1
|
Watson P, Thrailkill EA, Corbit LH, Bouton ME. Introduction to the special issue: Goal direction and habit in operant behavior. J Exp Anal Behav 2024; 121:3-7. [PMID: 38148687 DOI: 10.1002/jeab.901] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 12/14/2023] [Indexed: 12/28/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Poppy Watson
- University of Technology, Sydney, Australia
- UNSW, Sydney, Australia
| | - Eric A Thrailkill
- Department of Psychological Science, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT, USA
| | - Laura H Corbit
- Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
| | - Mark E Bouton
- Department of Psychological Science, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT, USA
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
Dunne S, Pedersen M. Habits, Infinite Jest and the recoveries of pragmatism. CULTURE AND ORGANIZATION 2022. [DOI: 10.1080/14759551.2022.2143500] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Stephen Dunne
- Business School, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
| | - Michael Pedersen
- Management, Politics and Philosophy, Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg, Denmark
| |
Collapse
|
3
|
García E, Arandia IR. Enactive and simondonian reflections on mental disorders. Front Psychol 2022; 13:938105. [PMID: 35992462 PMCID: PMC9382120 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.938105] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/07/2022] [Accepted: 07/04/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
As an alternative to linear and unidimensional perspectives focused mainly on either organic or psychological processes, the enactive approach to life and mind-a branch of 4-E (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended) cognitive theories-offers an integrative framework to study mental disorders that encompasses and articulates organic, sensorimotor, and intersubjective dimensions of embodiment. These three domains are deeply entangled in a non-trivial manner. A question remains on how this systemic and multi-dimensional approach may be applied to our understanding of mental disorders and symptomatic behavior. Drawing on Gilbert Simondon's philosophy of individuation (focusing particularly on the concepts of tension, metastability, and preindividual), we provide some enactive conceptual tools to better understand the dynamic, interactive, and multi-dimensional nature of human bodies in mental disorders and psychopathological symptoms. One of such tools cursiva is sense-making, a key notion that captures the relational process of generating meaning by interacting with the sociomaterial environment. The article analyzes five aspects related to sense-making: temporality, adaptivity, the multiplicity of normativities it involves, the fundamental role of tension, and its participatory character. On this basis, we draw certain implications for our understanding of mental disorders and diverse symptoms, and suggest their interpretation in terms of difficulties to transform tensions and perform individuation processes, which result in a reduction of the field of potentialities for self-individuation and sense-making.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Enara García
- IAS Research group, Department of Philosophy, University of the Basque Country, San Sebastián, Spain
| | | |
Collapse
|
4
|
Woolford FMG, Egbert MD. Goal Oriented Behavior With a Habit-Based Adaptive Sensorimotor Map Network. Front Neurorobot 2022; 16:846693. [PMID: 35619969 PMCID: PMC9127740 DOI: 10.3389/fnbot.2022.846693] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/31/2021] [Accepted: 03/28/2022] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
We present a description of an ASM-network, a new habit-based robot controller model consisting of a network of adaptive sensorimotor maps. This model draws upon recent theoretical developments in enactive cognition concerning habit and agency at the sensorimotor level. It aims to provide a platform for experimental investigation into the relationship between networked organizations of habits and cognitive behavior. It does this by combining (1) a basic mechanism of generating continuous motor activity as a function of historical sensorimotor trajectories with (2) an evaluative mechanism which reinforces or weakens those historical trajectories as a function of their support of a higher-order structure of higher-order sensorimotor coordinations. After describing the model, we then present the results of applying this model in the context of a well-known minimal cognition task involving object discrimination. In our version of this experiment, an individual robot is able to learn the task through a combination of exploration through random movements and repetition of historic trajectories which support the structure of a pre-given network of sensorimotor coordinations. The experimental results illustrate how, utilizing enactive principles, a robot can display recognizable learning behavior without explicit representational mechanisms or extraneous fitness variables. Instead, our model's behavior adapts according to the internal requirements of the action-generating mechanism itself.
