Impetus beliefs as default heuristics: dissociation between explicit and implicit knowledge about motion

Looking at Mental Images: Eye-Tracking Mental Simulation During Retrospective Causal Judgment

How do people evaluate causal relationships? Do they just consider what actually happened, or do they also consider what could have counterfactually happened? Using eye tracking and Gaussian process modeling, we investigated how people mentally simulated past events to judge what caused the outcomes to occur. Participants played a virtual ball-shooting game and then-while looking at a blank screen-mentally simulated (a) what actually happened, (b) what counterfactually could have happened, or (c) what caused the outcome to happen. Our findings showed that participants moved their eyes in patterns consistent with the actual or counterfactual events that they mentally simulated. When simulating what caused the outcome to occur, participants moved their eyes consistent with simulations of counterfactual possibilities. These results favor counterfactual theories of causal reasoning, demonstrate how eye movements can reflect simulation during this reasoning and provide a novel approach for investigating retrospective causal reasoning and counterfactual thinking.

Expectations of efficient actions bias social perception: a pre-registered online replication

Humans take a teleological stance when observing others' actions, interpreting them as intentional and goal directed. In predictive processing accounts of social perception, this teleological stance would be mediated by a perceptual prediction of an ideal energy-efficient reference trajectory with which a rational actor would achieve their goals within the current environmental constraints. Hudson and colleagues (2018 Proc. R. Soc. B 285, 20180638. (doi:10.1098/rspb.2018.0638)) tested this hypothesis in a series of experiments in which participants reported the perceived disappearance points of hands reaching for objects. They found that these judgements were biased towards the expected efficient reference trajectories. Observed straight reaches were reported higher when an obstacle needed to be overcome than if the path was clear. By contrast, unnecessarily high reaches over empty space were perceptually flattened. Moreover, these perceptual biases increased the more the environmental constraints and expected action trajectories were explicitly processed. These findings provide an important advance to our understanding of the mechanisms underlying social perception. The current replication tests the robustness of these findings and whether they uphold in an online setting.

The possibility of an impetus heuristic

Evidence consistent with a belief in impetus is drawn from studies of naïve physics, perception of causality, perception of force, and representational momentum, and the possibility of an impetus heuristic is discussed. An impetus heuristic suggests the motion path of an object that was previously constrained or influenced by an external source (e.g., object, force) appears to exhibit the same constraint or influence even after that constraint or influence is removed. Impetus is not a valid physical principle, but use of an impetus heuristic can in some circumstances provide approximately correct predictions regarding future object motion, and such predictions require less cognitive effort and resources than would predictions based upon objective physical principles. The relationship of an impetus heuristic to naïve impetus theory and to objective physical principles is discussed, and use of an impetus heuristic significantly challenges claims that causality or force can be visually perceived. Alternatives to an impetus heuristic are considered, and potential boundary conditions and falsification of the impetus notion are discussed. Overall, use of an impetus heuristic offers a parsimonious explanation for findings across a wide range of perceptual domains and could potentially be extended to more metaphorical types of motion.

Physical understanding in neurodegenerative diseases

This quantitative review gives an overview of physical understanding (i.e., the ability to represent and use the laws of physics to interact with the physical world) impairments in Alzheimer's disease (AD), semantic dementia (SD), and corticobasal syndrome (CBS), as assessed mainly with mechanical problem-solving and tool use tests. This review shows that: (1) SD patients have apraxia of tool use because of semantic tool knowledge deficits, but normal performance in tests of physical understanding; (2) AD and CBS patients show impaired performance in mechanical problem-solving tests, probably not because of intrinsic deficits of physical understanding, but rather because of additional cognitive (AD) or motor impairments (CBS); (3) As a result, the performance in mechanical problem-solving tests is not a good predictor of familiar tool use in dementia; (4) Actual deficits of physical understanding are probably observed only in late stages of neurodegenerative diseases, and associated with functional loss.

