The development of a sense of control scale

Prime-induced illusion of control: The influence of unconscious priming on self-initiated actions and the role of regression to the mean

To what degree human cognition is influenced by subliminal stimuli is a controversial empirical question. One striking example was reported by Linser and Goschke (2007): participants overestimated how much control they had over objectively uncontrollable stimuli when masked congruent primes were presented immediately before the action. Critically, however, unawareness of the masked primes was established by post hoc data selection. In our preregistered study we sought to explore these findings while adjusting prime visibility based on individual thresholds, so that each participant underwent both visible and non-visible conditions. In experiment 1, N = 39 participants engaged in a control judgement task: following the presentation of a semantic prime, they freely selected between two keys, which triggered the appearance of a colored circle. The color of the circles, however, was independent of the key-press. Subsequently, participants assessed their perceived control over the circle's color, based on their key-presses, via a rating scale that ranged from 0 % (no control) to 100 % (complete control). Contrary to Linser and Goschke (2007)'s findings, this experiment demonstrated that predictive information influenced the experience of agency only when primes were consciously processed. In experiment 2, utilizing symbolic (arrow) primes, N = 35 participants had to rate their feeling of control over the effect-stimulus' identity during a two-choice identification paradigm (i.e., they were instructed to press a key corresponding to a target stimulus; with a contingency between target and effect stimulus of 75 %/25 %). The results revealed no significant influence of subliminal priming on agency perceptions. In summary, this study implies that unconscious stimuli may not exert a substantial influence on the conscious experience of agency, underscoring the need for careful consideration of methodological aspects and experimental design's impact on observed phenomena.

Neurofeedback for the Education of Children with ADHD and Specific Learning Disorders: A Review

Neurofeedback (NF) is a type of biofeedback in which an individual’s brain activity is measured and presented to them to support self-regulation of ongoing brain oscillations and achieve specific behavioral and neurophysiological outcomes. NF training induces changes in neurophysiological circuits that are associated with behavioral changes. Recent evidence suggests that the NF technique can be used to train electrical brain activity and facilitate learning among children with learning disorders. Toward this aim, this review first presents a generalized model for NF systems, and then studies involving NF training for children with disorders such as dyslexia, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and other specific learning disorders such as dyscalculia and dysgraphia are reviewed. The discussion elaborates on the potential for translational applications of NF in educational and learning settings with details. This review also addresses some issues concerning the role of NF in education, and it concludes with some solutions and future directions. In order to provide the best learning environment for children with ADHD and other learning disorders, it is critical to better understand the role of NF in educational settings. The review provides the potential challenges of the current systems to aid in highlighting the issues undermining the efficacy of current systems and identifying solutions to address them. The review focuses on the use of NF technology in education for the development of adaptive teaching methods and the best learning environment for children with learning disabilities.

Doubting the double-blind: Introducing a questionnaire for awareness of experimental purposes in neurofeedback studies

Double-blinding subjects to the experiment's purpose is an important standard in neurofeedback studies. However, it is difficult to provide evidence that humans are entirely unaware of certain information. This study used insights from consciousness studies and neurophenomenology to develop a contingency awareness questionnaire for neurofeedback. We assessed whether participants had an awareness of experimental purposes to manipulate their attention and multisensory perception. A subset of subjects (5 out of 20) gained a degree of awareness of experimental purposes as evidenced by their correct guess about the purposes of the experiment to affect their attention and multisensory perceptions specific to their double-blinded group assignment. The results warrant replication before they are applied to clinical neurofeedback studies, given the considerable time taken to perform the questionnaire (∼25 min). We discuss the strengths and limitations of our contingency awareness questionnaire and the growing appeal of the double-blinded standard in clinical neurofeedback studies.