Collapse
|
5
|
Du Y, Krakauer JW, Haith AM. The relationship between habits and motor skills in humans. Trends Cogn Sci 2022; 26:371-387. [DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2022.02.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/02/2021] [Revised: 02/01/2022] [Accepted: 02/06/2022] [Indexed: 12/18/2022]
|
6
|
White J, Sims R. Improving Equine Welfare through Human Habit Formation. Animals (Basel) 2021; 11:ani11082156. [PMID: 34438614 PMCID: PMC8388501 DOI: 10.3390/ani11082156] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/30/2021] [Revised: 07/14/2021] [Accepted: 07/16/2021] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
This paper explores the potential for interventions to develop pro-animal welfare habitual behaviours (PAWHBs) in people to improve the lives of animals. Human behavioural research indicates that opportunities exist to deliver lasting change through developing positive habitual behaviours. The routine nature of many equine care and management practices lends itself to habit formation and maintenance. This proof-of-concept paper aims to evaluate a theory-based intervention of developing and maintaining a PAWHB in people caring for equines. Qualitative research methods were used. A 30 day PAWHB intervention (PAWHBInt) of providing enrichment to an equine by scratching them in a consistent context linked to an existing routine behaviour was undertaken. Participants (n = 9) then engaged in semi-structured interviews that were analysed using thematic analysis, where the participants self-reported the outcomes they observed during the intervention. The study findings suggest that the PAWHBInt had a positive impact on human behaviour and habit formation. The research helps to address the dearth of evidence regarding the application of habit theory to equine welfare interventions and emphasised linking a desired new behaviour to an existing routine behaviour when developing PAWHBs. The research also highlights the role of mutual benefit for human and equine, and emotion in providing feedback and potential reward, supporting the link to the cue-routine-reward principle of habit theory.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Jo White
- Human Behaviour Change for Animals CIC, Renhill, Mill Road, Barnham Broom, Norfolk NR9 4DE, UK
- Correspondence:
| | - Ruth Sims
- Ruth Sims, School of Psychology, College of Health, Psychology, and Social Care, University of Derby, Derby, Derbyshire DE22 1GB, UK;
| |
Collapse
|
7
|
Candiotto L, Dreon R. Affective Scaffoldings as Habits: A Pragmatist Approach. Front Psychol 2021; 12:629046. [PMID: 33841258 PMCID: PMC8034264 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.629046] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/13/2020] [Accepted: 03/03/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
In this paper, we provide a pragmatist conceptualization of affective habits as relatively flexible ways of channeling affectivity. Our proposal, grounded in a conception of sensibility and habits derived from John Dewey, suggests understanding affective scaffoldings in a novel and broader sense by re-orienting the debate from objects to interactions. We claim that habits play a positive role in supporting and orienting human sensibility, allowing us to avoid any residue of dualism between internalist and externalist conceptions of affectivity. We provide pragmatist tools for understanding the environment's role in shaping our feelings, emotions, moods, and affective behaviors. However, we contend that in addition to environment, the continuous and recursive affective transaction between agent and environment (both natural and cultural) are also crucially involved. We claim that habits are transformative, which is especially evident when we consider that emotions are often the result of a crisis in habitual behavior and successively play a role in prompting changes of habits. The final upshot is a conceptualization of affective habits as pervasive tools for feelings that scaffold human conduct as well as key features in the transformation of behaviors.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Laura Candiotto
- Department of Philosophy and Humanities, Institute of Philosophy, Free University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany
| | - Roberta Dreon
- Department of Philosophy and Cultural Heritage, Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Venice, Italy
| |
Collapse
|
8
|
Affiliation(s)
- Omar Lizardo
- Department of Sociology University of California Los Angeles California USA
| |
Collapse
|
9
|
Hardman D, Hutchinson P. Cultivating the dispositions to connect: an exploration of therapeutic empathy. MEDICAL HUMANITIES 2020; 46:525-531. [PMID: 32467303 DOI: 10.1136/medhum-2020-011846] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 03/31/2020] [Indexed: 06/11/2023]
Abstract
