Fregoli syndrome

Oh it's me again: Déjà vu, the brain, and self-awareness

Déjà vu and involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) are differentiated by a number of factors including metacognition. In contrast to IAMs, déjà vu activates regions associated with self-awareness including the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.

Psychosis as a Treatment Target in Dementia: A Roadmap for Designing Interventions

Psychotic phenomena are among the most severe and disruptive symptoms of dementias and appear in 30% to 50% of patients. They are associated with a worse evolution and great suffering to patients and caregivers. Their current treatments obtain limited results and are not free of adverse effects, which are sometimes serious. It is therefore crucial to develop new treatments that can improve this situation. We review available data that could enlighten the future design of clinical trials with psychosis in dementia as main target. Along with an explanation of its prevalence in the common diseases that cause dementia, we present proposals aimed at improving the definition of symptoms and what should be included and excluded in clinical trials. A review of the available information regarding the neurobiological basis of symptoms, in terms of pathology, neuroimaging, and genomics, is provided as a guide towards new therapeutic targets. The correct evaluation of symptoms is transcendental in any therapeutic trial and these aspects are extensively addressed. Finally, a critical overview of existing pharmacological and non-pharmacological treatments is made, revealing the unmet needs, in terms of efficacy and safety. Our work emphasizes the need for better definition and measurement of psychotic symptoms in dementias in order to highlight their differences with symptoms that appear in non-dementing diseases such as schizophrenia. Advances in neurobiology should illuminate the development of new, more effective and safer molecules for which this review can serve as a roadmap in the design of future clinical trials.

Delusional Misidentification Syndromes: Untangling Clinical Quandary With the Newer Evidence-Based Approaches

The delusional misidentification syndromes (DMS) have been described extensively in the descriptive literature of the last century given its unusual and often-distressing clinical presentations. In the last few decades, there have been advances in scientific research that have identified more precise brain areas involved in these delusional syndromes. Since DMS are reported in both early-onset psychosis and neurodegenerative conditions, the strategies to address and mitigate underlying etiology warrant a thorough assessment and individualized treatment planning. The age of onset, nature of the clinical presentation, the utility of diagnostic tests, and assessment of violence are few among many areas which need attention during clinical management of these rare syndromes.

Folie à deux and Fregoli syndrome with greater severity in the 'secondary' - A case report

Folie à deux and Fregoli syndrome are rarely seen in clinical practice. We present a case in which these rare syndromes co-occur. Remarkably, in this case the 'secondary' develops a more serious illness course than the 'primary' and reciprocally induces a de novo Fregoli delusion in the 'primary'. This case discusses how socio-cultural factors, such as interdependent family dynamics, could have precipitated this rare variant of folie à deux. It also highlights the importance of making culturally-sensitive formulations for treatment.

Social Neuroscience: Progress and Implications for Mental Health

Social neuroscience is a new, interdisciplinary field devoted to understanding how biological systems implement social processes and behavior. Social neuroscience capitalizes on biological concepts and methods to inform and refine theories of social behavior, and it uses social and behavioral constructs and data to inform and refine theories of neural organization and function. We focus here on the progress and potential of social neuroscience in the area of mental health. Research in social neuroscience has grown dramatically in recent years. Among the most active areas of research we found are brain-imaging studies in normal children and adults; animal models of social behavior; studies of stroke patients; imaging studies of psychiatric patients; and research on social determinants of peripheral neural, neuroendocrine, and immunological processes. We also found that these areas of research are proceeding along largely independent trajectories. Our goals in this article are to review the development of this field, examine some currently promising approaches, identify obstacles and opportunities for future advances and integration, and consider how this research can inform work on the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders.

Capgras' syndrome in first-episode psychotic disorders

BACKGROUND

Misidentification phenomena, including the delusion of 'imposters' named after Joseph Capgras, occur in various major psychiatric and neurological disorders but have rarely been studied systematically in broad samples of modern patients. This study investigated the prevalence and correlated clinical factors of Capgras' phenomenon in a broad sample of patient-subjects with first-lifetime episodes of psychotic affective and nonaffective disorders.

