Methodological Exclusion of the Transcendent? Implications for Theory and Research in Religion, Spirituality and Health

Early in the founding of psychology of religion, a debated issue was the methodological exclusion of the transcendent (MET). While cautiously endorsed by Theodore Flournoy, others, notable William James and Frederic Myers, refused to be limited by this principle. This paper discusses (a) what is MET as proposed by Flournoy and the reasons he provided to adopt it, (b) problems with MET, implications for research and theory in religion/spirituality and health, and why the transcendent should be included in psychological, medical and other academic research and theory on spiritual experiences (SE), and (c) some methodological guidelines perform it fruitfully.

Théodore Flournoy on synesthetic personification

In 1893, Théodore Flournoy published a landmark book on synesthesia - Des phénomènes de synopsie [Of Synoptic Phenomena]. The book presented a pioneering chapter on synesthetic personification, including numerous striking case examples, and it is frequently cited by twenty-first-century researchers as providing some of the earliest examples of the phenomenon. Flournoy employed a broad definition of personification - the representation of stimuli as concrete and specific individuals or inanimate objects. This definition encompassed a more extensive set of phenomena than the definition used by researchers today and was illustrated by cases that would fall outside of contemporary subtypes of synesthetic personification. Yet, Flournoy's seminal work remains unavailable in English, and the extent of the phenomenon that he described has not been discussed in the contemporary literature. We provide an unabridged translation of Flournoy's chapter "Des personnifications" ["Of Personifications"].

Jung, Winnicott and the divided psyche

In his review of Memories Dreams Reflections, Winnicott diagnosed Jung as suffering from a psychic split, and characterized the content and the structure of analytical psychology as primarily moulded and conditioned by Jung's own defensive quest for a 'self that he could call his own'. This pathologizing analysis continues to be endorsed by contemporary Jungian writers. In this paper I attempt to show that Winnicott's critique is fundamentally misguided because it derives from a psychoanalytic model of the psyche, a model that regards all dissociation as necessarily pathological. I argue that Jung's understanding of the psyche differs radically from this model, and further, that it conforms by and large to the kind of dissociative model that we find in the writings of Frederic Myers, William James and Theodor Flournoy. I conclude that a fruitful relationship between psychoanalysis and analytical psychology must depend upon an awareness of these important differences between the two psychic models.