Incentives for Delay-Constrained Data Query and Feedback in Mobile Opportunistic Crowdsensing

Selfishness in Vehicular Delay-Tolerant Networks: A Review

Various operational communication models are using Delay-Tolerant Network as a communication tool in recent times. In such a communication paradigm, sometimes there are disconnections and interferences as well as high delays like vehicle Ad hoc networks (VANETs). A new research mechanism, namely, the vehicle Delay-tolerant network (VDTN), is introduced due to several similar characteristics. The store-carry-forward mechanism in VDTNs is beneficial in forwarding the messages to the destination without end-to-end connectivity. To accomplish this task, the cooperation of nodes is needed to forward messages to the destination. However, we cannot be sure that all the nodes in the network will cooperate and contribute their computing resources for message forwarding without any reward. Furthermore, there are some selfish nodes in the network which may not cooperate to forward the messages, and are inclined to increase their own resources. This is one of the major challenges in VDTNs and incentive mechanisms are used as a major solution. This paper presents a detailed study of the recently proposed incentive schemes for VDTNs. This paper also gives some open challenges and future directions for interested researchers in the future.

Adopting incentive mechanisms for large-scale participation in mobile crowdsensing: from literature review to a conceptual framework

Mobile crowdsensing is a burgeoning concept that allows smart cities to leverage the sensing power and ubiquitous nature of mobile devices in order to capture and map phenomena of common interest. At the core of any successful mobile crowdsensing application is active user participation, without which the system is of no value in sensing the phenomenon of interest. A major challenge militating against widespread use and adoption of mobile crowdsensing applications is the issue of how to identify the most appropriate incentive mechanism for adequately and efficiently motivating participants. This paper reviews literature on incentive mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing and proposes the concept of SPECTRUM as a guide for inferring the most appropriate type of incentive suited to any given crowdsensing task. Furthermore, the paper highlights research challenges and areas where additional studies related to the different factors outlined in the concept of SPECTRUM are needed to improve citizen participation in mobile crowdsensing. It is envisaged that the broad range of factors covered in SPECTRUM will enable smart cities to efficiently engage citizens in large-scale crowdsensing initiatives. More importantly, the paper is expected to trigger empirical investigations into how various factors as outlined in SPECTRUM can influence the type of incentive mechanism that is considered most appropriate for any given mobile crowdsensing initiative.