Partially Overlapping Neural Correlates of Metacognitive Monitoring and Metacognitive Control

Strategic reminder setting for time-based intentions: Influence of metacognition, delay length, and cue visibility

Time-based intentions, such as remembering to make a telephone call at a particular time or removing food from the oven after a delay, can be highly cognitively demanding. In everyday life, people often offload these demands to the external environment by setting alerts and reminders; however, this process of time-based intention offloading has rarely been examined experimentally. Here, we investigated this process in a paradigm where participants had to remember to press a key after a 10, 20, or 30 s delay, while simultaneously engaged in an ongoing two-back working memory task. Use of reminders improved accuracy, and participants were more likely to offload intentions at longer delays. This process was driven at least partially by metacognitive beliefs about the need for reminders, rather than the actual need. There was also an influence of time-monitoring demands: offloading was reduced when a clock was always visible, compared with a condition where participants had to press a button to reveal it. These results show that principles of cognitive offloading established in other domains also apply to time-based prospective memory: it improves performance, is influenced by cognitive demand, and guided by metacognitive beliefs.

High Impostors Are More Hesitant to Ask for Help

Help-seeking behavior requires both components of metacognition-monitoring (being aware of the need for help) and control (initiating the help-seeking action). Difficulties in initiating help-seeking, therefore, can be indicative of a metacognitive breakdown, for instance, when a student believes that a gap in knowledge is something to hide. To explore the relationship between knowing that one needs help and actually seeking it, we examined the potential influences of impostorism, which refers to the feeling of being a "fraud", despite one's objective accomplishments. Participants were asked to solve math reasoning and verbal reasoning insight problems, while also being given a "help" button that could be pressed at any time in order to get the solution. Results showed that, overall, students were more likely to ask for help with math than verbal reasoning problems-help also correlated with boosted performance. There was also a slight indication that individuals who scored relatively high on impostorism were numerically less likely to seek help and waited longer to do so for the math problems. Our findings suggest that a fear of being exposed as an impostor may hinder one's help-seeking behaviors, especially in more challenging subjects, such as math.

Cognitive offloading is value-based decision making: Modelling cognitive effort and the expected value of memory

How do people decide between maintaining information in short-term memory or offloading it to external reminders? How does this affect subsequent memory? This article presents a simple computational model based on two principles: A) items stored in brain-based memory occupy its limited capacity, generating an opportunity cost; B) reminders incur a small physical-action cost, but capacity is effectively unlimited. These costs are balanced against the value of remembering, which determines the optimal strategy. Simulations reproduce many empirical findings, including: 1) preferential offloading of high-value items; 2) increased offloading at higher memory loads; 3) offloading can cause forgetting of offloaded items ('Google effect') but 4) improved memory for other items ('saving-enhanced memory'); 5) reduced saving-enhanced-memory effect when reminders are unreliable; 6) influence of item-value: people may preferentially offload high-value items and store additional low-value items in brain-based memory; 7) greatest sensitivity to the effort of reminder-setting at intermediate rather than highest/lowest levels of task difficulty; 8) increased offloading in individuals with poorer memory ability. Therefore, value-based decision-making provides a simple unifying account of many cognitive offloading phenomena. These results are consistent with an opportunity-cost model of cognitive effort, which can explain why internal memory feels effortful but reminders do not.

Influence of the physical effort of reminder-setting on strategic offloading of delayed intentions

Intention offloading involves using external reminders such as diaries, to-do lists, and digital alerts to help us remember delayed intentions. Recent studies have provided evidence for various cognitive and metacognitive factors that guide intention offloading, but little research has investigated the physical cost of reminder-setting itself. Here, we present two pre-registered experiments investigating how the cost of physical effort associated with reminder-setting influences strategic intention offloading under different levels of memory load. At all memory loads, reminder-setting was reduced when it was more effortful. The ability to set reminders allowed participants to compensate for the influence of memory load on accuracy in the low-effort condition; this effect was attenuated in the high-effort condition. In addition, there was evidence that participants with less confidence in their memory abilities were more likely to set reminders. Contrary to prediction, physical effort had the greatest effect on reminder-setting at intermediate memory loads. We speculate that the physical costs of reminder-setting might have the greatest impact when participants are uncertain about their strategy choice. These results demonstrate the importance of physical effort as one of the factors relevant to cost-benefit decision-making about cognitive offloading strategies.

