Costa Rica's implementation of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: Overcoming decades of industry dominance

Advocacy counterstrategies to tobacco industry interference in policymaking: a scoping review of peer-reviewed literature

BACKGROUND

There has been remarkable tobacco control progress in many places around the globe. Tobacco industry interference (TII) has been identified as the most significant barrier to further implementation of the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC). Civil society has been recognised as a key actor in countering TII. While TII has been extensively studied for several decades now, there is little research that focuses on counteractions to limit it and their effectiveness to do so. This scoping review seeks to map the peer-reviewed literature on civil society's activities of countering TII in policymaking to identify common counterstrategies and assess their effectiveness.

METHODS

Data sources: We searched Embase, IBSS, JSTOR, PubMed, Science Direct, Scopus and Web of Science using the following terms: ("Tobacco industry" OR "Tobacco compan*") AND. ("corporate political activity" OR "CPA" OR "lobbying" OR "interference") AND ("advoca*" OR "counter*" OR "activi*"), without time or language restrictions.

STUDY SELECTION

Our selection criteria included peer-reviewed studies that were written in English, German, or Spanish that drew on primary data and/or legal and policy documents and reported at least one specific example of civil society members or organisations countering tobacco industry action-based strategies.

DATA EXTRACTION

Advocates' counterstrategies were analysed inductively and countered industry strategies were analysed using the Policy Dystopia Model (PDM). Perceptions of effectiveness of countering attempts were analysed descriptively.

RESULTS

We found five common counterstrategies among 30 included papers covering five WHO regions; 1. Exposing industry conduct and false claims; 2. Accessing decision-makers; 3. Generating and using evidence; 4. Filing a complaint or taking legal action; 5. Mobilising coalition and potential supporters. These counterstrategies were used to work against a wide range of industry strategies, which are captured by five action-based strategies described in the PDM (Coalition Management, Information Management, Direct Access and Influence, Litigation, Reputation Management). While some studies reported the outcome of the countering activities, their impact remained largely underexplored.

CONCLUSION

The review shows that peer-reviewed literature documenting how civil society actors counter TII is scarce. It suggests that advocates employ a range of strategies to counter TII in its different forms and use them flexibly. More work is needed to better understand the effects of their actions. This could stimulate discussions about, and facilitate learning from, past experiences and help to further enhance advocates' capacity.

Tobacco industry thwarts ad ban legislation in India in the 1990s: Lessons for meeting FCTC obligations under Articles 13 and 5.3

Bans on tobacco advertising are important for reducing tobacco-caused disease. Previously secret internal tobacco industry documents and organizational and newspaper websites related to tobacco control efforts in India during 1990s were analyzed. The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, World Health Organization, Indian Council of Medical Research, and civil society played important roles in pushing for tobacco control legislation beginning in the 1980s. Guided by transnational tobacco companies, especially British American Tobacco, Philip Morris International, and RJ Reynolds, Indian cigarette companies formed the Tobacco Institute of India (TII). Following the industry's global strategy, TII proposed voluntary advertising codes, used diplomatic channels and high level political and judicial lobbying, and allied with other industry, sports and trade groups to delay legislation for ten years. TII argued for the social and economic importance of tobacco and that laws were unnecessary, unconstitutional, and would hurt the economy. These early global strategies were continuing in 2022 to delay and evade legislative efforts to ban tobacco advertising. Understanding these strategies can inform public health efforts to counter industry efforts to thwart the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in 2022 not only in India, where the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare has proposed strengthening India's tobacco control law, but globally.

Understanding why collective action resulted in greater advances for tobacco control as compared to alcohol control during the Philippines' Sin Tax Reform: a qualitative study

BACKGROUND AND AIMS

In 2012, the Philippines passed a law popularly known as the 'Sin Tax Reform'. This law increased excise tax on both tobacco and alcohol. While a victory for public health, the total amount of taxes paid by the tobacco and alcohol industries was an uneven 69-31 split. The primary aim of this study is to explore why collective action of Sin Tax proponents resulted in greater advances for tobacco control as compared with alcohol control.

