Reminding staff of diligence during the medication process is not enough to ensure safety: Learning from wrong fluid product selection incidents in the care of critically ill patients

Background and objectives

Wrong fluid product selection may cause harm to patients. This study aimed to describe voluntarily reported wrong fluid product selection incidents, including their consequences, the reported latent conditions and active failures leading to these and the suggested safeguards to prevent their occurrence, and to compare the suggested and literature-based safeguards to improve the fluid therapy safety within the intensive care (ICU) environment.

Methods

All voluntarily and anonymously reported wrong fluid product selection incidents in all Finnish ICUs during 2007–2017 were reviewed. The incident reports included categorized data that were analyzed quantitatively, and narratives that were analyzed qualitatively, using content analysis. The results were reported as frequencies and percentages and described by using Reason's model of human error.

Results

Over the eleven years, one wrong fluid product selection incident was reported every six days (n = 663; 584 errors, 79 near misses); most were reported to have occurred during the dispensing/preparing phase (92%). Of the 584 reported selection errors, a quarter (26%) was reported to have caused consequences to patients, and one third (35%) to have required corrective or monitoring actions. The main reported latent conditions to the incidents were Working environment and resources (e.g. workload and time pressure) (29%), Similar-looking and -sounding names or shared features of the product containers (i.e. the LASA phenomenon) (28%) and Working methods (22%); and the main reported active failures were a lack of concentration, or forgetfulness (26%). Some usable suggestions of safeguards were made, e.g. optimizing fluid storage (15%) or utilizing checking practices (21%). While requiring accuracy, i.e. reminding staff of diligence and to be more attentive to detail during the whole medication process, was emphasized in most reports (71%), involving manufacturers in redesigning labels of fluid products, utilizing technology and strengthening pharmacy services are advocated existing literature.

Conclusions

Wrong fluid product selection incidents with various latent conditions and active failures were reported more than once a week. To minimize the serious LASA phenomenon, multi-professional collaboration, coordinated international discussion and agreements of solutions with manufacturers, regulators and end-users, are needed. However, work is also needed to reduce the other latent factors, such as Working environment and resources as well as cognitive biases in daily work that may contribute to the occurrence of LASA related errors.

Medication safety officer preparatory course: Outcomes and experiences

Purpose

Few hospitals employ a medication safety officer. A medication safety officer preparatory course was planned using a structured curriculum to prepare pharmacists with the knowledge and skills to start medication safety officer activities. The current study aims to assess the outcome, as change in knowledge, of a hospital medication safety officer preparatory course.

Methods

We conducted a three-day course in February 2011 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. It was developed to provide attendees with the essential knowledge and skills to become a medication safety officer. Teaching methodologies included didactic teaching, group discussions, case presentations, and an independent study of medication safety materials. The content of the course focused on the various roles of a medication safety officer, the importance of medication safety in a health care setting, the incidence of adverse drug events in a hospital setting, strategies to identify and prevent adverse events, the use of root cause analysis and failure mode and effect analysis, the role of an officer in hospital accreditation, and ways for promoting safety culture. Assessment of the course outcome was accomplished by comparing scores of knowledge level before and after the course. The knowledge level was assessed by a 20-item exam which was developed and validated by course instructors.

Results

Twenty-one participants attended the course and completed both the baseline and after-course assessment questionnaires. The majority was male (N = 14, % = 66.7) with a job experience of 1–5 five years (N = 10, % = 47.6). The knowledge score increased from 14.3 ± 1.90 (mean ± standard deviation) at baseline to 18.5 ± 1.43 after successfully completing the course (P < 0.001).

Conclusion

A three-day medication safety officer preparatory course has been shown to significantly improve attendee knowledge about medication safety. Educating health care professionals is an important tool to help ensure the safety of patients.

Using Contemporary Leadership Skills in Medication Safety Programs

The discipline of studying medication errors and implementing medication safety programs in hospitals dates to the 1970s. These initial programs to prevent errors focused only on pharmacy operation changes - and not the broad medication use system. In the late 1990s, research showed that faulty systems, and not faulty people, are responsible for errors and require a multidisciplinary approach. The 2013 ASHP Statement on the Role of the Medication Safety Leader recommended that medication safety leaders be integrated team members rather than a single point of contact. Successful medication safety programs must employ a new approach - one that embraces the skills of all health care team members and positions many leaders to improve safety. This approach requires a new set of leadership skills based on contemporary management principles, including followership, team-building, tracking and assessing progress, storytelling and communication, and cultivating innovation, all of which promote transformational change. The application of these skills in developing or changing a medication safety program is reviewed in this article.