Debates about Conflict of Interest in Medicine: Deconstructing a Divided Discourse

The pharmaceutical industry plays an increasingly dominant role in healthcare, raising concerns about "conflicts of interest" (COI) on the part of the medical professionals who interact with the industry. However, there is considerable disagreement over the extent to which COI is a problem and how it should be managed. Participants in debates about COI have become entrenched in their views, which is both unproductive and deeply confusing for the majority of medical professionals trying to work in an increasingly commercialized environment. We used a modified meta-narrative review method to analyse debates about COI in the academic and grey literature. We found two Discourse Models: The Critical Discourse Model sees COI in health and biomedicine as a major problem that both can and should be addressed, while the Defensive Discourse Model argues that current efforts to control COIs are at best unnecessary and at worst harmful. Each model is underpinned by profoundly differing views about how society should be organized-in particular whether market forces should be encouraged or curtailed-and how the dangers associated with market forces should be managed. In order to make any headway, academics and policymakers must recognize that these debates are underpinned by profoundly differing worldviews.

The Dawn of Transparency: Insights from the Physician Payment Sunshine Act in Plastic Surgery

BACKGROUND

The Physician Payments Sunshine Act (PSSA) is a government initiative that requires all biomedical companies to publicly disclose payments to physicians through the Open Payments Program (OPP). The goal of this study was to use the OPP database and evaluate all nonresearch-related financial transactions between plastic surgeons and biomedical companies.

METHODS

Using the first wave of OPP data published on September 30, 2014, we studied the national distribution of industry payments made to plastic surgeons during a 5-month period. We explored whether a plastic surgeon's scientific productivity (as determined by their h-index), practice setting (private versus academic), geographic location, and subspecialty were associated with payment amount.

RESULTS

Plastic surgeons (N = 4195) received a total of US $5,278,613. The median (IQR) payment to a plastic surgeon was US $115 (US $35-298); mean, US $158. The largest payment to an individual was US $341,384. The largest payment category was non-CEP speaker fees (US $1,709,930) followed by consulting fees (US $1,403,770). Plastic surgeons in private practice received higher payments per surgeon compared with surgeons in academic practice (median [IQR], US $165 [US $81-$441] vs median [IQR], US $112 [US $33-$291], rank-sum P < 0.001). Among academic plastic surgeons, a higher h-index was associated with 77% greater chance of receiving at least US $1000 in total payments (RR/10 unit h-index increase = 1.47 1.772.11, P < 0.001). This association was not seen among plastic surgeons in private practice (RR = 0.89 1.091.32, P < 0.4).

CONCLUSIONS

Plastic surgeons in private practice receive higher payments from industry. Among academic plastic surgeons, higher payments were associated with higher h-indices.

Conflict of Interest Policies at French Medical Schools: Starting from the Bottom

Background

Medical faculties have a role in ensuring that their students are protected from undue commercial influence during their training, and are educated about professional-industry interactions. In North America, many medical faculties have introduced more stringent conflict of interest (COI) policies during the last decade. We asked whether similar steps had been taken in France. We hypothesized that such policies may have been introduced following a 2009–2010 drug safety scandal (benfluorex, Mediator) in which COIs in medicine received prominent press attention.

Methods

We searched the websites of all 37 French Faculties of Medicine in May 2015 for COI policies and curriculum, using standardized keyword searches. We also surveyed all deans of medicine on institutional COI policies and curriculum, based on criteria developed in similar US and Canadian surveys. Personal contacts were also consulted. We calculated a summary score per faculty based on 13 criteria. [range 0–26; higher scores denoting stronger policies]

Results

In total, we found that 9/37 (24%) of French medical schools had either introduced related curriculum or implemented a COI-related policy. Of these, only 1 (2.5%) had restrictive policies for any category. No official COI policies were found at any of the schools. However, at 2 (5%), informal policies were reported. The maximum score per faculty was 5/26, with 28 (76%) scoring 0.

