The utilitarian brain: Moving beyond the Free Energy Principle

The Free Energy Principle (FEP) is a normative computational framework for iterative reduction of prediction error and uncertainty through perception-intervention cycles that has been presented as a potential unifying theory of all brain functions (Friston, 2006). Any theory hoping to unify the brain sciences must be able to explain the mechanisms of decision-making, an important cognitive faculty, without the addition of independent, irreducible notions. This challenge has been accepted by several proponents of the FEP (Friston, 2010; Gershman, 2019). We evaluate attempts to reduce decision-making to the FEP, using Lucas' (2005) meta-theory of the brain's contextual constraints as a guidepost. We find reductive variants of the FEP for decision-making unable to explain behavior in certain types of diagnostic, predictive, and multi-armed bandit tasks. We trace the shortcomings to the core theory's lack of an adequate notion of subjective preference or "utility", a concept central to decision-making and grounded in the brain's biological reality. We argue that any attempts to fully reduce utility to the FEP would require unrealistic assumptions, making the principle an unlikely candidate for unifying brain science. We suggest that researchers instead attempt to identify contexts in which either informational or independent reward constraints predominate, delimiting the FEP's area of applicability. To encourage this type of research, we propose a two-factor formal framework that can subsume any FEP model and allows experimenters to compare the contributions of informational versus reward constraints to behavior.

Overreliance on inefficient computer-mediated information retrieval is countermanded by strategy advice that promotes memory-mediated retrieval

With ubiquitous computing, problems can be solved using more strategies than ever, though many strategies feature subpar performance. Here, we explored whether and how simple advice regarding when to use which strategy can improve performance. Specifically, we presented unfamiliar alphanumeric equations (e.g., A + 5 = F) and asked whether counting up the alphabet from the left letter by the indicated number resulted in the right letter. In an initial choice block, participants could engage in one of three cognitive strategies: (a) internal counting, (b) internal retrieval of previously generated solutions, or (c) computer-mediated external retrieval of solutions. Participants belonged to one of two groups: they were either instructed to first try internal retrieval before using external retrieval, or received no specific use instructions. In a subsequent internal block with identical instructions for both groups, external retrieval was made unavailable. The 'try internal retrieval first' instruction in the choice block led to pronounced benefits (d = .76) in the internal block. Benefits were due to facilitated creation and retrieval of internal memory traces and possibly also due to improved strategy choice. These results showcase how simple strategy advice can greatly help users navigate cognitive environments. More generally, our results also imply that uninformed use of external tools (i.e., technology) can bear the risk of not developing and using even more superior internal processing strategies.

Thoughts from the forest floor: a review of cognition in the slime mould Physarum polycephalum

Sensing, communication, navigation, decision-making, memory and learning are key components in a standard cognitive tool-kit that enhance an animal's ability to successfully survive and reproduce. However, these tools are not only useful for, or accessible to, animals-they evolved long ago in simpler organisms using mechanisms which may be either unique or widely conserved across diverse taxa. In this article, I review the recent research that demonstrates these key cognitive abilities in the plasmodial slime mould Physarum polycephalum, which has emerged as a model for non-animal cognition. I discuss the benefits and limitations of comparisons drawn between neural and non-neural systems, and the implications of common mechanisms across wide taxonomic divisions. I conclude by discussing future avenues of research that will draw the most benefit from a closer integration of Physarum and animal cognition research.

Cognitive Science Progresses Toward Interactive Frameworks

Despite its many twists and turns, the arc of cognitive science generally bends toward progress, thanks to its interdisciplinary nature. By glancing at the last few decades of experimental and computational advances, it can be argued that-far from failing to converge on a shared set of conceptual assumptions-the field is indeed making steady consensual progress toward what can broadly be referred to as interactive frameworks. This inclination is apparent in the subfields of psycholinguistics, visual perception, embodied cognition, extended cognition, neural networks, dynamical systems theory, and more. This pictorial essay briefly documents this steady progress both from a bird's eye view and from the trenches. The conclusion is one of optimism that cognitive science is getting there, albeit slowly and arduously, like any good science should.

VR for Cognition and Memory

This chapter will provide a review of research into human cognition through the lens of VR-based paradigms for studying memory. Emphasis is placed on why VR increases the ecological validity of memory research and the implications of such enhancements.

Cognitive Science of Augmented Intelligence

Cognitive science has been traditionally organized around the individual as the basic unit of cognition. Despite developments in areas such as communication, human-machine interaction, group behavior, and community organization, the individual-centric approach heavily dominates both cognitive research and its application. A promising direction for cognitive science is the study of augmented intelligence, or the way social and technological systems interact with and extend individual cognition. The cognitive science of augmented intelligence holds promise in helping society tackle major real-world challenges that can only be discovered and solved by teams made of individuals and machines with complementary skills who can productively collaborate with each other.

