Patent Challenges And Litigation On Inhalers For Asthma And COPD

Patent Thickets and Product Hops: Challenges and Opportunities for Legislative Reform

Two key strategies that brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers employ to limit generic competition are patent thickets and product hops. The former strategy entails obtaining numerous patents on peripheral features of products (not just the active ingredients), and the latter involves shifting active ingredients into reformulations with new patent protection that can extend periods of market exclusivity. These strategies have become particularly problematic for drug-device combinations like inhalers and glucagon-like peptide-1 receptor agonists, which contain pharmaceutical compounds that are sold together with their delivery devices. The Senate Judiciary Committee moved three bipartisan bills out of committee during the last legislative session aimed at facilitating more timely generic competition. Although these bills offer a valuable step forward, more is needed to limit the sort of patent gamesmanship that has become pervasive in the US pharmaceutical industry. Such reforms should include routine reexamination by the US Patent and Trademark Office of patents submitted for listing with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), a greater role for the FDA in reviewing such listings, limits on the number of patents that brand-name firms can assert when suing for infringement following patent challenges, stronger incentives for patent challenges, and more flexibility for the FDA to approve complex generic drugs.

Availability and Pricing of Drugs Prescribed by Otolaryngologists Through a Direct-to-Consumer Pharmacy: Medicare Savings Implications

High prescription drug prices can financially strain patients and insurers, with substantial clinical repercussions. In recent years, direct-to-consumer (DTC) pharmacies have emerged as potentially lower-cost alternatives for patients to fill prescriptions. We evaluated whether drugs commonly prescribed by otolaryngologists were available at a national DTC pharmacy (Mark Cuban Cost Plus Drug Company [MCCPDC]) and estimated potential Medicare savings from DTC pricing. We identified drugs and prices paid by Medicare Part D plans using the 2021 Drug Spending Dashboard. Our analysis included 16 generic drugs within the MCCPDC formulary, which offered lower prices for 14 (87.5%) drugs. If plans had secured MCCPDC pricing for all 16 drugs, Medicare patients and plans would have saved $2.9 billion (relative reduction: 62.3%) in 2021. Estimated total savings were greatest for budesonide-formoterol ($1.9 billion), dexlansoprazole ($464.6 million), and levothyroxine ($327.4 million). Otolaryngologists and insurers may consider utilizing DTC pharmacies with lower drug prices, though patients may face challenges projecting out-of-pocket costs across pharmacies, medications, benefit phases, and formulary tiers.

The Problem of Limited-Supply Agreements for Medicare Price Negotiation

This Viewpoint discusses how limited-supply agreements (introduction of generic products in reduced volumes) might thwart efforts to negotiate lower prices on prescription drugs in the US.

Patents and Regulatory Exclusivities on GLP-1 Receptor Agonists

Importance

Glucagon-like peptide 1 (GLP-1) receptor agonists were first approved for the treatment of type 2 diabetes in 2005. Demand for these drugs has increased rapidly in recent years, as indications have expanded, but they remain expensive.

Objective

To analyze how manufacturers of brand-name GLP-1 receptor agonists have used the patent and regulatory systems to extend periods of market exclusivity.

Evidence Review

The annual US Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) Approved Drug Products With Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations was used to identify GLP-1 receptor agonists approved from 2005 to 2021 and to record patents and nonpatent statutory exclusivities listed for each product. Google Patents was used to extract additional data on patents, including whether each was obtained on the delivery device or another aspect of the product. The primary outcome was the duration of expected protection from generic competition, defined as the time elapsed from FDA approval until expiration of the last-to-expire patent or regulatory exclusivity.

Findings

On the 10 GLP-1 receptor agonists included in the cohort, drug manufacturers listed with the FDA a median of 19.5 patents (IQR, 9.0-25.8) per product, including a median of 17 patents (IQR, 8.3-22.8) filed before FDA approval and 1.5 (IQR, 0-2.8) filed after FDA approval. Fifty-four percent of all patents listed on GLP-1 receptor agonists were on the delivery devices rather than active ingredients. Manufacturers augmented patent protection with a median of 2 regulatory exclusivities (IQR, 0-3) obtained at approval and 1 (IQR, 0.3-4.3) added after approval. The median total duration of expected protection after FDA approval, when accounting for both preapproval and postapproval patents and regulatory exclusivities, was 18.3 years (IQR, 16.0-19.4). No generic firm has successfully challenged patents on GLP-1 receptor agonists to gain FDA approval.

Conclusions and Relevance

Patent and regulatory reform is needed to ensure timely generic entry of GLP-1 receptor agonists to the market.