Neural dynamics of perceptual inference and its reversal during imagery

Communication of perceptual predictions from the hippocampus to the deep layers of the parahippocampal cortex

Current evidence suggests that the hippocampus is essential for exploiting predictive relationships during perception. However, it remains unclear whether the hippocampus drives the communication of predictions to sensory cortex or receives prediction signals from elsewhere. We collected 7-tesla fMRI data in the medial temporal lobe (MTL) while auditory cues predicted abstract shapes. Strikingly, neural patterns evoked by predicted shapes in CA2/3, pre/parasubiculum, and the parahippocampal cortex (PHC) were negatively correlated to patterns evoked by the same shapes when actually presented. Using layer-specific analyses, we ask: In which direction are predictions communicated between the hippocampus and neocortex? Superficial layers of the MTL cortex project to the hippocampus, while the deep layers receive feedback projections. Informational connectivity analyses revealed that communication between CA2/3 and PHC was specific to the deep layers of PHC. These findings suggest that the hippocampus generates predictions through pattern completion in CA2/3 and feeds these predictions back to the neocortex.

Evolving Engrams Demand Changes in Effective Cues

A longstanding principle in episodic memory research, known as the encoding specificity hypothesis, holds that an effective retrieval cue should closely match the original encoding conditions. This principle assumes that a successful retrieval cue remains static over time. Despite the broad acceptance of this idea, it conflicts with one of the most well-established findings in memory research: The dynamic and ever-changing nature of episodic memories. In this article, we propose that the most effective retrieval cue should engage with the current state of the memory, which may have shifted significantly since encoding. By redefining the criteria for successful recall, we challenge a core principle of the field and open new avenues for exploring memory accessibility, offering fresh insights into both theoretical, and applied domains.

Covariance-based decoding reveals a category-specific functional connectivity network for imagined visual objects

The coordination of different brain regions is required for the visual imagery of complex objects (e.g., faces and places). Short-range connectivity within sensory areas is necessary to construct the mental image. Long-range connectivity between control and sensory areas is necessary to re-instantiate and maintain the mental image. While dynamic changes in functional connectivity are expected during visual imagery, it is unclear whether a category-specific network exists in which the strength and the spatial destination of the connections vary depending on the imagery target. In this magnetoencephalography study, we used a minimally constrained experimental paradigm wherein imagery categories were prompted using visual word cues only, and we decoded face versus place imagery based on their underlying functional connectivity patterns as estimated from the spatial covariance across brain regions. A subnetwork analysis further disentangled the contribution of different connections. The results show that face and place imagery can be decoded from both short-range and long-range connections. Overall, the results show that imagined object categories can be distinguished based on functional connectivity patterns observed in a category-specific network. Notably, functional connectivity estimates rely on purely endogenous brain signals suggesting that an external reference is not necessary to elicit such category-specific network dynamics.

How are opposite neurofeedback tasks represented at cortical and corticospinal tract levels?

Objective.The study objective was to characterise indices of learning and patterns of connectivity in two neurofeedback (NF) paradigms that modulate mu oscillations in opposite directions, and the relationship with change in excitability of the corticospinal tract (CST).Approach.Forty-three healthy volunteers participated in 3 NF sessions for upregulation (N = 24) or downregulation (N = 19) of individual alpha (IA) power at central location Cz. Brain signatures from multichannel electroencephalogram (EEG) were analysed, including oscillatory (power, spindles), non-oscillatory components (Hurst exponent), and effective connectivity directed transfer function (DTF) of participants who were successful at enhancing or suppressing IA power at Cz. CST excitability was studied through leg motor-evoked potential, tested before and after the last NF session. We assessed whether participants modulated widespread alpha or central mu rhythm through the use of current source density derivation (CSD), and related the change in activity in mu and upper half of mu band, to CST excitability change.Main results.In the last session, IA/mu power suppression was achieved by 79% of participants, while 63% enhanced IA. CSD-EEG revealed that mu power was upregulated through an increase in the incidence rate of bursts of alpha band activity, while downregulation involved changes in oscillation amplitude and temporal patterns. Neuromodulation also influenced frequencies adjacent to the targeted band, indicating the use of common mental strategies within groups. DTF analysis showed, for both groups, significant connectivity between structures commonly associated with motor imagery tasks, known to modulate the excitability of the motor cortex, although most connections did not remain significant after correcting for multiple comparisons. CST excitability modulation was related to the absolute amplitude of upper mu modulation, rather than the modulation direction.Significance.The upregulation and downregulation of IA/mu power during NF, with respect to baseline were achieved via distinct mechanisms involving oscillatory and non-oscillatory EEG features. Mu enhancement and suppression post-NF and during the last NF block with respect to the baseline, respectively corresponded to opposite trends in motor-evoked potential changes post-NF. The ability of NF to modulate CST excitability could be a valuable rehabilitation tool for central nervous system disorders (stroke, spinal cord injury), where increased excitability and neural plasticity are desired. This work may inform future neuromodulation protocols, and may improve NF training effectiveness by rewarding certain EEG signatures.

Feedback scales the spatial tuning of cortical responses during both visual working memory and long-term memory

Perception, working memory, and long-term memory each evoke neural responses in visual cortex. While previous neuroimaging research on the role of visual cortex in memory has largely emphasized similarities between perception and memory, we hypothesized that responses in visual cortex would differ depending on the origins of the inputs. Using fMRI, we quantified spatial tuning in visual cortex while participants (both sexes) viewed, maintained in working memory, or retrieved from long-term memory a peripheral target. In each condition, BOLD responses were spatially tuned and aligned with the target's polar angle in all measured visual field maps including V1. As expected given the increasing sizes of receptive fields, polar angle tuning during perception increased in width up the visual hierarchy from V1 to V2, V3, hV4, and beyond. In stark contrast, the tuned responses were broad across the visual hierarchy during long-term memory (replicating a prior result) and during working memory. This pattern is consistent with the idea that mnemonic responses in V1 stem from top-down sources, even when the stimulus was recently viewed and is held in working memory. Moreover, in long-term memory, trial-to-trial biases in these tuned responses (clockwise or counterclockwise of target), predicted matched biases in memory, suggesting that the reinstated cortical responses influence memory guided behavior. We conclude that feedback widens spatial tuning in visual cortex during memory, where earlier visual maps inherit broader tuning from later maps thereby impacting the precision of memory.Significance Statement We demonstrate that remembering a visual stimulus evokes responses in visual cortex that differ in spatial extent compared to seeing the same stimulus. Perception evokes tuned responses in early visual areas that increase in size up the visual hierarchy. Prior work showed that feedback inputs associated with long-term memory originate from later visual areas with larger receptive fields resulting in uniformly wide spatial tuning even in primary visual cortex. We replicate these results and show that the same pattern holds when maintaining in working memory a recently viewed stimulus. That trial-to-trial difficulty is reflected in the accuracy and precision of these representations suggests that visual cortex is flexibly used for processing visuospatial information, regardless of where that information originates.