Empirical Evidence for Extended Cognitive Systems

We present an empirically supported theoretical and methodological framework for quantifying the system‐level properties of person‐plus‐tool interactions in order to answer the question: “Are person‐plus‐tool‐systems extended cognitive systems?” Nineteen participants provided perceptual judgments regarding their ability to pass through apertures of various widths while using visual information, blindfolded wielding a rod, or blindfolded wielding an Enactive Torch—a vibrotactile sensory‐substitution device for detecting distance. Monofractal, multifractal, and recurrence quantification analyses were conducted to assess features of person‐plus‐tool movement dynamics. Trials where people utilized the rod or Enactive Torch demonstrated stable “self‐similarity,” or indices of healthy and adaptive single systems, regardless of aperture width, trial order, features of the participants’ judgments, and participant characteristics. Enactive Torch trials exhibited a somewhat greater range of dynamic fluctuations than the rod trials, as well as less movement recurrence, suggesting that the Enactive Torch allowed for more exploratory movements. Findings provide support for the notion that person‐plus‐tool systems can be classified as extended cognitive systems and a framework for quantifying system‐level properties of these systems. Implications concerning future research on extended cognition are discussed.

Problem Solvers Adjust Cognitive Offloading Based on Performance Goals

When incorporating the environment into mental processing (cf., cognitive offloading), one creates novel cognitive strategies that have the potential to improve task performance. Improved performance can, for example, mean faster problem solving, more accurate solutions, or even higher grades at university.¹ Although cognitive offloading has frequently been associated with improved performance, it is yet unclear how flexible problem solvers are at matching their offloading habits with their current performance goals (can people improve goal-related instead of generic performance, e.g., when being in a hurry and aiming for a "quick and dirty" solution?). Here, we asked participants to solve a cognitive task, provided them with different goals-maximizing speed (SPD) or accuracy (ACC), respectively-and measured how frequently (Experiment 1) and how proficiently (Experiment 2) they made use of a novel external resource to support their cognitive processing. Experiment 1 showed that offloading behavior varied with goals: Participants offloaded less in the SPD than in the ACC condition. Experiment 2 showed that this differential offloading behavior was associated with high goal-related performance: fast answers in the SPD, accurate answers in the ACC condition. Simultaneously, goal-unrelated performance was sacrificed: inaccurate answers in the SPD, slow answers in the ACC condition. The findings support the notion of humans as canny offloaders who are able to successfully incorporate their environment in pursuit of their current cognitive goals. Future efforts should be focused on the finding's generalizability, for example, to settings without feedback or with high mental workload.

Extended cognition in plants: is it possible?

Plants do not possess brains or neurons. However, they present astonishingly complex behaviors such as information acquisition, memory, learning, decision making, etc., which helps these sessile organisms deal with their ever-changing environments. As a consequence, they have been proposed to be cognitive and intelligent, an idea which is becoming increasingly accepted. However, how plant cognition could operate without a nervous central system remains poorly understood and new insights on this topic are urgently needed. According to the Extended Cognition hypothesis, cognition may also occur beyond the limits of the body, encompassing objects from the environment. This was shown possible in humans and spiders, who actively manipulate their external environment to extend their cognitive capacity. Here, we propose that extended cognition may also be found in plants and could partly explain the complexity of plant behavior. We suggest that plants can extend their cognitive abilities to the environment they manipulate through the root influence zone and the mycorrhizal fungi that associate with them. The possibility of a cognitive process involving organisms from different kingdoms is exciting and worthwhile exploring as it may provide key insights into the origin and evolution of cognition.

Distributed cognition criteria: Defined, operationalized, and applied to human-dog systems

Distributed cognition generally refers to situations in which task requirements are shared among multiple agents or, potentially, off-loaded onto the environment. With few exceptions, socially distributed cognition has largely been discussed in terms of intraspecific interactions. This conception fails to capture some forms of group-level cognition among human and non-human animals that are not readily measured or explained in mentalistic or verbal terms. In response to these limitations, we argue for a more stringent set of empirically-verifiable criteria for assessing whether a system is an instance of distributed cognition: interaction-dominant dynamics, agency, and shared task orientation. We apply this framework to humans and working dogs, and contrast the human-dog socially distributed cognitive system with humans using non-biological tools and human interaction with draft animals. The human-dog system illustrates three operationalizable factors for classifying phenomena as socially distributed cognition and extends the framework to interspecies distributed cognition.

