Does Vergence Affect Perceived Size?

The contribution of semantic distance knowledge to size constancy in perception and grasping when visual cues are limited

To achieve a stable perception of object size in spite of variations in viewing distance, our visual system needs to combine retinal image information and distance cues. Previous research has shown that, not only retinal cues, but also extraretinal sensory signals can provide reliable information about depth and that different neural networks (perception versus action) can exhibit preferences in the use of these different sources of information during size-distance computations. Semantic knowledge of distance, a purely cognitive signal, can also provide distance information. Do the perception and action systems show differences in their ability to use this information in calculating object size and distance? To address this question, we presented 'glow-in-the-dark' objects of different physical sizes at different real distances in a completely dark room. Participants viewed the objects monocularly through a 1-mm pinhole. They either estimated the size and distance of the objects or attempted to grasp them. Semantic knowledge was manipulated by providing an auditory cue about the actual distance of the object: "20 cm", "30 cm", and "40 cm". We found that semantic knowledge of distance contributed to some extent to size constancy operations during perceptual estimation and grasping, but size constancy was never fully restored. Importantly, the contribution of knowledge about distance to size constancy was equivalent between perception and action. Overall, our study reveals similarities and differences between the perception and action systems in the use of semantic distance knowledge and suggests that this cognitive signal is useful but not a reliable depth cue for size constancy under restricted viewing conditions.

Linear perspective cues have a greater effect on the perceptual rescaling of distant stimuli than textures in the virtual environment

The presence of pictorial depth cues in virtual environments is important for minimising distortions driven by unnatural viewing conditions (e.g., vergence-accommodation conflict). Our aim was to determine how different pictorial depth cues affect size constancy in virtual environments under binocular and monocular viewing conditions. We systematically removed linear perspective cues and textures of a hallway in a virtual environment. The experiment was performed using the method of constant stimuli. The task required participants to compare the size of 'far' (10 m) and 'near' (5 m) circles displayed inside a virtual environment with one or both or none of the pictorial depth cues. Participants performed the experiment under binocular and monocular viewing conditions while wearing a virtual reality headset. ANOVA revealed that size constancy was greater for both the far and the near circles in the virtual environment with pictorial depth cues compared to the one without cues. However, the effect of linear perspective cues was stronger than textures, especially for the far circle. We found no difference between the binocular and monocular viewing conditions across the different virtual environments. We conclude that linear perspective cues exert a stronger effect than textures on the perceptual rescaling of far stimuli placed in the virtual environment, and that this effect does not vary between binocular and monocular viewing conditions.

Empirical validation of QUEST+ in PSE and JND estimations in visual discrimination tasks

One of the most precise methods to establish psychometric functions and estimate threshold and slope parameters is the constant stimuli procedure. The large distribution of predetermined stimulus values presented to observers enables the psychometric functions to be fully developed, but makes this procedure time-consuming. Adaptive procedures enable reliable threshold estimation while reducing the number of trials by concentrating stimulus presentations around observers' supposed threshold. Here, the stimulus value for the next trial depends on observer's responses to the previous trials. One recent improvement of these procedures is to also estimate the slope (related to discrimination sensitivity). The Bayesian QUEST+ procedure (Watson Journal of Vision, 17(3), 10, 2017), a generalization and extension of the QUEST procedure, includes this refinement. Surprisingly, this procedure is barely used. Our goal was to empirically assess its precision to evaluate size, orientation, or temporal perception, in three yes/no discrimination tasks that increase in demands. In 72 adult participants in total, we compared points of subjective equivalence (PSEs) or simultaneity (PSSs) as well as discrimination sensitivity obtained with the QUEST+, constant stimuli, and simple up-down staircase procedures. While PSEs did not differ between procedures, sensitivity estimates obtained with the 64-trials QUEST+ procedure were overestimated (i.e., just-noticeable differences, or JNDs, were underestimated). Overall, agreement between procedures was good, and was at its best for the easiest tasks. This study empirically confirmed that the QUEST+ procedure can be considered as a method of choice to accelerate PSE estimation, while keeping in mind that sensitivity estimation should be handled with caution.

When is a disparity not a disparity? Toward an old theory of three-dimensional vision

The aims of this paper are twofold: first, to discuss and analyze the concept of binocular disparity and second, to contrast the traditional "air theory" of three-dimensional vision with the much older "ground theory," first suggested by Ibn al-Haytham more than a thousand years ago. The origins of an "air theory" of perception can be traced back to Descartes and subsequently to the philosopher George Berkeley, who claimed that distance "could not be seen" because points lying along the same line of sight (in an empty space) would all project to the same location on the retina. However, Descartes was also aware that the angle of convergence of the two eyes could solve the problem of the "missing" information for the monocular observer and, since then, most visual scientists have assumed that eye vergence plays an important role both in judging absolute distance and for scaling retinal size and binocular disparities. In contrast, al-Haytham's and Gibson's "ground theories," which are based on the geometry of the textured ground plane surface that has surrounded us throughout evolution and during our lifetimes, are not just more ecologically based but they also obviate the need for disparity scaling.

