Diversity of aphantasia revealed by multiple assessments of visual imagery, multisensory imagery, and cognitive style

Assessing visual mental imagery abilities in cerebral visual impairment

Visual imagery refers to the ability to create voluntary mental representations in the absence of corresponding visual stimuli, and current evidence suggests that it shares common neural mechanisms with visual perception. Cerebral visual impairment (CVI) is a brain-based visual disorder caused by early neurological injury and maldevelopment of central visual processing pathways and areas. Individuals with CVI often present with a complex visual profile, including deficits related to higher-order visual processing. However, the impact of visual maldevelopment on imagery abilities in this population has not been extensively characterized. We used the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) to investigate visual imagery abilities in a cohort of CVI participants (n = 25, mean age = 22.48 years ± 12.31 SD) compared to controls with neurotypical vision and development (n = 25, mean age = 22.88 years ± 4.94 SD). We found that individuals with CVI had significantly lower VVIQ scores (mean = 41.84 ± 18.61 SD) than controls (mean = 62.48 ± 13.07 SD), after controlling for age and verbal IQ level. Within the CVI group, visual imagery abilities were not significantly different when separated by baseline visual acuity, gestational status, or co-occurrence of autism spectrum disorder. These results suggest that impaired visual imagery may represent an important feature characterizing the complex visual profile of CVI.

Don't think of a pink elephant: Individual differences in visualisation predict involuntary imagery and its neural correlates

There are substantial differences in the capacity of people to have imagined visual experiences, ranging from a lifelong inability (Congenital Aphantasia) to people who report having imagined experiences that are as vivid as actually seeing (Hyper-Phantasia). While Congenital Aphantasia has typically been framed as a cognitive deficit, it is possible that a weak or absent ability to have imagined visual sensations is balanced by a heightened resistance to intrusive thoughts - which are experienced as an imagined sensation. Here, we report on a direct test of that proposition. We asked people to either imagine, or to try not to imagine having a range of audio and visual experiences while we recorded their brain activity with electroencephalography (EEG). Ratings describing the subjective vividness of different people's voluntary visualisations predicted if they would also report having involuntary visualisations - such as an imagined experience of seeing a pink elephant when they were asked not to. Both the prevalence of different people's involuntary visualisations and the typical vividness of their visualisations could be predicted by neural correlates of disinhibition, working memory, and neural feedback. Our data suggest that the propensity of people to have involuntary visual experiences can scale with the subjective intensity of their typical experiences of visualisation.

"The Giant Black Elephant with white Tusks stood in a field of Green Grass": Cognitive and brain mechanisms underlying aphantasia

Aphantasia, a spectrum of inabilities creating and perceiving mental images, is becoming more of a focus in continued research to better understand functions of sensory perception and imagination. Current research on aphantasia is still in an era of exploration to find its underlying neural mechanisms, comorbidities and comparing levels of visual imagery to other cognitive functions. Through a systematic review, this article explores the most influential developments in aphantasia research. The search included 3 databases-PsycINFO, PubMed, and Web of Science. After a rigorous selection process, 52 studies are included in this review. The findings include new research themes across different studies such as relationships between aphantasia and diminished episodic and autobiographical memory, comorbidities including autism, attention, emotions, and neurobiological differences. By integrating diverse perspectives, this review aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the cognitive processes underlying mental imagery and offers implications for further development in aphantasia research.

Beyond self-report: Measuring visual, auditory, and tactile mental imagery using a mental comparison task

Finding a reliable and objective measure of individual differences in mental imagery across sensory modalities is difficult, with measures relying on self-report scales or focusing on one modality alone. Based on the idea that mental imagery involves multimodal sensorimotor simulations, a mental comparison task (MCT) was developed across three studies and tested on adults (n = 96, 345, and 448). Analyses examined: (a) the internal consistency of the MCT, (b) whether lexical features of the MCT stimuli (word length and frequency) predicted performance, (c) whether the MCT related to two widely used self-report scales, (d) response latencies and accuracies across the visual, auditory, and tactile modalities, and (e) whether MCT performance was independent of processing speed. The MCT showed evidence of reliability and validity. Responses were fastest and most accurate for the visual modality, followed by the auditory and tactile. However, consistent with the idea that self-report questionnaires index a different aspect of mental imagery, the MCT showed minimal correlations with self-report imagery. Finally, relations between MCT scales remained strong after controlling for processing speed. Findings are discussed in relation to current understanding and measurement of mental imagery.

