Perceived causality, force, and resistance in the absence of launching

Exploring the influence of self-identification on perceptual judgments of physical and social causality

People tend to overestimate the causal contribution of the self to the observed outcome in various situations, a cognitive bias known as the 'illusion of control.' This study delves into whether this cognitive bias impacts causality judgments in animations depicting physical and social causal interactions. In two experiments, participants were instructed to associate themselves and a hypothetical stranger identity with two geometrical shapes (a circle and a square). Subsequently, they viewed animations portraying these shapes assuming the roles of agent and patient in causal interactions. Within one block, the shape related to the self served as the agent, while the shape associated with the stranger played the role of the patient. Conversely, in the other block, the identity-role association was reversed. We posited that the perception of the self as a causal agent might influence explicit judgments of physical and social causality. Experiment 1 demonstrated that physical causality ratings were solely shaped by kinematic cues. In Experiment 2, emphasising social causality, the dominance of kinematic parameters was confirmed. Therefore, contrary to the hypothesis anticipating diminished causality ratings with specific identity-role associations, results indicated negligible impact of our manipulation. The study contributes to understanding the interplay between kinematic and non-kinematic cues in human causal reasoning. It suggests that explicit judgments of causality in simple animations primarily rely on low-level kinematic cues, with the cognitive bias of overestimating the self's contribution playing a negligible role.

Rotating objects cue spatial attention via the perception of frictive surface contact

We report a new attentional cueing effect, which shows how attention models the physical force of friction. Most objects we see are in frictive contact with a 'floor', such that clockwise rotation causes rightward movement and counterclockwise rotation leftward movement. Is this regularity encoded in spatial orienting responses? In Experiment 1, seeing a clockwise-rotating 'wheel' produced faster responses to subsequent targets appearing on the right vs. left (and vice versa for counterclockwise rotation). Thus, when viewing a lone rotating wheel, we orient attention toward where we predict it will move next, assuming frictive floor contact. But what happens if the rotating wheel is seen touching another visible surface? In Experiment 2, rotational cueing was stronger for wheels touching a visible floor, was abolished for wheels near but not touching another surface, and reversed for wheels touching a ceiling. We conclude that the visual system makes an assumption of frictive floor contact, and rapidly analyzes visual cues to frictive contact with other surfaces, in order to orient attention toward where objects are likely to move next.

The psychophysics of bouncing: Perceptual constraints, physical constraints, animacy, and phenomenal causality

In the present study we broadly explored the perception of physical and animated motion in bouncing-like scenarios through four experiments. In the first experiment, participants were asked to categorize bouncing-like displays as physical bounce, animated motion, or other. Several parameters of the animations were manipulated, that is, the simulated coefficient of restitution, the value of simulated gravitational acceleration, the motion pattern (uniform acceleration/deceleration or constant speed) and the number of bouncing cycles. In the second experiment, a variable delay at the moment of the collision between the bouncing object and the bouncing surface was introduced. Main results show that, although observers appear to have realistic representations of physical constraints like energy conservation and gravitational acceleration/deceleration, the amount of visual information available in the scene has a strong modulation effect on the extent to which they rely on these representations. A coefficient of restitution >1 was a crucial cue to animacy in displays showing three bouncing cycles, but not in displays showing one bouncing cycle. Additionally, bouncing impressions appear to be driven by perceptual constraints that are unrelated to the physical realism of the scene, like preference for simulated gravitational attraction smaller than g and perceived temporal contiguity between the different phases of bouncing. In the third experiment, the visible opaque bouncing surface was removed from the scene, and the results showed that this did not have any substantial effect on the resulting impressions of physical bounce or animated motion, suggesting that the visual system can fill-in the scene with the missing element. The fourth experiment explored visual impressions of causality in bouncing scenarios. At odds with claims of current causal perception theories, results indicate that a passive object can be perceived as the direct cause of the motion behavior of an active object.