Empathy is a broad concept that involves the various ways in which we come to know and make connections with one another. As medical practice becomes progressively orientated towards a model of engaged partnership, empathy is increasingly important in healthcare. This is often conceived more specifically through the concept of therapeutic empathy, which has two aspects: interpersonal understanding and caring action. The question of how we make connections with one another was also central to the work of the novelist E.M. Forster. In this article we analyse Forster's interpretation of connection-particularly in the novel Howards End-in order to explore and advance current debates on therapeutic empathy. We argue that Forster conceived of connection as a socially embedded act, reminding us that we need to consider how social structures, cultural norms and institutional constraints serve to affect interpersonal connections. From this, we develop a dispositional account of therapeutic empathy in which connection is conceived as neither an instinctive occurrence nor a process of representational inference, but a dynamic process of embodied, embedded and actively engaged enquiry. Our account also suggests that therapeutic empathy is not merely an untrainable reflex but something that can be cultivated. We thus promote two key ideas. First, that empathy should be considered as much a social as an individual phenomenon, and second that empathy training can and should be given to clinicians.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Doug Hardman
- Department of Psychology, Bournemouth University, Poole, UK
| | - Phil Hutchinson
- Department of Psychology, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK
| |
Collapse
|
10
|
Loaiza JM, Trasmundi SB, Steffensen SV. Multiscalar Temporality in Human Behaviour: A Case Study of Constraint Interdependence in Psychotherapy. Front Psychol 2020; 11:1685. [PMID: 32973594 PMCID: PMC7468424 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01685] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/31/2020] [Accepted: 06/22/2020] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
Ecological psychology (EP) and the enactive approach (EA) may benefit from a more focused view of lived temporality and the underlying temporal multiscalar nature of human living. We propose multiscalar temporality (MT) as a framework that complements EP and EA, and moves beyond their current conceptualisation of timescales and inter-scale relationships in organism-environment dynamical systems. MT brings into focus the wide ranging and meshwork-like interdependencies at play in human living and the questions concerning how agents are intimately entangled in such meshworks, utilising them as resources for skilful living. We develop a conceptual toolkit that highlights temporality: Firstly, we address lived temporality. We use a case study from psychotherapy to show how a person's skilful engagement with the world is best described as adaptive harnessing of interdependencies of constraints residing across a wide range of timescales. We call this skill time-ranging. Secondly, the case study provides a proof of concept of the integration of an idiographic approach to human conversing and a more general theory of emergent organisation rooted in theoretical biology. We introduce the existing concept of constraint closure from theoretical biology and scale it up to human interactivity. The detailed conceptualisation of constraint interdependencies constitutes the backbone of the proposal. Thirdly, we present a heuristic mapping of what we call organising frames. The mapping guides the conceptualisation of the emergence of inter-scale relationships and serves as an epistemic tool that brings together nomothetic and idiographic approaches. Finally, we combine new ideas with re-interpretations of existing EP and EA concepts and elaborate on the need of a fresh new look at the implicit and sometimes missing conceptualisations of temporality in the EP and EA literature.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Sarah B. Trasmundi
- Centre for Human Interactivity, Department of Language and Communication, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark
| | - Sune V. Steffensen
- Centre for Human Interactivity, Department of Language and Communication, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark
- Danish Institute for Advanced Study, Odense, Denmark
- Center for Ecolinguistics, South China Agricultural University, Guangzhou, China
- College of International Studies, Southwest University, Chongqing, China
| |
Collapse
|
11
|
Segundo-Ortin M. Agency From a Radical Embodied Standpoint: An Ecological-Enactive Proposal. Front Psychol 2020; 11:1319. [PMID: 32670161 PMCID: PMC7332856 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01319] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/05/2020] [Accepted: 05/19/2020] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Explaining agency is a significant challenge for those who are interested in the sciences of the mind, and non-representationalists are no exception to this. Even though both ecological psychologists and enactivists agree that agency is to be explained by focusing on the relation between the organism and the environment, they have approached it by focusing on different aspects of the organism-environment relation. In this paper, I offer a suggestion for a radical embodied account of agency that combines ecological psychology with recent trends in enactive cognitive science. According to this proposal, while enactivism focuses primarily on describing how our acquired sensorimotor schemes and habits mutually equilibrate, affecting our tendency to act upon some affordances instead of others, ecological psychology focuses on studying how perceptual information contributes to the actualization of the sensorimotor schemes and habits without mediating representations, inferences, and computations. The paper concludes by briefly exploring how this ecological-enactive theory of agency can account for how socio-cultural norms shape human agency.
