When A+B < A: Cognitive Bias in Experts' Judgment of Environmental Impact

"I should" Does Not Mean "I can." Introducing Efficacy, Normative, and General Compensatory Green Beliefs

Compensatory green beliefs (CGBs) denote beliefs that unsustainable behaviours can be compensated for by performing other sustainable behaviours. We propose to differentiate between efficacy, normative, and general beliefs (ECGBs, NCGBs, GCGBs). ECGBs refer to effectively offsetting previous lapses. NCGBs denote feeling morally obliged to make amends. GCGBs refer to trading off unspecified efforts in overall consumption. Employing survey data from n = 502 high school graduates and an n = 145 longitudinal subsample, we find a three-factor structure of CGBs. ECGBs, NCGBs, and GCGBs intercorrelate moderately, indicating their status as different constructs. NCGBs are positively associated with pro-environmental values, self-identity, and social norms, whereas GCGBs are negatively associated with these constructs. CGBs, in particular NCGBs, have unique explanatory power for sustainable behaviours. NCGBs show substantial temporal stability over one year. CGBs need not be destructive, as NCGBs may encourage sustainable action. Persuasive messages could be tailored to specific CGBs in specific behavioural domains.

Moral spillover in carbon offset judgments

Moral spillover occurs when a morally loaded behavior becomes associated with another source. In the current paper, we addressed whether the moral motive behind causing CO₂ emissions spills over on to how much people think is needed to compensate for the emissions. Reforestation (planting trees) is a common carbon-offset technique. With this in mind, participants estimated the number of trees needed to compensate for the carbon emissions from vehicles that were traveling with various moral motives. Two experiments revealed that people think larger carbon offsets are needed to compensate for the emissions when the emissions are caused by traveling for immoral reasons, in comparison with when caused by traveling for moral reasons. Hence, moral motives influence people’s judgments of carbon-offset requirements even though these motives have no bearing on what is compensated for. Moreover, the effect was insensitive to individual differences in carbon literacy and gender and to the unit (kilograms or tons) in which the CO₂ emissions were expressed to the participants. The findings stress the role of emotion in how people perceive carbon offsetting.

The negative footprint illusion in environmental impact estimates: Methodological considerations

Past research has consistently shown that carbon footprint estimates of a set of conventional and more environmentally friendly items in combination tend to be lower than estimates of the conventional items alone. This ‘negative footprint illusion’ is a benchmark for the study of how cognitive heuristics and biases underpin environmentally significant behavior. However, for this to be a useful paradigm, the findings must also be reliable and valid, and an understanding of how methodological details such as response time pressure influence the illusion is necessary. Past research has cast some doubt as to whether the illusion is obtained when responses are made on a ratio/quantitative scale and when a within-participants design is used. Moreover, in past research on the negative footprint illusion, participants have had essentially as much time as they liked to make the estimates. It is yet unknown how time pressure influences the effect. This paper reports an experiment that found the effect when participants were asked to estimate the items’ emissions in kilograms CO₂ (a ratio scale) under high and under low time pressure, using a within-participants design. Thus, the negative footprint illusion seems to be a reliable and valid phenomenon that generalizes across methodological considerations and is not an artifact of specific details in the experimental setup.

Irregular stimulus distribution increases the negative footprint illusion

As a climate change mitigation strategy, environmentally certified 'green' buildings with low carbon footprints are becoming more prevalent in the world. An interesting psychological question is how people perceive the carbon footprint of these buildings given their spatial distributions in a given community. Here we examine whether regular distribution (i.e., buildings organized in a block) or irregular distribution (i.e., buildings randomly distributed) influences people's perception of the carbon footprint of the communities. We first replicated the negative footprint illusion, the tendency to estimate a lower carbon footprint of a combined group of environmentally certified green buildings and ordinary conventional buildings, than the carbon footprint of the conventional buildings alone. Importantly, we found that irregular distribution of the buildings increased the magnitude of the negative footprint illusion. Potential applied implications for urban planning of green buildings are discussed.

