Explicit discrimination and ingroup favoritism, but no implicit biases in hypothetical triage decisions during COVID-19

Disturbingly realistic triage scenarios during the COVID-19 pandemic provide an opportunity for studying discrimination in moral reasoning. Biases and favoritism do not need to be explicit and overt, but can remain implicit and covert. In addition to assessing laypeople's propensity for engaging in overt discrimination, the present study examines whether they reveal implicit biases through seemingly fair random allocations. We present a cross-sectional online study comprising 6 timepoints and a total of 2296 participants. Each individual evaluated 19 hypothetical scenarios that provide an allocation dilemma between two patients who are in need of ventilation and differ only in one focal feature. Participants could either allocate the last ventilator to a patient, or opt for random allocation to express impartiality. Overall, participants exhibited clear biases for the patient who was expected to be favored based on health factors, previous ethical or caretaking behaviors, and in-group favoritism. If one patient had been pre-allocated care, a higher probability of keeping the ventilator for the favored patient indicates persistent favoritism. Surprisingly, the absence of an asymmetry in random allocations indicates the absence of covert discrimination. Our results demonstrate that laypeople's hypothetical triage decisions discriminate overtly and show explicit biases.

Humans strategically avoid connecting to others who agree and avert the emergence of network polarization in a coordination task

Clusters of like-minded individuals can impede consensus in group decision-making. We implemented an online color coordination task to investigate whether control over communication links creates clusters impeding group consensus. In 244 6-member networks, individuals were incentivized to reach a consensus by agreeing on a color, but had conflicting incentives for which color to choose. We varied (1) if communication links were static, changed randomly over time, or were player-controlled; (2) whether links determined who was observed or addressed; and (3) whether a majority existed or equally many individuals preferred each color. We found that individuals preferentially selected links to previously unobserved and disagreeing others, avoiding links with agreeing others. This prevented cluster formation, sped up consensus formation rather than impeding it, and increased the probability that the group agreed on the majority incentive. Overall, participants with a consensus goal avoided clusters by applying strategies that resolved uncertainty about others.

Link updating strategies influence consensus decisions as a function of the direction of communication

Consensus decision-making in social groups strongly depends on communication links that determine to whom individuals send, and from whom they receive, information. Here, we ask how consensus decisions are affected by strategic updating of links and how this effect varies with the direction of communication. We quantified the coevolution of link and opinion dynamics in a large population with binary opinions using mean-field numerical simulations of two voter-like models of opinion dynamics: an incoming model (IM) (where individuals choose who to receive opinions from) and an outgoing model (OM) (where individuals choose who to send opinions to). We show that individuals can bias group-level outcomes in their favour by breaking disagreeing links while receiving opinions (IM) and retaining disagreeing links while sending opinions (OM). Importantly, these biases can help the population avoid stalemates and achieve consensus. However, the role of disagreement avoidance is diluted in the presence of strong preferences-highly stubborn individuals can shape decisions to favour their preferences, giving rise to non-consensus outcomes. We conclude that collectively changing communication structures can bias consensus decisions, as a function of the strength of preferences and the direction of communication.

Perspectives on the 2 × 2 Matrix: Solving Semantically Distinct Problems Based on a Shared Structure of Binary Contingencies

Cognition is both empowered and limited by representations. The matrix lens model explicates tasks that are based on frequency counts, conditional probabilities, and binary contingencies in a general fashion. Based on a structural analysis of such tasks, the model links several problems and semantic domains and provides a new perspective on representational accounts of cognition that recognizes representational isomorphs as opportunities, rather than as problems. The shared structural construct of a 2 × 2 matrix supports a set of generic tasks and semantic mappings that provide a unifying framework for understanding problems and defining scientific measures. Our model's key explanatory mechanism is the adoption of particular perspectives on a 2 × 2 matrix that categorizes the frequency counts of cases by some condition, treatment, risk, or outcome factor. By the selective steps of filtering, framing, and focusing on specific aspects, the measures used in various semantic domains negotiate distinct trade-offs between abstraction and specialization. As a consequence, the transparent communication of such measures must explicate the perspectives encapsulated in their derivation. To demonstrate the explanatory scope of our model, we use it to clarify theoretical debates on biases and facilitation effects in Bayesian reasoning and to integrate the scientific measures from various semantic domains within a unifying framework. A better understanding of problem structures, representational transparency, and the role of perspectives in the scientific process yields both theoretical insights and practical applications.