The Status and Future of Consciousness Research

Continuous Theta Burst Stimulation to the left anterior medial prefrontal cortex influences metacognitive efficiency

The contribution of the prefrontal areas to visual awareness is critical for the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and higher-order theories of consciousness. The goal of the present study was to test the potential engagement of the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC) in visual awareness judgements. We aimed to temporarily influence the neuronal dynamics of the left aMPFC via neuroplasticity-like mechanisms. We used different Theta Burst Stimulation (TBS) protocols in combination with a visual identification task and visual awareness ratings. Either continuous TBS (cTBS), intermittent TBS (iTBS), or sham TBS was applied prior to the experimental paradigm in a within-participant design. Compared with sham TBS, we observed an increase in participants' ability to judge their perception adequately (metacognitive efficiency) following cTBS but not iTBS. The effect was accompanied by lower visual awareness ratings in incorrect responses. No significant differences in the identification task performance were observed. We interpret these results as evidence of the involvement of PFC in the brain network that underlies metacognition. Further, we discuss whether the results of TMS studies on perceptual metacognition can be taken as evidence for PFC involvement in awareness itself.

The No-Report Paradigm: A Revolution in Consciousness Research?

In the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness, participants have commonly been instructed to report their conscious content. This, it was claimed, risks confounding the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) with their preconditions, i.e., allocation of attention, and consequences, i.e., metacognitive reflection. Recently, the field has therefore been shifting towards no-report paradigms. No-report paradigms draw their validity from a direct comparison with no-report conditions. We analyze several examples of such comparisons and identify alternative interpretations of their results and/or methodological issues in all cases. These go beyond the previous criticism that just removing the report is insufficient, because it does not prevent metacognitive reflection. The conscious mind is fickle. Without having much to do, it will turn inward and switch, or timeshare, between the stimuli on display and daydreaming or mind-wandering. Thus, rather than the NCC, no-report paradigms might be addressing the neural correlates of conscious disengagement. This observation reaffirms the conclusion that no-report paradigms are no less problematic than report paradigms.

Indicators and criteria of consciousness: ethical implications for the care of behaviourally unresponsive patients

Background

Assessing consciousness in other subjects, particularly in non-verbal and behaviourally disabled subjects (e.g., patients with disorders of consciousness), is notoriously challenging but increasingly urgent. The high rate of misdiagnosis among disorders of consciousness raises the need for new perspectives in order to inspire new technical and clinical approaches.

Main body

We take as a starting point a recently introduced list of operational indicators of consciousness that facilitates its recognition in challenging cases like non-human animals and Artificial Intelligence to explore their relevance to disorders of consciousness and their potential ethical impact on the diagnosis and healthcare of relevant patients. Indicators of consciousness mean particular capacities that can be deduced from observing the behaviour or cognitive performance of the subject in question (or from neural correlates of such performance) and that do not define a hard threshold in deciding about the presence of consciousness, but can be used to infer a graded measure based on the consistency amongst the different indicators. The indicators of consciousness under consideration offer a potential useful strategy for identifying and assessing residual consciousness in patients with disorders of consciousness, setting the theoretical stage for an operationalization and quantification of relevant brain activity.

Conclusions

Our heuristic analysis supports the conclusion that the application of the identified indicators of consciousness to its disorders will likely inspire new strategies for assessing three very urgent issues: the misdiagnosis of disorders of consciousness; the need for a gold standard in detecting consciousness and diagnosing its disorders; and the need for a refined taxonomy of disorders of consciousness.

