Shared Neural Representations of Cognitive Conflict and Negative Affect in the Medial Frontal Cortex

Orthogonal neural encoding of targets and distractors supports multivariate cognitive control

The complex challenges of our mental life require us to coordinate multiple forms of neural information processing. Recent behavioural studies have found that people can coordinate multiple forms of attention, but the underlying neural control process remains obscure. We hypothesized that the brain implements multivariate control by independently monitoring feature-specific difficulty and independently prioritizing feature-specific processing. During functional MRI, participants performed a parametric conflict task that separately tags target and distractor processing. Consistent with feature-specific monitoring, univariate analyses revealed spatially segregated encoding of target and distractor difficulty in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex. Consistent with feature-specific attentional priority, our encoding geometry analysis revealed overlapping but orthogonal representations of target and distractor coherence in the intraparietal sulcus. Coherence representations were mediated by control demands and aligned with both performance and frontoparietal activity, consistent with top-down attention. Together, these findings provide evidence for the neural geometry necessary to coordinate multivariate cognitive control.

Task relevance alters the effect of emotion on congruency judgments during action understanding

The congruency judgments in action understanding helps individuals make timely adjustments to unexpected occurrence, and this process may be influenced by emotion. Previous research has showed contradictory effect of emotion on conflict processing, possibly due to the degree of relevance between emotion and task. However, to date, no study has systematically manipulated the relevance to explore how emotion affects congruency judgments in action understanding. We employed a cue-target paradigm and controlled the way emotional stimuli were presented on the target interface, setting up three experiments: emotion served as task-irrelevant distractor, task-irrelevant target and task-relevant target. The results showed that when emotion was irrelevant to the task, it impaired congruency judgements performance, regardless of a distractor or a target, while task-relevant emotion facilitated this process. These findings indicate that the impact of emotion on congruency judgements during action understanding depends on the degree of emotion-task relevance.

A precision neuroscience approach to estimating reliability of neural responses during emotion processing: Implications for task-fMRI

Recent work demonstrating low test-retest reliability of neural activation during fMRI tasks raises questions about the utility of task-based fMRI for the study of individual variation in brain function. Two possible sources of the instability in task-based BOLD signal over time are noise or measurement error in the instrument, and meaningful variation across time within-individuals in the construct itself-brain activation elicited during fMRI tasks. Examining the contribution of these two sources of test-retest unreliability in task-evoked brain activity has far-reaching implications for cognitive neuroscience. If test-retest reliability largely reflects measurement error, it suggests that task-based fMRI has little utility in the study of either inter- or intra-individual differences. On the other hand, if task-evoked BOLD signal varies meaningfully over time, it would suggest that this tool may yet be well suited to studying intraindividual variation. We parse these sources of variance in BOLD signal in response to emotional cues over time and within-individuals in a longitudinal sample with 10 monthly fMRI scans. Test-retest reliability was low, reflecting a lack of stability in between-person differences across scans. In contrast, within-person, within-session internal consistency of the BOLD signal was higher, and within-person fluctuations across sessions explained almost half the variance in voxel-level neural responses. Additionally, monthly fluctuations in neural response to emotional cues were associated with intraindividual variation in mood, sleep, and exposure to stressors. Rather than reflecting trait-like differences across people, neural responses to emotional cues may be more reflective of intraindividual variation over time. These patterns suggest that task-based fMRI may be able to contribute to the study of individual variation in brain function if more attention is given to within-individual variation approaches, psychometrics-beginning with improving reliability beyond the modest estimates observed here, and the validity of task fMRI beyond the suggestive associations reported here.

Disruptions of salience network during uncertain anticipation of conflict control in anxiety

BACKGROUND

Anxiety has been characterized by disrupted processing of conflict control, while little is known about anticipatory processing of conflicts in anxiety. Anticipation is the key factor in both anxiety and cognitive control, especially under uncertain conditions. The current study therefore examined neurocomputational mechanisms of uncertain anticipation of conflict control in anxiety.