Conclusion

This is the first survey in France to examine COI policies at medical faculties. We found little evidence that protection of medical students from undue commercial influence is a priority, either through institutional policies or education. This is despite national transparency legislation on industry financing of health professionals and limits on gifts. The French National Medical Students Association (ANEMF) has called for more attention to COI in medical education; our results strongly support such a call.

Pharmaceutical lobbying in Brazil: a missing topic in the public health research agenda

In the US, where registration of lobbyists is mandatory, the pharmaceutical industry and private health-care providers spend huge amounts of money seeking to influence health policies and government decisions. In Brazil, where lobbying lacks transparency, there is virtually no data on drug industry expenditure to persuade legislators and government officials of their viewpoints and to influence decision-making according to commercial interests. Since 1990, however, the Associação da Indústria Farmacêutica de Pesquisa (Interfarma - Pharmaceutical Research Industry Association), Brazilian counterpart of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), main lobbying organization of the US pharmaceutical industry, has played a major role in the advocacy of interests of major drug companies. The main goals of Interfarma lobbying activities are: shortening the average time taken by the Brazilian regulatory agency (ANVISA) to approve marketing authorization for a new drug; making the criteria for incorporation of new drugs into SUS (Brazilian Unified Health System) more flexible and speeding up technology incorporation; changing the Country's ethical clearance system and the ethical requirements for clinical trials to meet the need of the innovative drug industry, and establishing a National Policy for Rare Diseases that allows a prompt incorporation of orphan drugs into SUS. Although lobbying affects community health and well-being, this topic is not in the public health research agenda. The impacts of pharmaceutical lobbying on health policies and health-care costs are of great importance for SUS and deserve to be investigated.

Medicare Program; Conditions for Coverage for End-Stage Renal Disease Facilities--Third Party Payment. Interim final rule with comment period

This interim final rule with comment period implements new requirements for Medicare-certified dialysis facilities that make payments of premiums for individual market health plans. These requirements apply to dialysis facilities that make such payments directly, through a parent organization, or through a third party. These requirements are intended to protect patient health and safety; improve patient disclosure and transparency; ensure that health insurance coverage decisions are not inappropriately influenced by the financial interests of dialysis facilities rather than the health and financial interests of patients; and protect patients from mid-year interruptions in coverage.

Policies on Conflicts of Interest in Health Care Guideline Development: A Cross-Sectional Analysis

OBJECTIVE

To assess whether organisations that develop health care guidelines have conflict of interest (COI) policies and to review the content of the available COI policies.

METHODS

Survey and content analysis of COI policies available in English, French, Spanish, and Italian conducted between September 2014 and June 2015. A 24-item data abstraction instrument was created on the basis of guideline development standards.

RESULTS

The survey identified 29 organisations from 19 countries that met the inclusion criteria. From these organisations, 19 policies were eligible for inclusion in the content analysis. Over one-third of the policies (7/19, 37%) did not report or did not clearly report whether disclosure was a prerequisite for membership of the guideline panel. Strategies for the prevention of COI such as divestment were mentioned by only two organisations. Only 21% of policies (4/19) used criteria to determine whether an interest constitutes a COI and to assess the severity of the risk imposed.

CONCLUSIONS

The finding that some organisations, in contradiction of widely available standards, still do not have COI policies publicly available is concerning. Also troubling were the findings that some policies did not clearly report critical steps in obtaining, managing and communicating disclosure of relationships of interest. This in addition to the variability encountered in content and accessibility of COI policies may cause confusion and distrust among guideline users. It is in the interest of guideline users and developers to design an agreed-upon, comprehensive, clear, and accessible COI policy.

Sunshine Act: shedding light on inaccurate disclosures at a gynecologic annual meeting

BACKGROUND

Physicians and hospital systems often have relationships with biomedical manufacturers to develop new ideas, products, and further education. Because this relationship can influence medical research and practice, reporting disclosures are necessary to reveal any potential bias and inform consumers. The Sunshine Act was created to develop a new reporting system of these financial relationships called the Open Payments database. Currently all disclosures submitted with research to scientific meetings are at the discretion of the physician. We hypothesized that financial relationships between authors and the medical industry are underreported.