Minimal theory of 3D vision: new approach to visual scale and visual shape

Since Kepler and Descartes in the early-1600s, vision science has been committed to a triangulation model of stereo vision. But in the early-1800s, we realized that disparities are responsible for stereo vision. And we have spent the past 200 years trying to shoe-horn disparities back into the triangulation account. The first part of this article argues that this is a mistake, and that stereo vision is a solution to a different problem: the eradication of rivalry between the two retinal images, rather than the triangulation of objects in space. This leads to a 'minimal theory of 3D vision', where 3D vision is no longer tied to estimating the scale, shape, and direction of objects in the world. The second part of this article then asks whether the other aspects of 3D vision, which go beyond stereo vision, really operate at the same level of visual experience as stereo vision? I argue they do not. Whilst we want a theory of real-world 3D vision, the literature risks giving us a theory of picture perception instead. And I argue for a two-stage theory, where our purely internal 'minimal' 3D percept (from stereo vision) is linked to the world through cognition. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'New approaches to 3D vision'.

The Riemannian Geometry Theory of Visually-Guided Movement Accounts for Afterimage Illusions and Size Constancy

This discussion paper supplements our two theoretical contributions previously published in this journal on the geometric nature of visual space. We first show here how our Riemannian formulation explains the recent experimental finding (published in this special issue on size constancy) that, contrary to conclusions from past work, vergence does not affect perceived size. We then turn to afterimage experiments connected to that work. Beginning with the Taylor illusion, we explore how our proposed Riemannian visual–somatosensory–hippocampal association memory network accounts in the following way for perceptions that occur when afterimages are viewed in conjunction with body movement. The Riemannian metric incorporated in the association memory network accurately emulates the warping of 3D visual space that is intrinsically introduced by the eye. The network thus accurately anticipates the change in size of retinal images of objects with a change in Euclidean distance between the egocentre and the object. An object will only be perceived to change in size when there is a difference between the actual size of its image on the retina and the anticipated size of that image provided by the network. This provides a central mechanism for size constancy. If the retinal image is the afterimage of a body part, typically a hand, and that hand moves relative to the egocentre, the afterimage remains constant but the proprioceptive signals change to give the new hand position. When the network gives the anticipated size of the hand at its new position this no longer matches the fixed afterimage, hence a size-change illusion occurs.

Developmental Trajectories of Size Constancy as Implicitly Examined by Simple Reaction Times

It is still unclear whether size constancy is an innate ability or whether it develops with age. As many developmental studies are limited to the child's comprehension of the task instructions, here, an implicit measure of perceived size, namely, simple manual reaction time (RT), was opted for based on the assumption that perceptually bigger objects generate faster detection times. We examined size constancy in children (from 5 to 14 years of age) and adults using a simple RT approach. Participants were presented with pictures of tennis balls on a screen that was physically moved to two viewing distances. Visual stimuli were adjusted in physical size in order to subtend the same visual angle across distances, determining two conditions: a small-near tennis ball vs. a big-far tennis ball. Thanks to size constancy, the two tennis balls were perceived as different even though they were of equal size on the retina. Stimuli were also matched in terms of luminance. Participants were asked to react as fast as possible to the onset of the stimuli. The results show that the RTs reflected the perceived rather than the retinal size of the stimuli across the different age groups, such that participants responded faster to stimuli that were perceived as bigger than those perceived as smaller. Hence, these findings are consistent with the idea that size constancy is already present in early childhood, at least from the age of five, and does not require extensive visual learning.

V1 as an egocentric cognitive map

We typically distinguish between V1 as an egocentric perceptual map and the hippocampus as an allocentric cognitive map. In this article, we argue that V1 also functions as a post-perceptual egocentric cognitive map. We argue that three well-documented functions of V1, namely (i) the estimation of distance, (ii) the estimation of size, and (iii) multisensory integration, are better understood as post-perceptual cognitive inferences. This argument has two important implications. First, we argue that V1 must function as the neural correlates of the visual perception/cognition distinction and suggest how this can be accommodated by V1's laminar structure. Second, we use this insight to propose a low-level account of visual consciousness in contrast to mid-level accounts (recurrent processing theory; integrated information theory) and higher-level accounts (higher-order thought; global workspace theory). Detection thresholds have been traditionally used to rule out such an approach, but we explain why it is a mistake to equate visibility (and therefore the presence/absence of visual experience) with detection thresholds.