Competing initiatives: a new tobacco industry strategy to oppose statewide clean indoor air ballot measures

Defeating JUUL's Effort to Rewrite San Francisco's E-Cigarette Regulations

In 2019, San Francisco, California, prohibited the sale of electronic cigarettes lacking US Food and Drug Administration authorization. JUUL then promoted a ballot initiative (Proposition C) to replace San Francisco's e-cigarette legislation with legislation JUUL wrote that required future legislation to be approved by the voters. JUUL promoted Proposition C as a way to reduce youth e-cigarette use while allowing adult choice.Health groups argued that JUUL's measure could nullify San Francisco's prohibition on selling flavored tobacco products. Health groups benefitted from having an established campaign network that recently defended the flavor ban. They successfully framed Proposition C as a tobacco industry ploy to undo San Francisco's e-cigarette regulations, particularly the prohibition on selling flavored tobacco products. JUUL ended its campaign on September 30, 2019, and the measure failed on election day, with 82% voting against it.Lessons learned from the campaign include the importance of framing an industry initiative as a threat to local public health lawmaking and the potential for the e-cigarette issue to attract parents as new leaders and engage a powerful constituency to support tobacco control measures.

The Grassroots of Grass: Cannabis Legalization Ballot Initiative Campaign Contributions and Outcomes, 2004-2016

CONTEXT

As of November 2018, medical cannabis was legal in 33 US states and recreational cannabis in 10, mostly enacted via ballot initiative.

METHODS

We identified 32 cannabis legalization initiatives from 2004 to 2016 and obtained campaign contribution and state political and demographic data. After exploratory analyses of 15 potential independent variables, we quantified effects of 4 factors (initiative year, voter turnout, population born before 1946, advocate funding advantage) on voter support and likelihood of passage.

FINDINGS

A small number of campaign contributors dominated both sides of the issue, with little involvement by health advocates. Time and turnout, not money, were the factors most associated with electoral outcomes, consistent with increases in public opinion favoring cannabis legalization over time. Year, turnout, and population age were associated with voter support, while year, turnout, and advocate funding advantage were associated with likelihood of passage. When adjusting for an anomalous result, initiative year was the only variable that remained significantly associated with odds of passage, with a 1-year increase in initiative date associated with 2.02 times higher odds of passage (p < .01).

CONCLUSION

These results underscore the importance of health advocate participation in developing cannabis legalization frameworks.

When tobacco targets direct democracy

Tobacco control advocates began to use ballot initiatives to enact tobacco control measures in the late 1970s. In response, the tobacco industry worked for over two decades to change laws governing initiative and referendum processes to prevent passage of such measures. In 1981 the tobacco industry's political lobbying arm, the Tobacco Institute, created a front group that presented itself as a neutral initiative research clearinghouse to effect changes in state initiative and referenda laws. In 1990 the Tobacco Institute began creating an in-house team and worked with third-party groups to try to change state initiative laws. While the industry ultimately abandoned both efforts when neither achieved immediate success, over time the industry's goals have penetrated legitimate discourse on the initiative and referendum process in the United States, and many specific ideas it advocated have garnered mainstream support. Direct democracy advocates, as well as public health advocates and policy makers, need to understand the tobacco industry's goals (which other industries adopted) of limiting the direct democracy process to ensure that any changes do not inadvertently increase the power of the special interests that direct democracy was developed to counterbalance.

Political factors affecting the enactment of state-level clean indoor air laws

OBJECTIVES

We examined the effects of key political institutional factors on the advancement of state-level clean indoor air laws.

METHODS

We performed an observational study of state-level clean indoor air law enactment among all 50 US states from 1993 to 2010 by using extended Cox hazard models to assess risk of enacting a relevant law.

RESULTS

During the 18-year period from 1993 to 2010, 28 states passed a law covering workplaces, 33 states passed a law covering restaurants, 29 states passed a law covering bars, and 16 states passed a law covering gaming facilities. States with term limits had a 2.15 times greater hazard (95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.27, 3.65; P = .005) of enacting clean indoor air laws. The presence of state-level preemption of local clean indoor air laws was associated with a 3.26 times greater hazard (95% CI = 1.11, 9.53; P = .031) of state-level policy enactment. In the presence of preemption, increased legislative professionalism was strongly associated (hazard ratio = 3.28; 95% CI = 1.10, 9.75; P = .033) with clean indoor air law enactment.

CONCLUSIONS

Political institutional factors do influence state-level clean indoor air law enactment and may be relevant to other public health policy areas.

Enacting tobacco taxes by direct popular vote in the United States: lessons from 20 years of experience

BACKGROUND

Tobacco tax increases reduce tobacco use, can provide funds for tobacco prevention and enjoy broad public support. Because of tobacco industry influence in legislatures, US public health advocates have shifted the venue for tobacco tax policymaking to direct popular vote 22 times since 1988.

METHODS

We combined case studies of individual state campaigns with tobacco industry documents to identify strategies related to outcome.

RESULTS

The tobacco industry developed a voter segmentation model to determine which tobacco tax increases it could defeat. Two industry arguments arising from this model often were raised in losing campaigns-the tax increase did not dedicate enough to tobacco control and hospitals and health maintenance organisations would profit. The industry effectively influenced early voters. Success was associated with building a strong base of public support before the campaign, dedicating sufficient funds to tobacco control, avoiding proposals largely devoted to financing hospitals and other medical service providers, effectively engaging grassroots and framing the campaign with clear justifications for cigarette tax increases.

CONCLUSIONS

Tobacco tax ballot measures commonly allocated substantial funds to medical services; tobacco companies are becoming more successful in making this use of funds an issue. Proponents' campaigns should be timed to account for the trend to voting well before election day. Ballot measures to increase tobacco taxes with a substantial fraction of the money devoted to tobacco control activities will probably fare better than ones that give priority to funding medical services.