The possibility of an impetus heuristic

Evidence consistent with a belief in impetus is drawn from studies of naïve physics, perception of causality, perception of force, and representational momentum, and the possibility of an impetus heuristic is discussed. An impetus heuristic suggests the motion path of an object that was previously constrained or influenced by an external source (e.g., object, force) appears to exhibit the same constraint or influence even after that constraint or influence is removed. Impetus is not a valid physical principle, but use of an impetus heuristic can in some circumstances provide approximately correct predictions regarding future object motion, and such predictions require less cognitive effort and resources than would predictions based upon objective physical principles. The relationship of an impetus heuristic to naïve impetus theory and to objective physical principles is discussed, and use of an impetus heuristic significantly challenges claims that causality or force can be visually perceived. Alternatives to an impetus heuristic are considered, and potential boundary conditions and falsification of the impetus notion are discussed. Overall, use of an impetus heuristic offers a parsimonious explanation for findings across a wide range of perceptual domains and could potentially be extended to more metaphorical types of motion.

The Causal and Force Perception and Their Perceived Asymmetries in Flight Collisions

The present study was to investigate causal perception and force perception in ecological objects. Four experiments were designed to compare the perceived causality and force of one of the two objects on the other by changing the property of one or both of the objects involved in the launching effect. Our results support causal asymmetry and force asymmetry, in which the launcher has a greater causal effect and exerts more force on the target. Furthermore, we also found that, the ecological object, which is the airplane in this study, had a greater causal effect and exerted more force, resulting in strengthened asymmetries when the airplane acted as the launcher and weakened asymmetries when the airplane acted as the target. The properties of the object also impacted causal perception by attenuating the effect of the temporal gap on causality. Those results indicate that the airplane is perceived as the main cause for a collision compared with an abstract object. The influence of conceptual knowledge of the object and the sense of agency on changing the degree of perceived causality and force in a particular motion pattern was discussed.

Phenomenal Causality and Sensory Realism

One of the most important tasks for humans is the attribution of causes and effects in all wakes of life. The first systematical study of visual perception of causality-often referred to as phenomenal causality-was done by Albert Michotte using his now well-known launching events paradigm. Launching events are the seeming collision and seeming transfer of movement between two objects-abstract, featureless stimuli ("objects") in Michotte's original experiments. Here, we study the relation between causal ratings for launching events in Michotte's setting and launching collisions in a photorealistically computer-rendered setting. We presented launching events with differing temporal gaps, the same launching processes with photorealistic billiard balls, as well as photorealistic billiard balls with realistic motion dynamics, that is, an initial rebound of the first ball after collision and a short sliding phase of the second ball due to momentum and friction. We found that providing the normal launching stimulus with realistic visuals led to lower causal ratings, but realistic visuals together with realistic motion dynamics evoked higher ratings. Two-dimensional versus three-dimensional presentation, on the other hand, did not affect phenomenal causality. We discuss our results in terms of intuitive physics as well as cue conflict.

The space contraction asymmetry in Michotte's launching effect

Previous studies have found that, compared with noncausal events, spatial contraction exists between the causal object and the effect object due to the perceived causality. The present research aims to examine whether the causal object and the effect object have the same effect on spatial contraction. A modified launching effect, in which a bar bridges the spatial gap between the final position of the launcher and the initial position of the target, was adopted. Experiment 1 validates the absolute underestimation of the bar's length between the launcher and the target. Experiment 2a finds that in the direct launching effect, the perceived position of the bar's trailing edge that was contacted by the final launcher was displaced along the objects' direction of movement. Meanwhile, the perceived position of the bar's leading edge that was contacted by the initial target was displaced in opposite direction to the moving direction. The magnitude of the former's displacement was significantly larger than that of the latter, displaying a significant contraction asymmetry. Experiment 2b demonstrates that the contraction asymmetry did not result from the launcher remaining in contact with the edge of the bar. Experiment 3 indicates that contraction asymmetry showed a type of postdictive effect; that is, to some extent, this asymmetry depends on what happens after contact. In conclusion, the space between the causal object and effect object contracts asymmetrically in the launching effect, which implies that the causal object and effect object are perceived as shifting toward each other nonequidistantly in visual space.