Pathogenic Bacilli as an Emerging Biothreat?

Analysis of Sporulation in Bacillus cereus Biovar anthracis Which Contains an Insertion in the Gene for the Sporulation Factor σK

Bacillus cereus biovar anthracis (Bcbva) is an untypical pathogen causing a fatal anthrax-like disease in a variety of wildlife species in African rainforest areas. In contrast to Bacillus anthracis and most species of the B. cereus group, all strains of the Bcbva cluster contain a 22 kb insertion in the sigK gene which encodes the essential late sporulation sigma factor σK. This insertion is excised during sporulation in a site-specific recombination process resulting in an intact sigK gene and a circular molecule. The sporulation kinetics of two strains each of Bcbva and B. anthracis were compared by the expression analysis of eight sporulation-associated genes, including sigK, using reverse transcriptase quantitative real-time PCR. In addition, morphological sporulation stages were analyzed and quantified by electron microscopy. Our results indicated that the necessary excision of the insertion in Bcbva neither delayed nor inhibited its sporulation. In two spontaneous mutants of Bcbva, the excision of the sigK insertion and sporulation were impeded due to mutations in the spo0A and spoVG regulator genes, respectively. The spo0A frameshift mutation was overcome by intragenic suppression in a revertant which was able to sporulate normally, despite an M171S amino acid exchange in the global regulator Spo0A. A screening of the NCBI database identified further strains of the B. cereus group which possess unrelated insertions in the sigK gene, and two strains containing almost identical insertions at the same gene position. Some of the sigK insertions encode putative prophages, whereas the Bcbva insertion encoded a type I restriction-modification system. The function of these insertions and if they are possibly essential for sporulation remains to be assessed.

A simple undergraduate laboratory exercise for teaching the role of sentinel-level clinical microbiology testing in biological threat identification

Undergraduate students in the biomedical sciences are mostly unaware of how clinical microbiology laboratories handle suspected agents of bioterrorism or emerging infectious diseases. The Public Health Security Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 requires the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to maintain a list of microbes that pose serious biological threats to human health and safety, including Tier 1 agents with the potential for use in bioterrorism. The Laboratory Response Network (LRN), founded by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Association of Public Health Laboratories, coordinates the response of sentinel, reference, and national laboratories to these biothreats. The sentinel laboratories, which comprise most hospital-based and commercial laboratories, are the first to encounter a suspicious agent. For this reason, the LRN has published a series of testing guidelines to assist the sentinel laboratories in deciding whether a microbial isolate should be considered potentially hazardous and thus sent to a reference or national laboratory for further characterization. Here, we describe a simple laboratory exercise that teaches sentinel-level testing requirements in the context of an applied setting of a potential outbreak of anthrax that would require a sentinel laboratory to recognize a potential threat, attempt to rule it out, and refer to a national laboratory for identification.

Anthrax revisited: how assessing the unpredictable can improve biosecurity

B. anthracis is one of the most often weaponized pathogens. States had it in their bioweapons programs and criminals and terrorists have used or attempted to use it. This study is motivated by the narrative that emerging and developing technologies today contribute to the amplification of danger through greater easiness, accessibility and affordability of steps in the making of an anthrax weapon. As states would have way better preconditions if they would decide for an offensive bioweapons program, we focus on bioterrorism. This paper analyzes and assesses the possible bioterrorism threat arising from advances in synthetic biology, genome editing, information availability, and other emerging, and converging sciences and enabling technologies. Methodologically we apply foresight methods to encourage the analysis of contemporary technological advances. We have developed a conceptual six-step foresight science framework approach. It represents a synthesis of various foresight methodologies including literature review, elements of horizon scanning, trend impact analysis, red team exercise, and free flow open-ended discussions. Our results show a significant shift in the threat landscape. Increasing affordability, widespread distribution, efficiency, as well as ease of use of DNA synthesis, and rapid advances in genome-editing and synthetic genomic technologies lead to an ever-growing number and types of actors who could potentially weaponize B. anthracis. Understanding the current and future capabilities of these technologies and their potential for misuse critically shapes the current and future threat landscape and underlines the necessary adaptation of biosecurity measures in the spheres of multi-level political decision making and in the science community.