When and why does status threat at work bring out the best and the worst in us? A temporal social comparison theory

This paper seeks to explain when and why people respond to status threat at work with behaviors oriented toward either self-improvement or interpersonal harming. To that end, we extend the established static social comparison perspective on status threat. Specifically, we introduce the notion of temporal proximity of status threat, which is informed by five temporal social comparison markers. We argue that people construe distal future status gaps as a challenge (and thus show self-improvement-oriented responses), but construe a more proximal status gap as a threat (and thus engage in negative interpersonal behaviors). Further, we introduce three factors of uncertainty that may render the underlying temporal comparison less reliable, and thereby less useful for guiding one's response. Overall, our temporal social comparison theory integrates and extends current theorizing on status threat in organizations by fully acknowledging the dynamic nature of social comparisons. Plain Language Summary Employees often compare themselves to others to evaluate their status. If they perceive that their status is at threat or risk losing status, they engage in behaviors to prevent status loss. These behaviors can be positive, aimed at improving one's position or they can be negative, aimed at harming others. This paper develops a theoretical framework to examine when employees engage in more challenge- vs. threat-oriented behaviors. We argue that an important question how employees react to status threat is its temporal proximity—will an employee's status be threatened in the near versus distal future? We propose that the more distal (vs. proximate) the status threat is, the more employees gravitate towards challenge- and less threat-oriented behaviors. But how do employees know when a status threat occurs in the future? We argue that employees will compare their past status trajectories to co-workers’ status trajectories to mentally extrapolate the temporal proximity of such a threat. More specifically, we propose five characteristics (temporal markers) of social comparison trajectories that inform employees about the temporal proximity: their relative current position, the relative velocity and acceleration of their status trajectory, their relative mean status level, and their relative minimum and maximum status. Moreover, we suggest that employees’ conclusions from these markers are weakened by uncertainty in the “data stream” of social comparison information over time, that is, the length of the time span available, the amount of interruptions in this data stream, and the number of fluctuations in their own and others’ status trajectories.

Limits on simulation approaches in intuitive physics

A popular explanation of the human ability for physical reasoning is that it depends on a sophisticated ability to perform mental simulations. According to this perspective, physical reasoning problems are approached by repeatedly simulating relevant aspects of a scenario, with noise, and making judgments based on aggregation over these simulations. In this paper, we describe three core tenets of simulation approaches, theoretical commitments that must be present in order for a simulation approach to be viable. The identification of these tenets threatens the plausibility of simulation as a theory of physical reasoning, because they appear to be incompatible with what we know about cognition more generally. To investigate this apparent contradiction, we describe three experiments involving simple physical judgments and predictions, and argue their results challenge these core predictions of theories of mental simulation.

Perspectives of region II OSHA authorized safety and health trainers about initial COVID-19 response programs

In this cross-sectional survey-based study conducted in early fall 2020, we attempted to measure and ascertain the extent of whether employers in New York and New Jersey were prepared to manage and follow occupational safety and health (S&H) regulations and industry risk processes in developing an exposure control response program to COVID-19, the disease caused by exposure to the coronavirus SARS-CoV-2. We focused on Region II of the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL)-Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). In addition, we examined possible explanations for lack of compliance and uniformity across the region in various USDOL-OSHA regulatory aspects like training, respiratory protection program administration and proper task-specific application of occupational S&H hazard controls through risk management systems. We suggest opportunities for employer and governmental interventions to reduce potential worker exposures and better control future worksite biological hazards and infectious disease transmission. Overall, data suggested prevalent inconsistencies, noncompliance and a less than uniform approach to implementing COVID-19 response programs.