Collapse
|
12
|
James MM, Loaiza JM. Coenhabiting Interpersonal Inter-Identities in Recurrent Social Interaction. Front Psychol 2020; 11:577. [PMID: 32296376 PMCID: PMC7136421 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00577] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/15/2019] [Accepted: 03/11/2020] [Indexed: 11/26/2022] Open
Abstract
We propose a view of identity beyond the individual in what we call interpersonal inter-identities (IIIs). Within this approach, IIIs comprise collections of entangled stabilities that emerge in recurrent social interaction and manifest for those who instantiate them as relatively invariant though ever-evolving patterns of being (or more accurately, becoming) together. Herein, we consider the processes responsible for the emergence of these IIIs from the perspective of an enactive cognitive science. Our proposal hinges primarily on the development of two related notions: enhabiting and coenhabiting. First, we introduce the notion of enhabiting, a set of processes at the individual level whereby structural interdependencies stabilize and thereafter undergird the habits, networks of habits, and personal identities through which we make sense of our experience. Articulating this position we lean on the notion of a tendency toward an optimal grip, though offering it a developmental framing, whereby iterative states of selective openness help realize relatively stable autonomous personal identities with their own norms of self-regulation. We then extend many of the notions found applicable here to an account of social coenhabiting, in particular, we introduce the notion of tending toward a co-optimal grip as central to the development of social habits, networks of habits, and ultimately IIIs. Such structures, we propose, also emerge as autonomous structures with their own norms of self-regulation. We wind down our account with some reflections on the implications of these structures outside of the interactions wherein they come into being and offer some thoughts about the complex animations of the individual embodied subjects that instantiate them.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Mark M. James
- School of Computer Science, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
| | | |
Collapse
|
13
|
Pedersen M, Dunne S. Virtue’s Embodied Malleability: the Plasticity of Habit and the Double-Law of Habituation. PHILOSOPHY OF MANAGEMENT 2020. [DOI: 10.1007/s40926-020-00132-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/24/2022]
|
14
|
James MM. Bringing Forth Within: Enhabiting at the Intersection Between Enaction and Ecological Psychology. Front Psychol 2020; 11:1348. [PMID: 32922325 PMCID: PMC7457031 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01348] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/01/2020] [Accepted: 05/20/2020] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Baggs and Chemero (2018) propose that certain tensions between enaction and ecological psychology arise due different interpretations about what is meant by the "environment." In the enactive approach the emphasis is on the umwelt, which describes the environment as the "meaningful, lived surroundings of a given individual." The ecological approach, on the other hand, emphasises what they refer to as the habitat "the environment as a set of resources for a typical, or ideal, member of a species." By making this distinction, these authors claim they are able to retain the best of both the ecological and the enactive approaches. Herein I propose an account of the individuation of habits that straddles this distinction, what I call a compatabilist account. This is done in two parts. The first part teases out a host of compatibilities that exist between the enactive account as developed by Di Paolo et al. (2017) and the skilled intentionality framework as developed by Bruineberg and Rietveld (2014) and Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014). In part two these compatibilities are brought together with the that these compatibilities can be brought together with the philosophy of Gilbert Simondon to develop the notion of enhabiting. Enhabiting describes a set of ongoing processes by which an umwelt emerges from and is reproduced within the relationship between an embodied subject and their habitat. Thus, enhabiting points toward a point of intersection between enaction and ecological psychology. To enhabit is bring forth (to enact), within (to inhabit).