A tentative I/O curve with consciousness: Effects of multiple simultaneous ambiguous figures presentation on perceptual reversals and time estimation

This study was aimed at investigating mechanisms of consciousness using bistable perception. In 4 experimental conditions, 1, 2, 4 or 8 Rubin's face-vase ambiguous figures were presented for 3 min.In Experiment 1, 40 subjects looked at the center of the screen and pressed a specific key correspondent to the figure where they perceived a reversal. In Experiment 2, 32 subjects controlled with eye-tracker performed a similar task in which they pressed the spacebar whenever they perceived a reversal in any of the figures.At the end of each condition subjects estimated its duration. Results showed that changing the number of figures does not alter the number of reversals, producing a flat I/O curve between the two parameters. Estimated time lapse showed a negative correlation with the number of reversals. These findings are discussed considering the relationships between bistable perception, attention, and consciousness, as well as the time perception literature.

Methodological aspects of studying the mechanisms of consciousness

There are at least two approaches to the definition of consciousness. In the first case, certain aspects of consciousness, called qualia, are considered inaccessible for research from a third person and can only be described through subjective experience. This approach is inextricably linked with the so-called "hard problem of consciousness", that is, the question of why consciousness has qualia or how any physical changes in the environment can generate subjective experience. With this approach, some aspects of consciousness, by definition, cannot be explained on the basis of external observations and, therefore, are outside the scope of scientific research. In the second case, a priori constraints do not constrain the field of scientific investigation, and the best explanation of the experience in the first person is included as a possible subject of empirical research. Historically, in the study of cause-and-effect relationships in biology, it was customary to distinguish between proximate causation and ultimate causation existing in biological systems. Immediate causes are based on the immediate influencing factors [1]. Proximate causation has evolutionary explanations. When studying biological systems themselves, such an approach is undoubtedly justified, but it often seems insufficient when studying the interaction of consciousness and the brain [2,3]. Current scientific communities proceed from the assumption that the physical substrate for the generation of consciousness is a neural network that unites various types of neurons located in various brain structures. Many neuroscientists attach a key role in this process to the cortical and thalamocortical neural networks. This question is directly related to experimental and clinical research in the field of disorder of consciousness. Progress in this area of medicine depends on advances in neuroscience in this area and is also a powerful source of empirical information. In this area of consciousness research, a large amount of experimental data has been accumulated, and in this review an attempt was made to generalize and systematize.

Fishnition: Developing Models From Cognition Toward Consciousness

A challenge to developing a model for testing animal consciousness is the pull of opposite intuitions. On one extreme, the anthropocentric view holds that consciousness is a highly sophisticated capacity involving self-reflection and conceptual categorization that is almost certainly exclusive to humans. At the opposite extreme, an anthropomorphic view attributes consciousness broadly to any behavior that involves sensory responsiveness. Yet human experience and observation of diverse species suggest that the most plausible case is that consciousness functions between these poles. In exploring the middle ground, we discuss the pros and cons of "high level" approaches such as the dual systems approach. According to this model, System 1 can be thought of as unconscious; processing is fast, automatic, associative, heuristic, parallel, contextual, and likely to be conserved across species. Consciousness is associated with System 2 processing that is slow, effortful, rule-based, serial, abstract, and exclusively human. An advantage of this model is the clear contrast between heuristic and decision-based responses, but it fails to include contextual decision-making in novel conditions which falls in between these two categories. We also review a "low level" model involving trace conditioning, which is a trained response to the first of two paired stimuli separated by an interval. This model highlights the role of consciousness in maintaining a stimulus representation over a temporal span, though it overlooks the importance of attention in subserving and also disrupting trace conditioning in humans. Through a critical analysis of these two extremes, we will develop the case for flexible behavioral response to the stimulus environment as the best model for demonstrating animal consciousness. We discuss a methodology for gauging flexibility across a wide variety of species and offer a case study in spatial navigation to illustrate our proposal. Flexibility serves the evolutionary function of enabling the complex evaluation of changing conditions, where motivation is the basis for goal valuation, and attention selects task-relevant stimuli to aid decision-making processes. We situate this evolutionary function within the Temporal Representation Theory of consciousness, which proposes that consciousness represents the present moment in order to facilitate flexible action.

