Discontinuation of Contact Precautions for Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus in a Pediatric Healthcare System

BACKGROUND

Many hospitals caring for adult patients have discontinued the requirement for contact precautions (CP) for patients with methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infection or colonization without reported negative effects. It is not clear whether this experience can be extrapolated to pediatric facilities.

METHODS

CP for MRSA were discontinued in all locations except the neonatal intensive care unit at a 3-hospital pediatric healthcare system in September 2019. All hospitalized patients underwent surveillance for LabID healthcare facility-onset MRSA infections. Analysis was done using interrupted time series (ITS) from September 2017 through August 2023 and aggregate before-and-after rate ratios.

RESULTS

There were 234 incident healthcare facility-onset MRSA infections during 766 020 patient days of surveillance. After discontinuation of CP for MRSA there was no change in the ITS slope (0.06, 95% CI: -0.35 to 0.47, P = .78) or intercept (0.21, 95% CI: -0.36 to 0.78, P = .47) of the LabID healthcare facility-onset MRSA infection incidence density rate. Additionally, there was no change in the aggregate incidence density rate of these MRSA LabID events (aggregate rate ratio = 0.98, 95% CI: 0.74 to 1.28). MRSA nasal colonization among patients being screened before cardiac surgery did not change (aggregate rate ratio = 0.94, 95% CI: 0.60 to 1.48). The prevalence rate of contact isolation days decreased by 14.0%.

CONCLUSIONS

Discontinuation of CP for pediatric patients with MRSA was not associated with increased MRSA infection over 4 years. Our experience supports considering discontinuation of CP for MRSA in similar pediatric healthcare settings in the context of good adherence to horizontal infection prevention measures.

Revisiting the personal protective equipment components of transmission-based precautions for the prevention of COVID-19 and other respiratory virus infections in healthcare

The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted some potential limitations of transmission-based precautions. The distinction between transmission through large droplets vs aerosols, which have been fundamental concepts guiding infection control measures, has been questioned, leading to considerable variation in expert recommendations on transmission-based precautions for COVID-19. Furthermore, the application of elements of contact precautions, such as the use of gloves and gowns, is based on low-quality and inconclusive evidence and may have unintended consequences, such as increased incidence of healthcare-associated infections and spread of multidrug-resistant organisms. These observations indicate a need for high-quality studies to address the knowledge gaps and a need to revisit the theoretical background regarding various modes of transmission and the definitions of terms related to transmission. Further, we should examine the implications these definitions have on the following components of transmission-based precautions: (i) respiratory protection, (ii) use of gloves and gowns for the prevention of respiratory virus infections, (iii) aerosol-generating procedures and (iv) universal masking in healthcare settings as a control measure especially during seasonal epidemics. Such a review would ensure that transmission-based precautions are consistent and rationally based on available evidence, which would facilitate decision-making, guidance development and training, as well as their application in practice.

Duration of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) Infectivity: When Is It Safe to Discontinue Isolation?

Defining the duration of infectivity of SARS-CoV-2 has major implications for public health and infection control practice in healthcare facilities. Early in the pandemic, most hospitals required two negative RT-PCR tests before discontinuing isolation in patients with Covid-19. Many patients, however, have persistently positive RT-PCR tests for weeks to months following clinical recovery and multiple studies now indicate that persistently positive RT-PCRs generally do not reflect replication-competent virus. SARS-CoV-2 appears to be most contagious around the time of symptom onset and infectivity rapidly decreases thereafter to near-zero after about 10 days in mild-moderately ill patients and 15 days in severely-critically ill and immunocompromised patients. The longest interval associated with replication-competent virus thus far is 20 days from symptom onset. This review summarizes evidence-to-date on the duration of infectivity of SARS-CoV-2 and how this has informed evolving public health recommendations on when it is safe to discontinue isolation precautions.

Prospective Clinical Assessments of Hospitalized Patients With Positive SARS-CoV-2 PCR Tests for Necessity of Isolation

We prospectively assessed 536 hospitalized patients with positive severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) polymerase chain reaction tests for infectiousness based on symptoms, cycle thresholds, and SARS-CoV-2 history, with repeat testing and serologies in select cases. One hundred forty-eight (28%) patients were deemed noninfectious, most with evidence of prior infection, and managed on standard precautions without evidence of transmission.

Assessment of Oropharyngeal Specimens for Discontinuation of Transmission-Based COVID-19 Precautions

We compared oropharyngeal swab test performance with nasopharyngeal testing for discontinuation of transmission-based COVID-19 precautions. We performed a retrospective review of confirmed COVID-19-positive patients who received paired nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal SARS-CoV-2 tests for clearance from isolation from May 4, 2020, to May 26, 2020. Using nasopharyngeal swabs as the reference standard, we calculated the sensitivity, specificity, and negative predictive value of oropharyngeal swabs. We also calculated the kappa between the 2 tests. A total of 189 paired samples were collected from 74 patients. Oropharyngeal swab sensitivity was 38%, specificity was 87%, and negative predictive value was 70%. The kappa was 0.25. Our study suggests that oropharyngeal swabs are inferior to nasopharyngeal swabs for test-based clearance from COVID-19 isolation.

Implementing an OR Contact Precautions Decision Algorithm to Promote Interprofessional Teamwork for Infection Prevention

Perioperative nurses use aseptic and sterile technique along with standard cleaning and disinfection practices to prevent surgical site infections. At our hospital, OR team members identified a clinical problem: the lack of a systematic approach to determine the type of postprocedure cleaning required between procedures involving patients with multi-drug resistant organisms or Clostridium difficile. Facility leaders developed a project to design and implement an evidence-based decision-making algorithm to help perioperative nurses rapidly identify the appropriate environmental cleaning procedures for these ORs. After the perioperative nurses were taught how to use the algorithm, it was put into use. Nineteen months later, the nurses completed a postimplementation survey. The results of the survey were generally positive, and the cleaning process was more standardized. We found that a decision-making algorithm was an effective tool to determine the proper postprocedure environmental cleaning between surgical procedures for patients with multi-drug resistant organisms or C difficile.

Implementing AORN recommended practices for prevention of transmissible infections

Preventing infection in the perioperative setting is a critical element of patient and health care worker safety. This article reviews the recommendations in the AORN "Recommended practices for prevention of transmissible infections in the perioperative practice setting." The recommended practices are intended to help perioperative nurses implement standard and transmission-based precautions (ie, contact, droplet, airborne), including use of personal protective equipment as well as interventions to prevent surgical site infections and exposure to bloodborne pathogens. Additional recommendations cover vaccination programs and how to manage personnel who require work restrictions. Hospital and ambulatory patient scenarios are included to help perioperative nurses apply the recommendations in daily practice.