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Mark M James
- School of Computer Science, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
| |
Collapse
|
15
|
Car Use: Intentional, Habitual, or Both? Insights from Anscombe and the Mobility Biography Literature. SUSTAINABILITY 2019. [DOI: 10.3390/su11247122] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Policy-makers have recognized that changing travel behavior is important. People, however, do not change their behavior so readily, particularly the use of the car. A central concept that has been invoked to account for this has been the concept of habit. However, various studies also present people as having concrete reasons for driving: Their choices are intentional. This interdisciplinary study attempts to reconcile these two understandings of travel behavior by drawing on insights from the philosopher Anscombe and a growing body of travel research termed the mobility biography literature. It applies some of Anscombe’s insights from Intention to the act of driving. With regard to the mobility biography literature, it draws out conceptual implications both from theoretical and empirical aspects: In particular, the characterization of travel decisions as nested in a hierarchy of life decisions and the association of life events with changes in travel decisions. It concludes that a broader conceptualization of human behavior leads to a broader view as to what policy-makers can do. It reminds us that transport is ‘special’, that transport and policy are inextricable, and that the importance of infrastructure provision should not be ignored.
Collapse
|
16
|
|
17
|
Ramírez-Vizcaya S, Froese T. The Enactive Approach to Habits: New Concepts for the Cognitive Science of Bad Habits and Addiction. Front Psychol 2019; 10:301. [PMID: 30863334 PMCID: PMC6399396 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00301] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/24/2018] [Accepted: 01/30/2019] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Habits are the topic of a venerable history of research that extends back to antiquity, yet they were originally disregarded by the cognitive sciences. They started to become the focus of interdisciplinary research in the 1990s, but since then there has been a stalemate between those who approach habits as a kind of bodily automatism or as a kind of mindful action. This implicit mind-body dualism is ready to be overcome with the rise of interest in embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive (4E) cognition. We review the enactive approach and highlight how it moves beyond the traditional stalemate by integrating both autonomy and sense-making into its theory of agency. It defines a habit as an adaptive, precarious, and self-sustaining network of neural, bodily, and interactive processes that generate dynamical sensorimotor patterns. Habits constitute a central source of normativity for the agent. We identify a potential shortcoming of this enactive account with respect to bad habits, since self-maintenance of a habit would always be intrinsically good. Nevertheless, this is only a problem if, following the mainstream perspective on habits, we treat habits as isolated modules. The enactive approach replaces this atomism with a view of habits as constituting an interdependent whole on whose overall viability the individual habits depend. Accordingly, we propose to define a bad habit as one whose expression, while positive for itself, significantly impairs a person's well-being by overruling the expression of other situationally relevant habits. We conclude by considering implications of this concept of bad habit for psychological and psychiatric research, particularly with respect to addiction research.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Susana Ramírez-Vizcaya
- Philosophy of Science Graduate Program, National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), Mexico City, Mexico.,Institute for Philosophical Research (IIF), National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), Mexico City, Mexico
| | - Tom Froese
- Institute for Applied Mathematics and Systems Research (IIMAS), National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), Mexico City, Mexico.,Center for the Sciences of Complexity (C3), UNAM, Mexico City, Mexico
| |
Collapse
|
18
|
Tewes C. The Phenomenology of Habits: Integrating First-Person and Neuropsychological Studies of Memory. Front Psychol 2018; 9:1176. [PMID: 30042715 PMCID: PMC6048385 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01176] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/30/2017] [Accepted: 06/18/2018] [Indexed: 12/02/2022] Open
Abstract