The Perceptual Awareness Scale-recent controversies and debates

Accurate insight into subjective experience is crucial for the science of consciousness. The Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) was created in 2004 as a method for obtaining precise introspective reports for participants in research projects, and since then, the scale has become increasingly popular. This does not mean, of course, that no critiques have been voiced. Here, we briefly recapitulate our main thoughts on the intended PAS usage and the findings of the first decade, and we update this with the latest empirical and theoretical developments. We focus specifically on findings with relevance to whether consciousness is gradual or all-or-none phenomenon, to what should be considered conscious/unconscious, and to whether PAS is preferable to alternative measures of awareness. We respond in detail to some recent, selected articles.

Individual conscious and unconscious perception of emotion: Theory, methodology and applications

In this manuscript we review a seminal debate related to subliminality and concerning the relationship of consciousness, unconsciousness, and perception. We present the methodological implementations that contemporary psychology introduced to explore this relationship, such as the application of unbiased self-report metrics and Bayesian analyses for assessing detection and discrimination. We present evidence concerning an unaddressed issue, namely, that different participants and stimulus types require different thresholds for subliminal presentation. We proceed to a step-by-step experimental illustration of a method involving individual thresholds for the presentation of masked emotional faces. We show that individual thresholds provide Bayesian evidence for null responses to the presented faces. Conversely, we show in the same database that when applying established but biased non-individual criteria for subliminality physiological changes occur and relate - correctly, and most importantly incorrectly - to perception concerning the emotional type, and the valence and intensity of a presented masked emotional face.

Insect Consciousness

The question of consciousness in other species, not least species very physically different from humans such as insects, is highly challenging for a number of reasons. One reason is that we do not have any available empirical method to answer the question. Another reason is that current theories of consciousness disagree about the relation between physical structure and consciousness, i.e., whether consciousness requires specific, say, neural structures or whether consciousness can be realized in different ways. This article sets out to analyze if and how there could be an empirical and/or a theoretical approach to the topic on the basis of current consciousness research in humans.

Structural changes in brains of patients with disorders of consciousness treated with deep brain stimulation

Disorders of consciousness (DOC) are one of the major consequences after anoxic or traumatic brain injury. So far, several studies have described the regaining of consciousness in DOC patients using deep brain stimulation (DBS). However, these studies often lack detailed data on the structural and functional cerebral changes after such treatment. The aim of this study was to conduct a volumetric analysis of specific cortical and subcortical structures to determine the impact of DBS after functional recovery of DOC patients. Five DOC patients underwent unilateral DBS electrode implantation into the centromedian parafascicular complex of the thalamic intralaminar nuclei. Consciousness recovery was confirmed using the Rappaport Disability Rating and the Coma/Near Coma scale. Brain MRI volumetric measurements were done prior to the procedure, then approximately a year after, and finally 7 years after the implementation of the electrode. The volumetric analysis included changes in regional cortical volumes and thickness, as well as in subcortical structures. Limbic cortices (parahippocampal and cingulate gyrus) and paralimbic cortices (insula) regions showed a significant volume increase and presented a trend of regional cortical thickness increase 1 and 7 years after DBS. The volumes of related subcortical structures, namely the caudate, the hippocampus as well as the amygdala, were significantly increased 1 and 7 years after DBS, while the putamen and nucleus accumbens presented with volume increase. Volume increase after DBS could be a result of direct DBS effects, or a result of functional recovery. Our findings are in accordance with the results of very few human studies connecting DBS and brain volume increase. Which mechanisms are behind the observed brain changes and whether structural changes are caused by consciousness recovery or DBS in patients with DOC is still a matter of debate.

