Somatic responses in behavioral inhibition

Age-differences in cognitive flexibility when overcoming a preexisting bias through feedback

INTRODUCTION

Older adults are often worse than younger adults at adapting to changing situational demands, and this difference is commonly attributed to an age-related decline in acquiring and updating information. Previous research on aging and cognitive flexibility has used measures that require adapting to novel associations learned during a laboratory task (e.g., choice X led to positive outcomes but now leads to negative outcomes). However, in everyday life people must frequently overcome associations based on preexisting beliefs and biases (e.g., you like to eat cake, but your doctor said to limit your sugar intake). The goal of the present study was to examine possible age-differences in overcoming a preexisting bias and determine whether age-related changes in the acquisition and updating of information influence this form of flexibility.

METHOD

Older (n = 20) and younger (n = 20) adults completed a novel task in which repeated choices were made between a sure option (gain or loss) and one of two risky options that were initially ambiguous. Optimal performance required overcoming a framing bias toward being risk seeking to avoid a sure loss and risk averse when offered a sure gain. Probe questions assessed knowledge of choice outcomes, while skin conductance assessed physiological reactions to choices and choice outcomes.

RESULTS

Both older and younger adults demonstrated flexibility by reducing the impact of bias over trials, but younger adults had better performance overall. Age-differences were associated with distinct aspects of processing. Young adults had more precise knowledge of choice outcomes and developed skin conductance responses in anticipation of bad choices that were not apparent in older adults.

CONCLUSIONS

Older adults showed significant improvement over trials in their ability to decrease bias-driven choices, but younger showed greater flexibility. Age-differences in task performance were based on differences in learning and corresponding representations of task-relevant information.

Feedback Blunting: Total Sleep Deprivation Impairs Decision Making that Requires Updating Based on Feedback

STUDY OBJECTIVES

To better understand the sometimes catastrophic effects of sleep loss on naturalistic decision making, we investigated effects of sleep deprivation on decision making in a reversal learning paradigm requiring acquisition and updating of information based on outcome feedback.

DESIGN

Subjects were randomized to a sleep deprivation or control condition, with performance testing at baseline, after 2 nights of total sleep deprivation (or rested control), and following 2 nights of recovery sleep. Subjects performed a decision task involving initial learning of go and no go response sets followed by unannounced reversal of contingencies, requiring use of outcome feedback for decisions. A working memory scanning task and psychomotor vigilance test were also administered.

SETTING

Six consecutive days and nights in a controlled laboratory environment with continuous behavioral monitoring.

SUBJECTS

Twenty-six subjects (22-40 y of age; 10 women).

INTERVENTIONS

Thirteen subjects were randomized to a 62-h total sleep deprivation condition; the others were controls.

MEASUREMENTS AND RESULTS

Unlike controls, sleep deprived subjects had difficulty with initial learning of go and no go stimuli sets and had profound impairment adapting to reversal. Skin conductance responses to outcome feedback were diminished, indicating blunted affective reactions to feedback accompanying sleep deprivation. Working memory scanning performance was not significantly affected by sleep deprivation. And although sleep deprived subjects showed expected attentional lapses, these could not account for impairments in reversal learning decision making.

CONCLUSIONS

Sleep deprivation is particularly problematic for decision making involving uncertainty and unexpected change. Blunted reactions to feedback while sleep deprived underlie failures to adapt to uncertainty and changing contingencies. Thus, an error may register, but with diminished effect because of reduced affective valence of the feedback or because the feedback is not cognitively bound with the choice. This has important implications for understanding and managing sleep loss-induced cognitive impairment in emergency response, disaster management, military operations, and other dynamic real-world settings with uncertain outcomes and imperfect information.