Reconstructing Spatiotemporal Trajectories of Visual Object Memories in the Human Brain

How the human brain reconstructs, step-by-step, the core elements of past experiences is still unclear. Here, we map the spatiotemporal trajectories along which visual object memories are reconstructed during associative recall. Specifically, we inquire whether retrieval reinstates feature representations in a copy-like but reversed direction with respect to the initial perceptual experience, or alternatively, this reconstruction involves format transformations and regions beyond initial perception. Participants from two cohorts studied new associations between verbs and randomly paired object images, and subsequently recalled the objects when presented with the corresponding verb cue. We first analyze multivariate fMRI patterns to map where in the brain high- and low-level object features can be decoded during perception and retrieval, showing that retrieval is dominated by conceptual features, represented in comparatively late visual and parietal areas. A separately acquired EEG dataset is then used to track the temporal evolution of the reactivated patterns using similarity-based EEG-fMRI fusion. This fusion suggests that memory reconstruction proceeds from anterior frontotemporal to posterior occipital and parietal regions, in line with a conceptual-to-perceptual gradient but only partly following the same trajectories as during perception. Specifically, a linear regression statistically confirms that the sequential activation of ventral visual stream regions is reversed between image perception and retrieval. The fusion analysis also suggests an information relay to frontoparietal areas late during retrieval. Together, the results shed light onto the temporal dynamics of memory recall and the transformations that the information undergoes between the initial experience and its later reconstruction from memory.

Dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex Coordinates Contextual Mental Imagery for Single-Beat Manipulation during Rhythmic Sensorimotor Synchronization

Flexible pulse-by-pulse regulation of sensorimotor synchronization is crucial for voluntarily showing rhythmic behaviors synchronously with external cueing; however, the underpinning neurophysiological mechanisms remain unclear. We hypothesized that the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) plays a key role by coordinating both proactive and reactive motor outcomes based on contextual mental imagery. To test our hypothesis, a missing-oddball task in finger-tapping paradigms was conducted in 33 healthy young volunteers. The dynamic properties of the dACC were evaluated by event-related deep-brain activity (ER-DBA), supported by event-related potential (ERP) analysis and behavioral evaluation based on signal detection theory. We found that ER-DBA activation/deactivation reflected a strategic choice of motor control modality in accordance with mental imagery. Reverse ERP traces, as omission responses, confirmed that the imagery was contextual. We found that mental imagery was updated only by environmental changes via perceptual evidence and response-based abductive reasoning. Moreover, stable on-pulse tapping was achievable by maintaining proactive control while creating an imagery of syncopated rhythms from simple beat trains, whereas accuracy was degraded with frequent erroneous tapping for missing pulses. We conclude that the dACC voluntarily regulates rhythmic sensorimotor synchronization by utilizing contextual mental imagery based on experience and by creating novel rhythms.

Decoding Remapped Spatial Information in the Peri-Saccadic Period

It has been suggested that, prior to a saccade, visual neurons predictively respond to stimuli that will fall in their receptive fields after completion of the saccade. This saccadic remapping process is thought to compensate for the shift of the visual world across the retina caused by eye movements. To map the timing of this predictive process in the brain, we recorded neural activity using electroencephalography during a saccade task. Human participants (male and female) made saccades between two fixation points while covertly attending to oriented gratings briefly presented at various locations on the screen. Data recorded during trials in which participants maintained fixation were used to train classifiers on stimuli in different positions. Subsequently, data collected during saccade trials were used to test for the presence of remapped stimulus information at the post-saccadic retinotopic location in the peri-saccadic period, providing unique insight into when remapped information becomes available. We found that the stimulus could be decoded at the remapped location ∼180 ms post-stimulus onset, but only when the stimulus was presented 100-200 ms before saccade onset. Within this range, we found that the timing of remapping was dictated by stimulus onset rather than saccade onset. We conclude that presenting the stimulus immediately before the saccade allows for optimal integration of the corollary discharge signal with the incoming peripheral visual information, resulting in a remapping of activation to the relevant post-saccadic retinotopic neurons.

Representations of imaginary scenes and their properties in cortical alpha activity

Imagining natural scenes enables us to engage with a myriad of simulated environments. How do our brains generate such complex mental images? Recent research suggests that cortical alpha activity carries information about individual objects during visual imagery. However, it remains unclear if more complex imagined contents such as natural scenes are similarly represented in alpha activity. Here, we answer this question by decoding the contents of imagined scenes from rhythmic cortical activity patterns. In an EEG experiment, participants imagined natural scenes based on detailed written descriptions, which conveyed four complementary scene properties: openness, naturalness, clutter level and brightness. By conducting classification analyses on EEG power patterns across neural frequencies, we were able to decode both individual imagined scenes as well as their properties from the alpha band, showing that also the contents of complex visual images are represented in alpha rhythms. A cross-classification analysis between alpha power patterns during the imagery task and during a perception task, in which participants were presented images of the described scenes, showed that scene representations in the alpha band are partly shared between imagery and late stages of perception. This suggests that alpha activity mediates the top-down re-activation of scene-related visual contents during imagery.

Aphantasia and hyperphantasia: exploring imagery vividness extremes

The vividness of imagery varies between individuals. However, the existence of people in whom conscious, wakeful imagery is markedly reduced, or absent entirely, was neglected by psychology until the recent coinage of 'aphantasia' to describe this phenomenon. 'Hyperphantasia' denotes the converse - imagery whose vividness rivals perceptual experience. Around 1% and 3% of the population experience extreme aphantasia and hyperphantasia, respectively. Aphantasia runs in families, often affects imagery across several sense modalities, and is variably associated with reduced autobiographical memory, face recognition difficulty, and autism. Visual dreaming is often preserved. Subtypes of extreme imagery appear to be likely but are not yet well defined. Initial results suggest that alterations in connectivity between the frontoparietal and visual networks may provide the neural substrate for visual imagery extremes.

