Nonprobative photos rapidly lead people to believe claims about their own (and other people's) pasts

Human detection of political speech deepfakes across transcripts, audio, and video

Recent advances in technology for hyper-realistic visual and audio effects provoke the concern that deepfake videos of political speeches will soon be indistinguishable from authentic video. We conduct 5 pre-registered randomized experiments with N = 2215 participants to evaluate how accurately humans distinguish real political speeches from fabrications across base rates of misinformation, audio sources, question framings with and without priming, and media modalities. We do not find base rates of misinformation have statistically significant effects on discernment. We find deepfakes with audio produced by the state-of-the-art text-to-speech algorithms are harder to discern than the same deepfakes with voice actor audio. Moreover across all experiments and question framings, we find audio and visual information enables more accurate discernment than text alone: human discernment relies more on how something is said, the audio-visual cues, than what is said, the speech content.

When Seeing Isn't Believing: Navigating Visual Health Misinformation through Library Instruction

Visual misinformation poses unique challenges to public health due to its potential for persuasiveness and rapid spread on social media. In this article, librarians at the University of Pittsburgh Health Sciences Library System identify four types of visual health misinformation: misleading graphs and charts, out of context visuals, image manipulation in scientific publications, and AI-generated images and videos. To educate our campus's health sciences audience and wider community on these topics, we have developed a range of instruction about visual health misinformation. We describe our strategies and provide suggestions for implementing visual misinformation programming for a variety of audiences.

Framing the past (and future): Effects of generic photos on autobiographical judgments

Do the images we see every day influence how we remember our lives? Research on this matter often concerns how entire memories of events can be created or shaped through the use of doctored photographs of personal (Wade et al., Psychonomic bulletin & review, 9 (3), 597-603, 2002) and public events (Sacchi et al., Applied Cognitive Psychology, 21 (8), 1005-1022, 2007). Although this paradigm has yielded insights into false memory production, it may underestimate the extent to which photographs can bias or distort memory in a subtler manner (i.e., without the use of doctored photographs or suggestion). In Experiments 1 (N = 95) and 2 (N = 186) of the present study, we examined whether the mere presence of generic images, typical of stock photography, could influence aspects of our memories. Given the parallel between autobiographical remembering and forecasting (Berntsen & Bohn, Memory & Cognition, 38(3), 265-278, 2010), we also examined (Experiment 3: N=204) how such images would influence future autobiographical judgments. Specifically, three experiments investigated whether photographs would bias autobiographical judgments for either quantitative (e.g., How many movies have you seen in the past year?) or affective (e.g., How enjoyable do you think your next date will be?) aspects of events in everyday life. We found that photographs reliably influenced judgments related to quantitative aspects of autobiographical events. Moreover, though less robustly, there was an indication that these photos could bias our affective construal of such events as well. Overall, we conclude that the mere presence of generic photographs may exert an influence on the way we think about our lives to an extent previously under-recognized.

Perceived truth of statements and simulated social media postings: an experimental investigation of source credibility, repeated exposure, and presentation format

To better understand the spread of fake news in the Internet age, it is important to uncover the variables that influence the perceived truth of information. Although previous research identified several reliable predictors of truth judgments—such as source credibility, repeated information exposure, and presentation format—little is known about their simultaneous effects. In a series of four experiments, we investigated how the abovementioned factors jointly affect the perceived truth of statements (Experiments 1 and 2) and simulated social media postings (Experiments 3 and 4). Experiment 1 explored the role of source credibility (high vs. low vs. no source information) and presentation format (with vs. without a picture). In Experiments 2 and 3, we additionally manipulated repeated exposure (yes vs. no). Finally, Experiment 4 examined the role of source credibility (high vs. low) and type of repetition (congruent vs. incongruent vs. no repetition) in further detail. In sum, we found no effect of presentation format on truth judgments, but strong, additive effects of source credibility and repetition. Truth judgments were higher for information presented by credible sources than non-credible sources and information without sources. Moreover, congruent (i.e., verbatim) repetition increased perceived truth whereas semantically incongruent repetition decreased perceived truth, irrespectively of the source. Our findings show that people do not rely on a single judgment cue when evaluating a statement’s truth but take source credibility and their meta-cognitive feelings into account.

