Lightness, equivalent backgrounds, and anchoring

Measuring the meter: on the constancy of lightness scales seen against different backgrounds

The constancy of a 16-step achromatic Munsell scale was tested with regards to background variations in two experiments. In experiment 1 three groups of observers were asked to find lightness matches for targets in simultaneous lightness displays by using a 16-step achromatic Munsell scale placed on a white, black, or white-black checkered background. In experiment 2, a yellow-blue checkered background and a green-red checkered background replaced Munsell scales on the black and on the white backgrounds. Significant effects of scale background on matches were found only in experiment 1, suggesting that background luminance is a crucial factor in the overall appearance of the scale. The lack of significant differences in experiment 2, however, may stand for an overall robustness of the scale with respect to background luminance changes occurring within certain luminance ranges.

Contrast polarity and edge integration in achromatic color perception

Previous work has shown that the achromatic color of a target patch embedded in simple two-dimensional display depends not only on the luminance contrast between the target and its immediate surround but also on the contrasts of other nearby edges. Quantitative models have been proposed in which the target color is modeled as a spatially weighted sum of edge contrasts in which the target edge receives the largest weight. Rudd and Arrington [Vision Res.41, 3649 (2001)] elaborated on this idea to include an additional mechanism whereby effects of individual color-inducing edges are "partially blocked" by edges lying along the path between the inducing edge and the target. We tested the blockage model in appearance matching experiments performed with disk-and-single-ring stimuli having all four possible combinations of inner and outer ring edge contrast polarities. Evidence was obtained for both "blockage" (attenuation) and "antiblockage" (amplification) of achromatic color induction signals, depending on the contrast polarities of the inner and outer ring edges. A neural model is proposed to account for our data on the basis of the contrast gain control occurring between cortical edge detector neurons.

Effects of surround articulation on lightness depend on the spatial arrangement of the articulated region

We investigated the effect of surround articulation on the perceived lightness of a target disk. Surround articulation was manipulated by varying either the number of wedges in a surround consisting of wedges of alternating luminance or the number of checks in a surround consisting of a radial checkerboard pattern. In most conditions, increased articulation caused incremental targets to appear lighter and decremental targets to appear darker. But increasing the surround articulation in a way that did not increase the number of target-coaligned edges in the display did not affect the target lightness. We propose that the effects of surround articulation depend on the relationship between the orientations and contrast polarities of the target edges and those of edges present within the surround.

Lightness constancy in 4-month-old infants

In the present study, discrete trial familiarization/novelty techniques were used to study lightness constancy in 4-month-old infants. The test stimuli were real objects (paper smiley faces) of two different reflectances, dark gray (17% reflectance) and light gray (54% reflectance). In Experiment 1, the test stimuli were viewed against a white (90% reflectance) surround, and in Experiment 2, against a black (4.6% reflectance) surround. In Experiments 1 and 2, the illumination was changed between familiarization and test phases of each trial. In Experiment 3, the reflectance of the surround was changed from white to mid gray (28.5% reflectance) between familiarization and test phases of each trial. With the white surround, the infants preferred the face with the novel reflectance, consistent with the presence of lightness constancy. With the black surround, the infants showed no preference between faces with novel reflectance vs. novel luminance. With the changing surround, the infants showed a small preference for the stimulus with the novel ratio, as opposed to the stimulus with the novel reflectance and the novel luminance. The results are discussed in the context of adult cues for lightness constancy, including white anchor points and local luminance ratios.

Inhomogeneous surrounds, conflicting frameworks, and the double-anchoring theory of lightness

The empirical question of whether or not the lightness of a region is accounted for purely by the average luminance of its surround has a complex answer that depends on whether such a region is an increment, a decrement, or intermediate relative to the luminances of the contiguous surfaces. It is shown here that a new model of lightness, based on anchoring principles, predicts and clarifies such intricacies. In this model, the luminance of the target region determines its lightness in two ways: indirectly, by causing it to group with parts of its surround and thus defining the nested frameworks to which it belongs; and directly, by anchoring it to the highest luminance and to the average surround luminance in each of these frameworks. Inter- and intraindividual differences in lightness assessment are shown to emerge under grouping conditions that create unstable, conflicting frameworks.

Chromatic shadow compatibility and cone-excitation ratios

Logvinenko [Perception 31, 201 (2002)] asserts that Adelson's wall-of-blocks illusion [Science 262, 2042 (1993)], where identical gray-cube surface tops appear to differ in brightness, arises when the surfaces surrounding the cube tops are shadow compatible, creating a concomitant illusion of transparency. We replicated Logvinenko's main findings in the chromatic domain across three experiments in which observers match cube tops in hue, saturation, and brightness. A second set of stimuli adjusted cone-excitation ratios across the apparent transparency border [Proc. R. Soc. London 257, 115 (1994)], which enhanced lightness and brightness constancy but only when the stimuli varied in both chromaticity and intensity.