An fMRI study of scientists with a Ph.D. in physics confronted with naive ideas in science

A central challenge in developing conceptual understanding in science is overcoming naive ideas that contradict the content of science curricula. Neuroimaging studies reveal that high school and university students activate frontal brain areas associated with inhibitory control to overcome naive ideas in science, probably because they persist despite scientific training. However, no neuroimaging study has yet explored how persistent naive ideas in science are. Here, we report brain activations of 25 scientists with a Ph.D. in physics assessing the scientific value of naive ideas in science. Results show that scientists are slower and have lower accuracy when judging the scientific value of naive ideas compared to matched control ideas. fMRI data reveals that a network of frontal brain regions is more activated when judging naive ideas. Results suggest that naive ideas are likely to persist, even after completing a Ph.D. Advanced experts may still rely on high order executive functions like inhibitory control to overcome naive ideas when the context requires it.

Semantic modulation of time-to-collision judgments

Observers are able to make generally accurate judgments of the time-to-collision (TTC) of approaching stimuli. Traditional theories have emphasized the role of optical cues about the expansion of the retinal image in this ability. Recent work, however, has further emphasized the role of semantic information about the object. Here we investigate the role of semantic information in TTC judgments by presenting a range of real-world objects, which varied widely in size, weight, and hardness. Our results show that the physical characteristics of looming stimuli predict observers' TTC estimations. Bigger, heavier, and harder objects were underestimated more, relative to smaller, lighter, and softer objects. As expected, actual TTC and stimulus size were also significant predictors of TTC judgments. In estimating the arrival time of looming stimuli, observers automatically take into account several characteristics of the stimuli, even though these characteristics are completely task irrelevant. This suggests that semantic properties of seen objects and the consequences of their impact on the observer's body are processed automatically.

Affordance matching predictively shapes the perceptual representation of others' ongoing actions

Predictive processing accounts of social perception argue that action observation is a predictive process, in which inferences about others' goals are tested against the perceptual input, inducing a subtle perceptual confirmation bias that distorts observed action kinematics toward the inferred goals. Here we test whether such biases are induced even when goals are not explicitly given but have to be derived from the unfolding action kinematics. In 2 experiments, participants briefly saw an actor reach ambiguously toward a large object and a small object, with either a whole-hand power grip or an index-finger and thumb precision grip. During its course, the hand suddenly disappeared, and participants reported its last seen position on a touch-screen. As predicted, judgments were consistently biased toward apparent action targets, such that power grips were perceived closer to large objects and precision grips closer to small objects, even if the reach kinematics were identical. Strikingly, these biases were independent of participants' explicit goal judgments. They were of equal size when action goals had to be explicitly derived in each trial (Experiment 1) or not (Experiment 2) and, across trials and across participants, explicit judgments and perceptual biases were uncorrelated. This provides evidence, for the first time, that people make online adjustments of observed actions based on the match between hand grip and object goals, distorting their perceptual representation toward implied goals. These distortions may not reflect high-level goal assumptions, but emerge from relatively low-level processing of kinematic features within the perceptual system. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Visuomotor Interactions and Perceptual Judgments in Virtual Reality Simulating Different Levels of Gravity

Virtual reality is used to manipulate sensorimotor interactions in a controlled manner. A critical issue is represented by the extent to which virtual scenarios must conform to physical realism to allow ecological human–machine interactions. Among the physical constraints, Earth gravity is one of the most pervasive and significant for sensorimotor coordination. However, it is still unclear whether visual perception is sensitive to the level of gravity acting on target motion displayed in virtual reality, given the poor visual discrimination of accelerations. To test gravity sensitivity, we asked participants to hit a virtual ball rolling down an incline and falling in air, and to report whether ball motion was perceived as natural or unnatural. We manipulated the gravity level independently for the motion on the incline and for the motion in air. The ball was always visible during rolling, whereas it was visible or occluded during falling before interception. The scene included several cues allowing metric calibration of visual space and motion. We found that the perception rate of natural motion was significantly higher and less variable when ball kinematics was congruent with Earth gravity during both rolling and falling. Moreover, the timing of target interception was accurate only in this condition. Neither naturalness perception nor interception timing depended significantly on whether the target was visible during free-fall. Even when occluded, free-fall under natural gravity was correctly extrapolated from the preceding, visible phase of rolling motion. Naturalness perception depended on motor performance, in addition to the gravity level. In sum, both motor and perceptual responses were guided by an internal model of Earth gravity effects. We suggest that, in order to enhance perceptual sensitivity to physical realism, virtual reality should involve visual backgrounds with metric cues and closed-loop sensorimotor interactions. This suggestion might be especially relevant for the design of rehabilitation protocols.

