Naming our concerns about neuroscience: a review of Bennett and Hacker's philosophical foundations of neuroscience

Minding the gut: extending embodied cognition and perception to the gut complex

Scientific and philosophical accounts of cognition and perception have traditionally focused on the brain and external sense organs. The extended view of embodied cognition suggests including other parts of the body in these processes. However, one organ has often been overlooked: the gut. Frequently conceptualized as merely a tube for digesting food, there is much more to the gut than meets the eye. Having its own enteric nervous system, sometimes referred to as the "second brain," the gut is also an immune organ and has a large surface area interacting with gut microbiota. The gut has been shown to play an important role in many physiological processes, and may arguably do so as well in perception and cognition. We argue that proposals of embodied perception and cognition should take into account the role of the "gut complex," which considers the enteric nervous, endocrine, immune, and microbiota systems as well as gut tissue and mucosal structures. The gut complex is an interface between bodily tissues and the "internalized external environment" of the gut lumen, involved in many aspects of organismic activity beyond food intake. We thus extend current embodiment theories and suggest a more inclusive account of how to "mind the gut" in studying cognitive processes.

Murray Sidman: fostering progress through foundational choices

The contributions of Murray Sidman to the field of behavior analysis have helped to put the field on a progressive path. In this paper we describe three areas as examples, drawn from the larger set of his notable contributions: the analysis of stimulus equivalence in a way that has fostered a behavior-analytic approach to derived stimulus relations and symbolic meaning; the observation and measurement of individual behavior through time; and his stance against punitive applied methods. In each of these areas Sidman was a dedicated behaviorist, avoiding appeals to mentalistic or transcendental forces, opposing hypothetical mediational accounts, and taking a functional and contextual approach. Clarity of assumptions was at the heart of Sidman's effective scientific practices and there is no reason to think that those same assumptions will not carry us further, as evidence mounts in support of these views on psychological research and practice.

Influence of Cognitive Neuroscience on Contemporary Philosophy of Science

The study of contemporary philosophy of science based on cognitive neuroscience has strongly promoted the philosophy study of brain cognitive problems. It has pointed out the research direction for human to explore the relationship between the traditional mind and brain while systematically reflecting and investigating the theoretical basis and research method of cognitive neuroscience. Therefore, this study explores the influence and the significance of cognitive neuroscience on contemporary philosophy of science.

Who, What, and When: Skinner's Critiques of Neuroscience and His Main Targets

Skinner is commonly accused of being against neurophysiological explanations of behavior. However, in his writings, he did not criticize neuroscience itself as an important independent field from behavior analysis. The problem was in how some authors were using a pseudo-physiology in the explanation of behavior. Skinner was explicit in showing which authors and theories were using physiology incorrectly. Therefore, my goal is to present an analysis of the main targets of Skinner's critiques against neurophysiological explanations of behavior. This analysis will be divided as follows: (a) the targets of Skinner's critiques, (b) when the critiques were presented, and (c) the specific critiques that were made. The analysis was based upon 73 papers written by Skinner that were selected through keywords related to the issue. When placed in proper historical context, Skinner did not criticize neuroscience, but the misuse of pseudo-physiological theories in the explanation of behavior.

Explaining how the mind works: on the relation between cognitive science and philosophy

In this paper, we argue that under certain prevalent interpretations of the nature and aims of cognitive science, theories of cognition generate a forced choice between a conception of cognition which depends on the possibility of a private language, and a conception of cognition which depends on mereological confusions. We argue, further, that this should not pose a fundamental problem for cognitive scientists since a plausible interpretation of the nature and aims of cognitive science is available that does not generate this forced choice. The crucial difference between these interpretations is that on the one hand the aim of theories of cognition is to tell us what thinking (etc.) is, and on the other it is to tell us what is causally necessary if an intelligent creature is to be able to think. Our argument draws heavily on a Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy in which no philosophical theory can explain what thinking, perceiving, remembering, etc. are, either. The positive, strictly therapeutic, purpose of a philosophy of cognitive science should be to show that, since the traditional problems which constitute the philosophy of mind are chimerical, there is nothing for philosophical theorizing in cognitive science to achieve.

Realism without truth: a review of Giere's science without laws and scientific perspectivism

An increasingly popular view among philosophers of science is that of science as action-as the collective activity of scientists working in socially-coordinated communities. Scientists are seen not as dispassionate pursuers of Truth, but as active participants in a social enterprise, and science is viewed on a continuum with other human activities. When taken to an extreme, the science-as-social-process view can be taken to imply that science is no different from any other human activity, and therefore can make no privileged claims about its knowledge of the world. Such extreme views are normally contrasted with equally extreme views of classical science, as uncovering Universal Truth. In Science Without Laws and Scientific Perspectivism, Giere outlines an approach to understanding science that finds a middle ground between these extremes. He acknowledges that science occurs in a social and historical context, and that scientific models are constructions designed and created to serve human ends. At the same time, however, scientific models correspond to parts of the world in ways that can legitimately be termed objective. Giere's position, perspectival realism, shares important common ground with Skinner's writings on science, some of which are explored in this review. Perhaps most fundamentally, Giere shares with Skinner the view that science itself is amenable to scientific inquiry: scientific principles can and should be brought to bear on the process of science. The two approaches offer different but complementary perspectives on the nature of science, both of which are needed in a comprehensive understanding of science.