Introducing conjoint analysis method into delayed lotteries studies: its validity and time stability are higher than in adjusting

Side Effects in Time Discounting Procedures: Fixed Alternatives Become the Reference Point

Typical research on intertemporal choice utilizes a two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) paradigm requiring participants to choose between a smaller sooner and larger later payoff. In the adjusting-amount procedure (AAP) one of the alternatives is fixed and the other is adjusted according to particular choices made by the participant. Such a method makes the alternatives unequal in status and is speculated to make the fixed alternative a reference point for choices, thereby affecting the decision made. The current study shows that fixing different alternatives in the AAP influences discount rates in intertemporal choices. Specifically, individuals’ (N = 283) choices were affected to just the same extent by merely fixing an alternative as when choices were preceded by scenarios explicitly imposing reference points.

You Cannot be Partially Pregnant: A Comparison of Divisible and Nondivisible Outcomes in Delay and Probability Discounting Studies

Research by The Psychological Record, 64(3), 433-440. doi:10.1007/s40732-014-0052-9, (2014) demonstrated the novel finding that the magnitude effect for medical outcomes does not reverse across delay and probability discounting as it does for monetary outcomes. We suggest that a possible reason for the lack of a reverse magnitude effect in nonmonetary outcomes is incomparable divisibility of discounted alternatives. To test whether the lack of a reverse magnitude effect in probability discounting of medical outcomes is due to incomparable divisibility of treatment effects, 4 studies were conducted. In the replication study, the effect observed by The Psychological Record, 64(3), 433-440. doi:10.1007/s40732-014-0052-9, (2014) was marginally not significant, although it was directionally consistent with their prediction of steeper discounting of small medical outcomes (as compared to large, defined as brain cancer) both in time and probability discounting. Our manipulation by substituting a divisible outcome (body paralysis) for an indivisible one (brain cancer) did not, however, bring expected results. We discuss the explanations and possible implications of introduced division for divisible and nondivisible medical outcomes.

Information Use Differences in Hot and Cold Risk Processing: When Does Information About Probability Count in the Columbia Card Task?

Objective: This paper aims to provide insight into information processing differences between hot and cold risk taking decision tasks within a single domain. Decision theory defines risky situations using at least three parameters: outcome one (often a gain) with its probability and outcome two (often a loss) with a complementary probability. Although a rational agent should consider all of the parameters, s/he could potentially narrow their focus to only some of them, particularly when explicit Type 2 processes do not have the resources to override implicit Type 1 processes. Here we investigate differences in risky situation parameters' influence on hot and cold decisions. Although previous studies show lower information use in hot than in cold processes, they do not provide decision weight changes and therefore do not explain whether this difference results from worse concentration on each parameter of a risky situation (probability, gain amount, and loss amount) or from ignoring some parameters.

Methods: Two studies were conducted, with participants performing the Columbia Card Task (CCT) in either its Cold or Hot version. In the first study, participants also performed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) to monitor their ability to override Type 1 processing cues (implicit processes) with Type 2 explicit processes. Because hypothesis testing required comparison of the relative importance of risky situation decision weights (gain, loss, probability), we developed a novel way of measuring information use in the CCT by employing a conjoint analysis methodology.

Results: Across the two studies, results indicated that in the CCT Cold condition decision makers concentrate on each information type (gain, loss, probability), but in the CCT Hot condition they concentrate mostly on a single parameter: probability of gain/loss. We also show that an individual's CRT score correlates with information use propensity in cold but not hot tasks. Thus, the affective dimension of hot tasks inhibits correct information processing, probably because it is difficult to engage Type 2 processes in such circumstances. Individuals' Type 2 processing abilities (measured by the CRT) assist greater use of information in cold tasks but do not help in hot tasks.