Extended spider cognition

There is a tension between the conception of cognition as a central nervous system (CNS) process and a view of cognition as extending towards the body or the contiguous environment. The centralised conception requires large or complex nervous systems to cope with complex environments. Conversely, the extended conception involves the outsourcing of information processing to the body or environment, thus making fewer demands on the processing power of the CNS. The evolution of extended cognition should be particularly favoured among small, generalist predators such as spiders, and here, we review the literature to evaluate the fit of empirical data with these contrasting models of cognition. Spiders do not seem to be cognitively limited, displaying a large diversity of learning processes, from habituation to contextual learning, including a sense of numerosity. To tease apart the central from the extended cognition, we apply the mutual manipulability criterion, testing the existence of reciprocal causal links between the putative elements of the system. We conclude that the web threads and configurations are integral parts of the cognitive systems. The extension of cognition to the web helps to explain some puzzling features of spider behaviour and seems to promote evolvability within the group, enhancing innovation through cognitive connectivity to variable habitat features. Graded changes in relative brain size could also be explained by outsourcing information processing to environmental features. More generally, niche-constructed structures emerge as prime candidates for extending animal cognition, generating the selective pressures that help to shape the evolving cognitive system.

Extended Cognition and the Internet: A Review of Current Issues and Controversies

The Internet is an important focus of attention for those concerned with issues of extended cognition. In particular, the application of active externalist theorizing to the Internet gives rise to the notion of Internet-extended cognition: the idea that the Internet can (on occasion) form part of an integrated nexus of material elements that serves as the realization base for human mental states and processes. The current review attempts to survey a range of issues and controversies that arise in respect of the notion of Internet-extended cognition. These include the issue of whether the Internet, as a technological system, is able to support real-world cases of cognitive extension. It also includes issues concerning the cognitive and epistemic impacts of the Internet. Finally, the review highlights a range of issues and concerns that have not been the focus of previous philosophical attention. These include issues of ‘network-extended cognitive bloat’, ‘conjoined minds’, and an entirely new form of cognitive extension that goes under the heading of ‘human-extended machine cognition’. Together, these issues serve to highlight the value and importance of Internet-extended cognition to contemporary philosophical debates about the extended mind. In particular, the notion of Internet-extended cognition has the potential to highlight points of philosophical progress that are not easily revealed by the kind of technologically low-grade cases that tend to animate the majority of philosophical discussions in this area.

Mechanistic explanation, cognitive systems demarcation, and extended cognition

Approaches to the Internalism-Externalism controversy in the philosophy of mind often involve both (broadly) metaphysical and explanatory considerations. Whereas originally most emphasis seems to have been placed on metaphysical concerns, recently the explanation angle is getting more attention. Explanatory considerations promise to offer more neutral grounds for cognitive systems demarcation than (broadly) metaphysical ones. However, it has been argued that explanation-based approaches are incapable of determining the plausibility of internalist-based conceptions of cognition vis-à-vis externalist ones. On this perspective, improved metaphysics is the route along which to solve the Internalist-Externalist stalemate. In this paper we challenge this claim. Although we agree that explanation-orientated approaches have indeed so far failed to deliver solid means for cognitive system demarcation, we elaborate a more promising explanation-oriented framework to address this issue. We argue that the mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms, extended with the criterion of 'fat-handedness', is capable of plausibly addressing the cognitive systems demarcation problem, and thus able to decide on the explanatory traction of Internalist vs. Externalist conceptions, on a case-by-case basis. Our analysis also highlights why some other recent mechanistic takes on the problem of cognitive systems demarcation have been unsuccessful. We illustrate our claims with a case on gestures and learning.

What is the extension of the extended mind?

Two aspects of cognitive coupling, as brought forward in the Extended Mind Hypothesis, are discussed in this paper: (1) how shall the functional coupling between the organism and some entity in his environment be spelled out in detail? (2) What are the paradigmatic external entities to enter into that coupling? These two related questions are best answered in the light of an aetiological variety of functionalist argument that adds historical depth to the "active externalism" promoted by Clark and Chalmers and helps to counter some of the core criticisms levelled against this view. Under additional reference to conceptual parallels between the Extended Mind Hypothesis and a set of heterodox theories in biology-environmental constructivism, niche construction, developmental systems theory-an argument for the grounding of environmentally extended cognitive traits in evolved biological functions is developed. In a spirit that seeks to integrate extended functionalism with views from cognitive integration and complementarity, it is argued (ad 1) that instances of environmental coupling should be understood as being constitutive to cognitive functions in either of two distinct ways. It is further argued (ad 2) that the historically and systematically prior environmental counterparts in that coupling are features of the natural environment. Language and linguistically imbued artefacts are likely to have descended from more basic relations that have an extension over the environment.