Biased Estimates of Environmental Impact in the Negative Footprint Illusion: The Nature of Individual Variation

People consistently act in ways that harm the environment, even when believing their actions are environmentally friendly. A case in point is a biased judgment termed the negative footprint illusion, which arises when people believe that the addition of "eco-friendly" items (e.g., environmentally certified houses) to conventional items (e.g., standard houses), reduces the total carbon footprint of the whole item-set, whereas the carbon footprint is, in fact, increased because eco-friendly items still contribute to the overall carbon footprint. Previous research suggests this illusion is the manifestation of an "averaging-bias." We present two studies that explore whether people's susceptibility to the negative footprint illusion is associated with individual differences in: (i) environment-specific reasoning dispositions measured in terms of compensatory green beliefs and environmental concerns; or (ii) general analytic reasoning dispositions measured in terms of actively open-minded thinking, avoidance of impulsivity and reflective reasoning (indexed using the Cognitive Reflection Test; CRT). A negative footprint illusion was demonstrated when participants rated the carbon footprint of conventional buildings combined with eco-friendly buildings (Study 1 and 2) and conventional cars combined with eco-friendly cars (Study 2). However, the illusion was not identified in participants' ratings of the carbon footprint of apples (Study 1 and 2). In Studies 1 and 2, environment-specific dispositions were found to be unrelated to the negative footprint illusion. Regarding reflective thinking dispositions, reduced susceptibility to the negative footprint illusion was only associated with actively open-minded thinking measured on a 7-item scale (Study 1) and 17-item scale (Study 2). Our findings provide partial support for the existence of a negative footprint illusion and reveal a role of individual variation in reflective reasoning dispositions in accounting for a limited element of differential susceptibility to this illusion.

Biased perception of the environmental impact of everyday behaviors

Despite our concern about climate change, certain psychological barriers hinder the adoption of a pro-environmental lifestyle. In the present study (n = 186), we analyzed the participants' estimates of the environmental impact of their lifestyles, compared to their moral standards and the perceived normative impact. Results show that individuals recognize their lifestyle is more unsustainable than what is generally acceptable, yet they consider the lifestyle of others to be even more harmful. Furthermore, we studied the role of compensatory green beliefs on the biases in the estimated environmental impacts. The results showed that individuals tend to consider that pro-environmental behaviors have a neutral environmental impact. Thus, our research suggests the existence of a bias in individuals' perception of environmental impacts.

Motivation Analysis of Online Green Users: Evidence From Chinese "Ant Forest"

Environmental protection activities based on digital technology have cultivated many online green users (OGUs) and may become a critical means to combat global climate change. This paper explores individuals’ motivation to participate in online environmental protection activities and whether the activities have significantly increased individuals’ intention to participate in global collaboration on climate change. Taking Ant Forest as an example, this paper first summarized 14 trigger reasons for users’ participation in online environmental protection activities through interviews, then surveyed 600 OGUs through questionnaires, and studied the behavioral motivation from the four dimensions of environmental awareness, social motivation, online immersion, and global cooperation intention by using a structural equation model. The study found that both environmental awareness and social motivation had significant positive promotional effects on OGUs’ online immersion, and environmental awareness was higher than social motivation. Environmental awareness as a long-term motivation is conducive to the achievement of long-term climate goals, and social motivation is focused on short-term entertainment functions. There is a significant positive interactive relationship between environmental awareness and social motivation under the effect of digital technology, which jointly promote the improvement of OGUs’ online immersion, and online immersion is conducive to enhancing OGUs’ global cooperation intention. This study demonstrated that digital technology can effectively improve individuals’ intention to protect the environment and found a means to quickly identify the best OGUs (most willing to participate in global cooperation), which provided a new opportunity to inspire greater public participation in the global action against climate change.