Decoding sound content in the early visual cortex of aphantasic participants

Listening to natural auditory scenes leads to distinct neuronal activity patterns in the early visual cortex (EVC) of blindfolded sighted and congenitally blind participants.1,2 This pattern of sound decoding is organized by eccentricity, with the accuracy of auditory information increasing from foveal to far peripheral retinotopic regions in the EVC (V1, V2, and V3). This functional organization by eccentricity is predicted by primate anatomical connectivity,3,4 where cortical feedback projections from auditory and other non-visual areas preferentially target the periphery of early visual areas. In congenitally blind participants, top-down feedback projections to the visual cortex proliferate,5 which might account for even higher sound-decoding accuracy in the EVC compared with blindfolded sighted participants.2 In contrast, studies in participants with aphantasia suggest an impairment of feedback projections to early visual areas, leading to a loss of visual imagery experience.6,7 This raises the question of whether impaired visual feedback pathways in aphantasia also reduce the transmission of auditory information to early visual areas. We presented auditory scenes to 23 blindfolded aphantasic participants. We found overall decreased sound decoding in early visual areas compared to blindfolded sighted ("control") and blind participants. We further explored this difference by modeling eccentricity effects across the blindfolded control, blind, and aphantasia datasets, and with a whole-brain searchlight analysis. Our findings suggest that the feedback of auditory content to the EVC is reduced in aphantasic participants. Reduced top-down projections might lead to both less sound decoding and reduced subjective experience of visual imagery.

A Systematic Review of Aphantasia: Concept, Measurement, Neural Basis, and Theory Development

People with aphantasia exhibit the inability to voluntarily generate or form mental imagery in their minds. Since the term "aphantasia" was proposed to describe this, it has gained increasing attention from psychiatrists, neuroscientists, and clinicians. Previous studies have mainly focused on the definition, prevalence, and measurement of aphantasia, its impacts on individuals' cognitive and emotional processing, and theoretical frameworks synthesizing existing findings, which have contributed greatly to our understanding of aphantasia. However, there are still some debates regarding the conclusions derived from existing research and the theories that were constructed from various sources of evidence. Building upon existing endeavors, this systematic review emphasizes that future research is much needed to refine the definition and diagnosis of aphantasia, strengthen empirical investigations at behavioral and neural levels, and, more importantly, develop or update theories. These multiple lines of efforts could lead to a deeper understanding of aphantasia and further guide researchers in future research directions.

Aphantasia and hyperphantasia: exploring imagery vividness extremes

The vividness of imagery varies between individuals. However, the existence of people in whom conscious, wakeful imagery is markedly reduced, or absent entirely, was neglected by psychology until the recent coinage of 'aphantasia' to describe this phenomenon. 'Hyperphantasia' denotes the converse - imagery whose vividness rivals perceptual experience. Around 1% and 3% of the population experience extreme aphantasia and hyperphantasia, respectively. Aphantasia runs in families, often affects imagery across several sense modalities, and is variably associated with reduced autobiographical memory, face recognition difficulty, and autism. Visual dreaming is often preserved. Subtypes of extreme imagery appear to be likely but are not yet well defined. Initial results suggest that alterations in connectivity between the frontoparietal and visual networks may provide the neural substrate for visual imagery extremes.

Deep Aphantasia: a visual brain with minimal influence from priors or inhibitory feedback?

The authors are both self-described congenital aphantasics, who feel they have never been able to have volitional imagined visual experiences during their waking lives. In addition, Loren has atypical experiences of a number of visual phenomena that involve an extrapolation or integration of visual information across space. In this perspective, we describe Loren's atypical experiences of a number of visual phenomena, and we suggest these ensue because her visual experiences are not strongly shaped by inhibitory feedback or by prior expectations. We describe Loren as having Deep Aphantasia, and Derek as shallow, as for both a paucity of feedback might prevent the generation of imagined visual experiences, but for Loren this additionally seems to disrupt activity at a sufficiently early locus to cause atypical experiences of actual visual inputs. Our purpose in describing these subjective experiences is to alert others to the possibility of there being sub-classes of congenital aphantasia, one of which-Deep Aphantasia, would be characterized by atypical experiences of actual visual inputs.

Multisensory subtypes of aphantasia: Mental imagery as supramodal perception in reverse

Cognitive neuroscience research on mental imagery has largely focused on the visual imagery modality in unimodal task contexts. Recent studies have uncovered striking individual differences in visual imagery capacity, with some individuals reporting a subjective absence of conscious visual imagery ability altogether ("aphantasia"). However, naturalistic mental imagery is often multi-sensory, and preliminary findings suggest that many individuals with aphantasia also report a subjective lack of mental imagery in other sensory domains (such as auditory or olfactory imagery). In this paper, we perform a series of cluster analyses on the multi-sensory imagery questionnaire scores of two large groups of aphantasic subjects, defining latent sub-groups in this sample population. We demonstrate that aphantasia is a heterogenous phenomenon characterised by dominant sub-groups of individuals with visual aphantasia (those who report selective visual imagery absence) and multi-sensory aphantasia (those who report an inability to generate conscious mental imagery in any sensory modality). We replicate our findings in a second large sample and show that more unique aphantasia sub-types also exist, such as individuals with selectively preserved mental imagery in only one sensory modality (e.g. intact auditory imagery). We outline the implications of our findings for network theories of mental imagery, discussing how unique aphantasia aetiologies with distinct self-report patterns might reveal alterations to various levels of the sensory processing hierarchy implicated in mental imagery.