What lies between a plan and its execution?

We plan to make dreams come true. But it is an exception when such plans lead to the desired result. Why is that? Why is it so difficult to make a dream come true? Or better: Why is it so difficult to realize plans? Why, in pursuing plans, do we spend inordinate amounts of energy, time and resources addressing the wrong questions and fighting the wrong battles? Yet, we have the illusion that we are in control. Why? One reason is that we do not recognize the complexity of the system that we want to change. Those living in the Western world or in the Westernized world have been educated in linear cause and effect relationships, of being in control, in fighting ourselves out of a conflict.

Relationships among driving styles, desire for control, illusion of control, and self-reported driving behaviors

OBJECTIVE

A correlational study examined relationships among driving styles, 4 subfactors of desire for control, illusion of control, accident concern, self-rated likelihood of being involved in an accident, self-rated driving skill, and self-reported accidents, violations, and close calls.

METHODS

An online sample of participants (N = 601) completed (1) the Multidimensional Driving Style Inventory (MDSI); (2) the Desirability of Control Scale (DCS); (3) an Illusion of Control Scale; (4) an accident concern self-rating, (5) a 3-item speed questionnaire; (6) a 4-item accidents, violations, and close calls questionnaire; (7) a driving skill self-rating; and (8) a demographic questionnaire. Scales were analyzed using exploratory factor analysis where appropriate. Exploratory correlational analyses examined relationships among factor scores for subscales and other variables of interest.

RESULTS

The MDSI factored into 6 distinct driving styles, and the DCS factored in 4 subfactors of desire for control. Relationships among driving styles and other variables were used to create profiles of each of 6 driving styles-angry, anxious, cautious, dissociative, risky, and stress reduction-based on relationships among variables examined.

CONCLUSIONS

Our results may help to identify traits that are related to driving behaviors. In general, our results showed that several maladaptive driving styles (dissociative, risky, and angry) were negatively correlated with 2 subscales of desire for control (desire to proactively seek control and desire to control making decisions) and positively correlated with illusion of control. Cautious driving style, which is adaptive, showed the opposite pattern. We also produced evidence to support the construct validity of the MDSI and added to the growing literature suggesting that the MDSI factors into 6 distinct driving styles.

Mind Control Tricks: Magicians' Forcing and Free Will

A new research program has recently emerged that investigates magicians' mind control tricks, also called forces. This research highlights the psychological processes that underpin decision-making, illustrates the ease by which our decisions can be covertly influenced, and helps answer questions about our sense of free will and agency over choices.

Illusion of control affects ERP amplitude reductions for auditory outcomes of self-generated actions

The reduction of neural responses to self-generated stimuli compared to external stimuli is thought to result from the matching of motor-based sensory predictions and sensory reafferences and to serve the identification of changes in the environment as caused by oneself. The amplitude of the auditory event-related potential (ERP) component N1 seems to closely reflect this matching process, while the later positive component (P2/ P3a) has been associated with judgments of agency, which are also sensitive to contextual top-down information. In this study, we examined the effect of perceived control over sound production on the processing of self-generated and external stimuli, as reflected in these components. We used a new version of a classic two-button choice task to induce different degrees of the illusion of control (IoC) and recorded ERPs for the processing of self-generated and external sounds in a subsequent task. N1 amplitudes were reduced for self-generated compared to external sounds, but not significantly affected by IoC. P2/3a amplitudes were affected by IoC: We found reduced P2/3a amplitudes after a high compared to a low IoC induction training, but only for self-generated, not for external sounds. These findings suggest that prior contextual belief information induced by an IoC affects later processing as reflected in the P2/P3a, possibly for the formation of agency judgments, while early processing reflecting motor-based predictions is not affected.

The Impact of Behavioral Biases on Herding Behavior of Investors in Islamic Financial Products

The study aimed to investigate the impact of behavioral biases on herding for Islamic financial products with the mediation of shariah literacy. An adopted questionnaire from several published studies was used to collect data. The data were collected from 410 respondents and were analyzed with SmartPLS. The results for the direct impact showed that self-attribution, illusion of control, and information availability have a positive and significant impact on herding for Islamic financial products while shariah literacy showed an insignificant impact on herding. The results for mediation showed that previously significant and positive impact turned to insignificant when shariah literacy was introduced as mediating variable between the illusion of control, self-attribution, information availability, and herding. From a theoretical perspective, this study would contribute to the existing body of knowledge of financial decision making from shariah literacy point-out. On the other hand, the findings of this study may be useful for investors to avoid herding in the Islamic financial markets. The authors synthesize the contribution made by behavioral finance studies in extending the knowledge of herding behavior in Islamic financial products with a mediating role of shariah literacy. The key limitation of the study includes data that were collected from three districts of Punjab, Pakistan.