METHODS

A case study approach was used. Key informant interviews were carried out with 25 individuals from academic, governmental, non-governmental and international organisations and industry who had first-hand knowledge of the Sin Tax policy process, led an organisation that participated in the process and/or possessed expert knowledge of Sin Taxes in the Philippines. Interviews were subsequently transcribed then analysed using inductive coding.

RESULTS

Four factors contributed to the varying tax treatment of the two industries: (1) absence of advocacy-oriented alcohol control groups, (2) the proponents' 'divide and conquer' strategy, which aimed to prevent the alcohol and tobacco industries from joining forces, (3) the perception that moderate drinking is acceptable among some of the Sin Tax proponents, public and medical community and (4) a weaker global push for alcohol control.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings suggest the need to cultivate advocacy-oriented alcohol control civil society organisations, generate consensus at the local and global level regarding the problem definition and policy solutions for alcohol control and consider global instruments to strengthen norms and standards for alcohol control. Given that proponents also negotiated for a lower alcohol tax compared with tobacco due to the concern that the two industries might join forces, it also raises the question of whether or not a health tax bill should tackle more than one health harming product at a time.

Health Taxes on Tobacco, Alcohol, Food and Drinks in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: A Scoping Review of Policy Content, Actors, Process and Context

BACKGROUND

Taxation of tobacco, food, alcohol and other beverages has gained renewed attention in responding to non-communicable diseases (NCDs). While largely built on evidence from high-income countries (HICs), the projected economic and health benefits of these measures have increased calls for their use in price-sensitive low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). However, uptake has been sporadic and there remains little research on why and how LMICs utilise fiscal measures in response to NCDs.

METHODS

This scoping review analyses factors influencing the design and implementation of health-related fiscal measures in LMICs. Utilising Arksey and O'Malley's scoping review methodology and Walt and Gilson's policy triangle, we considered the contextual, procedural, content and stakeholder-related factors that influenced measures.

RESULTS

We identified 75 papers focussing on health-related fiscal measures, with 47 (63%) focused on tobacco, 5 on alcohol, 6 on soft drink and 4 studies on food-related fiscal regulation. Thirteen papers analysed multiple measures and most papers (n = 66, 88%) were less than a decade old. Key factors enabling the design and implementation of measures included localised health and economic evidence, policy championing, inter-ministerial support, and global or regional momentum. Impeding factors encompassed negative framing and retaliation by industry, vested interests and governmental policy disjuncture. Aligning with theoretic insights from the policy triangle, findings consistently demonstrated that the interplay between factors - rather than the presence or absence of particular factors - has the most profound impact on policy implementation.

CONCLUSION

Given the growing urgency to address NCDs in LMICs, this review highlights the need for recognition and rigorous exploration of political economy factors influencing the design and implementation of fiscal measures. Broader LMIC-specific empirical research is needed to overcome an implication noted in much of the literature: that mechanisms used to enact tobacco taxation are universally applicable to measures targeting foods, alcohol and other beverages.

Global Implementation of Tobacco Demand Reduction Measures Specified in Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

INTRODUCTION

The world's first global health treaty, WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) aims to reduce tobacco product demand by focusing on tobacco taxes, smoking bans, health warning labels, and tobacco advertising bans. Previous studies almost unanimously suggest that FCTC has prompted countries to implement more effective tobacco demand reduction policies.

AIMS AND METHODS

By taking into account the pre-FCTC status, country income level, and state capacity we studied if ratifying FCTC was associated with tobacco demand reduction measures in 2018/2019. We used logistic regression to assess the association of FCTC ratification with adoption demand reduction measures, accounting for years since ratification, baseline status, and other covariates.

RESULTS

Except for taxes, state of tobacco policy implementation before FCTC ratification did not predict adoption of FCTC policies. Time since FCTC ratification was associated with implementing smoking bans and pictorial HWLs. In contrast, while the tax rate prior to FCTC ratification was positively associated with increased taxes after FCTC ratification, time since FCTC ratification was marginally negatively associated with increases in tobacco taxes.

CONCLUSIONS

While the FCTC was followed by implementation of compliant demand reduction policies, there are still many parties that have not implemented the FCTC, particularly increasing taxes and ending tobacco advertising and promotions.

