Networks of Influence Diagrams: A Formalism for Representing Agents' Beliefs and Decision-Making Processes

An Extended Chemical Plant Environmental Protection Game on Addressing Uncertainties of Human Adversaries

Chemical production activities in industrial districts pose great threats to the surrounding atmospheric environment and human health. Therefore, developing appropriate and intelligent pollution controlling strategies for the management team to monitor chemical production processes is significantly essential in a chemical industrial district. The literature shows that playing a chemical plant environmental protection (CPEP) game can force the chemical plants to be more compliant with environmental protection authorities and reduce the potential risks of hazardous gas dispersion accidents. However, results of the current literature strictly rely on several perfect assumptions which rarely hold in real-world domains, especially when dealing with human adversaries. To address bounded rationality and limited observability in human cognition, the CPEP game is extended to generate robust schedules of inspection resources for inspection agencies. The present paper is innovative on the following contributions: (i) The CPEP model is extended by taking observation frequency and observation cost of adversaries into account, and thus better reflects the industrial reality; (ii) Uncertainties such as attackers with bounded rationality, attackers with limited observation and incomplete information (i.e., the attacker’s parameters) are integrated into the extended CPEP model; (iii) Learning curve theory is employed to determine the attacker’s observability in the game solver. Results in the case study imply that this work improves the decision-making process for environmental protection authorities in practical fields by bringing more rewards to the inspection agencies and by acquiring more compliance from chemical plants.

Economic reasoning and artificial intelligence

The field of artificial intelligence (AI) strives to build rational agents capable of perceiving the world around them and taking actions to advance specified goals. Put another way, AI researchers aim to construct a synthetic homo economicus, the mythical perfectly rational agent of neoclassical economics. We review progress toward creating this new species of machine, machina economicus, and discuss some challenges in designing AIs that can reason effectively in economic contexts. Supposing that AI succeeds in this quest, or at least comes close enough that it is useful to think about AIs in rationalistic terms, we ask how to design the rules of interaction in multi-agent systems that come to represent an economy of AIs. Theories of normative design from economics may prove more relevant for artificial agents than human agents, with AIs that better respect idealized assumptions of rationality than people, interacting through novel rules and incentive systems quite distinct from those tailored for people.

A decision network account of reasoning about other people's choices

The ability to predict and reason about other people's choices is fundamental to social interaction. We propose that people reason about other people's choices using mental models that are similar to decision networks. Decision networks are extensions of Bayesian networks that incorporate the idea that choices are made in order to achieve goals. In our first experiment, we explore how people predict the choices of others. Our remaining three experiments explore how people infer the goals and knowledge of others by observing the choices that they make. We show that decision networks account for our data better than alternative computational accounts that do not incorporate the notion of goal-directed choice or that do not rely on probabilistic inference.

Norms for reasoning about decisions

Reasoning research has traditionally focused on the derivation of beliefs from beliefs, but it is increasingly turning to reasoning about decisions. In the absence of a single, entrenched normative model, the drive toward normativism is weaker in this new field than in its parent fields. The current balance between normativism and descriptivism is illustrated by three approaches to reasoning about decisions.