There is an ongoing debate how one can integrate the subjective (first-person) dimension of experiences more thoroughly into neuropsychological research. In cognitive experimental memory research, for instance, cognitive psychology begins by separating the act of recollection from the context where recollections occur, so as to make memory research suitable for study in the experimental conditions of the laboratory. It is the claim of this article that the challenge for memory research consists not merely in the (possible) loss of meaning entailed by transforming embedded recollected experiences into operationalized cognitive functions. Rather, from the outset, the first-person experiential basis of the entire research procedure is often insufficiently elaborated and hence risks neglecting or misrepresenting significant dimensions of the phenomena it studies. I demonstrate this with regard to habits understood as procedural memories. Research based on the paradigm of embodied cognition and phenomenology has shown that procedural memory-based skills and habits are not necessarily confined to sub-personal (unconscious) processing mechanisms. This paradigm states that some cognitive processes involve not only the brain but also the pre-reflectively experienced lived-body. The key idea is that we have experiential access to bodily processes that are not yet conceptualized or reflexively mediated. In the final part of my paper, I delineate how such experiences can be integrated into the neuropsychological study of habits via the method of ‘front-loaded phenomenology.’
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Christian Tewes
- Section of Phenomenology, University Hospital Heidelberg, University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany
| |
Collapse
|
19
|
Hutto DD, Robertson I, Kirchhoff MD. A New, Better BET: Rescuing and Revising Basic Emotion Theory. Front Psychol 2018; 9:1217. [PMID: 30065688 PMCID: PMC6057353 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01217] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/07/2018] [Accepted: 06/27/2018] [Indexed: 12/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Basic Emotion Theory, or BET, has dominated the affective sciences for decades (Ekman, 1972, 1992, 1999; Ekman and Davidson, 1994; Griffiths, 2013; Scarantino and Griffiths, 2011). It has been highly influential, driving a number of empirical lines of research (e.g., in the context of facial expression detection, neuroimaging studies and evolutionary psychology). Nevertheless, BET has been criticized by philosophers, leading to calls for it to be jettisoned entirely (Colombetti, 2014; Hufendiek, 2016). This paper defuses those criticisms. In addition, it shows that we have good reason to retain BET. Finally, it reviews and puts to rest worries that BET's commitment to affect programs renders it outmoded. We propose that, with minor adjustments, BET can avoid such criticisms when conceived under a radically enactive account of emotions. Thus, rather than leaving BET behind, we show how its basic ideas can be revised, refashioned and preserved. Hence, we conclude, our new BET is still a good bet.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Daniel D. Hutto
- Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia
| | | | | |
Collapse
|
20
|
Maiese M. Affective Scaffolds, Expressive Arts, and Cognition. Front Psychol 2016; 7:359. [PMID: 27014164 PMCID: PMC4794486 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00359] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/30/2015] [Accepted: 02/26/2016] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Some theorists have argued that elements of the surrounding world play a crucial role in sustaining and amplifying both cognition and emotion. Such insights raise an interesting question about the relationship between cognitive and affective scaffolding: in addition to enabling the realization of specific affective states, can an affective niche also enable the realization of certain cognitive capacities? In order to gain a better understanding of this relationship between affective niches and cognition, I will examine the use of expressive arts in the context of psychotherapy and peacebuilding. In these settings, environmental resources and interpersonal scaffolds not only evoke emotion and encourage the adoption of particular bodily affective styles, but also support the development of capacities for self-awareness and interpersonal understanding. These affective scaffolds play a crucial role in therapy and peacebuilding, in fact, insofar as they facilitate the development of self-knowledge, enhance capacities associated with social cognition, and build positive rapport and trust among participants. I will argue that this is because affectivity is linked to the way that subjects frame and attend to their surroundings. Insofar as the regulation and modification of emotion goes hand in hand with opening up new interpretive frames and establishing new habits of mind, the creation of an affective niche can contribute significantly to various modes of cognition.