IMPLICATIONS

We assessed changes in tobacco demand reductions measures over 22 years in 193 countries. By using internal tobacco industry documents, we were able establish a baseline before the FCTC negotiations. Unlike previous studies, we included four tobacco demand reductions measures: tobacco taxes, smoking bans, health warning labels, and tobacco advertising ban. The limitation of the study is that we do not have data to describe if demand reduction measures are actually enforced or what their effect on tobacco consumption is.

Seven-year tobacco tax plan in Ukraine: a case study of the actors, tactics and factors motivating policy passage

OBJECTIVE

In December 2017, the Ukrainian Rada passed legislation that would increase tobacco taxes for the next 7 years to meet requirements of the European Union-Ukraine Association Agreement (EU-UAA). We analysed factors motivating passage of Ukraine's 7-year tobacco tax plan as well as tactics used by both opponents and proponents to describe how the plan was passed.

DESIGN

A case study approach was used. Data were gathered from semistructured interviews (n=12) and document review (n=24) and analysed using inductive and deductive coding.

RESULTS

The European Union-Ukraine Association Agreement, a significant budget deficit and a history of tobacco tax success were all contextual factors contributing to policy passage. Proponents of high tobacco taxes capitalised on this opportunity, using media advocacy, generating scientific evidence and collaborating effectively across multiple sectors to support the passage of the plan. Opponents used media advocacy and lobbied to water down several features of the plan, resulting in smaller increases that might not meet EU-UAA requirements.

CONCLUSION

Industry interference via lobbying continues to hamper passage of high tobacco taxes and should be addressed via legislation that aligns with Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Proponents should look for windows of opportunity caused by external events, create a multisectoral coalition, including tax experts and use media advocacy to support tax increases. Further work should continue to document what contextual factors support tobacco control policy change.

Food and beverage industry interference in science and policy: efforts to block soda tax implementation in Mexico and prevent international diffusion

Mexico is the largest soft drink market in the world, with high rates of obesity and type 2 diabetes. Due to strains on the nation’s productivity and healthcare spending, Mexican lawmakers implemented one of the world’s first public health taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) in 2014. Because Mexico’s tax was designed to reduce SSB consumption, it faced strong opposition from transnational food and beverage corporations. We analysed previously secret internal industry documents from major corporations in the University of California San Francisco’s Food Industry Documents Archive that shed light on the industry response to the Mexican soda tax. We also reviewed all available studies of the Mexican soda tax’s effectiveness, contrasting the results of industry-funded and non-industry-funded studies. We found that food and beverage industry trade organisations and front groups paid scientists to produce research suggesting that the tax failed to achieve health benefits while harming the economy. These results were disseminated before non-industry-funded studies could be finalized in peer review. Mexico still provided a real-world context for the first independent peer-reviewed studies documenting the effectiveness of soda taxation—studies that were ultimately promoted by the global health community. We conclude that the case of the Mexican soda tax shows that industry resistance can persist well after new policies have become law as vested interests seek to roll back legislation, and to stall or prevent policy diffusion. It also underscores the decisive role that conflict-of-interest-free, peer-reviewed research can play in implementing health policy innovations.

Exceeding WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) Obligations: Nepal Overcoming Tobacco Industry Interference to Enact a Comprehensive Tobacco Control Policy

BACKGROUND

The tobacco industry works to block, delay, and weaken national tobacco control legislation to implement the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). This article reviews how Nepal overcame industry opposition and to a comprehensive tobacco control law implementing the FCTC.

METHODS

We triangulated newspaper articles and policy documents with key informant interviews.

RESULTS

With the support of international health groups, local tobacco control advocates worked with policymakers in Nepal to pass a comprehensive tobacco control law that exceeded FCTC obligations. The tobacco industry exploited a time of political transition to block consideration by Parliament, arranged and sponsored foreign tours for legislators, made death threats to tobacco control advocates and their families, and argued for the economic importance of tobacco farms. Despite strong interference from Health, and Law and Justice ministers, a 2009 Supreme Court ruling helped tobacco control advocates secure a comprehensive tobacco control law in 2011 that included rotating pictorial health warning labels covering 75% of both sides of cigarette packages, 100% smoke free public places and workplaces, private homes and vehicles, and a tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship ban.