Earth-Gravity Congruent Motion Facilitates Ocular Control for Pursuit of Parabolic Trajectories

There is evidence that humans rely on an earth gravity (9.81 m/s²) prior for a series of tasks involving perception and action, the reason being that gravity helps predict future positions of moving objects. Eye-movements in turn are partially guided by predictions about observed motion. Thus, the question arises whether knowledge about gravity is also used to guide eye-movements: If humans rely on a representation of earth gravity for the control of eye movements, earth-gravity-congruent motion should elicit improved visual pursuit. In a pre-registered experiment, we presented participants (n = 10) with parabolic motion governed by six different gravities (-1/0.7/0.85/1/1.15/1.3 g), two initial vertical velocities and two initial horizontal velocities in a 3D environment. Participants were instructed to follow the target with their eyes. We tracked their gaze and computed the visual gain (velocity of the eyes divided by velocity of the target) as proxy for the quality of pursuit. An LMM analysis with gravity condition as fixed effect and intercepts varying per subject showed that the gain was lower for -1 g than for 1 g (by -0.13, SE = 0.005). This model was significantly better than a null model without gravity as fixed effect (p < 0.001), supporting our hypothesis. A comparison of 1 g and the remaining gravity conditions revealed that 1.15 g (by 0.043, SE = 0.005) and 1.3 g (by 0.065, SE = 0.005) were associated with lower gains, while 0.7 g (by 0.054, SE = 0.005) and 0.85 g (by 0.029, SE = 0.005) were associated with higher gains. This model was again significantly better than a null model (p < 0.001), contradicting our hypothesis. Post-hoc analyses reveal that confounds in the 0.7/0.85/1/1.15/1.3 g condition may be responsible for these contradicting results. Despite these discrepancies, our data thus provide some support for the hypothesis that internalized knowledge about earth gravity guides eye movements.

Intuitive physics of gravitational motion as shown by perceptual judgment and prediction-motion tasks

In Experiment 1, we explored participants' perceptual knowledge of vertical fall by presenting them with virtually simulated polystyrene or wooden spheres falling to the ground from about two meters high. Participants rated the perceived naturalness of the motion. Besides the implied mass of the sphere, we manipulated the motion pattern (i.e., uniform acceleration vs. uniform velocity), and the magnitude of acceleration or velocity. Results show that relatively low values of acceleration or velocity were judged as natural for the polystyrene sphere, whereas relatively high values of acceleration or velocity were judged as natural for the wooden sphere. In Experiment 2, the same stimuli of Experiment 1 were used, but the sphere disappeared behind an invisible occluder at some point of its trajectory. Participants were asked to predict the time-to-contact (TTC) of the sphere with the ground by pressing a key at the exact time of impact of the lower edge of the sphere with the floor of the room. Results show that the estimated TTC for the simulated wooden sphere was slightly but consistently smaller than the estimated TTC for the simulated polystyrene sphere. The influence of the implied mass on participants' responses might be the manifestation of two processes, namely an explicit 'heavy-fast, light-slow' heuristic, and/or an implicit, automatic association between mass and falling speed.