METHODS

Twenty-six participants with high-trait anxiety and twenty-nine low-trait anxiety participants completed a cue-flanker task with functional magnetic resonance imaging. The hierarchical drift diffusion model (HDDM) was used to measure the cognitive computations during the task. To identify the neurocomputational mechanism of anticipatory control in anxiety, mediation analysis and dynamic causal modelling (DCM) analysis were conducted to examine the relationship between functional connectivity of brain networks and the parameters of HDDM.

RESULTS

We found influences of regulatory signals from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to dorsal anterior cingulate cortex on decision threshold in low-trait anxiety (LTA), but not in high-trait anxiety (HTA), especially for the condition with uncertain cues. The results indicate deficient top-down anticipatory control of upcoming conflicts in anxious individuals. DCM and HDDM analyses revealed that lower decision threshold was associated with higher intrinsic connectivity of salience network (SN) in anxious individuals, suggesting that dysfunctional SN disrupts anticipation of conflict control under uncertainty in anxiety.

CONCLUSIONS

Our results suggest hyperfunction of the SN underlies the deficient information accumulation during uncertain anticipation of upcoming conflicts in anxiety. Our findings shed new light on the mechanisms of anticipation processing and the psychopathology of anxiety.

When the mind's eye prevails: The Internal Dominance over External Attention (IDEA) hypothesis

Throughout the 20th century, the psychological literature has considered attention as being primarily directed at the outside world. More recent theories conceive attention as also operating on internal information, and mounting evidence suggests a single, shared attentional focus between external and internal information. Such sharing implies a cognitive architecture where attention needs to be continuously shifted between prioritizing either external or internal information, but the fundamental principles underlying this attentional balancing act are currently unknown. Here, we propose and evaluate one such principle in the shape of the Internal Dominance over External Attention (IDEA) hypothesis: Contrary to the traditional view of attention as being primarily externally oriented, IDEA asserts that attention is inherently biased toward internal information. We provide a theoretical account for why such an internal attention bias may have evolved and examine findings from a wide range of literatures speaking to the balancing of external versus internal attention, including research on working memory, attention switching, visual search, mind wandering, sustained attention, and meditation. We argue that major findings in these disparate research lines can be coherently understood under IDEA. Finally, we consider tentative neurocognitive mechanisms contributing to IDEA and examine the practical implications of more deliberate control over this bias in the context of psychopathology. It is hoped that this novel hypothesis motivates cross-talk between the reviewed research lines and future empirical studies directly examining the mechanisms that steer attention either inward or outward on a moment-by-moment basis.

Conflict Experience Regulates the Neural Encoding of Cognitive Conflict

Cognitive control is adaptive in that it rapidly adjusts attention in response to changing contexts and shifting goals. Research provides evidence that cognitive control can rapidly adjust attention to focus on task-relevant information based on prior conflict experience. Neural encoding of goal-related information is critical for goal-directed behaviour; however, the empirical evidence on how conflict experience affects the encoding of cognitive conflict in the brain is rather weak. In the present fMRI study, a Stroop task with different proportions of incongruent trial was used to investigate the neural encoding of cognitive conflict in the environment with changing conflict experience. The results showed that the anterior cingulate cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and intraparietal sulcus played a pivotal role in the neural encoding of cognitive conflict. The classification in anterior cingulate cortex was significantly above chance in the high-proportion, moderate-proportion, and low-proportion conflict conditions conducted separately, suggesting that neural encoding of cognitive conflict in this region was not altered based on proportion of conflict. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and intraparietal sulcus showed significant above-chance classification in the moderate-proportion and low-proportion conflict conditions, but not in the high-proportion conflict condition. These findings provide direct evidence that conflict experience modulates the neural encoding of cognitive conflict.

Phasic affective signals by themselves do not regulate cognitive control

Cognitive control is a set of mechanisms that help us process conflicting stimuli and maintain goal-relevant behaviour. According to the Affective Signalling Hypothesis, conflicting stimuli are aversive and thus elicit (negative) affect, moreover - to avoid aversive signals - affective and cognitive systems work together by increasing control and thus, drive conflict adaptation. Several studies have found that affective stimuli can indeed modulate conflict adaptation, however, there is currently no evidence that phasic affective states not triggered by conflict also trigger improved cognitive control. To investigate this possibility, we intermixed trials of a conflict task and trials involving the passive viewing of emotional words. We tested whether affective states induced by affective words in a given trial trigger improved cognitive control in a subsequent conflict trial. Applying Bayesian analysis, the results of four experiments supported the lack of adaptation to aversive signals, both in terms of valence and arousal. These results suggest that phasic affective states by themselves are not sufficient to elicit an increase in control.

