Taking stock of the past: A psychometric evaluation of the Autobiographical Interview

A novel scoring protocol reveals age-related differences in abstract compared to concrete thinking in cued autobiographical remembering

Human imagination has garnered growing interest in many fields. However, it remains unclear how to characterize different forms of imaginative thinking and how imagination differs between young and older adults. Here, we introduce a novel scoring protocol based on recent theoretical developments in the cognitive neuroscience of imagination to provide a broad tool with which to characterize imaginative thinking. The scoring protocol distinguishes between concrete/perceptual forms of imagination termed the "mind's eye" and abstract/reflective forms of imagination termed the "mind's mind." The protocol also captures whether thoughts pertain to the self, others, or both. We applied this scoring protocol with high inter-rater reliability across two studies involving distinct participants and narrative-based imagination tasks. When compared to young adults, older adults showed a bias toward general content, which is a feature of the mind's mind form of thinking while describing aloud their memories of specific, past events (Study 1). Further, older adults made fewer references to the self. In a separate study of only older adults (Study 2), increasing age was not associated with a bias toward the mind's mind while describing specific past or future events. These results reveal that imaginative thinking can be characterized within the Mind's Eye Mind's Mind framework, with implications for understanding cognitively normal older age.

Time spent imagining does not influence younger and older adults' episodic simulation of helping behavior

Shared cognitive processes underlie our ability to remember the past (i.e., episodic memory) and imagine the future (i.e., episodic simulation) and age-related declines in episodic memory are also noted when simulating future scenarios. Given older adults' reduced cognitive control and protracted memory retrieval time, we examined whether imposing time limits on episodic simulation of future helping scenarios affects younger and older adults' willingness to help, phenomenological experience, and the type of details produced. Relative to a control task, episodic simulation increased younger and older participants' willingness to help, scene vividness, and perspective-taking regardless of the time spent imagining future helping scenarios. Notably, time spent imagining influenced the number, but not proportion of internal details produced, suggesting that participants' use of episodic-like information remained consistent regardless of the time they spent imagining. The present findings highlight the importance of collecting phenomenological experience when assessing episodic simulation abilities across the lifespan.

Peering into the future: Eye movements predict neural repetition effects during episodic simulation

Imagining future scenarios involves recombining different elements of past experiences into a coherent event, a process broadly supported by the brain's default network. Prior work suggests that distinct brain regions may contribute to the inclusion of different simulation features. Here we examine how activity in these brain regions relates to the vividness of future simulations. Thirty-four healthy young adults imagined future events with familiar people and locations in a two-part study involving a repetition suppression paradigm. First, participants imagined events while their eyes were tracked during a behavioral session. Immediately after, participants imagined events during MRI scanning. The events to be imagined were manipulated such that some were identical to those imagined in the behavioral session while others involved new locations, new people, or both. In this way, we could examine how self-report ratings and eye movements predict brain activity during simulation along with specific simulation features. Vividness ratings were negatively correlated with eye movements, in contrast to an often-observed positive relationship with past recollection. Moreover, fewer eye movements predicted greater involvement of the hippocampus during simulation, an effect specific to location features. Our findings suggest that eye movements may facilitate scene construction for future thinking, lending support to frameworks that spatial information forms the foundation of episodic simulation.

Remembering what we imagine: the role of event schemas in shaping how imagined autobiographical events are recalled

Much like recalling autobiographical memories, constructing imagined autobiographical events depends on episodic memory processes. The ability to imagine events contributes to several future-oriented behaviors (e.g., decision-making, problem solving), which relies, in part, on the ability to remember the imagined events. A factor affecting the memorability of such events is their adherence to event schemas-conceptualizations of how events generally unfold. In the current study, we examined how two aspects of event schemas-event expectancy and familiarity-affect the ability to recall imagined events. Participants first imagined and described in detail autobiographical events that either aligned with or deviated from an event, expected to occur in a context (e.g., a kitchen) that was either familiar or unfamiliar. This resulted in imaginations ranging from maximally schema-congruent (expected events in a familiar context) to maximally novel (unexpected events in an unfamiliar context). Twenty-four hours later, participants recalled these imagined events. Recollections were scored for the number of reinstated details from the imaginations and the number of newly added details. We found greater reinstatement of details for both the maximally congruent and maximally novel events, while maximally novel events were recalled more precisely than other events (i.e., fewer added details). Our results indicate a complementary benefit to remembering schematic and novel imagined events, which may guide equally important but distinct future-oriented behaviors.

Grandiose narcissism influences the phenomenology of remembered past and imagined future events

Little empirical work has examined future thinking in narcissistic grandiosity. We here extend prior work finding that people scoring high in grandiosity have self-bolstering tendencies in remembering past events, and we consider whether these tendencies extend to imagining future events. Across an initial study (N = 112) and replication (N = 169), participants wrote about remembered past events and imagined future events in which they embodied or would embody either positive or negative traits. Participants then rated those events on several subjective measures. We find that people scoring higher in grandiosity remember past events in which they embody positive traits with greater detail and ease than past events in which they embody negative traits. These same effects persist when people scoring high in grandiosity imagine possible events in their future. Those scoring higher in grandiosity endorse thinking about positive events in their past and future more frequently than negative events, and they judge positive future events as more plausible than negative future events. These tendencies did not extend to objective detail provided in their written narratives about these events. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that grandiosity is associated with self-bolstering tendencies in both remembering the past and imagining the future.