When the boss turns pusher: a proposal for employee protections in the age of cosmetic neurology

Neurocognitive enhancement, or cosmetic neurology, offers the prospect of improving the learning, memory and attention skills of healthy individuals well beyond the normal human range. Much has been written about the ethics of such enhancement, but policy-makers in the USA, the UK and Europe have been reluctant to legislate in this rapidly developing field. However, the possibility of discrimination by employers and insurers against individuals who choose not to engage in such enhancement is a serious threat worthy of legislative intervention. While lawmakers should not prevent individuals from freely pursuing neurocognitive enhancement, they should act to ensure that such enhancement is not coerced. This paper offers one model for such legislation, based upon a proposed US law, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, to address precisely this particular pitfall of the impending neuroscience revolution.

The challenges of neuroethics

This paper presents different conceptions of neuroethics, focusing both on applications of neuroscience aiming to provide access to other people's minds and on the theoretical study of the neural bases of moral judgement and decision making. It is argued that these studies have not yet seriously undermined the traditional view of humans as moral free agents, nor have they accomplished the radical naturalisation of ethics that is sometimes promised or predicted. A few implications for normative ethics and moral epistemology are also discussed.

Cosmetic psychopharmacology and the President's Council on Bioethics

Advances in neuroscience and biotechnology have heightened the urgency of the debate over "cosmetic psychopharmacology," the use of drugs to enhance mood and temperament in the absence of illness. Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness (2003), the report of the President's Council on Bioethics, has criticized the use of cosmetic psychopharmacology. The Council claimed that cosmetic psychopharmacology will necessarily lead to "severing the link between feelings of happiness and our actions and experiences in the world," but it provided no satisfactory arguments to support this claim and ignored the possibility that cosmetic psychopharmacology might actually enhance the link between happiness and experience. The Council's arguments against cosmetic psychopharmacology depend heavily on the mistaken belief that Prozac and similar antidepressants are mood brighteners in healthy subjects. The empirical evidence, however, clearly indicates that these drugs are not forms of cosmetic psychopharmacology, thus negating much of the Council's arguments. The use of pharmaceutical agents to enhance mood or personality in normal individuals should not be rejected a priori. Instead, the effects of each agent on the individual and on society must be weighed using sound ethical reasoning and the best evidence available.