The use of visual cues in gravity judgements on parabolic motion

Evidence suggests that humans rely on an earth gravity prior for sensory-motor tasks like catching or reaching. Even under earth-discrepant conditions, this prior biases perception and action towards assuming a gravitational downwards acceleration of 9.81 m/s². This can be particularly detrimental in interactions with virtual environments employing earth-discrepant gravity conditions for their visual presentation. The present study thus investigates how well humans discriminate visually presented gravities and which cues they use to extract gravity from the visual scene. To this end, we employed a Two-Interval Forced-Choice Design. In Experiment 1, participants had to judge which of two presented parabolas had the higher underlying gravity. We used two initial vertical velocities, two horizontal velocities and a constant target size. Experiment 2 added a manipulation of the reliability of the target size. Experiment 1 shows that participants have generally high discrimination thresholds for visually presented gravities, with weber fractions of 13 to beyond 30%. We identified the rate of change of the elevation angle (ẏ) and the visual angle (θ) as major cues. Experiment 2 suggests furthermore that size variability has a small influence on discrimination thresholds, while at the same time larger size variability increases reliance on ẏ and decreases reliance on θ. All in all, even though we use all available information, humans display low precision when extracting the governing gravity from a visual scene, which might further impact our capabilities of adapting to earth-discrepant gravity conditions with visual information alone.

An Effect of Context on Whether Memory for Initial Position Exhibits a FröHlich Effect or an Onset Repulsion Effect

Memory for the initial and final positions of moving targets was examined. When targets appeared adjacent to the boundary of a larger enclosing window, memory for initial position exhibited a Fröhlich effect (i.e., a displacement forward), and when distance of initial position from the boundary increased, memory for initial position exhibited a smaller Fröhlich effect or an onset repulsion effect (i.e., a displacement backward). When targets vanished adjacent to the boundary of a larger enclosing window, memory for final position was displaced backward, and when distance of final position from the boundary increased, memory for final position did not exhibit significant displacement. These patterns differed from previously reported displacements of initial and final positions of targets presented on a blank background. Possible influences of attention and extrapolation of trajectory on whether memory for initial position exhibits a Fröhlich effect or an onset repulsion effect and on backward displacement in memory for final position are discussed.

Mental imagery of gravitational motion

There is considerable evidence that gravitational acceleration is taken into account in the interaction with falling targets through an internal model of Earth gravity. Here we asked whether this internal model is accessed also when target motion is imagined rather than real. In the main experiments, naïve participants grasped an imaginary ball, threw it against the ceiling, and caught it on rebound. In different blocks of trials, they had to imagine that the ball moved under terrestrial gravity (1g condition) or under microgravity (0g) as during a space flight. We measured the speed and timing of the throwing and catching actions, and plotted ball flight duration versus throwing speed. Best-fitting duration-speed curves estimate the laws of ball motion implicit in the participant's performance. Surprisingly, we found duration-speed curves compatible with 0g for both the imaginary 0g condition and the imaginary 1g condition, despite the familiarity with Earth gravity effects and the added realism of performing the throwing and catching actions. In a control experiment, naïve participants were asked to throw the imaginary ball vertically upwards at different heights, without hitting the ceiling, and to catch it on its way down. All participants overestimated ball flight durations relative to the durations predicted by the effects of Earth gravity. Overall, the results indicate that mental imagery of motion does not have access to the internal model of Earth gravity, but resorts to a simulation of visual motion. Because visual processing of accelerating/decelerating motion is poor, visual imagery of motion at constant speed or slowly varying speed appears to be the preferred mode to perform the tasks.

Toward a general theory of momentum-like effects

The future actions, behaviors, and outcomes of objects, individuals, and processes can often be anticipated, and some of these anticipations have been hypothesized to result from momentum-like effects. Five types of momentum-like effects (representational momentum, operational momentum, attentional momentum, behavioral momentum, psychological momentum) are briefly described. Potential similarities involving properties of momentum-like effects (continuation, coherence, role of chance or guessing, role of sensory processing, imperviousness to practice or error feedback, shifts in memory for position, effects of changes in velocity, rapid occurrence, effects of retention interval, attachment to an object rather than an abstract frame of reference, nonrigid transformation) are described, and potential constraints on a future theory of momentum-like effects (dynamic representation, nature of extrapolation, sensitivity to environmental contingencies, bridging gaps between stimulus and response, increasing adaptiveness to the environment, serving as a heuristic for perception and action, insensitivity to stimulus format, importance of subjective consequences, role of knowledge and belief, automaticity of occurrence, properties of functional architecture) are discussed. The similarity and ubiquity of momentum-like effects suggests such effects might result from a single or small number of mechanisms that operate over different dimensions, modalities, and time-scales and provide a fundamental adaptation for perception and action.

