Application of game theory to the interface between militarization and environmental stewardship in the Mariana Islands

Tree conservation can be constrained by agents from conservation permitting and funding agencies

Recent conservation actions for Serianthes nelsonii Merr. and Cycas micronesica K.D. Hill in the Mariana Islands have illuminated some negative consequences associated with ill-informed agents representing permitting and funding agencies. Several cases from the islands of Guam and Tinian are discussed as ineffective conservation examples, and these are countered with two examples of successful conservation approaches. When biologists that act as points of contact for federal permitting and funding agencies do not possess education, knowledge, and experience that is germane to federally listed species, sound science may be marginalized from the conservation agenda. When rapid turnover of federal conservation agents introduces dysfunction, discontinuities in collaborations may thwart success. When lapses in conservation contracts are allowed, short-term extemporary contracting approaches are utilized, and conservation practitioners that lack the ability to include an experimental approach to conservation actions are employed, the co-production of new knowledge to enable decision support tools for future decision-makers may be hindered.