OBJECTIVES

We aimed to describe concordance between physicians' financial disclosures listed in the abstract book from the 41st annual scientific meeting of the Society of Gynecologic Surgeons to physician payments reported to the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services Open Payments database for the same year.

STUDY DESIGN

Authors and scientific committee members responsible for the content of the 41st annual scientific meeting of the Society of Gynecologic Surgeons were identified from the published abstract book; each abstract listed disclosures for each author. Abstract disclosures were compared with the transactions recorded on the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services Open Payments database for concordance. Two authors reviewed each nondisclosed Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services listing to determine the relatedness between the company listed on the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services and abstract content.

RESULTS

Abstracts and disclosures of 335 physicians meeting inclusion criteria were reviewed. A total of 209 of 335 physicians (62%) had transactions reported in the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services, which totaled $1.99 million. Twenty-four of 335 physicians (7%) listed companies with their abstracts; 5 of those 24 physicians were concordant with the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services. The total amount of all nondisclosed transactions was $1.3 million. Transactions reported in the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services associated with a single physician ranged from $11.72 to $405,903.36. Of the 209 physicians with Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services transactions that were not disclosed, the majority (68%) had at least 1 company listed in the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services that was determined after review to be related to the subject of their abstract.

CONCLUSION

Voluntary disclosure of financial relationships was poor, and the majority of unlisted disclosures in the abstract book were companies related to the scientific content of the abstract. Better transparency is needed by physicians responsible for the content presented at gynecological scientific meetings.

Assessment of the European Union's illicit trade agreements with the four major Transnational Tobacco Companies

To address the illicit cigarette trade, the European Union (EU) has signed agreements with the four major Transnational Tobacco Companies (TTCs) that involve establishing extensive systems of cooperation. All agreements foresee two types of payments: annual payments (totalling US$ 1.9 billion over 20 years) and supplementary seizure payments, equivalent to 100% of the evaded taxes in the event of seizures of their products. While limited by the fundamental lack of transparency in this area, our analysis suggests that these agreements have served largely to secure the TTCs' interests and are threatening progress in tobacco control. The seizure payments are paltry and a wholly inadequate deterrent to TTC involvement in illicit trade. Despite the agreements, growing evidence indicates the TTCs remain involved in the illicit trade or are at best failing to secure their supply chains as required by the agreements. The intention of the seizure-based payments to deter the tobacco industry from further involvement in the illicit cigarette trade has failed because the agreements contain too many loopholes that provide TTCs with both the incentive and opportunity to classify seized cigarettes as counterfeit. In addition, the shifting nature of cigarette smuggling from larger to smaller consignments often results in seizures that are too small to qualify for the payments. Consequently, the seizure payments represent a tiny fraction of the revenue lost from cigarette smuggling, between 2004 and 2012, 0.08% of the estimated losses due to illicit cigarette trade in the EU. Our evidence suggests the EU should end these agreements.

The New Academic Environment and Faculty Misconduct

Faculty members are expected to abide by codes of conduct that are delineated in institutional policies and to behave ethically when engaging in scientific pursuits. As federal funds for research decrease, faculty members face increasing pressure to sustain their research activities, and many have developed new collaborations and pursued new entrepreneurial opportunities. As research collaborations increase, however, there may be competition to get credit as the first person to develop ideas, make new discoveries, and/or publish new findings. This increasingly competitive academic environment may contribute to intentional or unintentional faculty misconduct. The authors, who work in the Dean's Office at a large U.S. medical school (University of California, San Francisco), investigate one to two cases of alleged misconduct each month. These investigations, which are stressful and unpleasant, may culminate in serious disciplinary action for the faculty member. Further, these allegations sometimes result in lengthy and acrimonious civil litigation. This Perspective provides three examples of academic misconduct: violations of institutional conflict-of-interest policies, disputes about intellectual property, and authorship conflicts.The authors also describe prevention and mitigation strategies that their medical school employs, which may be helpful to other institutions. Prevention strategies include training campus leaders, using attestations to reduce violations of institutional policies, encouraging open discussion and written agreements about individuals' roles and responsibilities, and defining expectations regarding authorship and intellectual property at the outset. Mitigation strategies include using mediation by third parties who do not have a vested academic, personal, or financial interest in the outcome.