The para-hippocampal-medial frontal gyrus functional connectivity mediates the relationship between dispositional optimism and procrastination

Procrastination is a prevalent phenomenon throughout the world, which can lead to worse consequences across life domains, such as academic performance, mental health, and even public policy. Despite the evidence for the association between dispositional optimism and procrastination, the neural mechanisms underlying this link remain unexplored. To address this issue, we employed voxel-based morphometry (VBM) and resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC) methods to explore the underlying links between dispositional optimism and procrastination in a large sample (N=408). The self-report results showed that dispositional optimism was negatively associated with procrastination (r= -.30, p<.001). The VBM analysis indicated that dispositional optimism was positively correlated with gray matter volumes (GMV) in the right para-hippocampal (rPHC), and negatively correlated with GMV in the left cerebellum. Moreover, the functional connectivity analysis with the rPHC as a seed region revealed that rPHC-rMFC (right medial frontal gyrus) functional connectivity was negatively associated with dispositional optimism. Furthermore, the mediation analysis showed that the rPHC-rMFC connectivity partially mediated the relationship between dispositional optimism and procrastination. These results suggested that the rPHC-rMFC connectivity engaged in less task aversiveness by episodic prospection may underlie the association between dispositional optimism and procrastination, which provides a new perspective to understand the relationship between dispositional optimism and procrastination. DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT: The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

Neural correlates of affective task switching and asymmetric affective task switching costs

The control of emotions is of potentially great clinical relevance. Accordingly, there has been increasing interest in understanding the cognitive mechanisms underlying the ability to switch efficiently between the processing of affective and non-affective information. Reports of asymmetrically increased switch costs when switching toward the more salient emotion task indicate specific demands in the flexible control of emotion. The neural mechanisms underlying affective task switching, however, are so far not fully understood. Using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) (N = 57), we observed that affective task switching was accompanied by increased activity in domain-general fronto-parietal control systems. Blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) activity in the posterior medial frontal and anterolateral prefrontal cortex was directly related to affective switch costs, indicating that these regions play a particular role in individual differences in (affective) task-switching ability. Asymmetric switch costs were associated with increased activity in the right inferior frontal and dorsal anterior medial prefrontal cortex, two brain regions critical for response inhibition. This suggests that asymmetric switch costs might-to a great extent-reflect higher demands on inhibitory control of the dominant emotion task. These results contribute to a refined understanding of brain systems for the flexible control of emotions and thereby identify valuable target systems for future clinical research.

Multivariate analysis differentiates intertemporal choices in both value and cognitive control network

Choices between immediate smaller reward and long-term larger reward are referred to as intertemporal choice. Numerous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have investigated the neural substrates of intertemporal choice via conventional univariate analytical approaches, revealing dissociable activations of decisions involving immediately available rewards and decisions involving delayed rewards in value network. With the help of multivariate analyses, which is more sensitive for evaluating information encoded in spatially distributed patterns, we showed that fMRI activity patterns represent viable signatures of intertemporal choice, as well as individual differences while controlling for age. Notably, in addition to value network, regions from cognitive control network play prominent roles in differentiating between different intertemporal choices as well as individuals with distinct discount rates. These findings provide clear evidence that substantiates the important role of value and cognitive control networks in the neural representation of one's intertemporal decisions.