Does context matter for memory? Testing the effectiveness of learning by imagining situated interactions with objects

Mounting evidence supports the efficacy of mental imagery for verbal information retention. Motor imagery, imagining oneself interacting physically with the object to be learned, emerges as an optimal form compared to less physically engaging imagery. Yet, when engaging in mental imagery, it occurs within a specific context that may affect imagined actions and consequently impact the mnemonic benefits of mental imagery. In a first study, participants were given instructions for incidental learning: mental rehearsal, visual imagery, motor imagery or situated motor imagery. The latter, which involved imagining physical interaction with an item within a coherent situation, produced the highest proportion of correct recalls. This highlights memory's role in supporting situated actions and offers the possibility for further developing the mnemonic potential of embodied mental imagery. Furthermore, item-level analysis showed that individuals who engaged in situated motor imagery remembered words primarily due to the sensorimotor characteristics of the words' referent. A second study investigating the role of inter-item distinctiveness in this effect failed to determine the extent to which the situational and motor elements need to be distinctive in order to be considered useful retrieval cues and produce an optimal memory performance.

Multisensory subtypes of aphantasia: Mental imagery as supramodal perception in reverse

Cognitive neuroscience research on mental imagery has largely focused on the visual imagery modality in unimodal task contexts. Recent studies have uncovered striking individual differences in visual imagery capacity, with some individuals reporting a subjective absence of conscious visual imagery ability altogether ("aphantasia"). However, naturalistic mental imagery is often multi-sensory, and preliminary findings suggest that many individuals with aphantasia also report a subjective lack of mental imagery in other sensory domains (such as auditory or olfactory imagery). In this paper, we perform a series of cluster analyses on the multi-sensory imagery questionnaire scores of two large groups of aphantasic subjects, defining latent sub-groups in this sample population. We demonstrate that aphantasia is a heterogenous phenomenon characterised by dominant sub-groups of individuals with visual aphantasia (those who report selective visual imagery absence) and multi-sensory aphantasia (those who report an inability to generate conscious mental imagery in any sensory modality). We replicate our findings in a second large sample and show that more unique aphantasia sub-types also exist, such as individuals with selectively preserved mental imagery in only one sensory modality (e.g. intact auditory imagery). We outline the implications of our findings for network theories of mental imagery, discussing how unique aphantasia aetiologies with distinct self-report patterns might reveal alterations to various levels of the sensory processing hierarchy implicated in mental imagery.

Visual mental imagery: Evidence for a heterarchical neural architecture

Theories of Visual Mental Imagery (VMI) emphasize the processes of retrieval, modification, and recombination of sensory information from long-term memory. Yet, only few studies have focused on the behavioral mechanisms and neural correlates supporting VMI of stimuli from different semantic domains. Therefore, we currently have a limited understanding of how the brain generates and maintains mental representations of colors, faces, shapes - to name a few. Such an undetermined scenario renders unclear the organizational structure of neural circuits supporting VMI, including the role of the early visual cortex. We aimed to fill this gap by reviewing the scientific literature of five semantic domains: visuospatial, face, colors, shapes, and letters imagery. Linking theory to evidence from over 60 different experimental designs, this review highlights three main points. First, there is no consistent activity in the early visual cortex across all VMI domains, contrary to the prediction of the dominant model. Second, there is consistent activity of the frontoparietal networks and the left hemisphere's fusiform gyrus during voluntary VMI irrespective of the semantic domain investigated. We propose that these structures are part of a domain-general VMI sub-network. Third, domain-specific information engages specific regions of the ventral and dorsal cortical visual pathways. These regions partly overlap with those found in visual perception studies (e.g., fusiform face area for faces imagery; lingual gyrus for color imagery). Altogether, the reviewed evidence suggests the existence of domain-general and domain-specific mechanisms of VMI selectively engaged by stimulus-specific properties (e.g., colors or faces). These mechanisms would be supported by an organizational structure mixing vertical and horizontal connections (heterarchy) between sub-networks for specific stimulus domains. Such a heterarchical organization of VMI makes different predictions from current models of VMI as reversed perception. Our conclusions set the stage for future research, which should aim to characterize the spatiotemporal dynamics and interactions among key regions of this architecture giving rise to visual mental images.

Top-down generation of low-resolution representations improves visual perception and imagination

Perception or imagination requires top-down signals from high-level cortex to primary visual cortex (V1) to reconstruct or simulate the representations bottom-up stimulated by the seen images. Interestingly, top-down signals in V1 have lower spatial resolution than bottom-up representations. It is unclear why the brain uses low-resolution signals to reconstruct or simulate high-resolution representations. By modeling the top-down pathway of the visual system using the decoder of a variational auto-encoder (VAE), we reveal that low-resolution top-down signals can better reconstruct or simulate the information contained in the sparse activities of V1 simple cells, which facilitates perception and imagination. This advantage of low-resolution generation is related to facilitating high-level cortex to form geometry-respecting representations observed in experiments. Furthermore, we present two findings regarding this phenomenon in the context of AI-generated sketches, a style of drawings made of lines. First, we found that the quality of the generated sketches critically depends on the thickness of the lines in the sketches: thin-line sketches are harder to generate than thick-line sketches. Second, we propose a technique to generate high-quality thin-line sketches: instead of directly using original thin-line sketches, we use blurred sketches to train VAE or GAN (generative adversarial network), and then infer the thin-line sketches from the VAE- or GAN-generated blurred sketches. Collectively, our work suggests that low-resolution top-down generation is a strategy the brain uses to improve visual perception and imagination, which inspires new sketch-generation AI techniques.

The cognitive neuroscience of self-awareness: Current framework, clinical implications, and future research directions

Self-awareness, the ability to take oneself as the object of awareness, has been an enigma for our species, with different answers to this question being provided by religion, philosophy, and, more recently, science. The current review aims to discuss the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying self-awareness. The multidimensional nature of self-awareness will be explored, suggesting how it can be thought of as an emergent property observed in different cognitive complexity levels, within a predictive coding approach. A presentation of alterations of self-awareness in neuropsychiatric conditions will ground a discussion on alternative frameworks to understand this phenomenon, in health and psychopathology, with future research directions being indicated to fill current gaps in the literature. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Consciousness Psychology > Brain Function and Dysfunction Neuroscience > Cognition.

