Leveraging Nonhuman Primate Multisensory Neurons and Circuits in Assessing Consciousness Theory

An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness

How is conscious experience related to material brain processes? A variety of theories aiming to answer this age-old question have emerged from the recent surge in consciousness research, and some are now hotly debated. Although most researchers have so far focused on the development and validation of their preferred theory in relative isolation, this article, written by a group of scientists representing different theories, takes an alternative approach. Noting that various theories often try to explain different aspects or mechanistic levels of consciousness, we argue that the theories do not necessarily contradict each other. Instead, several of them may converge on fundamental neuronal mechanisms and be partly compatible and complementary, so that multiple theories can simultaneously contribute to our understanding. Here, we consider unifying, integration-oriented approaches that have so far been largely neglected, seeking to combine valuable elements from various theories.

The hidden structure of consciousness

According to Loorits, if we want consciousness to be explained in terms of natural sciences, we should be able to analyze its seemingly non-structural aspects, like qualia, in structural terms. However, the studies conducted over the last three decades do not seem to be able to bridge the explanatory gap between physical phenomena and phenomenal experience. One possible way to bridge the explanatory gap is to seek the structure of consciousness within consciousness itself, through a phenomenal analysis of the qualitative aspects of experience. First, this analysis leads us to identify the explanandum concerning the simplest forms of experience not in qualia but in the unitary set of qualities found in early vision. Second, it leads us to hypothesize that consciousness is also made up of non-apparent parts, and that there exists a hidden structure of consciousness. This structure, corresponding to a simple early visual experience, is constituted by a Hierarchy of Spatial Belongings nested within each other. Each individual Spatial Belonging is formed by a primary content and a primary space. The primary content can be traced in the perceptibility of the contents we can distinguish in the phenomenal field. The primary space is responsible for the perceptibility of the content and is not perceptible in itself. However, the phenomenon I refer to as subtraction of visibility allows us to characterize it as phenomenally negative. The hierarchical relationships between Spatial Belongings can ensure the qualitative nature of components of perceptual organization, such as object, background, and detail. The hidden structure of consciousness presents aspects that are decidedly counterintuitive compared to our idea of phenomenal experience. However, on the one hand, the Hierarchy of Spatial Belongings can explain the qualities of early vision and their appearance as a unitary whole, while on the other hand, it might be more easily explicable in terms of brain organization. In other words, the hidden structure of consciousness can be considered a bridge structure which, placing itself at an intermediate level between experience and physical properties, can contribute to bridging the explanatory gap.

Approaching the nature of consciousness through a phenomenal analysis of early vision. What is the explanandum?

Loorits (2014) identifies the solution to the hard problem of consciousness in the possibility of fully analyzing seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness in structural terms. However, research on consciousness conducted in recent decades has failed to bridge the explanatory gap between the brain and conscious mind. One reason why the explanatory gap cannot be filled, and consequently the problem remains hard, is that experience and neural structure are too different or "distant" to be directly compatible. Conversely, structural aspects of consciousness can be found in phenomenal experience. One possible alternative, therefore, is to seek the structure of seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness not in the neural substrate, but within consciousness itself, through a phenomenal analysis of the qualitative aspects of experience, starting from its simplest forms. An essential premise is to reformulate the explanandum of consciousness, which is usually attributed to qualia and what it is like to be in a certain state. However, these properties do not allow us to identify the fundamental aspects of phenomenal experience. Sensations such as the redness of red or the painfulness of pain are inseparable from the context of the experience to which they belong, making qualia appear as phenomenal artifacts. Furthermore, the simplest qualitative aspects can be found in early vision. They are involved in perceptual organization and necessarily have relational significance. The unitary set of qualities found in early vision-such as those related to being an object, background or detail-constitutes the explanandum of the simplest forms of consciousness and seems to imply a justifying structure. Although early vision is characterized by interdependent qualitative components that form a unitary whole, we cannot find in it the structure of seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness. Phenomenal appearance alone does not seem sufficient to identify a unitary structure of consciousness. However, the closeness of these characteristics to a unitary structure prompts us to delve into less explored territory, using the components of experience also as possible explanans.

The nature of consciousness in anaesthesia

Neuroscientists agree on the value of locating the source of consciousness within the brain. Anaesthesiologists are no exception, and have their own operational definition of consciousness based on phenomenological observations during anaesthesia. The full functional correlates of consciousness are yet to be precisely identified, however rapidly evolving progress in this scientific domain has yielded several theories that attempt to model the generation of consciousness. They have received variable support from experimental observations, including those involving anaesthesia and its ability to reversibly modulate different aspects of consciousness. Aside from the interest in a better understanding of the mechanisms of consciousness, exploring the functional tenets of the phenomenological consciousness states of general anaesthesia has the potential to ultimately improve patient management. It could facilitate the design of specific monitoring devices and approaches, aiming at reliably detecting each of the possible states of consciousness during an anaesthetic procedure, including total absence of mental content (unconsciousness), and internal awareness (sensation of self and internal thoughts) with or without conscious perception of the environment (connected or disconnected consciousness, respectively). Indeed, it must be noted that unresponsiveness is not sufficient to infer absence of connectedness or even absence of consciousness. This narrative review presents the current knowledge in this field from a system-level, underlining the contribution of anaesthesia studies in supporting theories of consciousness, and proposing directions for future research.

