft, and were asked to conceal information related to the crime. Participants were then divided into three equal groups: two groups were asked to provide a detailed written account of either a happy or sad event in order to induce a happy or sad mood, while the third group served as a neutral group. Participants then underwent a polygraph test and were asked to try to avoid detection. An induced happy or sad mood tended to lower relative skin conductance responses to critical (crime related) items and enhance relative cardiovascular responses. Relative respiration responses to critical items obtained for the sad mood condition were more robust than the ones obtained for the happy mood condition. Under induced sad and happy moods, those who self-rated their lie-telling ability as high showed enhanced cardiovascular responsivity to critical items. These results were limited to the initial phase of the test. We discussed possible motivational explanations and implications for the Concealed Information polygraph test.

Cues to deception: can complications, common knowledge details, and self-handicapping strategies discriminate between truths, embedded lies and outright lies in an Italian-speaking sample?

Deception research has shown that analysing verbal content can be effective to distinguish between truths and lies. However, most verbal cues are cues to truthfulness (truth tellers report the cue more than lie tellers), whereas cues to deception (lie tellers report the cue more than truth tellers) are largely absent. The complication approach, measuring complications (cue to truthfulness), common knowledge details (cue to deception), self-handicapping strategies (cue to deception), and the ratio of complications, aims to fill this gap in the literature. The present experiment examined the effectiveness of the complication approach when varying the amount of lying, with an Italian sample. Seventy-eight participants were assigned to one of three different experimental conditions: Truth tellers (telling the truth about the event), embedders (providing a mixture of truthful and false information) and outright lie tellers (providing false information). Participants were interviewed about a past experience concerning an out of the ordinary event. Complications discriminated truth tellers from lie tellers. The absence of significant effects for common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies, the limitations of the experiment and suggestions for future research are discussed.

The Model Sketch for Enhancing Lie Detection and Eliciting Information

Background: Sketching while narrating is an effective interview technique for eliciting information and cues to deceit. The current research examined the effects of introducing a Model Sketch in investigative interviews andis pre-registered on https://osf.io/kz9mc (accessed on 18 January 2022). Methods: Participants (N = 163) completed a mock mission and were asked to tell the truth or to lie about it in an interview. In Phase 1 of the interview, participants provided either a free recall (control condition), sketched and narrated with exposure to a Model Sketch (Model Sketch-present condition), or sketched and narrated without exposure to a Model Sketch (Model Sketch-absent condition). In Phase 2, all participants provided a free recall without sketching. Results: Truth tellers reported significantly more information than lie tellers. The Model Sketch elicited more location details than a Free recall in Phase 1 and more veracity differences than the other Modality conditions in Phase 2. Conclusion: The Model Sketch seems to enhance the elicitation of information and to have carryover veracity effects in a follow-up free recall.

Profiling the Interrogee: Applying the Person-Centered Approach in Investigative Interviewing Research

In the past, deception detection research has explored whether there were specific personal characteristics that were related to lying and found that factors such as personality and morality are indeed related to lying. However, past research has usually focused on a variable-centered approach. Yet, a person-centered might be more suitable here as it allows for the study of people in an integrative manner. In this experiment, 673 students completed a questionnaire which included measures of the five factors of personality, the level of moral disengagement, the perceived cognitive load when lying, lying strategies, frequency of lying and the LiES scale, a tool measuring the tendency to tell self-serving, altruistic and vindicative lies. We performed a Latent Profile Analysis to integrate personality, moral disengagement, and perceived cognitive load scores into specific profiles. Then, we related profile membership to lying behavior. We obtained four profiles, and found that extraversion, moral disengagement, and the perceived cognitive load contributed most to profile differences. We also found that lying frequency did not differ across profiles, whereas lying tendency did. In conclusion, our results suggest that several facets of the individual play a joint role in lying behavior, and that adopting a person-centered approach might be a good strategy to explore the role of interpersonal differences in lie detection research.

Do liars really remember what they lied upon? The impact of fabrication on memory

The present experiment aimed to examine how fabrication can affect memory. In particular, we examined whether different types of fabrication can lead to different mnemonic effects. A sample of 159 participants watched a video of a robbery and subsequently answered some questions about it. Participants were divided into three conditions: one group was instructed to tell the truth (i.e., truth-telling group), while the other two groups were instructed to lie either by partially distorting details (i.e., distortion group) or by completely making up wrong details of the event seen in the video (i.e., fabrication group). Two days later, participants completed a final memory test where they honestly answered recognition and recall questions concerning: (i) memory for the video and (ii) memory for having discussed details during the interview. Results showed that different types of fabrication affect liars' memory differently. Fabricators reported an undermining of memory for the event, whereas those who partially distorted details reported a higher impairment for the interview. Our findings showed that the effects of lying on liars' memory might be determined by the cognitive resources required to lie.

The role of executive functions in the effects of lying on memory

Recent studies have demonstrated that lying can affect memory and that such memory effects are based on the cognitive load required in performing the lie. The present study aimed to verify whether the impact of two deceptive strategies (i.e., false denials and fabrication) depends on individuals' cognitive resources in terms of Executive Functions (i.e., EF: Shifting, Inhibition, and Updating). A sample of 147 participants watched a video of a robbery and then were instructed to either fabricate (i.e., fabrication condition), deny (i.e. false denial condition), or tell the truth (i.e., truth-telling condition) to some questions about the crime. Two days later, all participants had to provide an honest account on a final memory test where they indicated their memory for having discussed details (i.e., fabricated, denied, or told the truth) and their memory for the video. Finally, their EF resources were also assessed. Our findings demonstrated that individual differences in EFs played a role in how the event was recalled and on the effects of lying on memory. That is, memory for the event after having lied depended especially on individuals' Shifting resources. We also found that the two deceptive strategies differentially affected individuals' memory for the interview and for the event: Denying affected memory for the interview while fabricating affected memory for the event. Our findings can inform legal professionals on the possibility to assess individuals' EF as an indicator of witnesses' credibility.