Distinctive types of aversiveness are represented as the same in a portion of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex: An fMRI study with the cue paradigm

Some studies have argued that the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) is generally activated in response to aversive information, including pain, negative affect, and cognitive conflict. Other studies have claimed that the dACC has subdivisions, and each division has a specific function. By manipulating emotionally and cognitively aversive cues, the present study determined whether the dACC is generally responsive to aversiveness or it has subdivisions for specific forms of aversiveness. Conjunction functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) analysis showed that emotionally and cognitively aversive cues activated the same portion of the dACC. When these cues were contiguously presented, the region demonstrated additive activity, further supporting the overlapping representation of the two different forms of aversiveness in the dACC. Additional effective connectivity analysis showed that the dACC was co-activated with different brain regions depending on the cue type, characterizing its behavioral control mechanism. Complementary multivariate analyses showed that the reaction time was negatively correlated with the activity of the dACC and that the activity of the dACC under the emotional cue was predicted by the individual state anxiety score but not under the cognitive cue. We also found that the superior part of the dACC was uniquely activated in response to cognitively aversive cues, partially supporting the functional segregation account. Collectively, our results provide evidence that the specific locus of the dACC is generally responsive to distinctive motivational information, whereas the other loci may have segregated functions. Discussion includes recent neurocomputational theories that seem to satisfactorily account for the present results.

The selective use of punishments on congruent versus incongruent trials in the Stroop task

Conflict adaptation refers to the dynamic modulation of conflict processing across successive trials and reflects improved cognitive control. Interestingly, aversive motivation can increase conflict adaptation, although it remains unclear through which process this modulation occurs because previous studies presented punishment feedback following suboptimal performance on both congruent and incongruent trials. According to integrative accounts of conflict monitoring and aversive motivation in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, punishment feedback following slow or erroneous performance on incongruent trials in particular should lead to improved conflict adaptation. Second, selectively increasing motivation on incongruent trials should reduce the overall congruency effect. The current study sought to test both hypotheses. Specifically, we administered the confound-minimized Stroop task to a large group of participants and manipulated the position of feedback (following either congruent or incongruent trials) and aversive motivation (tied to a monetary loss or not) across different blocks. As expected, the congruency effect was found to be smaller when punishment was coupled with incongruent versus congruent trials. However, results showed that conflict adaptation was increased when punishment feedback was selectively coupled with congruent rather than incongruent trials. Together, these results suggest that aversive motivation does not uniformly improve cognitive control but this gain appears to be context dependent.

Modulation of Conflict Processing by Reappraisal: An Experimental Investigation

Negative affect facilitates conflict processing. Here we sought to assess whether symmetrically, its downregulation by means of reappraisal could lower it. To this end, 105 participants performed the confound-minimized Stroop task eliciting negative affect that was followed by a simple reward-related visual discrimination task. Conflict processing was induced with the former task. Half of them (experimental group) were instructed to use this second task to downregulate negative affect arising from the Stroop task. The other half (control group) did not receive these appraisal-related instructions. Group comparisons showed that negative affect and the conflict effect were similar for these two groups. However, when we added and modeled the subjective ratings related to emotion regulation, we found that conflict processing significantly improved for participants who reported using reappraisal spontaneously, and this gain occurred irrespective of negative affect. These results suggest that reappraisal can influence conflict processing but this change does not depend on negative affect.

Neural spatio-temporal patterns of information processing related to cognitive conflict and correct or false recognitions

Using a visual short-term memory task and employing a new methodological approach, we analyzed neural responses from the perspective of the conflict level and correctness/erroneous over a longer time window. Sixty-five participants performed the short-term memory task in the fMRI scanner. We explore neural spatio-temporal patterns of information processing in the context of correct or erroneous response and high or low level of cognitive conflict using classical fMRI analysis, surface-based cortical data, temporal analysis of interpolated mean activations, and machine learning classifiers. Our results provide evidence that information processing dynamics during the retrieval process vary depending on the correct or false recognition—for stimuli inducing a high level of cognitive conflict and erroneous response, information processing is prolonged. The observed phenomenon may be interpreted as the manifestation of the brain’s preparation for future goal-directed action.