Whole-Brain Models to Explore Altered States of Consciousness from the Bottom Up

The scope of human consciousness includes states departing from what most of us experience as ordinary wakefulness. These altered states of consciousness constitute a prime opportunity to study how global changes in brain activity relate to different varieties of subjective experience. We consider the problem of explaining how global signatures of altered consciousness arise from the interplay between large-scale connectivity and local dynamical rules that can be traced to known properties of neural tissue. For this purpose, we advocate a research program aimed at bridging the gap between bottom-up generative models of whole-brain activity and the top-down signatures proposed by theories of consciousness. Throughout this paper, we define altered states of consciousness, discuss relevant signatures of consciousness observed in brain activity, and introduce whole-brain models to explore the biophysics of altered consciousness from the bottom-up. We discuss the potential of our proposal in view of the current state of the art, give specific examples of how this research agenda might play out, and emphasize how a systematic investigation of altered states of consciousness via bottom-up modeling may help us better understand the biophysical, informational, and dynamical underpinnings of consciousness.

Channels to consciousness: a possible role of gap junctions in consciousness

The neurophysiological basis of consciousness is still unknown and one of the most challenging questions in the field of neuroscience and related disciplines. We propose that consciousness is characterized by the maintenance of mental representations of internal and external stimuli for the execution of cognitive operations. Consciousness cannot exist without working memory, and it is likely that consciousness and working memory share the same neural substrates. Here, we present a novel psychological and neurophysiological framework that explains the role of consciousness for cognition, adaptive behavior, and everyday life. A hypothetical architecture of consciousness is presented that is organized as a system of operation and storage units named platforms that are controlled by a consciousness center (central executive/online platform). Platforms maintain mental representations or contents, are entrusted with different executive functions, and operate at different levels of consciousness. The model includes conscious-mode central executive/online and mental time travel platforms and semiconscious steady-state and preconscious standby platforms. Mental representations or contents are represented by neural circuits and their support cells (astrocytes, oligodendrocytes, etc.) and become conscious when neural circuits reverberate, that is, fire sequentially and continuously with relative synchronicity. Reverberatory activity in neural circuits may be initiated and maintained by pacemaker cells/neural circuit pulsars, enhanced electronic coupling via gap junctions, and unapposed hemichannel opening. The central executive/online platform controls which mental representations or contents should become conscious by recruiting pacemaker cells/neural network pulsars, the opening of hemichannels, and promoting enhanced neural circuit coupling via gap junctions.

ERP and MEG correlates of visual consciousness: The second decade

The first decade of event-related potential (ERP) research had established that the most consistent correlates of the onset of visual consciousness are the early visual awareness negativity (VAN), a posterior negative component in the N2 time range, and the late positivity (LP), an anterior positive component in the P3 time range. Two earlier extensive reviews ten years ago had concluded that VAN is the earliest and most reliable correlate of visual phenomenal consciousness, whereas LP probably reflects later processes associated with reflective/access consciousness. This article provides an update to those earlier reviews. ERP and MEG studies that have appeared since 2010 and directly compared ERPs between aware and unaware conditions are reviewed, and important new developments in the field are discussed. The result corroborates VAN as the earliest and most consistent signature of visual phenomenal consciousness, and casts further doubt on LP as an ERP correlate of phenomenal consciousness.

Physically Sufficient Neural Mechanisms of Consciousness

Neural correlates of consciousness (for brevity NCC) are foundational to the scientific study of consciousness. Chalmers (2000) has provided the most informative and influential definition of NCC, according to which neural correlates are minimally sufficient for consciousness. However, the sense of sufficiency needs further clarification since there are several relevant senses with different entailments. In section one of this article, we give an overview of the desiderata for a good definition of NCC and Chalmers’s definition. The second section analyses the merit of understanding the sufficiency of neural correlates for corresponding consciousness according to three relevant types of sufficiency: logical, metaphysical, and physical. In section three, a theoretical approach to consciousness studies is suggested in light of the sense in which NCC are sufficient for consciousness. Section four addresses a concern some might have about this approach. By the end, it will become apparent that our conception of NCC has important implications for research methodology, neuroethics, and the vitality of the search for NCC.