Olive green or chestnut brown?

Reflectance and spectral power functions are poor predictors of color experiences. Only in completely relativized conditions (single observer, non-metameric set of stimuli, and single set of viewing conditions) is the relationship close. Variation in reflectance of Munsell chips experienced by color-normal observers as having a unique green hue encompasses approximately sixty percent of the complete range of hues falling under the category “green”; and in recent determinations of unique hues, ranges of yellow and green as well as green and blue unique hues overlap.

Why not color physicalism without color absolutism?

We make three points. First, the concept of productance value that the authors propose in their defense of color physicalism fails to do the work for which it is intended. Second, the authors fail to offer an adequate physicalist account of what they call the hue-magnitudes. Third, their answer to the problem of individual differences faces serious difficulties.

Color realism and color illusions

As demonstrated by several example displays, color illusions challenge color realism, because they involve a one-to-many reflectance-to-color mapping. Solving this problem by differentiating between veridical and illusory colors corresponding to the same reflectance is hampered because of the lack of an appropriate criterion. However, the difference between veridical and illusory color perception can still be maintained.

Have Byrne & Hilbert answered Hardin's challenge?

I argue that Byrne & Hilbert (B&H) have not answered Hardin's objection to physicalism about color concerning the unitary-binary structure of the colors for two reasons. First, their account of unitary-binary structure seems unsatisfactory. Second, pace B&H, there are no physicalistically acceptable candidates to be the hue-magnitudes. I conclude with a question about the justification of physicalism about color.

Perceptual variation, realism, and relativization, or: How I learned to stop worrying and love variations in color vision

In many cases of variation in color vision, there is no nonarbitrary way of choosing between variants. Byrne & Hilbert insist that there is an unknown standard for choosing, whereas eliminativists claim that all the variants are erroneous. A better response relativizes colors to perceivers, thereby providing a color realism that avoids the need to choose between variants.

Can a physicalist notion of color provide any insight into the nature of color perception?

Byrne & Hilbert (B&H) conceive of color perception as the representation of a physical property “out there.” In our view, their approach does not only have various internal problems, but is also apt to becloud both the intricate and still poorly understood role that “color” plays within perceptual architecture, and the complex coupling to the “external world” of the perceptual system as an entirety. We propose an alternative perspective, which avoids B&H's misleading dichotomy between a purely subjective and a realist conception of “color.”

An account of color without a subject?

While color realism is endorsed, Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's) case for it stretches the notion of “physical property” beyond acceptable bounds. It is argued that a satisfactory account of color should do much more to respond to antirealist intuitions that flow from the specificity of color experience, and a pointer to an approach that does so is provided.

Color realism redux

Our reply is in three parts. The first part concerns some foundational issues in the debate about color realism. The second part addresses the many objections to the version of physicalism about color (“productance physicalism”) defended in the target article. The third part discusses the leading alternative approaches and theories endorsed by the commentators.

Orange laser beams are not illusory: The need for a plurality of “real” color ontologies

Reflectance physicalism only provides a partial picture of the ontology of color. Byrne & Hilbert’ account is unsatisfactory because the replacement of reflectance functions by productance functions is ad hoc, unclear, and only leads to new problems. Furthermore, the effects of color contrast and differences in illumination are not really taken seriously: Too many “real” colors are tacitly dismissed as illusory, and this for arbitrary reasons. We claim that there cannot be an all-embracing ontology for color.

Color nominalism, pluralistic realism, and color science

Byrne & Hilbert are right that it might be an objective fact that a particular tomato is unique red, but wrong that it cannot simultaneously be yellowish-red (not only objectively, but from somebody else's point of view). Sensory categorization varies among organisms, slightly among conspecifics, and sharply across taxa. There is no question of truth or falsity concerning choice of categories, only of utility and disutility. The appropriate framework for color categories is Nominalism and Pluralistic Realism.

Perceptual variation and access to colors

To identify the set of reflectances that constitute redness, the authors must first determine which surfaces are red. They do this by relying on widespread agreement among us. However, arguments based on the possible ways in which humans would perceive colors show that mere widespread agreement among us is not a satisfactory way to determine which surfaces are red.

Parallels between hearing and seeing support physicalism

There are 2,000 hair cells in the cochlea, but only three cones in the retina. This disparity can be understood in terms of the differences between the physical characteristics of the auditory signal (discrete excitations and resonances requiring many narrowly tuned receptors) and those of the visual signal (smooth daylight excitations and reflectances requiring only a few broadly tuned receptors). We argue that this match supports the physicalism of color and timbre.