METHODS

We evaluated 517 initially hospitalized, first-episode psychotic-disorder patients for the prevalence of Capgras' phenomenon and its association with DSM-IV-TR diagnoses including schizophreniform, brief psychotic, unspecified psychotic, delusional, and schizoaffective disorders, schizophrenia, bipolar-I disorder and major depression with psychotic features, and with characteristics of interest including antecedent psychiatric and neurological morbidity, onset type and presenting psychopathological phenomena, using standard bivariate and multivariate statistical methods.

RESULTS

Capgras' syndrome was identified in 73/517 (14.1%) patients (8.2-50% across diagnoses). Risk was greatest with acute or brief psychotic disorders (schizophreniform psychoses 50%, brief psychoses 34.8%, or unspecified psychoses 23.9%), intermediate in major depression (15%), schizophrenia (11.4%) and delusional disorder (11.1%), and lowest in bipolar-I (10.3%) and schizoaffective disorders (8.2%). Associated were somatosensory, olfactory and tactile hallucinations, Schneiderian (especially delusional perception), and cycloid features including polymorphous psychotic phenomena, rapidly shifting psychomotor and affective symptoms, pananxiety, ecstasy, overconcern with death, and perplexity or confusion, as well as rapid onset, but not sex, age, abuse history, dissociative features, or indications of neurological disorders.

CONCLUSIONS

Capgras' syndrome was prevalent across a broad spectrum of first-episode psychotic disorders, most often in acute psychoses of rapid onset.

Delusional misidentification syndromes and dementia: a border zone between neurology and psychiatry

The delusional misidentification syndromes (DMSs) are psychopathologic phenomena in which a patient consistently misidentifies persons, places, objects, or events. Although often described in relation to psychotic states including schzofrenia, it is, nevertheless, widely considered that these syndromes have an anatomical basis because of their frequent association with organic brain disease; studies have pointed to the presence of identifiable lesions, especially in the right frontal lobe and adjacent regions, in a considerable proportion of patients. The purpose of this article is to examine the phenomenon in people with dementia. We searched the electronic databases for original research and review articles on DMS in patients with dementia using the search terms "Delusional Misidentification Syndrome, Capgras syndrome, Fregoli syndrome, reduplicative paramnesia, and dementia." The DMSs are a frequent problem in dementia. The violence and dangerousness in patients with dementia having these syndromes are well documented, and forensic aspects are highlighted. Pathogenetic viewpoint and management are considered.

Progesterone turnover to its 5α-reduced metabolites in the ventral tegmental area of the midbrain is essential for initiating social and affective behavior and progesterone metabolism in female rats

BACKGROUND

Among women and female rodents, progesterone (P) influences social affiliation and affect. These effects may be partly due to formation of its 5α-reduced, 3α- hydroxylated metabolite, 5α-pregnan-3α-ol-20-one (3α,5α- THP).

AIM

To elucidate whether actions of 3α,5α-THP in the midbrain ventral tegmental area (VTA) are both necessary and sufficient to enhance non-sexual and sexual social behaviors, affect, and central 3α,5α-THP metabolism.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

P and 3α,5α-THP formation were unperturbed or blocked in VTA via infusions of vehicle, PK11195 (400 ng), and/or indomethacin (10 μg). Rats then received subsequent infusions of vehicle or 3α,5α-THP (100 ng) and were assessed in a battery of tasks that included open field (exploration), elevated plus maze (anxiety behavior), social interaction (social affiliation), and paced mating (sexual behavior) or were not tested. Metabolic turnover of P to its 5α-reduced metabolites was assessed in plasma, midbrain, hippocampus, frontal cortex, diencephalon, and remaining subcortical tissues (control interbrain).

RESULTS

Infusions of any combination of inhibitors significantly reduced social and affective behavior in all tasks compared to vehicle, concomitant with reduced turnover of P to its 5α-reduced metabolites, in midbrain only. Subsequent infusions of 3α,5α-THP significantly reinstated/enhanced anti- anxiety behavior, lordosis, and P turnover to its 5α-reduced metabolites in midbrain, as well as hippocampus, cortex, and diencephalon (but not plasma or interbrain).