CONCLUSIONS

Advocates in developing countries should utilize Nepal's experience to reject tobacco industry offers of compromise and continue educating politicians and legislators to generate political support to pass a comprehensive tobacco control law. Technical and financial support from international agencies, and effective collaboration and coordination of civil societies, and utilization of domestic litigation are helpful in LMICs where governance is weak (the abstract in Nepali is available as a Supplementary Material).

IMPLICATIONS

The tobacco industry exploited a time of political transition in Nepal in its effort to block comprehensive tobacco control policy in Parliament by sponsoring foreign tours of legislatures, making death threats to tobacco control advocates and their families, and arguing for the economic importance of tobacco farms. Tobacco control advocates used litigation to raise awareness and educate legislators and promote strong legislation with the involvement of international health groups. Technical and financial support from international agencies, and effective collaboration and coordination of civil societies, and utilization of domestic litigation are helpful in LMICs where governance is weak.

Defending Comprehensive Tobacco Control Policy Implementation in Nepal From Tobacco Industry Interference (2011-2018)

INTRODUCTION

Nepal passed a comprehensive tobacco control law in 2011. Tobacco control advocates successfully countered tobacco industry (TI) interference to force implementation of law.

AIMS AND METHODS

Policy documents, news stories, and key informant interviews were triangulated and interpreted using the Policy Dystopia Model (PDM).

RESULTS

The TI tried to block and weaken the law after Parliament passed it. Tobacco control advocates used litigation to force implementation of the law while the TI used litigation in an effort to block implementation. The TI argued that tobacco was socially and economically important, and used front groups to weaken the law. Tobacco control advocates mobilized the media, launched public awareness campaigns, educated the legislature, utilized lawsuits, and monitored TI activities to successfully counter TI opposition.

CONCLUSIONS

Both tobacco control advocates and the industry used the discursive and instrumental strategies described in the PDM. The model was helpful for understanding TI activities in Nepal and could be applied to other low- and middle-income countries. Civil society, with the help of international health groups, should continue to track TI interference and learn the lessons from other countries to proactively to counter it.

IMPLICATIONS

The PDM provides an effective framework to understand battles over implementation of a strong tobacco control law in Nepal, a low- and middle-income country. The TI applied discursive and instrumental strategies in Nepal in its efforts to weaken and delay the implementation of the law at every stage of implementation. It is important to continuously monitor TI activities and learn lessons from other countries, as the industry often employ the same strategies globally. Tobacco control advocates utilized domestic litigation, media advocacy, and engaged with legislators, politicians, and other stakeholders to implement a strong tobacco control law. Other low- and middle-income countries can adapt these lessons from Nepal to achieve effective implementation of their laws.

Tobacco control in Nepal during a time of government turmoil (1960-2006)

BACKGROUND

Nepal was a monarchy, then a dictatorship, then a democracy. This paper reviews how tobacco control progressed in Nepal in the context of these changes in government from 1950 through 2006.

METHODS

We triangulated tobacco industry documents, newspaper articles and key informant interviews.

RESULTS

Until 1983, the tobacco industry was mostly state owned. Transnational tobacco companies entered the Nepalese market through ventures with Surya Tobacco Company Private Limited (with Imperial Tobacco Company and British American Tobacco) in 1983 and Seti Cigarette Factory Limited (with Philip Morris International [PMI]) in 1985. Seminars and conferences on tobacco, celebrations of World No Tobacco Day (WNTD) and efforts by WHO helped promote tobacco control in Nepal beginning in the 1970s. Tobacco advocates in Nepal pushed the government to issue executive orders banning smoking in public places in 1992 and tobacco advertising in electronic media in 1998, and to introduce a tobacco health tax in 1993. The tobacco industry lobbied against these measures and succeeded in keeping the tobacco tax low by challenging it in court. Tobacco advocates sued the government in 2003 and 2005, resulting in a June 2006 Supreme Court decision upholding the smoking and advertising bans and requiring the government to enact a comprehensive tobacco control law.