Behavioral and Neural Correlates of Visual Working Memory Reveal Metacognitive Aspects of Mental Imagery

Mental imagery (MI) is the ability to generate visual phenomena in the absence of sensory input. MI is often likened to visual working memory (VWM): the ability to maintain and manipulate visual representations. How MI is recruited during VWM is yet to be established. In a modified orientation change-discrimination task, we examined how behavioral (proportion correct) and neural (contralateral delay activity [CDA]) correlates of precision and capacity map onto subjective ratings of vividness and number of items in MI within a VWM task. During the maintenance period, 17 participants estimated the vividness of their MI or the number of items held in MI while they were instructed to focus on either precision or capacity of their representation and to retain stimuli at varying set sizes (1, 2, and 4). Vividness and number ratings varied over set sizes; however, subjective ratings and behavioral performance correlated only for vividness rating at set size 1. Although CDA responded to set size as was expected, CDA did not reflect subjective reports on high and low vividness and on nondivergent (reported the probed number of items in mind) or divergent (reported number of items diverged from probed) rating trials. Participants were more accurate in low set sizes compared with higher set sizes and in coarse (45°) orientation changes compared with fine (15°) orientation changes. We failed to find evidence for a relationship between the subjective sensory experience of precision and capacity of MI and the precision and capacity of VWM.

The noise in our brain: A systematic review and meta-analysis of neuroimaging and signal-detection studies on source monitoring in psychosis

OBJECTIVES

Noisy thoughts or perceptions are characteristics of psychosis (PSY) and, they are deeply related to source monitoring (SM) - the ability to discriminate the origin of internal/external experiences.

METHODS

This MOOSE, PRISMA-compliant meta-analysis compared SM performances in PSY compared to healthy controls (HC) focusing on signal-to-noise discrimination in order to: i) test whether neuroimaging procedures (fMRI/EEG) might be a group-specific source of noise for SM; ii) compare error- and accuracy-based indexes; iii) to meta-analyze signal-detection measures (i.e., discrimination index and response bias); iv) to determine the best index capturing SM deficits in psychosis. We conducted a 3-level meta-analysis for each aim to estimate pooled effect-sizes (Cohen's d). SM type, source discrimination and stimulus modality were used as meta-regressors. Heterogeneity (I2), publication bias (Egger's test) and multiple comparisons (Bonferroni correction) were considered.

RESULTS

Sixteen neuroimaging, 44 error/accuracy-based behavioral and 7 signal-detection trials were included (2297 PSY, age range = 18.78-52.6; 1745 HC, age range = 21.1-53.3). The noise generated by neuroimaging procedures slightly influenced error, but not accuracy. Accuracy-based (d = -0.83), but not error-based, indexes showed significant and large SM impairments in PSY compared to HC. Overall SM performance differences between PSY and HC were larger in discrimination index (d = -0.65) and accuracy (d = -0.61), followed by response bias (d = -0.59, ns) and error-based (d = 0.35) indexes.

CONCLUSION

Although both accuracy and discrimination indexes differentiate patients with PSY from HC, discrimination index is more reliable and may better capture the bi-directional nature of the internal/external source confusion.

Properties of imagined experience across visual, auditory, and other sensory modalities

Little is known about the perceptual characteristics of mental images nor how they vary across sensory modalities. We conducted an exhaustive survey into how mental images are experienced across modalities, mainly targeting visual and auditory imagery of a single stimulus, the letter "O", to facilitate direct comparisons. We investigated temporal properties of mental images (e.g. onset latency, duration), spatial properties (e.g. apparent location), effort (e.g. ease, spontaneity, control), movement requirements (e.g. eye movements), real-imagined interactions (e.g. inner speech while reading), beliefs about imagery norms and terminologies, as well as respondent confidence. Participants also reported on the five traditional senses and their prominence during thinking, imagining, and dreaming. Overall, visual and auditory experiences dominated mental events, although auditory mental images were superior to visual mental images on almost every metric tested except regarding spatial properties. Our findings suggest that modality-specific differences in mental imagery may parallel those of other sensory neural processes.

Strength of predicted information content in the brain biases decision behavior

Prediction-for-perception theories suggest that the brain predicts incoming stimuli to facilitate their categorization.1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17 However, it remains unknown what the information contents of these predictions are, which hinders mechanistic explanations. This is because typical approaches cast predictions as an underconstrained contrast between two categories18,19,20,21,22,23,24-e.g., faces versus cars, which could lead to predictions of features specific to faces or cars, or features from both categories. Here, to pinpoint the information contents of predictions and thus their mechanistic processing in the brain, we identified the features that enable two different categorical perceptions of the same stimuli. We then trained multivariate classifiers to discern, from dynamic MEG brain responses, the features tied to each perception. With an auditory cueing design, we reveal where, when, and how the brain reactivates visual category features (versus the typical category contrast) before the stimulus is shown. We demonstrate that the predictions of category features have a more direct influence (bias) on subsequent decision behavior in participants than the typical category contrast. Specifically, these predictions are more precisely localized in the brain (lateralized), are more specifically driven by the auditory cues, and their reactivation strength before a stimulus presentation exerts a greater bias on how the individual participant later categorizes this stimulus. By characterizing the specific information contents that the brain predicts and then processes, our findings provide new insights into the brain's mechanisms of prediction for perception.

Spatiotemporal dynamics of self-generated imagery reveal a reverse cortical hierarchy from cue-induced imagery

Visual imagery allows for the construction of rich internal experience in our mental world. However, it has remained poorly understood how imagery experience derives volitionally as opposed to being cue driven. Here, using electroencephalography and functional magnetic resonance imaging, we systematically investigate the spatiotemporal dynamics of self-generated imagery by having participants volitionally imagining one of the orientations from a learned pool. We contrast self-generated imagery with cue-induced imagery, where participants imagined line orientations based on associative cues acquired previously. Our results reveal overlapping neural signatures of cue-induced and self-generated imagery. Yet, these neural signatures display substantially differential sensitivities to the two types of imagery: self-generated imagery is supported by an enhanced involvement of the anterior cortex in representing imagery contents. By contrast, cue-induced imagery is supported by enhanced imagery representations in the posterior visual cortex. These results jointly support a reverse cortical hierarchy in generating and maintaining imagery contents in self-generated versus externally cued imagery.