Diagnosing, fast and slow

Diagnostic error is increasingly recognised as a source of significant morbidity and mortality in medicine. In this article, we will attempt to address several questions relating to clinical decision making; How do we decide on a diagnosis? Why do we so often get it wrong? Can we improve our critical faculties?We begin by describing a clinical vignette in which a medical error occurred and resulted in an adverse outcome for a patient. This case leads us to the concepts of heuristic thinking and cognitive bias. We then discuss how this is relevant to our current clinical paradigm, examples of heuristic thinking and potential mechanisms to mitigate bias.The aim of this article is to increase awareness of the role that cognitive bias and heuristic thinking play in medical decision making. We hope to motivate clinicians to reflect on their own patterns of thinking with an overall aim of improving patient care.

Assuming the Best: Individual Differences in Compensatory “Green” Beliefs Predict Susceptibility to the Negative Footprint Illusion

Recent years have seen a marked increase in carbon emissions despite pledges made by the international community at the Paris Accord in 2015 to reduce fossil fuel production and consumption. Rebound effects could contribute to this phenomenon as, in which attempts to curb carbon emissions might have inadvertently led to an upswing in fossil fuel usage. The present study hypothesizes that rebound effects are driven by a misapplication of compensatory balancing heuristics, with the unintended outcome of producing inaccurate estimates of the environmental impact of “green” or environmentally friendly labelled products or behaviors. The present study therefore aims to investigate the relationship between participants’ degree of compensatory thinking (e.g., “Recycling compensates for driving a car”) and their susceptibility to the Negative Footprint Illusion, a widely replicated phenomenon demonstrating that the presence of “green” products biases carbon footprint estimations. One hundred and twelve participants were asked to complete a 15-item Compensatory Green Beliefs scale and to estimate the total carbon footprint of a set of 15 conventional houses, followed by a set that included 15 “green” houses in addition to 15 conventional houses. Results indicated that participants, on average, believed that the “green” houses were carbon neutral, and that susceptibility to the Negative Footprint Illusion was predicted by performance on the Compensatory Green Beliefs scale. This is the first study confirming that individual differences in cognitive processes (i.e., Compensatory Green Beliefs) are indeed related to inaccurate estimates of “green” products, providing a foundation for further investigation of the influence of “green” and compensatory beliefs on carbon footprint estimates.

Are We Overestimating the Benefits of Emission Reduction Measures?

When people evaluate the environmental impact of both “environmentally” and “non-environmentally” friendly objects, actions, or behavior, their judgement of the total set in combination is lower than the sum of the individual components. The current communication is a personal perspective article that proposes a human cognitive framework that is adopted during evaluations, which consequently results in wrong reasoning and the reinforcement of misconceptions. The framework gives plausible interpretation of the following: (1) “compensatory green beliefs”—the belief that environmentally harmful behavior can be compensated for by friendly actions; (2) the “negative footprint illusion”—the belief that introducing environmentally friendly objects to a set of conventional objects (e.g., energy efficient products or measures) will reduce the environmental impact of the total set; and (3) “rebound effects”—sustainability interventions increase unsustainable behavior directly or indirectly. In this regard, the framework herein proposes that many seemingly different environmentally harmful behaviors may sprout from a common cause, known as the averaging bias. This may have implications for the success of sustainability interventions, or how people are influenced by the marketing of “environmentally friendly” measures or products and policymaking.

Why People Harm the Environment Although They Try to Treat It Well: An Evolutionary-Cognitive Perspective on Climate Compensation

Anthropogenic climate changes stress the importance of understanding why people harm the environment despite their attempts to behave in climate friendly ways. This paper argues that one reason behind why people do this is that people apply heuristics, originally shaped to handle social exchange, on the issues of environmental impact. Reciprocity and balance in social relations have been fundamental to social cooperation, and thus to survival, and therefore the human brain has become specialized by natural selection to compute and seek this balance. When the same reasoning is applied to environment-related behaviors, people tend to think in terms of a balance between “environmentally friendly” and “harmful” behaviors, and to morally account for the average of these components rather than the sum. This balancing heuristic leads to compensatory green beliefs and negative footprint illusions—the misconceptions that “green” choices can compensate for unsustainable ones. “Eco-guilt” from imbalance in the moral environmental account may promote pro-environmental acts, but also acts that are seemingly pro-environmental but in reality more harmful than doing nothing at all. Strategies for handling problems caused by this cognitive insufficiency are discussed.