Inferring mass in complex scenes by mental simulation

After observing a collision between two boxes, you can immediately tell which is empty and which is full of books based on how the boxes moved. People form rich perceptions about the physical properties of objects from their interactions, an ability that plays a crucial role in learning about the physical world through our experiences. Here, we present three experiments that demonstrate people's capacity to reason about the relative masses of objects in naturalistic 3D scenes. We find that people make accurate inferences, and that they continue to fine-tune their beliefs over time. To explain our results, we propose a cognitive model that combines Bayesian inference with approximate knowledge of Newtonian physics by estimating probabilities from noisy physical simulations. We find that this model accurately predicts judgments from our experiments, suggesting that the same simulation mechanism underlies both peoples' predictions and inferences about the physical world around them.

Representational Momentum Beyond Internalized Physics

Prediction of future motion is necessary in order to successfully deal with moving objects. Implicit measures have been used to evaluate the sources of information used in this task. For instance, observers may be asked to localize the final position of a moving target. Judgments have been found to be displaced in the direction of motion (forward displacement), suggesting that observers have internalized a mental analogue of physical momentum. However, more recent studies have shown that forward displacement may not be caused by cognitive mechanisms alone. Rather, predictive mechanisms at the perceptual and motor levels may contribute to the forward error. Supporting the notion that mechanisms of anticipation may be embodied, the forward error was found to depend on the execution of eye and pointing movements. Also, forward displacement depended on the motion type that was presented (smooth vs. jerky or implied), which suggests that attention moves to the next expected target position to facilitate responses to this position.

Individualistic weight perception from motion on a slope

Perception of an object’s weight is linked to its form and motion. Studies have shown the relationship between weight perception and motion in horizontal and vertical environments to be universally identical across subjects during passive observation. Here we show a contradicting finding in that not all humans share the same motion-weight pairing. A virtual environment where participants control the steepness of a slope was used to investigate the relationship between sliding motion and weight perception. Our findings showed that distinct, albeit subjective, motion-weight relationships in perception could be identified for slope environments. These individualistic perceptions were found when changes in environmental parameters governing motion were introduced, specifically inclination and surface texture. Differences in environmental parameters, combined with individual factors such as experience, affected participants’ weight perception. This phenomenon may offer evidence of the central nervous system’s ability to choose and combine internal models based on information from the sensory system. The results also point toward the possibility of controlling human perception by presenting strong sensory cues to manipulate the mechanisms managing internal models.

Heavy objects and small children: Developmental data extend the passive frame theory

Passive frame theory is compatible with modern complexity theory and the idea that conflict drives the emergence of a novel structural organization. After describing new developmental data, we suggest that this conflict needs to be expanded to include not only conflict between action options, but also between action and perception.

Causal agency and the perception of force

In the Michotte task, a ball (X) moves toward a resting ball (Y). In the moment of contact, X stops und Y starts moving. Previous studies have shown that subjects tend to view X as the causal agent ("X launches Y") rather than Y ("Y stops X"). Moreover, X tends to be attributed more force than Y (force asymmetry), which contradicts the laws of Newtonian mechanics. Recent theories of force asymmetry try to explain these findings as the result of an asymmetrical identification with either the (stronger) agent or the (weaker) patient of the causal interaction. We directly tested this assumption by manipulating attributions of causal agency while holding the properties of the causal interaction constant across conditions. In contrast to previous accounts, we found that force judgments stayed invariant across conditions in which assignments of causal agency shifted from X to Y and that even those subjects who chose Y as the causal agent gave invariantly higher force ratings to X. These results suggest that causal agency and the perception of force are conceptually independent of each other. Different possible explanations are discussed.