Theoretical Neurobiology of Consciousness Applied to Human Cerebral Organoids

Organoids and specifically human cerebral organoids (HCOs) are one of the most relevant novelties in the field of biomedical research. Grown either from embryonic or induced pluripotent stem cells, HCOs can be used as in vitro three-dimensional models, mimicking the developmental process and organization of the developing human brain. Based on that, and despite their current limitations, it cannot be assumed that they will never at any stage of development manifest some rudimentary form of consciousness. In the absence of behavioral indicators of consciousness, the theoretical neurobiology of consciousness being applied to unresponsive brain-injured patients can be considered with respect to HCOs. In clinical neurology, it is difficult to discern a capacity for consciousness in unresponsive brain-injured patients who provide no behavioral indicators of consciousness. In such scenarios, a validated neurobiological theory of consciousness, which tells us what the neural mechanisms of consciousness are, could be used to identify a capacity for consciousness. Like the unresponsive patients that provide a diagnostic difficulty for neurologists, HCOs provide no behavioral indicators of consciousness. Therefore, this article discusses how three prominent neurobiological theories of consciousness apply to human cerebral organoids. From the perspective of the Temporal Circuit Hypothesis, the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory, and the Integrated Information Theory, we discuss what neuronal structures and functions might indicate that cerebral organoids have a neurobiological capacity to be conscious.

Bistability of prefrontal states gates access to consciousness

Access of sensory information to consciousness has been linked to the ignition of content-specific representations in association cortices. How does ignition interact with intrinsic cortical state fluctuations to give rise to conscious perception? We addressed this question in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) by combining multi-electrode recordings with a binocular rivalry (BR) paradigm inducing spontaneously driven changes in the content of consciousness, inferred from the reflexive optokinetic nystagmus (OKN) pattern. We find that fluctuations between low-frequency (LF, 1-9 Hz) and beta (∼20-40 Hz) local field potentials (LFPs) reflect competition between spontaneous updates and stability of conscious contents, respectively. Both LF and beta events were locally modulated. The phase of the former locked differentially to the competing populations just before a spontaneous transition while the latter synchronized the neuronal ensemble coding the consciously perceived content. These results suggest that prefrontal state fluctuations gate conscious perception by mediating internal states that facilitate perceptual update and stability.

Escaping from the IIT Munchausen method: Re-establishing the scientific method in the study of consciousness

Integrated information theory (IIT) is an example of "ironic science" and obstructs the scientific study of consciousness. By confusing the ontological status of a method to quantify network complexity with that of a theory of consciousness, IIT has to square the circle and spirals toward its panpsychism conclusion. I analyze the consequences of this fallacy and suggest how the study of consciousness can be brought back into the realm of rational, empirical science.

Explanatory profiles of models of consciousness - towards a systematic classification

Models of consciousness aim to inspire new experimental protocols and aid interpretation of empirical evidence to reveal the structure of conscious experience. Nevertheless, no current model is univocally accepted on either theoretical or empirical grounds. Moreover, a straightforward comparison is difficult for conceptual reasons. In particular, we argue that different models explicitly or implicitly subscribe to different notions of what constitutes a satisfactory explanation, use different tools in their explanatory endeavours and even aim to explain very different phenomena. We thus present a framework to compare existing models in the field with respect to what we call their 'explanatory profiles'. We focus on the following minimal dimensions: mode of explanation, mechanisms of explanation and target of explanation. We also discuss the empirical consequences of the discussed discrepancies among models. This approach may eventually lead to identifying driving assumptions, theoretical commitments, experimental predictions and a better design of future testing experiments. Finally, our conclusion points to more integrative theoretical research, where axiomatic models may play a critical role in solving current theoretical and experimental contradictions.

Bifurcation in brain dynamics reveals a signature of conscious processing independent of report

An outstanding challenge for consciousness research is to characterize the neural signature of conscious access independently of any decisional processes. Here we present a model-based approach that uses inter-trial variability to identify the brain dynamics associated with stimulus processing. We demonstrate that, even in the absence of any task or behavior, the electroencephalographic response to auditory stimuli shows bifurcation dynamics around 250–300 milliseconds post-stimulus. Namely, the same stimulus gives rise to late sustained activity on some trials, and not on others. This late neural activity is predictive of task-related reports, and also of reports of conscious contents that are randomly sampled during task-free listening. Source localization further suggests that task-free conscious access recruits the same neural networks as those associated with explicit report, except for frontal executive components. Studying brain dynamics through variability could thus play a key role for identifying the core signatures of conscious access, independent of report.