CONCLUSIONS

Political instability, conflict, weak governance and the dictatorship significantly affect tobacco control activities in low-income and middle-income countries. Nepal shows that tobacco control advocates can take advantage of global events, such as WNTD, and use domestic litigation to maintain support from civil societies and to advocate for stronger tobacco control policies.

Memoranda of understanding: a tobacco industry strategy to undermine illicit tobacco trade policies

OBJECTIVE

Analyse the transnational tobacco companies' (TTCs) memoranda of understanding (MoUs) on illicit trade and how they could undermine the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (Protocol).

METHODS

Review of tobacco industry documents and websites, reports, news and media items using standard snowball search methods.

RESULTS

Facing increasing pressure from governments and the FCTC to address illicit tobacco trade during the late 1990s, TTCs entered into voluntary partnerships embodied in MoUs with governments' law enforcement and customs agencies. One of the earliest known MoUs was between Philip Morris International and Italy in 1999. TTCs agreed among themselves to establish MoUs individually but use the Italian MoU as a basis to establish similar connections with other governments to pre-empt more stringent regulation of illicit trade. TTCs report to have signed over 100 MoUs since 1999, and promote them on their websites, in Corporate Social Responsibility reports and in the media as important partnerships to combat illicit tobacco trade. There is no evidence to support TTCs' claims that these MoUs reduce illicit trade. The terms of these MoUs are rarely made public. MoUs are non-transparent partnerships between government agencies and TTCs, violating FCTC Article 5.3 and the Protocol. MoUs are not legally binding so do not create an accountability system or penalties for non-compliance, rendering them ineffective at controlling illicit trade.

CONCLUSION

Governments should reject TTC partnerships through MoUs and instead ratify and implement the FCTC and the Protocol to effectively address illicit trade in tobacco products.

Limited implementation of the framework convention on tobacco control's tobacco tax provision: global comparison

OBJECTIVE

To quantify changes in tobacco tax rates and cigarette affordability after countries ratified the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) using with the WHO MPOWER standards.

METHODS

We used logistic regression to assess the association of FCTC ratification with adoption of at least 50% and 75% (high) of retail price tobacco tax rates for the most sold brands in countries, accounting for years since ratification and other covariates. We also compared cigarette affordability in 2014 with 1999.

RESULTS

By 2014, 44% of high-income countries had taxes above 75% of retail value compared with 18% in 1998/1999. In 15 years, 69 countries increased the tobacco tax rate, 33 decreased it and one had the same tax rate. FCTC ratification was not associated with implementing high tobacco taxes. More fragile countries in terms of security, political, economic and social development were less likely to have at least 50% and 75% tobacco tax rates in 2014 compared with 1999. The higher the cigarette prices in 1999 the less likely the countries were to have at least 75% tobacco tax rates in 2014. However, cigarettes were less affordable in 2014 than in 1999 in countries that had ratified FCTC earlier.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite widespread FCTC ratification, implementing higher tobacco taxes remains incomplete. Guidelines for FCTC Article 6 implementation should assign definite targets for tobacco taxes and for implementation of a tax escalator that gradually increases taxes to match rising income levels. Fragile countries are less likely to have high tobacco taxes and less affordable cigarettes. The tobacco control community should intensify efforts to help fragile countries improve performance in FCTC implementation both through strengthening their administrative and technical capacity and through supporting basic functions of government.

Tobacco control law implementation in a middle-income country: Transnational tobacco control network overcoming tobacco industry opposition in Colombia

The objective of this paper is to examine the implementation of Colombia's tobacco control law. Methods involved are triangulated government legislation, news sources, and interviews with policy-makers and health advocates in Colombia. Colombia, a middle-income country, passed a tobacco control law in 2009 that included a prohibition on tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship; and required pictorial health warning labels, ingredients disclosure, and a prohibition on individual cigarette sales. Tobacco companies challenged the implementation through litigation, tested government enforcement of advertising provisions and regulations on ingredients disclosure, and lobbied local governments to deprioritise policy responses to single cigarette sales. A transnational network including international health groups and funders helped strengthen domestic capacity to implement the law by; promoting public awareness of Ley [Law] 1335; training local health department staff on enforcement; facilitating health agencies' sharing of educational strategies; and providing legal defence assistance. This network included vigilant efforts by local health groups, which continuously monitored and alerted the media to noncompliance, engaged government officials and policy-makers on implementation, and raised public awareness. Support from international health NGOs and funders and continuous engagement by local health groups enhanced implementation capacities to counter continued tobacco industry interference and ensure effective tobacco control implementation.