The nature of visual awareness at stimulus energy and feature levels: A backward masking study

The level of processing (LoP) hypothesis proposes that low-level stimulus perception (i.e., stimulus energy and features) is a graded process whereas high-level (i.e., letters, words, meaning) stimulus perception is all-or-none. In the present study, we set up a visual masking design in order to examine the nature of visual awareness at stimulus energy (i.e., detection task) and feature levels (identification task) at specific individual target durations (13, 27, 40, 53, and 80 ms). We manipulated the strength of the masking to produce different visibility conditions and gathered participants' subjective (across a 4-point awareness scale) and objective (accuracy levels) awareness performances. We found that intermediate ratings (i.e., ratings 2 and 3, which index graded awareness experiences) were used in more than 50% of the trials for target presentations of 27, 40, 53, and 80 ms. In addition, objective accuracy performances for target presentations of 27 and 80 ms produced linearly increasing detection and identification accuracies across the awareness scale categories, respectively. Overall, our results suggest that visual awareness at energy and feature levels of stimulus perception may be graded. Furthermore, we found a divergence in detection and identification performance results, which emphasizes the need for an adequate election of target durations when studying different perceptual processes such as detection versus more complex stimulus identification processes. Finally, "clarity" in the perceptual awareness scale should be exhaustively defined depending on the level of processing of the stimulus, as participants may recalibrate the meaning of the different awareness categories depending on task demands.

Neural Correlates of Consciousness Meet the Theory of Identity

One of the greatest challenges of consciousness research is to understand the relationship between consciousness and its implementing substrate. Current research into the neural correlates of consciousness regards the biological brain as being this substrate, but largely fails to clarify the nature of the brain-consciousness connection. A popular approach within this research is to construe brain-consciousness correlations in causal terms: the neural correlates of consciousness are the causes of states of consciousness. After introducing the notion of the neural correlate of consciousness, we argue (see Against Causal Accounts of NCCs) that this causal strategy is misguided. It implicitly involves an undesirable dualism of matter and mind and should thus be avoided. A non-causal account of the brain-mind correlations is to be preferred. We favor the theory of the identity of mind and brain, according to which states of phenomenal consciousness are identical with their neural correlates. Research into the neural correlates of consciousness and the theory of identity (in the philosophy of mind) are two major research paradigms that hitherto have had very little mutual contact. We aim to demonstrate that they can enrich each other. This is the task of the third part of the paper in which we show that the identity theory must work with a suitably defined concept of type. Surprisingly, neither philosophers nor neuroscientists have taken much care in defining this central concept; more often than not, the term is used only implicitly and vaguely. We attempt to open a debate on this subject and remedy this unhappy state of affairs, proposing a tentative hierarchical classification of phenomenal and neurophysiological types, spanning multiple levels of varying degrees of generality. The fourth part of the paper compares the theory of identity with other prominent conceptions of the mind-body connection. We conclude by stressing that scientists working on consciousness should engage more with metaphysical issues concerning the relation of brain processes and states of consciousness. Without this, the ultimate goals of consciousness research can hardly be fulfilled.

Large-Scale Brain Simulation and Disorders of Consciousness. Mapping Technical and Conceptual Issues

Modeling and simulations have gained a leading position in contemporary attempts to describe, explain, and quantitatively predict the human brain's operations. Computer models are highly sophisticated tools developed to achieve an integrated knowledge of the brain with the aim of overcoming the actual fragmentation resulting from different neuroscientific approaches. In this paper we investigate the plausibility of simulation technologies for emulation of consciousness and the potential clinical impact of large-scale brain simulation on the assessment and care of disorders of consciousness (DOCs), e.g., Coma, Vegetative State/Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome, Minimally Conscious State. Notwithstanding their technical limitations, we suggest that simulation technologies may offer new solutions to old practical problems, particularly in clinical contexts. We take DOCs as an illustrative case, arguing that the simulation of neural correlates of consciousness is potentially useful for improving treatments of patients with DOCs.