CONCLUSIONS

These data are the first to provide direct evidence that actions of 3α,5α-THP in the VTA are both necessary and sufficient for social and affective behavior, as well as initiation of central 5α-reduction.

Fregoli syndrome: an underrecognized risk factor for aggression in treatment settings

Fregoli syndrome (FS) is commonly associated with verbal threats and aggressive behavior. We present a case of Fregoli syndrome leading to an assault. We discuss the possible underdiagnosis of FS, associated risk for aggression, and strategies to reduce that risk.

Confabulation, delusion, and anosognosia: motivational factors and false claims

False claims are a key feature of confabulation, delusion, and anosognosia. In this paper we consider the role of motivational factors in such claims. We review motivational accounts of each symptom and consider the evidence adduced in support of these accounts. In our view the evidence is strongly suggestive of a role for motivational factors in each domain. Before concluding, we widen the focus by outlining a tentative general taxonomy of false claims, including false claims that occur in clinical settings as well as more garden-variety false claims, and incorporating both motivational and nonmotivational approaches to explaining such claims.

Frégoli syndrome accompanied with prosopagnosia in a woman with a 40-year history of schizophrenia

A 68-year-old woman with schizophrenia after a cerebrovascular accident resulting in right medial temporal and occipital damage developed Frégoli syndrome. Neuropsychological testing revealed that she had impairment in facial recognition compatible with prosopagnosia. The Frégoli syndrome disappeared in three month when, remarkably, her prosopagnosia also disappeared. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that combination of hyperactivations of temporo-limbic connection and frontal dysfunction may account for the development of Frégoli syndrome.

Models of misbelief: Integrating motivational and deficit theories of delusions

The impact of our desires and preferences upon our ordinary, everyday beliefs is well-documented [Gilovich, T. (1991). How we know what isn't so: The fallibility of human reason in everyday life. New York: The Free Press.]. The influence of such motivational factors on delusions, which are instances of pathological misbelief, has tended however to be neglected by certain prevailing models of delusion formation and maintenance. This paper explores a distinction between two general classes of theoretical explanation for delusions; the motivational and the deficit. Motivational approaches view delusions as extreme instances of self-deception; as defensive attempts to relieve pain and distress. Deficit approaches, in contrast, view delusions as the consequence of defects in the normal functioning of belief mechanisms, underpinned by neuroanatomical or neurophysiological abnormalities. It is argued that although there are good reasons to be sceptical of motivational theories (particularly in their more floridly psychodynamic manifestations), recent experiments confirm that motives are important causal forces where delusions are concerned. It is therefore concluded that the most comprehensive account of delusions will involve a theoretical unification of both motivational and deficit approaches.

Cognitive neuropsychiatry and delusional belief

Cognitive neuropsychiatry is a new field of cognitive psychology which seeks to learn more about the normal operation of high-level aspects of cognition such as belief formation, reasoning, decision making, theory of mind, and pragmatics by studying people in whom such processes are abnormal. So far, the high-level cognitive process most widely studied in cognitive neuropsychiatry has been belief formation, investigated by examining people with delusional beliefs. This paper describes some of the forms of delusional belief that have been examined from this perspective and offers a general two-deficit cognitive-neuropsychiatric account of delusional belief.

Schizophrenia and monothematic delusions

Numerous delusions have been studied which are highly specific and which can present in isolation in people whose beliefs are otherwise entirely unremarkable - "monothematic delusions" such as Capgras or Cotard delusions. We review such delusions and summarize our 2-factor theory of delusional belief which seeks to explain what causes these delusional beliefs to arise initially and what prevents them being rejected after they have arisen. Although these delusions can occur in the absence of other symptoms, they can also occur in the context of schizophrenia, when they are likely to be accompanied by other delusions and hallucinations. We propose that the 2-factor account of particular delusions like Capgras and Cotard still applies even when these delusions occur in the context of schizophrenia rather than occurring in isolation.