Legal Briefing: Mandated Reporters and Compulsory Reporting Duties

This issue's "Legal Briefing" column, one product of a Greenwall Foundation grant, reviews recent developments concerning compulsory reporting duties. Most licensed clinicians in the United States are "mandated reporters." When these clinicians discover certain threats to the safety of patients or the public, they are legally required to report that information to specified government officials. Over the past year, several states have legislatively expanded the scope of these reporting duties. In other states, new court cases illustrate the vigorous enforcement of already existing duties. I have organized all these legal developments into the following eight categories: 1. Overview of Mandatory Reporting Duties 2. Controversy over the Benefits of Mandatory Reporting 3. New and Expanded Duties to Report 4. Criminal Penalties for Failing to Report 5. Civil Liability for Failing to Report 6. Disciplinary Penalties for Failing to Report 7. Legal Immunity for Good-Faith Reporting 8. Protection against Employers' Retaliation.

Dialectical principlism: an approach to finding the most ethical action

Most forensic psychiatrists occasionally face complex situations in forensic work in which ethics dilemmas cause discomfort. They want to determine the most ethical action, but the best choice is unclear. Fostering justice is primary in forensic roles, but secondary duties such as traditional biomedical ethics and personal values like helping society, combating racism, and being sensitive to cultural issues can impinge on or even outweigh the presumptive primary duty in extreme cases. Similarly, in treatment the psychiatrists' primary duty is to patients, but that can be outweighed by secondary duties such as protecting children and the elderly or maintaining security. The implications of one's actions matter. In forensic work, if the psychiatrist determines that he should not assist the party who wants to hire him, despite evidence clearly supporting its side, the only ethical option becomes not to accept the case at all, because the evidence does not support the better side. Sometimes it can be ethical to accept cases only for one side. In ethics-related dilemmas, I call the method of prioritizing and balancing all types of conflicting principles, duties, and personal and societal values in a dialectic to resolve conflicts among them dialectical principlism. This approach is designed to help determine the most ethical action. It is aspirational and is not intended to get the psychiatrist into trouble.

Commentary: is the plot thickening for partisan forensic expert witnesses?

Knowledge of the past has a powerful way of clarifying the challenges of the present. Dr. Weiss enables the reader to exploit this phenomenon as it applies to the important perennial struggle of the expert witness for objectivity.

John H. Wigmore on the abolition of partisan experts

The American justice system traditionally has relied on expert witnesses hired by adverse parties, resulting in the appearance of dueling hired guns. There have been attempts to reform the system through court-appointed impartial experts, but trial attorneys have resisted them. Celebrated cases have brought the problem to the forefront--for example, the 1924 murder trial of Richard Loeb and Nathan Leopold, Jr, in Chicago. These young men were on trial for kidnapping and killing a teenage boy. That there was no motive but thrill-seeking incensed citizens, who called for their death. Several psychiatrists testified at the penalty phase. The judge sentenced the defendants to life in prison, ostensibly because of their age. Commenting on the case, John H. Wigmore, Dean of Northwestern Law School and authority on evidence, critiqued the system of partisan experts. This article contains a reprint of his editorial and a discussion of it in the context of evolving expert testimony standards. My conclusion is that a robust but honest airing of opinions is most helpful in criminal cases and that court-appointed experts may be more appropriate in civil and domestic relations matters.