The apparent action causation: Using a magician forcing technique to investigate our illusory sense of agency over the outcome of our choices

We often fall victim of an illusory sense of control and agency over our thoughts and actions. Magicians are masters at exploiting these illusions, and forcing techniques provide a powerful way to study apparent action causation-the illusion that our action caused the outcome we get. In this article, we used the Criss-Cross force to study whether people can tell the difference between an action which had an impact on the outcome they get and one which has no impact. In the Criss-Cross force, participants are asked to cut to a card, and while they are genuinely free to cut the cards at any position, the cut does not affect the card they are given (i.e., they always get the top card). We investigate the psychological processes that underpin the success of this force. Experiment 1 (N = 60) showed that participants cannot tell the difference between a forced and a controlled outcome. Experiment 2 (N = 90) showed that contrary to common magicians' knowledge, misdirection does not play a role in the success of the force. Finally, Experiment 3 (N = 60) suggests that rather than misdirection, an attribute substitution error explains why people fail to understand that their action does not have an impact on the outcome they get. Debriefing also shows the importance of participants' expectations in the perception of the trick, as well as the role of prediction of the outcome in participants' sense of agency over the events.

The relationship between mood state and perceived control in contingency learning: effects of individualist and collectivist values

Perceived control in contingency learning is linked to psychological wellbeing with low levels of perceived control thought to be a cause or consequence of depression and high levels of control considered to be the hallmark of mental healthiness. However, it is not clear whether this is a universal phenomenon or whether the value that people ascribe to control influences these relationships. Here we hypothesize that values affect learning about control contingencies and influence the relationship between perceived control and symptoms of mood disorders. We tested these hypotheses with European university samples who were categorized as endorsing (or not) values relevant to control-individualist and collectivist values. Three online experimental contingency learning studies (N 1 = 127, N 2 = 324, N 3 = 272) were carried out. Evidence suggested that individualist values influenced basic learning processes via an effect on learning about the context in which events took place. Participants who endorsed individualist values made control judgments that were more in line with an elemental associative learning model, whilst those who were ambivalent about individualist values made judgments that were more consistent with a configural process. High levels of perceived control and individualist values were directly associated with increased euphoric symptoms of bipolar disorder, and such values completely mediated the relation between perceived control and symptoms. The effect of low perceived control on depression was moderated by collectivist values. Anxiety created by dissonance between values and task may be a catalyst for developing mood symptoms. Conclusions are that values play a significant intermediary role in the relation between perceived control and symptoms of mood disturbance.

Illusions of causality: how they bias our everyday thinking and how they could be reduced

Illusions of causality occur when people develop the belief that there is a causal connection between two events that are actually unrelated. Such illusions have been proposed to underlie pseudoscience and superstitious thinking, sometimes leading to disastrous consequences in relation to critical life areas, such as health, finances, and wellbeing. Like optical illusions, they can occur for anyone under well-known conditions. Scientific thinking is the best possible safeguard against them, but it does not come intuitively and needs to be taught. Teaching how to think scientifically should benefit from better understanding of the illusion of causality. In this article, we review experiments that our group has conducted on the illusion of causality during the last 20 years. We discuss how research on the illusion of causality can contribute to the teaching of scientific thinking and how scientific thinking can reduce illusion.

Exploring the factors that encourage the illusions of control: the case of preventive illusions

Most previous research on illusions of control focused on generative scenarios, in which participants’ actions aim to produce a desired outcome. By contrast, the illusions that may appear in preventive scenarios, in which actions aim to prevent an undesired outcome before it occurs, are less known. In this experiment, we studied two variables that modulate generative illusions of control, the probability with which the action takes place, P(A), and the probability of the outcome, P(O), in two different scenarios: generative and preventive. We found that P(O) affects the illusion in symmetrical, opposite directions in each scenario, while P(A) is positively related to the magnitude of the illusion. Our conclusion is that, in what concerns the illusions of control, the occurrence of a desired outcome is equivalent to the nonoccurrence of an undesired outcome, which explains why the P(O) effect is reversed depending on the scenario.

The costs and benefits of positive illusions

Positive illusions are associated with unrealistic optimism about the future and an inflated assessment of one’s abilities. They are prevalent in normal life and are considered essential for maintaining a healthy mental state, although, there are disagreements to the extent to which people demonstrate these positive illusions and whether they are beneficial or not. But whatever the situation, it is hard to dismiss their existence and their positive and/or negative influence on human behavior and decision making in general. Prominent among illusions is that of control, that is “the tendency for people to overestimate their ability to control events.” This paper describes positive illusions, their potential benefits but also quantifies their costs in five specific fields (gambling, stock and other markets, new firms and startups, preventive medicine and wars). It is organized into three parts. First the psychological reasons giving rise to positive illusions are described and their likely harm and benefits stated. Second, their negative consequences are presented and their costs are quantified in five areas seriously affected with emphasis to those related to the illusion of control that seems to dominate those of unrealistic optimism. The costs involved are huge and serious efforts must be undertaken to understand their enormity and steps taken to avoid them in the future. Finally, there is a concluding section where the challenges related to positive illusions are noted and directions for future research are presented.