Collapse
|
21
|
Bernacer J, Lombo JA, Murillo JI. Editorial: Habits: plasticity, learning and freedom. Front Hum Neurosci 2015; 9:468. [PMID: 26379531 PMCID: PMC4550794 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2015.00468] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/22/2015] [Accepted: 08/10/2015] [Indexed: 11/23/2022] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Javier Bernacer
- Mind-Brain Group, Institute for Culture and Society, University of Navarra Pamplona, Spain
| | - Jose A Lombo
- School of Philosophy, Pontifical University of the Holy Cross Rome, Italy
| | - Jose I Murillo
- Mind-Brain Group, Institute for Culture and Society, University of Navarra Pamplona, Spain
| |
Collapse
|
22
|
Clark D, Schumann F, Mostofsky SH. Mindful movement and skilled attention. Front Hum Neurosci 2015; 9:297. [PMID: 26190986 PMCID: PMC4484342 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2015.00297] [Citation(s) in RCA: 32] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/28/2014] [Accepted: 05/09/2015] [Indexed: 12/04/2022] Open
Abstract
Bodily movement has long been employed as a foundation for cultivating mental skills such as attention, self-control or mindfulness, with recent studies documenting the positive impacts of mindful movement training, such as yoga and tai chi. A parallel “mind-body connection” has also been observed in many developmental disorders. We elaborate a spectrum of mindfulness by considering ADHD, in which deficient motor control correlates with impaired (disinhibited) behavioral control contributing to defining features of excessive distractibility and impulsivity. These data provide evidence for an important axis of variation for wellbeing, in which skillful cognitive control covaries with a capacity for skillful movement. We review empirical and theoretical literature on attention, cognitive control, mind wandering, mindfulness and skill learning, endorsing a model of skilled attention in which motor plans, attention, and executive goals are seen as mutually co-defining aspects of skilled behavior that are linked by reciprocal inhibitory and excitatory connections. Thus, any movement training should engage “higher-order” inhibition and selection and develop a repertoire of rehearsed procedures that coordinate goals, attention and motor plans. However, we propose that mindful movement practice may improve the functional quality of rehearsed procedures, cultivating a transferrable skill of attention. We adopt Langer’s spectrum of mindful learning that spans from “mindlessness” to engagement with the details of the present task and contrast this with the mental attitudes cultivated in standard mindfulness meditation. We particularly follow Feldenkrais’ suggestion that mindful learning of skills for organizing the body in movement might transfer to other forms of mental activity. The results of mindful movement training should be observed in multiple complementary measures, and may have tremendous potential benefit for individuals with ADHD and other populations.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Dav Clark
- D-Lab, University of California, Berkeley Berkeley, CA, USA ; Berkeley Institute for Data Science, University of California, Berkeley Berkeley, CA, USA
| | - Frank Schumann
- Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, Université Paris Descartes Paris, France
| | - Stewart H Mostofsky
- Center for Neurodevelopmental Medicine and Research, Kennedy Krieger Institute Baltimore, MD, USA ; Departments of Neurology and Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine Baltimore, MD, USA
| |
Collapse
|
23
|
Bernacer J, Murillo JI. The Aristotelian conception of habit and its contribution to human neuroscience. Front Hum Neurosci 2014; 8:883. [PMID: 25404908 PMCID: PMC4217385 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00883] [Citation(s) in RCA: 37] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/15/2014] [Accepted: 10/13/2014] [Indexed: 01/30/2023] Open
Abstract