Neural Representations in Visual and Parietal Cortex Differentiate between Imagined, Perceived, and Illusory Experiences

Humans constantly receive massive amounts of information, both perceived from the external environment and imagined from the internal world. To function properly, the brain needs to correctly identify the origin of information being processed. Recent work has suggested common neural substrates for perception and imagery. However, it has remained unclear how the brain differentiates between external and internal experiences with shared neural codes. Here we tested this question in human participants (male and female) by systematically investigating the neural processes underlying the generation and maintenance of visual information from voluntary imagery, veridical perception, and illusion. The inclusion of illusion allowed us to differentiate between objective and subjective internality: while illusion has an objectively internal origin and can be viewed as involuntary imagery, it is also subjectively perceived as having an external origin like perception. Combining fMRI, eye-tracking, multivariate decoding, and encoding approaches, we observed superior orientation representations in parietal cortex during imagery compared with perception, and conversely in early visual cortex. This imagery dominance gradually developed along a posterior-to-anterior cortical hierarchy from early visual to parietal cortex, emerged in the early epoch of imagery and sustained into the delay epoch, and persisted across varied imagined contents. Moreover, representational strength of illusion was more comparable to imagery in early visual cortex, but more comparable to perception in parietal cortex, suggesting content-specific representations in parietal cortex differentiate between subjectively internal and external experiences, as opposed to early visual cortex. These findings together support a domain-general engagement of parietal cortex in internally generated experience.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT How does the brain differentiate between imagined and perceived experiences? Combining fMRI, eye-tracking, multivariate decoding, and encoding approaches, the current study revealed enhanced stimulus-specific representations in visual imagery originating from parietal cortex, supporting the subjective experience of imagery. This neural principle was further validated by evidence from visual illusion, wherein illusion resembled perception and imagery at different levels of cortical hierarchy. Our findings provide direct evidence for the critical role of parietal cortex as a domain-general region for content-specific imagery, and offer new insights into the neural mechanisms underlying the differentiation between subjectively internal and external experiences.

Visual Representations: Insights from Neural Decoding

Patterns of brain activity contain meaningful information about the perceived world. Recent decades have welcomed a new era in neural analyses, with computational techniques from machine learning applied to neural data to decode information represented in the brain. In this article, we review how decoding approaches have advanced our understanding of visual representations and discuss efforts to characterize both the complexity and the behavioral relevance of these representations. We outline the current consensus regarding the spatiotemporal structure of visual representations and review recent findings that suggest that visual representations are at once robust to perturbations, yet sensitive to different mental states. Beyond representations of the physical world, recent decoding work has shone a light on how the brain instantiates internally generated states, for example, during imagery and prediction. Going forward, decoding has remarkable potential to assess the functional relevance of visual representations for human behavior, reveal how representations change across development and during aging, and uncover their presentation in various mental disorders.

Modelling perception as a hierarchical competition differentiates imagined, veridical, and hallucinated percepts

Mental imagery is a process by which thoughts become experienced with sensory characteristics. Yet, it is not clear why mental images appear diminished compared to veridical images, nor how mental images are phenomenologically distinct from hallucinations, another type of non-veridical sensory experience. Current evidence suggests that imagination and veridical perception share neural resources. If so, we argue that considering how neural representations of externally generated stimuli (i.e. sensory input) and internally generated stimuli (i.e. thoughts) might interfere with one another can sufficiently differentiate between veridical, imaginary, and hallucinatory perception. We here use a simple computational model of a serially connected, hierarchical network with bidirectional information flow to emulate the primate visual system. We show that modelling even first approximations of neural competition can more coherently explain imagery phenomenology than non-competitive models. Our simulations predict that, without competing sensory input, imagined stimuli should ubiquitously dominate hierarchical representations. However, with competition, imagination should dominate high-level representations but largely fail to outcompete sensory inputs at lower processing levels. To interpret our findings, we assume that low-level stimulus information (e.g. in early visual cortices) contributes most to the sensory aspects of perceptual experience, while high-level stimulus information (e.g. towards temporal regions) contributes most to its abstract aspects. Our findings therefore suggest that ongoing bottom-up inputs during waking life may prevent imagination from overriding veridical sensory experience. In contrast, internally generated stimuli may be hallucinated when sensory input is dampened or eradicated. Our approach can explain individual differences in imagery, along with aspects of daydreaming, hallucinations, and non-visual mental imagery.

Vividness as the similarity between generated imagery and an internal model

Vividness in visual mental imagery has been relatively under-explored compared to imagery's representational format and neural mechanisms. In this paper, we take a deeper look at vividness and suggest that in re-framing it, we can potentially reconcile disparate findings regarding visual cortex activation during imagery. Unlike traditional views of vividness that define the concept in terms of perception, we frame vividness in terms of imagery's relation to an internal model; the closer the generated imagery is to this model, the more vivid it is. This view is considered alongside existing neuroscientific, psychological, and philosophical research, as well as directions for future research.

Position representations of moving objects align with real-time position in the early visual response

When interacting with the dynamic world, the brain receives outdated sensory information, due to the time required for neural transmission and processing. In motion perception, the brain may overcome these fundamental delays through predictively encoding the position of moving objects using information from their past trajectories. In the present study, we evaluated this proposition using multivariate analysis of high temporal resolution electroencephalographic data. We tracked neural position representations of moving objects at different stages of visual processing, relative to the real-time position of the object. During early stimulus-evoked activity, position representations of moving objects were activated substantially earlier than the equivalent activity evoked by unpredictable flashes, aligning the earliest representations of moving stimuli with their real-time positions. These findings indicate that the predictability of straight trajectories enables full compensation for the neural delays accumulated early in stimulus processing, but that delays still accumulate across later stages of cortical processing.

Sustained neural representations of personally familiar people and places during cued recall

The recall and visualization of people and places from memory is an everyday occurrence, yet the neural mechanisms underpinning this phenomenon are not well understood. In particular, the temporal characteristics of the internal representations generated by active recall are unclear. Here, we used magnetoencephalography (MEG) and multivariate pattern analysis to measure the evolving neural representation of familiar places and people across the whole brain when human participants engage in active recall. To isolate self-generated imagined representations, we used a retro-cue paradigm in which participants were first presented with two possible labels before being cued to recall either the first or second item. We collected personalized labels for specific locations and people familiar to each participant. Importantly, no visual stimuli were presented during the recall period, and the retro-cue paradigm allowed the dissociation of responses associated with the labels from those corresponding to the self-generated representations. First, we found that following the retro-cue it took on average ∼1000 ms for distinct neural representations of freely recalled people or places to develop. Second, we found distinct representations of personally familiar concepts throughout the 4 s recall period. Finally, we found that these representations were highly stable and generalizable across time. These results suggest that self-generated visualizations and recall of familiar places and people are subserved by a stable neural mechanism that operates relatively slowly when under conscious control.