Relation of life sciences students' metacognitive monitoring to neural activity during biology error detection

Metacognitive calibration-the capacity to accurately self-assess one's performance-forms the basis for error detection and self-monitoring and is a potential catalyst for conceptual change. Limited brain imaging research on authentic learning tasks implicates the lateral prefrontal and anterior cingulate brain regions in expert scientific reasoning. This study aimed to determine how variation in undergraduate life sciences students' metacognitive calibration relates to their brain activity when evaluating the accuracy of biological models. Fifty undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory life sciences course completed a biology model error detection task during fMRI. Students with higher metacognitive calibration recruited lateral prefrontal regions linked in prior research to expert STEM reasoning to a greater extent than those with lower metacognitive calibration. Findings suggest that metacognition relates to important individual differences in undergraduate students' use of neural resources during an authentic educational task and underscore the importance of fostering metacognitive calibration in the classroom.

Boundary updating as a source of history effect on decision uncertainty

When sorting a sequence of stimuli into binary classes, current choices are often negatively correlated with recent stimulus history. This phenomenon-dubbed the repulsive bias-can be explained by boundary updating, a process of shifting the class boundary to previous stimuli. This explanation implies that recent stimulus history can also influence "decision uncertainty," the probability of making incorrect decisions, because it depends on the location of the boundary. However, there have been no previous efforts to elucidate the impact of previous stimulus history on decision uncertainty. Here, from the boundary-updating process that accounts for the repulsive bias, we derived a prediction that decision uncertainty increases as current choices become more congruent with previous stimuli. We confirmed this prediction in behavioral, physiological, and neural correlates of decision uncertainty. Our work demonstrates that boundary updating offers a principled account of how previous stimulus history concurrently relates to choice bias and decision uncertainty.

HD-tDCS over the left DLPFC increases cued recall and subjective question familiarity rather than other aspects of memory and metamemory

When retrieving information from memory there is an interplay between memory and metamemory processes, and the prefrontal cortex has been implicated in both memory and metamemory. Previous work shown that High Definition transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (HD-tDCS) over the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) can lead to improvements in memory and metamemory monitoring, but findings are mixed. Our original design targeted metamemory, but because the prefrontal cortex plays a role in both memory and metamemory, we tested for effects of HD-tDCS on multiple memory tasks (e.g., recall, cued recall, and recognition) and multiple aspects of metamemory (e.g., once-knew-it ratings, feeling-of-knowing ratings, metamemory accuracy, and metamemory control). There were HD-tDCS-related improvements in cued recall performance, but not other memory tasks. For metamemory, there were HD-tDCS-related increases in subjective once-knew-it ratings, but not other aspects of metamemory. These results highlight the need to consider the effects of HD-tDCS on memory and metamemory at different timepoints during retrieval, as well as specific conditions that show benefits from HD-tDCS.

Metacognitive Differences in Amnestic Mild Cognitive Impairment and Healthy Cognition: A Cross-Sectional Study Employing Online Measures

This study aimed to examine metacognitive abilities in individuals diagnosed with amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI) by using online metacognitive measures during cognitive tasks. A total of 100 participants were enrolled, all aged 50 or older (mean age = 61.98; SD = 6.27), and with a minimum of six years of education (mean = 14.95; SD = 2.94). The sample included 50 individuals with aMCI (34 females) and 50 healthy controls (HC) (33 females). Both groups underwent metacognitive versions of memory tasks (Doors and People) and executive functions tasks (Wisconsin Card Sorting Test). Metacognition was assessed through confidence ratings given after each answer (referred to as metacognitive monitoring) and the accuracy of the participants' decisions to include or exclude answers from their final scores (known as metacognitive control). The results showed that although individuals with aMCI were aware of their cognitive limitations-evidenced by their lower confidence ratings across all tasks-they still exhibited overconfidence relative to their actual performance. Moreover, they included a greater number of incorrect answers in their final scores compared to the healthy control group. These findings suggest that while individuals with aMCI retain some level of awareness, their self-evaluations appear to lack precision. This observation was consistent across both types of cognitive tasks. The results underscore the need for additional research to better understand metacognition in MCI as well as the interplay between metacognitive monitoring and control.