Illusory Tactile Motion Perception: An Analog of the Visual Filehne Illusion

We continually move our body and our eyes when exploring the world, causing our sensory surfaces, the skin and the retina, to move relative to external objects. In order to estimate object motion consistently, an ideal observer would transform estimates of motion acquired from the sensory surface into fixed, world-centered estimates, by taking the motion of the sensor into account. This ability is referred to as spatial constancy. Human vision does not follow this rule strictly and is therefore subject to perceptual illusions during eye movements, where immobile objects can appear to move. Here, we investigated whether one of these, the Filehne illusion, had a counterpart in touch. To this end, observers estimated the movement of a surface from tactile slip, with a moving or with a stationary finger. We found the perceived movement of the surface to be biased if the surface was sensed while moving. This effect exemplifies a failure of spatial constancy that is similar to the Filehne illusion in vision. We quantified this illusion by using a Bayesian model with a prior for stationarity, applied previously in vision. The analogy between vision and touch points to a modality-independent solution to the spatial constancy problem.

The embodied dynamics of perceptual causality: a slippery slope?

In Michotte's launching displays, while the launcher (object A) seems to move autonomously, the target (object B) seems to be displaced passively. However, the impression of A actively launching B does not persist beyond a certain distance identified as the "radius of action" of A over B. If the target keeps moving beyond the radius of action, it loses its passivity and seems to move autonomously. Here, we manipulated implied friction by drawing (or not) a surface upon which A and B are traveling, and by varying the inclination of this surface in screen- and earth-centered reference frames. Among 72 participants (n = 52 in Experiment 1; n = 20 in Experiment 2), we show that both physical embodiment of the event (looking straight ahead at a screen displaying the event on a vertical plane vs. looking downwards at the event displayed on a horizontal plane) and contextual information (objects moving along a depicted surface or in isolation) affect interpretation of the event and modulate the radius of action of the launcher. Using classical mechanics equations, we show that representational consistency of friction from radius of action responses emphasizes the embodied nature of frictional force in our cognitive architecture.

Patterns of response times and response choices to science questions: the influence of relative processing time

We report on five experiments investigating response choices and response times to simple science questions that evoke student "misconceptions," and we construct a simple model to explain the patterns of response choices. Physics students were asked to compare a physical quantity represented by the slope, such as speed, on simple physics graphs. We found that response times of incorrect answers, resulting from comparing heights, were faster than response times of correct answers comparing slopes. This result alone might be explained by the fact that height was typically processed faster than slope for this kind of task, which we confirmed in a separate experiment. However, we hypothesize that the difference in response time is an indicator of the cause (rather than the result) of the response choice. To support this, we found that imposing a 3-s delay in responding increased the number of students comparing slopes (answering correctly) on the task. Additionally a significant proportion of students recognized the correct written rule (compare slope), but on the graph task they incorrectly compared heights. Finally, training either with repetitive examples or providing a general rule both improved scores, but only repetitive examples had a large effect on response times, thus providing evidence of dual paths or processes to a solution. Considering models of heuristics, information accumulation models, and models relevant to the Stroop effect, we construct a simple relative processing time model that could be viewed as a kind of fluency heuristic. The results suggest that misconception-like patterns of answers to some science questions commonly found on tests may be explained in part by automatic processes that involve the relative processing time of considered dimensions and a priority to answer quickly.