Predictive coding is a consequence of energy efficiency in recurrent neural networks

Predictive coding is a promising framework for understanding brain function. It postulates that the brain continuously inhibits predictable sensory input, ensuring preferential processing of surprising elements. A central aspect of this view is its hierarchical connectivity, involving recurrent message passing between excitatory bottom-up signals and inhibitory top-down feedback. Here we use computational modeling to demonstrate that such architectural hardwiring is not necessary. Rather, predictive coding is shown to emerge as a consequence of energy efficiency. When training recurrent neural networks to minimize their energy consumption while operating in predictive environments, the networks self-organize into prediction and error units with appropriate inhibitory and excitatory interconnections and learn to inhibit predictable sensory input. Moving beyond the view of purely top-down-driven predictions, we demonstrate, via virtual lesioning experiments, that networks perform predictions on two timescales: fast lateral predictions among sensory units and slower prediction cycles that integrate evidence over time.

Predictive processing and perception: What does imagining have to do with it?

Predictive processing (PP) accounts of perception are unique not merely in that they postulate a unity between perception and imagination, but in claiming that (i) perception should be conceptualised in terms of imagination and (ii) the two involve an identity of neural implementation. This paper argues against these claims, on both conceptual and empirical grounds. Conceptually, the manner in which PP theorists link perception and imagination belies an impoverished account of imagery as cloistered from the external world in its intentionality, akin to a virtual reality, as well as endogenously generated. Yet this ignores a whole class of imagery whose intentionality is directed on the actual environment-projected mental imagery-and also ignores the fact that imagery may be triggered crossmodally in a bottom-up, stimulus-driven way. Empirically, claiming that imagery and perception share neural circuitry ignores relevant clinical results in this area. These evidence substantial perception/imagery neural dissociations, most notably in the case of aphantasia. Taken together, the arguments here suggest that PP theorists should substantially temper, if not outright abandon, their claim to a perception/imagination unity.

Perception and memory have distinct spatial tuning properties in human visual cortex

Reactivation of earlier perceptual activity is thought to underlie long-term memory recall. Despite evidence for this view, it is unclear whether mnemonic activity exhibits the same tuning properties as feedforward perceptual activity. Here, we leverage population receptive field models to parameterize fMRI activity in human visual cortex during spatial memory retrieval. Though retinotopic organization is present during both perception and memory, large systematic differences in tuning are also evident. Whereas there is a three-fold decline in spatial precision from early to late visual areas during perception, this pattern is not observed during memory retrieval. This difference cannot be explained by reduced signal-to-noise or poor performance on memory trials. Instead, by simulating top-down activity in a network model of cortex, we demonstrate that this property is well explained by the hierarchical structure of the visual system. Together, modeling and empirical results suggest that computational constraints imposed by visual system architecture limit the fidelity of memory reactivation in sensory cortex.

The relationship between frequency content and representational dynamics in the decoding of neurophysiological data

Decoding of high temporal resolution, stimulus-evoked neurophysiological data is increasingly used to test theories about how the brain processes information. However, a fundamental relationship between the frequency spectra of the neural signal and the subsequent decoding accuracy timecourse is not widely recognised. We show that, in commonly used instantaneous signal decoding paradigms, each sinusoidal component of the evoked response is translated to double its original frequency in the subsequent decoding accuracy timecourses. We therefore recommend, where researchers use instantaneous signal decoding paradigms, that more aggressive low pass filtering is applied with a cut-off at one quarter of the sampling rate, to eliminate representational alias artefacts. However, this does not negate the accompanying interpretational challenges. We show that these can be resolved by decoding paradigms that utilise both a signal's instantaneous magnitude and its local gradient information as features for decoding. On a publicly available MEG dataset, this results in decoding accuracy metrics that are higher, more stable over time, and free of the technical and interpretational challenges previously characterised. We anticipate that a broader awareness of these fundamental relationships will enable stronger interpretations of decoding results by linking them more clearly to the underlying signal characteristics that drive them.

Effects of Self-Efficacy and Outcome Expectations on Motor Imagery-Induced Thermal and Mechanical Hypoalgesia: A Single-Blind Randomised Controlled Trial

The main aim of this study was to assess whether self-efficacy (SE) and outcome expectations (OEs) modulate the hypoalgesic effect induced by motor imagery (MI). A total of 75 asymptomatic participants were randomly assigned to the positive (SE+, OE+), negative (SE-, OE-) or non-expectation (CG) groups. Heat pain threshold (HPT) and pain pressure threshold (PPT) were the main variables. Cold detection threshold (CDT), warm detection threshold (WDT), heart rate (HR) and perceived fatigue were the secondary variables. The variables were assessed preintervention, immediately postintervention and 10 min postintervention, except for HR, which was measured continuously during the intervention. Regarding HPT, significant within-group pre-post differences were found in the OE+ group, with a low effect size (p = 0.01, d = -0.39). With regard to ΔPPT, significant intergroup differences were found in Δpost-pre between the SE+ and CG groups (p = 0.012, d = 1.04) and also between SE+ and OE- (p = 0.006, d = 1.08), both with a large effect size. CG, SE-, and OE- groups had poorer CDT and WDT. Regarding HR, significant intergroup differences were found in the postintervention measurement between OE+ and SE-, with a large effect size (p = 0.016, d = 1.34). Lastly, no between-group differences were found regarding perceived fatigue (p > 0.05). The results obtained showed that positive expectations have a slight influence on the increase in heat and mechanical pain detection thresholds. Positive and non-expectancy groups showed an autonomic activation. The results also showed that negative expectations led to poorer perceptual processes.

Social-affective features drive human representations of observed actions

Humans observe actions performed by others in many different visual and social settings. What features do we extract and attend when we view such complex scenes, and how are they processed in the brain? To answer these questions, we curated two large-scale sets of naturalistic videos of everyday actions and estimated their perceived similarity in two behavioral experiments. We normed and quantified a large range of visual, action-related, and social-affective features across the stimulus sets. Using a cross-validated variance partitioning analysis, we found that social-affective features predicted similarity judgments better than, and independently of, visual and action features in both behavioral experiments. Next, we conducted an electroencephalography experiment, which revealed a sustained correlation between neural responses to videos and their behavioral similarity. Visual, action, and social-affective features predicted neural patterns at early, intermediate, and late stages, respectively, during this behaviorally relevant time window. Together, these findings show that social-affective features are important for perceiving naturalistic actions and are extracted at the final stage of a temporal gradient in the brain.