Regulatory chills: tobacco industry legal threats and the politics of tobacco standardised packaging in New Zealand

AIMS

To describe the process of enacting tobacco standardised packaging (SP) amidst tobacco industry legal threats in New Zealand.

METHODS

Relevant government and NGO documents, and media items were reviewed. Policymakers and health advocates in New Zealand were interviewed. The data were triangulated and thematically analysed.

RESULTS

In 2011, the New Zealand Government announced the goal of becoming a smokefree country (reducing smoking prevalence to 5%) by the year 2025, and considered adopting SP. In April 2012, the Government announced it would introduce SP, but tobacco companies threatened the Government with litigation in international courts for violating investment and intellectual property rights. In response, the Government adopted a 'wait and see' approach, waiting until two legal challenges against Australia's SP law were resolved before it enacted its legislation in September 2016. Health advocates, limited due to funding constraints, attempted to alter the Government's approach to the legal threats without success. Interviews with policymakers and health advocates confirmed these threats helped produce a regulatory chill, delaying the policymaking process by three years.

CONCLUSION

The New Zealand case illustrates how the threat of a potential international lawsuit can create a chilling effect by helping delay the implementation of public health policies.

Defending strong tobacco packaging and labelling regulations in Uruguay: transnational tobacco control network versus Philip Morris International

OBJECTIVE

Describe the process of enacting and defending strong tobacco packaging and labelling regulations in Uruguay amid Philip Morris International's (PMI) legal threats and challenges.

METHODS

Triangulated government legislation, news sources and interviews with policy-makers and health advocates in Uruguay.

RESULTS

In 2008 and 2009, the Uruguayan government enacted at the time the world's largest pictorial health warning labels (80% of front and back of package) and prohibited different packaging or presentations for cigarettes sold under a given brand. PMI threatened to sue Uruguay in international courts if these policies were implemented. The Vazquez administration maintained the regulations, but a week prior to President Vazquez's successor, President Mujica, took office on 1 March 2010 PMI announced its intention to file an investment arbitration dispute against Uruguay in the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. Initially, the Mujica administration announced it would weaken the regulations to avoid litigation. In response, local public health groups in Uruguay enlisted former President Vazquez and international health groups and served as brokers to develop a collaboration with the Mujica administration to defend the regulations. This united front between the Uruguayan government and the transnational tobacco control network paid off when Uruguay defeated PMI's investment dispute in July 2016.

CONCLUSION

To replicate Uruguay's success, other countries need to recognise that strong political support, an actively engaged local civil society and financial and technical support are important factors in overcoming tobacco industry's legal threats to defend strong public health regulations.

Advancing progressive health policy to reduce NCDs amidst international commercial opposition: Tobacco standardised packaging in Australia

This study examines how health advocates and the Australian government responded to international commercial pressure during the implementation of tobacco standardised packaging (SP) as a measure to reduce non-communicable diseases (NCDs). Relevant government and NGO documents, and media items were reviewed. Policymakers and health advocates (n = 19) in Australia were interviewed. In 2009, Australia's National Health Taskforce recommended SP, which the Australian government announced in April 2010. In response, tobacco companies threatened the government with litigation in both domestic and international courts, claiming that SP would violate their investment and intellectual property rights. However, these legal threats were unsuccessful in forcing the government to withdrawal the SP proposal. Tobacco companies legally challenged SP, but as of February 2018 failed with each legal challenge. The political success of enacting and implementing SP against international commercial pressure was supported by legal preparation and support, and a whole-of-government approach. The Australian SP case illustrates how, against international commercial opposition, governments can build and maintain political and official support to enact and implement progressive public health measures to reduce NCDs.