The reliability of assistance systems modulates the sense of control and acceptability of human operators

Individuals are increasingly required to interact with complex and autonomous technologies, which often has a significant impact on the control they experience over their actions and choices. A better characterization of the factors responsible for modulating the control experience of human operators is therefore a major challenge to improve the quality of human-system interactions. Using a decision-making task performed in interaction with an automated system, we investigated the influence of two key properties of automated systems, their reliability and explicability, on participants' sense of agency (SoA), as well as the perceived acceptability of system choices. The results show an increase in SoA associated with the most explicable system. Importantly, the increase in system explicability influenced participants' ability to regulate the control resources they engaged in the current decision. In particular, we observed that participants' SoA varied with system reliability in the "explained" condition, whereas no variation was observed in the "non-explained" condition. Finally, we found that system reliability had a direct impact on system acceptability, such that the most reliable systems were also considered the most acceptable systems. These results highlight the importance of studying agency in human-computer interaction in order to define more acceptable automation technologies.

Expectations about precision bias metacognition and awareness

Bayesian models of the mind suggest that we estimate the reliability or "precision" of incoming sensory signals to guide perceptual inference and to construct feelings of confidence or uncertainty about what we are perceiving. However, accurately estimating precision is likely to be challenging for bounded systems like the brain. One way observers could overcome this challenge is to form expectations about the precision of their perceptions and use these to guide metacognition and awareness. Here we test this possibility. Participants made perceptual decisions about visual motion stimuli, while providing confidence ratings (Experiments 1 and 2) or ratings of subjective visibility (Experiment 3). In each experiment, participants acquired probabilistic expectations about the likely strength of upcoming signals. We found these expectations about precision altered metacognition and awareness-with participants feeling more confident and stimuli appearing more vivid when stronger sensory signals were expected, without concomitant changes in objective perceptual performance. Computational modeling revealed that this effect could be well explained by a predictive learning model that infers the precision (strength) of current signals as a weighted combination of incoming evidence and top-down expectation. These results support an influential but untested tenet of Bayesian models of cognition, suggesting that agents do not only "read out" the reliability of information arriving at their senses, but also take into account prior knowledge about how reliable or "precise" different sources of information are likely to be. This reveals that expectations about precision influence how the sensory world appears and how much we trust our senses. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

The Impact of Item Difficulty on Judgment of Confidence-A Cross-Level Moderated Mediation Model

The factors that influence metacognitive judgments often appear in combination, rather than in isolation. The multi-cue utilization model proposes that individuals often make use of multiple cues when making judgments. Previous studies have focused on the integration of intrinsic and extrinsic cues, while the current investigation examines the integration and influence of intrinsic cues and mnemonic cues. Judgment of confidence is a common form of metacognitive judgment. In this study, 37 college students completed Raven's Progressive Matrices and made judgments of confidence. We used the cross-level moderated mediation model to explore the impact of item difficulty on confidence judgments. Our results indicated that item difficulty negatively predicts the level of confidence. Item difficulty has an impact on the confidence evaluation by altering the processing fluency of intermediate variables. The joint effect of intrinsic cue item difficulty and mnemonic cue processing fluency influences confidence judgments. Additionally, we found that intelligence moderates the effect of difficulty on processing fluency across levels. Specifically, individuals with higher intelligence exhibited lower fluency on difficult tasks and higher fluency on simple tasks than individuals with lower intelligence. These findings expand on the multi-cue utilization model and integrate the influence mechanism of intrinsic and mnemonic cues on confidence judgments. Finally, we propose and verify a cross-level moderated mediation model that explains how item difficulty affects confidence judgments.

Outsourcing Memory to External Tools: A Review of 'Intention Offloading'

How do we remember delayed intentions? Three decades of research into prospective memory have provided insight into the cognitive and neural mechanisms involved in this form of memory. However, we depend on more than just our brains to remember intentions. We also use external props and tools such as calendars and diaries, strategically placed objects, and technologies such as smartphone alerts. This is known as 'intention offloading'. Despite the progress in our understanding of brain-based prospective memory, we know much less about the role of intention offloading in individuals' ability to fulfil delayed intentions. Here, we review recent research into intention offloading, with a particular focus on how individuals decide between storing intentions in internal memory versus external reminders. We also review studies investigating how intention offloading changes across the lifespan and how it relates to underlying brain mechanisms. We conclude that intention offloading is highly effective, experimentally tractable, and guided by metacognitive processes. Individuals have systematic biases in their offloading strategies that are stable over time. Evidence also suggests that individual differences and developmental changes in offloading strategies are driven at least in part by metacognitive processes. Therefore, metacognitive interventions could play an important role in promoting individuals' adaptive use of cognitive tools.