Suppression weakens unwanted memories via a sustained reduction of neural reactivation

Aversive events sometimes turn into intrusive memories. However, prior evidence indicates that such memories can be controlled via a mechanism of retrieval suppression. Here, we test the hypothesis that suppression exerts a sustained influence on memories by deteriorating their neural representations. This deterioration, in turn, would hinder their subsequent reactivation and thus impoverish the vividness with which they can be recalled. In an fMRI study, participants repeatedly suppressed memories of aversive scenes. As predicted, this process rendered the memories less vivid. Using a pattern classifier, we observed that suppression diminished the neural reactivation of scene information both globally across the brain and locally in the parahippocampal cortices. Moreover, the decline in vividness was associated with reduced reinstatement of unique memory representations in right parahippocampal cortex. These results support the hypothesis that suppression weakens memories by causing a sustained reduction in the potential to reactivate their neural representations.

Perceptual reality monitoring: Neural mechanisms dissociating imagination from reality

There is increasing evidence that imagination relies on similar neural mechanisms as externally triggered perception. This overlap presents a challenge for perceptual reality monitoring: deciding what is real and what is imagined. Here, we explore how perceptual reality monitoring might be implemented in the brain. We first describe sensory and cognitive factors that could dissociate imagery and perception and conclude that no single factor unambiguously signals whether an experience is internally or externally generated. We suggest that reality monitoring is implemented by higher-level cortical circuits that evaluate first-order sensory and cognitive factors to determine the source of sensory signals. According to this interpretation, perceptual reality monitoring shares core computations with metacognition. This multi-level architecture might explain several types of source confusion as well as dissociations between simply knowing whether something is real and actually experiencing it as real. We discuss avenues for future research to further our understanding of perceptual reality monitoring, an endeavour that has important implications for our understanding of clinical symptoms as well as general cognitive function.

The prevalence of aphantasia (imagery weakness) in the general population

Visual mental imagery is the ability to create a quasi-perceptual visual picture in the mind's eye. For people with the rare trait of aphantasia, this ability is entirely absent or markedly impaired. Here, we aim to clarify the prevalence of aphantasia in the general population, while overcoming limitations of previous research (e.g., recruitment biases). In Experiment 1, we screened a cohort of undergraduate students (n502) using the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (Marks, 1973) and found that 4.2% had aphantasia. To establish the reliability of our estimate, we then screened a new sample of people (n502) at an online crowdsourcing marketplace, again finding that approximately four percent (3.6%) had aphantasia. Overall, our combined prevalence from over a thousand people of 3.9% - which shows no gender bias - provides a useful index for how commonly aphantasia occurs, based on measures and diagnostic thresholds in line with contemporary aphantasia literature.

Dissociable Components of Information Encoding in Human Perception

Brain decoding can predict visual perception from non-invasive electrophysiological data by combining information across multiple channels. However, decoding methods typically conflate the composite and distributed neural processes underlying perception that are together present in the signal, making it unclear what specific aspects of the neural computations involved in perception are reflected in this type of macroscale data. Using MEG data recorded while participants viewed a large number of naturalistic images, we analytically decomposed the brain signal into its oscillatory and non-oscillatory components, and used this decomposition to show that there are at least three dissociable stimulus-specific aspects to the brain data: a slow, non-oscillatory component, reflecting the temporally stable aspect of the stimulus representation; a global phase shift of the oscillation, reflecting the overall speed of processing of specific stimuli; and differential patterns of phase across channels, likely reflecting stimulus-specific computations. Further, we show that common cognitive interpretations of decoding analysis, in particular about how representations generalize across time, can benefit from acknowledging the multicomponent nature of the signal in the study of perception.

Visual working memory in aphantasia: Retained accuracy and capacity with a different strategy

Visual working memory paradigms involve retaining and manipulating visual information in mind over a period of seconds. Evidence suggests that visual imagery (sensory recruitment) is a strategy used by many to retain visual information during such tasks, leading some researchers to propose that visual imagery and visual working memory may be one and the same. If visual imagery is essential to visual working memory task performance there should be large ramifications for a special population of individuals who do not experience visual imagery, aphantasia. Here we assessed visual working memory task performance in this population using a number of different lab and clinical working memory tasks. We found no differences in capacity limits for visual, general number or spatial working memory for aphantasic individuals compared to controls. Further, aphantasic individuals showed no significant differences in performance on visual components of clinical working memory tests as compared to verbal components. However, there were significant differences in the reported strategies used by aphantasic individuals across all memory tasks. Additionally, aphantasic individual's visual memory accuracy did not demonstrate a significant oblique orientation effect, which is proposed to occur due to sensory recruitment, further supporting their non-visual imagery strategy reports. Taken together these data demonstrate that aphantasic individuals are not impaired on visual working memory tasks, suggesting visual imagery and working memory are not one and the same, with imagery (and sensory recruitment) being just one of the tools that can be used to solve visual working memory tasks.

Testing covariance models for MEG source reconstruction of hippocampal activity

Beamforming is one of the most commonly used source reconstruction methods for magneto- and electroencephalography (M/EEG). One underlying assumption, however, is that distant sources are uncorrelated and here we tested whether this is an appropriate model for the human hippocampal data. We revised the Empirical Bayesian Beamfomer (EBB) to accommodate specific a-priori correlated source models. We showed in simulation that we could use model evidence (as approximated by Free Energy) to distinguish between different correlated and uncorrelated source scenarios. Using group MEG data in which the participants performed a hippocampal-dependent task, we explored the possibility that the hippocampus or the cortex or both were correlated in their activity across hemispheres. We found that incorporating a correlated hippocampal source model significantly improved model evidence. Our findings help to explain why, up until now, the majority of MEG-reported hippocampal activity (typically making use of beamformers) has been estimated as unilateral.