The influence of inhibitory control on reappraisal and the experience of negative emotions

Inhibitory control (IC) enables goal-directed behaviour by reducing the interference of irrelevant information. Studies have shown that IC can downregulate performance-based behavioural and physiological measures of emotional reactivity. This study examined whether transient recruitment of IC can modulate self-reported negative feelings after exposure to negative or neutral content. Furthermore, it was tested if triggering IC can improve the ability to reduce the negativity of unpleasant content by reinterpreting its meaning (cognitive reappraisal). For this purpose, a combined flanker and cognitive reappraisal task was performed by 49 participants. The flanker task was used to prime IC before participants reappraised or observed negative and neutral content. Priming IC before negative images reduced self-reported negative feelings compared to when IC was not primed. In contrast, priming IC before neutral images increased negative feelings. Priming IC had no influence on the ability to reappraise negative emotional content. Finally, trait rumination was associated with higher emotional reactivity only when IC was not primed. These results illustrate the importance of IC in decreasing emotional reactivity after being exposed to negative content. IC is revealed as a mechanism that can dynamically modulate subjective emotional reactivity as a function of emotional context.

Limitations of cognitive control on emotional distraction - Congruency in the Color Stroop task does not modulate the Emotional Stroop effect

Emotional information receives prioritized processing over concurrent cognitive processes. This can lead to distraction if emotional information has to be ignored. In the cognitive domain, mechanisms have been described that allow control of (cognitive) distractions. However, whether similar cognitive control mechanisms also can attenuate emotional distraction is an active area of research. This study asked whether cognitive control (triggered in the Color Stroop task) attenuates emotional distraction in the Emotional Stroop task. Theoretical accounts of cognitive control, and the Emotional Stroop task alike, predict such an interaction for tasks that employ the same relevant (e.g., color-naming) and irrelevant (e.g., word-reading) dimension. In an alternating-runs design with Color and Emotional Stroop tasks changing from trial to trial, we analyzed the impact of proactive and reactive cognitive control on Emotional Stroop effects. Four experiments manipulated predictability of congruency and emotional stimuli. Overall, results showed congruency effects in Color Stroop tasks and Emotional Stroop effects. Moreover, we found a spillover of congruency effects and emotional distraction to the other task, indicating that processes specific to one task impacted to the other task. However, Bayesian analyses and a mini-meta-analysis across experiments weigh against the predicted interaction between cognitive control and emotional distraction. The results point out limitations of cognitive control to block off emotional distraction, questioning views that assume a close interaction between cognitive control and emotional processing.

The Stroop Task Influences Product Evaluations

Cognitive conflict is considered to represent a psychologically negative signal. Indeed, a recent publication showed that cognitive conflict emerging from the Stroop task influences evaluations for neutral shapes that had become associated with conflict and non-conflict, respectively. Building on these findings, the present research investigates the degree to which Stroop conflict influences evaluations of actual products. In an experimental study, participants performed a Stroop task in which they responded to conflict trials (e.g., the word red presented in a blue font) as well as non-conflict trials (e.g., the word red presented in a red font). Participants were also presented with two pictures featuring bottled water brands: One brand was consistently presented after non-conflict trials; the other brand was consistently presented after conflict trials. When participants evaluated the products, the results showed they rated the product associated with Stroop conflict less favorably than the product associated with non-conflict; however, this effect only emerged when participants were thirsty. When participants were not thirsty, no differences emerged. The present findings add to the literature on cognitive conflict and negativity, suggesting that Stroop conflict can influence product evaluations when those products are goal relevant.

Perceived conflict may be negative but resolved conflict is not

The current study investigated how exposure to a conflict stimulus influences the judgment of a subsequent stimulus's valence. We used an affective priming paradigm, presenting a color Stroop stimulus as a prime and a face as a target for an emotion recognition task. When the task for the prime was passive viewing (Experiment 1), congruent primes resulted in faster responses to emotionally positive targets than negative targets. However, this positivity bias disappeared following incongruent primes. In Experiment 2, instead of passive viewing, participants were asked to indicate the congruency of the prime, and the positivity bias was significant following the congruent prime but not following the incongruent prime. In Experiments 3 and 4, participants performed the conventional Stroop task on the prime, therefore resolving the conflict when the prime was incongruent. Experiment 3 adopted an equal proportion of congruent and incongruent primes. Experiment 4 adopted twice as many congruent primes as incongruent primes. In both experiments, the positivity bias was not significant regardless of the congruency of the prime. These results suggest that detecting conflict may interfere with positive affect or promote negative affect, therefore reducing the positivity bias. Once the conflict is resolved, however, the negative valence may disappear.