Illusion of control: the role of personal involvement

The illusion of control consists of overestimating the influence that our behavior exerts over uncontrollable outcomes. Available evidence suggests that an important factor in development of this illusion is the personal involvement of participants who are trying to obtain the outcome. The dominant view assumes that this is due to social motivations and self-esteem protection. We propose that this may be due to a bias in contingency detection which occurs when the probability of the action (i.e., of the potential cause) is high. Indeed, personal involvement might have been often confounded with the probability of acting, as participants who are more involved tend to act more frequently than those for whom the outcome is irrelevant and therefore become mere observers. We tested these two variables separately. In two experiments, the outcome was always uncontrollable and we used a yoked design in which the participants of one condition were actively involved in obtaining it and the participants in the other condition observed the adventitious cause-effect pairs. The results support the latter approach: Those acting more often to obtain the outcome developed stronger illusions, and so did their yoked counterparts.

Obsessive-compulsive disorder patients have a reduced sense of control on the illusion of control task

There is disagreement regarding the role of perceived control in obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD). The present study used a traditional illusion of control paradigm (Alloy and Abramson, 1979) to empirically test control estimation in OCD. Twenty-six OCD patients and 26 matched comparison subjects completed an illusion of control task wherein their goal was to attempt to exert control over a light bulb. The density of reinforcement (high, low) and the valence of trials (gain, loss) were experimentally manipulated within subjects. Unbeknownst to participants, the illumination of the light bulb was predetermined and irrespective of their behavior. OCD patients exhibited lower estimates of control compared with healthy comparison subjects. There were no interactions between group and outcome density or group and valence. We found that OCD patients endorse lower estimates of control than comparison subjects. This finding highlights a potential role for contingency learning in the disorder.

Rationality and the illusion of choice

The psychology of reasoning and decision making (RDM) shares the methodology of cognitive psychology in that researchers assume that participants are doing their best to solve the problems according to the instruction. Unlike other cognitive researchers, however, they often view erroneous answers evidence of irrationality rather than limited efficiency in the cognitive systems studied. Philosophers and psychologists also talk of people being irrational in a special sense that does not apply to other animals, who are seen as having no choice in their own behavior. I argue here that (a) RDM is no different from other fields of cognitive psychology and should be subject to the same kind of scientific inferences, and (b) the special human sense of irrationality derives from folk psychology and the illusory belief that there are conscious people in charge of their minds and decisions.

Pathological gamblers are more vulnerable to the illusion of control in a standard associative learning task

An illusion of control is said to occur when a person believes that he or she controls an outcome that is uncontrollable. Pathological gambling has often been related to an illusion of control, but the assessment of the illusion has generally used introspective methods in domain-specific (i.e., gambling) situations. The illusion of control of pathological gamblers, however, could be a more general problem, affecting other aspects of their daily life. Thus, we tested them using a standard associative learning task which is known to produce illusions of control in most people under certain conditions. The results showed that the illusion was significantly stronger in pathological gamblers than in a control undiagnosed sample. This suggests (1) that the experimental tasks used in basic associative learning research could be used to detect illusions of control in gamblers in a more indirect way, as compared to introspective and domain-specific questionnaires; and (2), that in addition to gambling-specific problems, pathological gamblers may have a higher-than-normal illusion of control in their daily life.

The Gambler's Fallacy: A Basic Inhibitory Process?

Two studies were conducted to examine the relation between the gambler's fallacy (GF) and attentional processes associated with inhibition of return (IOR). In Study 1, participants completed rapid aiming movements to equally probable targets presented to the left and right. They also completed a gambling protocol in which they bet on the illumination of either target. Consistent with the IOR phenomenon, participants were slower to initiate their movements on trial N + 1 when the target was the same as trial N. Participants with more pronounced IOR were more likely to switch betting behavior after a win than participants with a smaller index. This betting behavior was also related to a GF index measured by a questionnaire. In Study 2, participants performed both the aiming task and the betting task with a partner. Each participant performed two trials before ceding to the partner. Thus we were able to examine IOR and betting behavior as a function of the participant's own previous trial and their partner's previous trial. The IOR effect was robust both within and between-participants. Participants were more likely to maintain their bet following an unsuccessful outcome regardless of whether it was their own outcome or their partner's outcome. This type of betting behavior is consistent with the GF. Individual IOR scores were a reliable predictor of betting behavior and the questionnaire was also successful in predicting behavior. In addition, the within-person IOR indices covaried with the GF index derived from the questionnaire. In summary, there appears to be a relation between IOR and the GF. We suggest that early humans developed specialized attentional systems to deal with non-random environmental contingencies, and that the automatic processes associated with these systems are sometimes maladaptive in artificial environments in which the same contingencies do not hold.

Altering response chains in pathological gamblers using a response-cost procedure

Two pathological gamblers could choose between emitting or having the dealer emit the response options when playing each of three casino games. A response-cost procedure was introduced in a multiple baseline design across games in which the participant had to pay to perform the responses himself, which was somewhat effective at reducing many of the initial irrational choices made by each participant.