Truthiness, the illusory truth effect, and the role of need for cognition

Ease of processing-cognitive fluency-is a central input in assessments of truth, but little is known about individual differences in susceptibility to fluency-based biases in truth assessment. Focusing on two paradigms-truthiness and the illusory truth effect-we consider the role of Need for Cognition (NFC), an individual difference variable capturing one's preference for elaborative thought. Across five experiments, we replicated basic truthiness and illusory truth effects. We found very little evidence that NFC moderates truthiness. However, we found some evidence that (without an experimental warning), people high on NFC may be more susceptible to the illusory truth effect. This may reflect that elaborative thought increases the fluency with which encoded statements are processed after a delay (thus increasing the illusory truth effect). Future research may fruitfully test whether the influence of NFC and other individual difference measures depends on whether people are making immediate or delayed truth judgments.

Telling a good story: The effects of memory retrieval and context processing on eyewitness suggestibility

Witnesses are likely to describe a crime many times before testifying or encountering misinformation about that crime. Research examining the effect of retrieval on later suggestibility has yielded mixed results. LaPaglia and Chan manipulated whether misinformation was presented in a narrative or misleading questions, and they found that retrieval increased suggestibility when misinformation was presented in a narrative, but reduced suggestibility when the same misinformation was presented in questions. In the current study, we aimed to address why these differences occurred. Specifically, we examined whether contextual detail and narrative coherence during misinformation exposure influenced the relation between retrieval and suggestibility. Participants watched a robbery video and some were questioned about the event afterwards. They were then exposed to misinformation presented in a narrative (Experiment 1) or questions (Experiment 2) before taking a final memory test. Testing enhanced suggestibility when the misinformation phase reinstated contextual information of the event, but not when the misinformation phase included few contextual details–regardless of whether the misinformation was in a narrative or questions. In Experiment 3, disrupting narrative coherence by randomizing the order of contextual information eliminated retrieval-enhanced suggestibility. Therefore, context processing during the post-event information phase influences whether retrieval enhances or reduces eyewitness suggestibility.

Picture (im)perfect: Illusions of recognition memory produced by photographs at test

Photographs have been found to affect a variety of psychological judgments. For example, nonprobative but semantically related photographs may increase beliefs in the truth of general knowledge statements (Newman, Garry, Bernstein, Kantner, & Lindsay, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 19(5), 969-974, 2012; Newman et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 41(5), 1337-1348, 2015). Photographs can also create illusions of memory (Cardwell, Henkel, Garry, Newman, & Foster, Memory & Cognition, 44(6), 883-896, 2016; Henkel, Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25(1), 78-86, 2011; Henkel & Carbuto, 2008). A candidate mechanism for these effects is that a photograph increases the fluency with which a statement or an event is processed. The present study was conducted to determine whether photos at test can induce illusions of recognition memory and to test the viability of a conceptual fluency explanation of these effects. The results of the present study suggest that photographs enhance the fluency of related words (Experiment 1), that false memories can be produced by the mere presence of a related photo on a recognition memory test for words (Experiments 2 & 3), and that these effects appear to be limited to conceptually based recognition tests (Experiments 4 & 5). The results support the notion that photograph-based illusions of memory stem from the ability of related photographs to increase the speed and ease of conceptual processing.

The citation effect: In-text citations moderately increase belief in trivia claims

Authors use in-text citations to provide support for their claims and to acknowledge work done by others. How much do such citations increase the believability of an author's claims? It is possible that readers (especially novices) might ignore citations as they read. Alternatively, citations ostensibly serve as evidence for a claim, which justifies using them as a basis for a judgment of truth. In six experiments, subjects saw true and false trivia claims of varying difficulty presented with and without in-text citations (e.g., The cat is the only pet not mentioned in the bible) and rated the likelihood that each statement was true. A mini meta-analysis summarizing the results of all six experiments indicated that citations had a small but reliable effect on judgments of truth (d=0.13, 95% CI [0.06, 0.20]) suggesting that subjects were more likely to believe claims that were presented with citations than without. We discuss this citation effect and how it is similar and different to related research suggesting that nonprobative photos can increase judgments of truth.