The notion of habit used in neuroscience is an inheritance from a particular theoretical origin, whose main source is William James. Thus, habits have been characterized as rigid, automatic, unconscious, and opposed to goal-directed actions. This analysis leaves unexplained several aspects of human behavior and cognition where habits are of great importance. We intend to demonstrate the utility that another philosophical conception of habit, the Aristotelian, may have for neuroscientific research. We first summarize the current notion of habit in neuroscience, its philosophical inspiration and the problems that arise from it, mostly centered on the sharp distinction between goal-directed actions and habitual behavior. We then introduce the Aristotelian view and we compare it with that of William James. For Aristotle, a habit is an acquired disposition to perform certain types of action. If this disposition involves an enhanced cognitive control of actions, it can be considered a “habit-as-learning”. The current view of habit in neuroscience, which lacks cognitive control and we term “habit-as-routine”, is also covered by the Aristotelian conception. He classifies habits into three categories: (1) theoretical, or the retention of learning understood as “knowing that x is so”; (2) behavioral, through which the agent achieves a rational control of emotion-permeated behavior (“knowing how to behave”); and (3) technical or learned skills (“knowing how to make or to do”). Finally, we propose new areas of research where this “novel” conception of habit could serve as a framework concept, from the cognitive enrichment of actions to the role of habits in pathological conditions. In all, this contribution may shed light on the understanding of habits as an important feature of human action. Habits, viewed as a cognitive enrichment of behavior, are a crucial resource for understanding human learning and behavioral plasticity.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Javier Bernacer
- Mind-Brain Group, Institute for Culture and Society, University of Navarra Pamplona, Navarra, Spain
| | - Jose Ignacio Murillo
- Mind-Brain Group, Institute for Culture and Society, University of Navarra Pamplona, Navarra, Spain
| |
Collapse
|
24
|
Egbert MD, Barandiaran XE. Modeling habits as self-sustaining patterns of sensorimotor behavior. Front Hum Neurosci 2014; 8:590. [PMID: 25152724 PMCID: PMC4126554 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00590] [Citation(s) in RCA: 30] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/15/2014] [Accepted: 07/16/2014] [Indexed: 11/29/2022] Open
Abstract
In the recent history of psychology and cognitive neuroscience, the notion of habit has been reduced to a stimulus-triggered response probability correlation. In this paper we use a computational model to present an alternative theoretical view (with some philosophical implications), where habits are seen as self-maintaining patterns of behavior that share properties in common with self-maintaining biological processes, and that inhabit a complex ecological context, including the presence and influence of other habits. Far from mechanical automatisms, this organismic and self-organizing concept of habit can overcome the dominating atomistic and statistical conceptions, and the high temporal resolution effects of situatedness, embodiment and sensorimotor loops emerge as playing a more central, subtle and complex role in the organization of behavior. The model is based on a novel “iterant deformable sensorimotor medium (IDSM),” designed such that trajectories taken through sensorimotor-space increase the likelihood that in the future, similar trajectories will be taken. We couple the IDSM to sensors and motors of a simulated robot, and show that under certain conditions, the IDSM conditions, the IDSM forms self-maintaining patterns of activity that operate across the IDSM, the robot's body, and the environment. We present various environments and the resulting habits that form in them. The model acts as an abstraction of habits at a much needed sensorimotor “meso-scale” between microscopic neuron-based models and macroscopic descriptions of behavior. Finally, we discuss how this model and extensions of it can help us understand aspects of behavioral self-organization, historicity and autonomy that remain out of the scope of contemporary representationalist frameworks.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Matthew D Egbert
- Embodied Emotion, Cognition and (Inter-)Action Lab, School of Computer Science, University of Hertfordshire Hatfield, UK
| | - Xabier E Barandiaran
- Department of Philosophy, University School of Social Work, UPV/EHU, University of the Basque Country Spain ; Department of Philosophy, IAS-Research Center for Life, Mind, and Society, UPV/EHU University of the Basque Country Spain
| |
Collapse
|