Current knowledge on the neural basis of consciousness mostly relies on situations where people report their perception. Here, the authors provide evidence for the idea that bifurcation in brain dynamics reflects conscious perception independent of report.

Neural signatures of α2-Adrenergic agonist-induced unconsciousness and awakening by antagonist

How the brain dynamics change during anesthetic-induced altered states of consciousness is not completely understood. The α2-adrenergic agonists are unique. They generate unconsciousness selectively through α2-adrenergic receptors and related circuits. We studied intracortical neuronal dynamics during transitions of loss of consciousness (LOC) with the α2-adrenergic agonist dexmedetomidine and return of consciousness (ROC) in a functionally interconnecting somatosensory and ventral premotor network in non-human primates. LOC, ROC and full task performance recovery were all associated with distinct neural changes. The early recovery demonstrated characteristic intermediate dynamics distinguished by sustained high spindle activities. Awakening by the α2-adrenergic antagonist completely eliminated this intermediate state and instantaneously restored awake dynamics and the top task performance while the anesthetic was still being infused. The results suggest that instantaneous functional recovery is possible following anesthetic-induced unconsciousness and the intermediate recovery state is not a necessary path for the brain recovery.

The neural mechanisms of audiotactile binding depend on asynchrony

Asynchrony is a critical cue informing the brain whether sensory signals are caused by a common source and should be integrated or segregated. This psychophysics-electroencephalography (EEG) study investigated the influence of asynchrony on how the brain binds audiotactile (AT) signals to enable faster responses in a redundant target paradigm. Human participants actively responded (psychophysics) or passively attended (EEG) to noise bursts, "taps-to-the-face" and their AT combinations at seven AT asynchronies: 0, ±20, ±70 and ±500 ms. Behaviourally, observers were faster at detecting AT than unisensory stimuli within a temporal integration window: the redundant target effect was maximal for synchronous stimuli and declined within a ≤70 ms AT asynchrony. EEG revealed a cascade of AT interactions that relied on different neural mechanisms depending on AT asynchrony. At small (≤20 ms) asynchronies, AT interactions arose for evoked response potentials (ERPs) at 110 ms and ~400 ms post-stimulus. Selectively at ±70 ms asynchronies, AT interactions were observed for the P200 ERP, theta-band inter-trial coherence (ITC) and power at ~200 ms post-stimulus. In conclusion, AT binding was mediated by distinct neural mechanisms depending on the asynchrony of the AT signals. Early AT interactions in ERPs and theta-band ITC and power were critical for the behavioural response facilitation within a ≤±70 ms temporal integration window.

Conscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis

We review the central tenets and neuroanatomical basis of the global neuronal workspace (GNW) hypothesis, which attempts to account for the main scientific observations regarding the elementary mechanisms of conscious processing in the human brain. The GNW hypothesis proposes that, in the conscious state, a non-linear network ignition associated with recurrent processing amplifies and sustains a neural representation, allowing the corresponding information to be globally accessed by local processors. We examine this hypothesis in light of recent data that contrast brain activity evoked by either conscious or non-conscious contents, as well as during conscious or non-conscious states, particularly general anesthesia. We also discuss the relationship between the intertwined concepts of conscious processing, attention, and working memory.

Peri-personal space encoding in patients with disorders of consciousness and cognitive-motor dissociation

Behavioral assessments of consciousness based on overt command following cannot differentiate patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC) from those who demonstrate a dissociation between intent/awareness and motor capacity: cognitive motor dissociation (CMD). We argue that delineation of peri-personal space (PPS) – the multisensory-motor space immediately surrounding the body – may differentiate these patients due to its central role in mediating human-environment interactions, and putatively in scaffolding a minimal form of selfhood. In Experiment 1, we determined a normative physiological index of PPS by recording electrophysiological (EEG) responses to tactile, auditory, or audio-tactile stimulation at different distances (5 vs. 75 cm) in healthy volunteers (N = 19). Contrasts between paired (AT) and summed (A + T) responses demonstrated multisensory supra-additivity when AT stimuli were presented near, i.e., within the PPS, and highlighted somatosensory-motor sensors as electrodes of interest. In Experiment 2, we recorded EEG in patients behaviorally diagnosed as DOC or putative CMD (N = 17, 30 sessions). The PPS-measure developed in Experiment 1 was analyzed in relation with both standard clinical diagnosis (i.e., Coma Recovery Scale; CRS-R) and a measure of neural complexity associated with consciousness. Results demonstrated a significant correlation between the PPS measure and neural complexity, but not with the CRS-R, highlighting the added value of the physiological recordings. Further, multisensory processing in PPS was preserved in putative CMD but not in DOC patients. Together, the findings suggest that indexing PPS allows differentiating between groups of patients whom both show overt motor impairments (DOC and CMD) but putatively distinct levels of awareness or motor intent.

•

Behavioral assessments confound consciousness and motor output.

•

We suggest that multisensory coding of actionable space may dissociate these two.

•

We develop an electrophysiological marker of peri-personal space.

•

Then use this marker to distinguish impairments in consciousness and motor output.