Getting a grip on heaviness perception: a review of weight illusions and their probable causes

Weight illusions--where one object feels heavier than an identically weighted counterpart--have been the focus of many recent scientific investigations. The most famous of these illusions is the 'size-weight illusion', where a small object feels heavier than an identically weighted, but otherwise similar-looking, larger object. There are, however, a variety of similar illusions which can be induced by varying other stimulus properties, such as surface material, temperature, colour, and even shape. Despite well over 100 years of research, there is little consensus about the mechanisms underpinning these illusions. In this review, I will first provide an overview of the weight illusions that have been described. I will then outline the dominant theories that have emerged over the past decade for why we consistently misperceive the weights of objects which vary in size, with a particular focus on the role of lifters' expectations of heaviness. Finally, I will discuss the magnitude of the various weight illusions and suggest how this largely overlooked facet of the topic might resolve some of the debates surrounding the cause of these misperceptions of heaviness.

Judgements about the relation between force and trajectory variables in verbally described ballistic projectile motion

How accurate are explicit judgements about familiar forms of object motion, and how are they made? Participants judged the relations between force exerted in kicking a soccer ball and variables that define the trajectory of the ball: launch angle, maximum height attained, and maximum distance reached. Judgements tended to conform to a simple heuristic that judged force tends to increase as maximum height and maximum distance increase, with launch angle not being influential. Support was also found for the converse prediction, that judged maximum height and distance tend to increase as the amount of force described in the kick increases. The observed judgemental tendencies did not resemble the objective relations, in which force is a function of interactions between the trajectory variables. This adds to a body of research indicating that practical knowledge based on experiences of actions on objects is not available to the processes that generate judgements in higher cognition and that such judgements are generated by simple rules that do not capture the objective interactions between the physical variables.

The impetus theory in judgments about object motion: a new perspective

Several tendencies found in explicit judgments about object motion have been interpreted as evidence that people possess a naive theory of impetus. The theory states that objects that are caused to move by other objects acquire force that determines the kind of motion exhibited by the object, and that this force gradually dissipates over time. I argue that the findings can better be understood as manifestations of a general understanding of externally caused motion based on experiences of acting on objects. Experiences of acting on objects yield the idea that properties of the cause of motion are transmitted to the effect object. This idea functions as a heuristic for explicit predictions of object motion under conditions of uncertainty. This accounts not only for the findings taken as evidence for the impetus theory, but also for several findings that fall outside the scope of the impetus theory. It has also been claimed that judgments about the location at which a moving object disappeared are influenced by the impetus theory. I argue that these judgments are better explained in a different way, as best-guess extrapolations made by the visual system as a practical guide to interactions with the object, such as interception.

The property transmission hypothesis: a possible explanation for visual impressions of pulling and other kinds of phenomenal causality

Under certain circumstances, stimuli involving two moving objects that do not come into contact reliably give rise to the illusory perceptual impression that one of the objects is pulling the other, as if there is an unseen connection between them. It is proposed that the conditions determining the occurrence of this impression can be explained as cases of application of the property-transmission hypothesis. This is a general hypothesis that causal objects operate in part by transmitting some of their own properties to effect objects under conditions where the causal object is active, where there are cues to the occurrence of generative transmission between the causal object and an effect object, and where there is a time-ordered relation of resemblance between properties of the causal object and those of the effect object. This hypothesis predicts that the pulling impression should occur only when the effect object adopts kinematic properties (speed and direction) that resemble those of the causal object. An experiment is reported that supports this prediction.

Adolescents' Cognition of Projectile Motion: A Pilot Study

Previous work on the development of intuitive knowledge about projectile motion has shown a dissociation between action knowledge expressed on an action task and conceptual knowledge expressed on a judgment task for young children. The research investigated the generality of dissociation for adolescents. On the action task, participants were asked to swing Ball A of a bifilar pendulum to some height then release it to collide with Ball B, which was projected to hit a target. On the judgment task, participants indicated orally the desired swing angle at which Ball A should be released so that Ball B would strike a target. Unlike previous findings with adults, the adolescents showed conceptual difficulties on the judgment task and well-developed action knowledge on the action task, which suggests dissociation between the two knowledge systems is also present among adolescents. The result further supports the hypothesis that the two knowledge systems follow different developmental trajectories and at different speeds.