Non-motor cues do not generate the perception of self-agency: A critique of cue-integration

How does one know that (s)he is the causal agent of their motor actions? Earlier theories of sense of agency have attributed the capacity for perception of self-agency to the comparator process of the motor-control/action system. However, with the advent of the findings implying a role of non-motor cues (like affective states, beliefs, primed concepts, and social instructions or previews of actions) in the sense of agency literature, the perception of self-agency is hypothesized to be generated even by non-motor cues (based on their relative reliability or weighting estimate); and, this theory is come to be known as the cue-integration of sense of agency. However, the cue-integration theory motivates skepticism about whether it is falsifiable and whether it is plausible that non-motor cues that are sensorily unrelated to typical sensory processes of self-agency have the capacity to produce a perception of self-agency. To substantiate this skepticism, I critically analyze the experimental operationalizations of cue-integration-with the (classic) vicarious agency experiment as a case study-to show that (1) the participants in these experiments are ambiguous about their causal agency over motor actions, (2) thus, these participants resort to reports of self-agency as heuristic judgments (under ambiguity) rather than due to cue-integration per se, and (3) there might not have occurred cue-integration based self-agency reports if these experimental operationalizations had eliminated ambiguity about the causal agency. Thus, I conclude that the reports of self-agency (observed in typical non-motor cues based cue-integration experiments) are not instances of perceptual effect-that are hypothesized to be produced by non-motor cues-but are of heuristic judgment effect.

The Perceptual Awareness Scale-recent controversies and debates

Accurate insight into subjective experience is crucial for the science of consciousness. The Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) was created in 2004 as a method for obtaining precise introspective reports for participants in research projects, and since then, the scale has become increasingly popular. This does not mean, of course, that no critiques have been voiced. Here, we briefly recapitulate our main thoughts on the intended PAS usage and the findings of the first decade, and we update this with the latest empirical and theoretical developments. We focus specifically on findings with relevance to whether consciousness is gradual or all-or-none phenomenon, to what should be considered conscious/unconscious, and to whether PAS is preferable to alternative measures of awareness. We respond in detail to some recent, selected articles.

Neurofeedback Modulation of the Sound-induced Flash Illusion Using Parietal Cortex Alpha Oscillations Reveals Dependency on Prior Multisensory Congruency

Spontaneous neural oscillations are key predictors of perceptual decisions to bind multisensory signals into a unified percept. Research links decreased alpha power in the posterior cortices to attention and audiovisual binding in the sound-induced flash illusion (SIFI) paradigm. This suggests that controlling alpha oscillations would be a way of controlling audiovisual binding. In the present feasibility study we used MEG-neurofeedback to train one group of subjects to increase left/right and another to increase right/left alpha power ratios in the parietal cortex. We tested for changes in audiovisual binding in a SIFI paradigm where flashes appeared in both hemifields. Results showed that the neurofeedback induced a significant asymmetry in alpha power for the left/right group, not seen for the right/left group. Corresponding asymmetry changes in audiovisual binding in illusion trials (with 2, 3, and 4 beeps paired with 1 flash) were not apparent. Exploratory analyses showed that neurofeedback training effects were present for illusion trials with the lowest numeric disparity (i.e., 2 beeps and 1 flash trials) only if the previous trial had high congruency (2 beeps and 2 flashes). Our data suggest that the relation between parietal alpha power (an index of attention) and its effect on audiovisual binding is dependent on the learned causal structure in the previous stimulus. The present results suggests that low alpha power biases observers towards audiovisual binding when they have learned that audiovisual signals originate from a common origin, consistent with a Bayesian causal inference account of multisensory perception.

Measures of agency

The sense of agency is typically defined as the experience of controlling one’s own actions, and through them, changes in the external environment. It is often assumed that this experience is a single, unified construct that can be experimentally manipulated and measured in a variety of ways. In this article, we challenge this assumption. We argue that we should acknowledge four possible agency-related psychological constructs. Having a clear grasp of the possible constructs is important since experimental procedures are only able to target some but not all the possible constructs. The unacknowledged misalignment of the possible constructs of a sense of agency and the experimental procedures is a major theoretical and methodological obstacle to studying the sense of agency. Only if we recognize the nature of this obstacle will we be able to design the experimental paradigms that would enable us to study the responsible computational mechanisms.

Perceived Control among People with Severe Mental Illness: A Comparative Study

BACKGROUND

Given the importance of perceived control to mental health and recovery, research is needed to determine strategies to increase perceived control for people with a mental illness.

AIM

Investigate the implications of a therapeutic recreation program on the perceived control of people with a mental illness.

METHOD

Participants of an intervention group (n=27) and comparison group (n=18) completed the Perceived Control Across Domains Scale at three time intervals. Subscale and total scores were analysed.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Significant variation occurred in the perceived control areas of substance use, personal cognition and personal empowerment.

IMPLICATIONS

A unique nurse led therapeutic recreation initiative, such as Recovery Camp, can improve and maintain facets of perceived control among people with mental illness.