Moral leniency towards belief-consistent disinformation may help explain its spread on social media

Individual differences in sharing false political information on social media: Deliberate and accidental sharing, motivations and positive schizotypy

False political information-misinformation or disinformation-is widely spread on social media. Individual social media users play a large part in this. However, only a minority actively share false material. It is important to establish what sets these individuals apart from those who do not, and why they do it. Motivations for sharing may vary and are likely to differ between people who share false material unknowingly and on purpose. In this paper we consider the extent to which individual differences in personality and other variables, and motivations for sharing, are associated with the likelihood of people sharing false political information both accidentally and deliberately. In a series of four studies (Ns = 614, 563, 627, 113) we examined predictors of sharing false political information using different methodological approaches. Across the four studies, a key finding was that positive schizotypy is associated with measures of sharing false information both accidentally and deliberately. Motivations for sharing political information online were also relevant, with sharing for reasons of 'raising awareness' appearing particularly important. Implications for research and practice are discussed.

"It's Not Literally True, But You Get the Gist:" How nuanced understandings of truth encourage people to condone and spread misinformation

People have a more-nuanced view of misinformation than the binary distinction between "fake news" and "real news" implies. We distinguish between the truth of a statement's verbatim details (i.e., the specific, literal information) and its gist (i.e., the general, overarching meaning), and suggest that people tolerate and intentionally spread misinformation in part because they believe its gist. That is, even when they recognize a claim as literally false, they may judge it as morally acceptable to spread because they believe it is true "in spirit." Prior knowledge, partisanship, and imagination increase belief in the gist. We argue that partisan conflict about the morality of spreading misinformation hinges on disagreements not only about facts but also about gists.