Surreptitious substitution

In this commentary I argue that Byrne & Hilbert commit a number of philosophical solecisms: They beg the question of “realism,” they take the phenomenon and the theoretical model to be the same thing, and they surreptitiously substitute data sets for the life-world.

Clarifying the problem of color realism

“The problem of color realism” as defined in the first section of the target article, is crucial to the argument laid out by Byrne & Hilbert. They claim that the problem of color realism “does not concern, at least in the first instance, color language or color concepts” (sect. 1.1). I argue that this claim is misconceived and that a different characterisation of the problem, and some of their preliminary assumptions makes their positive proposal less appealing.

Ecological considerations support color physicalism

We argue that any theory of color physicalism must include consideration of ecological interactions. Ecological and sensorimotor contingencies resulting from relative surface motion and observer motion give rise to measurable effects on the spectrum of light reflecting from surfaces. These contingencies define invariant manifolds in a sensory-spatial space, which is the physical underpinning of all subjective color experiences.

Confusion of sensations and their physical correlates

The authors favor a “color realism” theory that considers colors to be physical properties residing in objects that reflect, emit, or transmit light. It is opposed to the theory that colors are sensations or visual experiences. This commentary suggests that both theories are correct, and that context usually indicates which of these dual aspects is being considered.

True color only exists in the eye of the observer

The colors we perceive are the outcome of an attempt to meaningfully order the spectral information from the environment. These colors are not the result of a straightforward mapping of a physical property to a sensation, but arise from an interaction between our environment and our visual system. Thus, although one may infer from a surface’ reflectance characteristics that it will be perceived as “colored,” true colors only arise by virtue of the interaction of the reflected light with the eye (and brain) of an observer.

Color and content

Those who identify colours with physical properties need to say how the content of colour experiences relate to their favoured identifications. This is because it is not plausible to hold that colour experiences represent things as having the physical properties in question. I sketch how physical realists about colour might tackle this item of unfinished business.

“Color realism” shows a subjectivist' mode of thinking

Byrne & Hilbert (B&H) assert that reflectances embody the reality of color, but metamerism smears the authors' “real” color categories into uselessness. B&H ignore this problem, possibly because they implicitly adopt a sort of subjectivism, whereby an object is defined by the percepts (or more generally by the measurements) it engenders. Subjectivism is unwieldy, and hence prone to such troubles.

Spatial position and perceived color of objects

Visual percepts are called veridical when a “real” object can be identified as their cause, and illusions otherwise. The perceived position and color of a flashed object may be called veridical or illusory depending on which viewpoint one adopts. Since “reality” is assumed to be fixed (independent of viewpoint) in the definition of veridicality (or illusion), this suggests that “perceived” position and color are not properties of “real” objects.

Reflectance-to-color mappings depend critically on spatial context

In visual science, color is usually regarded as a subjective phenomenon. The relationship between the specific color experiences that are evoked by a visual scene and the physical properties of the surfaces viewed in that scene are complex and highly dependent on spatial context. There is no simple correspondence between experienced color and a stable class of physical reflectances.

Byrne and Hilbert's chromatic ether

Because our only access to color qualities is through their appearance, Byrne & Hilbert's insistence on a strict distinction between apparent colors and real colors leaves them without a principled way of determining when, if ever, we see colors as they really are.

Beautiful red squares

The reflectance types that Byrne & Hilbert identify with colors count as types only in a way that is more dependent on, and more relative to color perceivers, than their account suggests. Their account of perceptual content may be overly focused on input conditions and distal causes.

Measuring surface achromatic color: toward a common measure for increments and decrements

Surface color is traditionally measured by matching methods. However, in some conditions, the color of certain surfaces cannot be measured: The surface simply looks brighter or darker than all the patches on a matching scale. We studied the reliability, validity, and range of application of three different types of simulated Munsell scales (white-, black-, and split-surrounded) as methods for measuring surface colors in simple disk-ring displays. All the scales were equally reliablefor matching both increments and decrements, but about 2096 of the increments were unmatchable on the white-surrounded scale, about 1396 of the decrements were unmatchable on the black-surrounded scale, and about 9% of the increments were unmatchable on the split-surrounded scale. However, matches on all the scales were linearly related. Therefore, it is possible to convert them to common units, using regression parameters. These units provide an extended metric for measuring all increments and decrements in the stimulus space, effectively removing ceiling and floor effects, and providing measures even for surfaces that were perceived as out of range on some of the scales.

Perceptual objects may have nonphysical properties

Byrne & Hilbert defend color realism, which assumes that: (a) colors are properties of objects; (b) these objects are physical; hence, (c) colors are physical properties. I accept (a), agree that in a certain sense (b) can be defended, but reject (c). Colors are properties of perceptual objects – which also have underlying physical properties – but they are not physical properties.