No Evidence for Neural Overlap between Unconsciously Processed and Imagined Stimuli

Visual representations can be generated via feedforward or feedback processes. The extent to which these processes result in overlapping representations remains unclear. Previous work has shown that imagined stimuli elicit similar representations as perceived stimuli throughout the visual cortex. However, while representations during imagery are indeed only caused by feedback processing, neural processing during perception is an interplay of both feedforward and feedback processing. This means that any representational overlap could be because of overlap in feedback processes. In the current study, we aimed to investigate this issue by characterizing the overlap between feedforward- and feedback-initiated category representations during imagined stimuli, conscious perception, and unconscious processing using fMRI in humans of either sex. While all three conditions elicited stimulus representations in left lateral occipital cortex (LOC), significant similarities were observed only between imagery and conscious perception in this area. Furthermore, connectivity analyses revealed stronger connectivity between frontal areas and left LOC during conscious perception and in imagery compared with unconscious processing. Together, these findings can be explained by the idea that long-range feedback modifies visual representations, thereby reducing representational overlap between purely feedforward- and feedback-initiated stimulus representations measured by fMRI. Neural representations influenced by feedback, either stimulus driven (perception) or purely internally driven (imagery), are, however, relatively similar.

The Ganzflicker experience: High probability of seeing vivid and complex pseudo-hallucinations with imagery but not aphantasia

There are considerable individual differences in visual mental imagery ability across the general population, including a "blind mind's eye", or aphantasia. Recent studies have shown that imagery is linked to differences in perception in the healthy population, and clinical work has found a connection between imagery and hallucinatory experiences in neurological disorders. However, whether imagery ability is associated with anomalous perception-including hallucinations-in the general population remains unclear. In the current study, we explored the relationship between imagery ability and the anomalous perception of pseudo-hallucinations (PH) using rhythmic flicker stimulation ("Ganzflicker"). Specifically, we investigated whether the ability to generate voluntary imagery is associated with susceptibility to flicker-induced PH. We additionally explored individual differences in observed features of PH. We recruited a sample of people with aphantasia (aphants) and imagery (imagers) to view a constant red-and-black flicker for approximately 10 min. We found that imagers were more susceptible to PH, and saw more complex and vivid PH, compared to aphants. This study provides the first evidence that the ability to generate visual imagery increases the likelihood of experiencing complex and vivid anomalous percepts.

How do the blind 'see'? The role of spontaneous brain activity in self-generated perception

Spontaneous activity of the human brain has been well documented, but little is known about the functional role of this ubiquitous neural phenomenon. It has previously been hypothesized that spontaneous brain activity underlies unprompted (internally generated) behaviour. We tested whether spontaneous brain activity might underlie internally-generated vision by studying the cortical visual system of five blind/visually-impaired individuals who experience vivid visual hallucinations (Charles Bonnet syndrome). Neural populations in the visual system of these individuals are deprived of external input, which may lead to their hyper-sensitization to spontaneous activity fluctuations. To test whether these spontaneous fluctuations can subserve visual hallucinations, the functional MRI brain activity of participants with Charles Bonnet syndrome obtained while they reported their hallucinations (spontaneous internally-generated vision) was compared to the: (i) brain activity evoked by veridical vision (externally-triggered vision) in sighted controls who were presented with a visual simulation of the hallucinatory streams; and (ii) brain activity of non-hallucinating blind controls during visual imagery (cued internally-generated vision). All conditions showed activity spanning large portions of the visual system. However, only the hallucination condition in the Charles Bonnet syndrome participants demonstrated unique temporal dynamics, characterized by a slow build-up of neural activity prior to the reported onset of hallucinations. This build-up was most pronounced in early visual cortex and then decayed along the visual hierarchy. These results suggest that, in the absence of external visual input, a build-up of spontaneous fluctuations in early visual cortex may activate the visual hierarchy, thereby triggering the experience of vision.

Aphantasia: The science of visual imagery extremes

Visual imagery allows us to revisit the appearance of things in their absence and to test out virtual combinations of sensory experience. Visual imagery has been linked to many cognitive processes, such as autobiographical and visual working memory. Imagery also plays symptomatic and mechanistic roles in neurologic and mental disorders and is utilized in treatment. A large network of brain activity spanning frontal, parietal, temporal, and visual cortex is involved in generating and maintain images in mind. The ability to visualize has extreme variations, ranging from completely absent (aphantasia) to photo-like (hyperphantasia). The anatomy and functionality of visual cortex, including primary visual cortex, have been associated with individual differences in visual imagery ability, pointing to a potential correlate for both aphantasia and hyperphantasia. Preliminary evidence suggests that lifelong aphantasia is associated with prosopagnosia and reduction in autobiographical memory; hyperphantasia is associated with synesthesia. Aphantasic individuals can also be highly imaginative and are able to complete many tasks that were previously thought to rely on visual imagery, demonstrating that visualization is only one of many ways of representing things in their absence. The study of extreme imagination reminds us how easily invisible differences can escape detection.

Prior Expectations of Motion Direction Modulate Early Sensory Processing

Perception is a process of inference, integrating sensory inputs with prior expectations. However, little is known regarding the temporal dynamics of this integration. It has been proposed that expectation plays a role early in the perceptual process, biasing sensory processing. Alternatively, others suggest that expectations are integrated only at later, postperceptual decision-making stages. The current study aimed to dissociate between these hypotheses. We exposed human participants (male and female) to auditory cues predicting the likely direction of upcoming moving dot patterns, while recording neural activity using magnetoencephalography (MEG). Participants' reports of the moving dot directions were biased toward the direction predicted by the cues. To investigate when expectations affected sensory representations, we used inverted encoding models to decode the direction represented in early sensory signals. Strikingly, the cues modulated the direction represented in the MEG signal as early as 150 ms after visual stimulus onset. While this may not reflect a modulation of the initial feedforward sweep, it does reveal a modulation of early sensory representations. Exploratory analyses showed that the neural modulation was related to perceptual expectation effects: participants with a stronger perceptual bias toward the predicted direction also revealed a stronger reflection of the predicted direction in the MEG signal. For participants with this perceptual bias, a correlation between decoded and perceived direction already emerged before visual stimulus onset, suggesting that the prestimulus state of the visual cortex influences sensory processing. Together, these results suggest that expectations play an integral role in the neural computations underlying perception.

SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Perception can be thought of as an inferential process in which our brains integrate sensory inputs with prior expectations to make sense of the world. This study investigated whether this integration occurs early or late in the process of perception. We exposed human participants to auditory cues that predicted the likely direction of visual moving dots, while recording neural activity with millisecond resolution using magnetoencephalography. Participants' perceptual reports of the direction of the moving dots were biased toward the predicted direction. Additionally, the predicted direction modulated the neural representation of the moving dots just 150 ms after they appeared. This suggests that prior expectations affected sensory processing at early stages, playing an integral role in the perceptual process.