Color as a material, not an optical, property

For all animals, color is an indicator of the substance and state of objects, for which purpose reflectance is just one among many relevant optical properties. This broader meaning of color is confirmed by linguistic evidence. Rather than reducing color to a simple physical property, it is more realistic to embrace its full phenomenology.

Productance physicalism and a posteriori necessity

The problem of nonreflectors perceived as colored is the central problem for Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's) physicalism. Vision scientists and other interested parties need to consider the motivation for their account of “productance physicalism.” Is B&H's theory motivated by scientific concerns or by philosophical interests intended to preserve a physicalist account of color as a posteriori necessary?

In favor of an ecological account of color

Byrne & Hilbert understate the difficulties facing their version of color realism. We doubt that they can fix reflectance types and magnitudes in a way that does not invoke relations to perceivers. B&H's account, therefore, resembles the dispositional or ecological accounts that they dismiss. This is a good thing, for a dispositional account is promising if understood in an ecological framework.

Color as a factor analytic approximation to Nature

Color vision provides accurate measures of the phase and intensity of daylight, and also a means of discriminating between objects. Neither property implies that objects are colored.

Hue magnitudes and Revelation

Revelation, the thesis that the full intrinsic nature of colors is revealed to us by color experiences, is false in Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's) view, but in an interesting and nonobvious way. I show what would make Revelation true, given B&H's account of colors, and then show why that situation fails to obtain, and why that is interesting.

Surface color perception in constrained environments

Byrne & Hilbert propose that color can be identified with explicit properties of physical surfaces. I argue that this claim must be qualified to take into account constraints needed to make recovery of surface color information possible. When these constraints are satisfied, then a biological visual system can establish a correspondence between perceived surface color and specific surface properties.

Color: A vision scientist's perspective

Vision scientists are interested in three diverse entities: physical stimuli, neural states, and consciously perceived colors, and in the mapping rules among the three. In this worldview, the three kinds of entities have coequal status, and views that attribute color exclusively to one or another of them, such as color realism, have no appeal.

Do metamers matter?

Metamerism is a rather common feature of objects. The authors see it as problematic because they are concerned with a special case: metamerism in standard conditions. Such metamerism does not, however, pose a problem for color realists. There is an apparent problem in cases of metameric light sources, but to see such metamers as problematic is to fail to answer Berkeley's challenge.

Imprecise color constancy versus color realism

Byrne & Hilbert's thesis, that color be associated with reflectance-type, is questioned on the grounds that it is far from clear that the human visual system is able to determine a surface's reflectance-type with sufficient accuracy. In addition, a (friendly) suggestion is made as to how to amend the definition of reflectance-type in terms of CIE (Commission Internationale de l'Eclairage) coordinates under a canonical illuminant.

Darkness filling-in: a neural model of darkness induction

A model of darkness induction based on a neural filling-in mechanism is proposed. The model borrows principles from both Land's Retinex theory and BCS/FCS filling-in model of Grossberg and colleagues. The main novel assumption of the induction model is that darkness filling-in signals, which originate at luminance borders, are partially blocked when they try to cross other borders. The percentage of the filling-in signal that is blocked is proportional to the log luminance ratio across the border that does the blocking. The model is used to give a quantitative account of the data from a brightness matching experiment in which a decremental test disk was surrounded by two concentric rings. The luminances of the rings were independently varied to modulate the brightness of the test. Observers adjusted the luminance of a comparison disk surrounded by a single ring of higher luminance to match the test disk in brightness.

Relative area and relative luminance combine to anchor surface lightness values

The anchoring of lightness perception was tested in simple visual fields composed of only two regions by placing observes inside opaque acrylic hemispheres. Both side-by-side and center/surround configurations were tested. The results, which undermine Gilchrist and Bonato's (1995) recent claim that surrounds tend to appear white, indicate that anchoring involves both relative luminance and relative area. As long as the area of the darker region is equal to or smaller than the area of the lighter region, relative area plays no role in anchoring. Only relative luminance controls anchoring: The lighter region appears white, and the darker region is perceived relative to that value. When the area of the darker region becomes greater than that of the lighter region, relative area begins to play a role. As the darker region becomes larger and relative area shifts from the lighter region to the darker region, the appearance of the darker region moves toward white and the appearance of lighter region moves toward luminosity. This hitherto unrecognized rule is consistent with almost all of the many previous reports of area effects in lightness and brightness. This in turn suggests that a wide range of earlier work on area effects in brightness induction, lightness contrast, lightness assimilation, and luminosity perception can be understood in terms of a few simple rules of anchoring.