Deep and continuous palliative sedation (terminal sedation): clinical-ethical and philosophical aspects

Personhood within the context of sedation at the end of life in Singapore

The concept of personhood is critical to the provision of holistic, patient-centred, palliative care yet no common definition of this term exists. Some characterise personhood by the presence of consciousness-related features such as self-awareness while others deem personhood present by virtue of Divine endowment or as a result of one's social relations. Efforts to appropriately delineate this concept come under scrutiny following suggestions that patients rendered deeply and irreversibly unconscious lack personhood and ought to be considered 'dead'. This case report studies the views of a family caring for a deeply sedated terminally ill patient, to appropriately site local views of personhood within the context of sedation at the end of life. The resultant Ring Theory of Personhood dispenses with concerns that personhood is solely dependent upon consciousness and distances sedative treatments of last resort such as continuous deep sedation from euthanasia.

Autonomy-based arguments against physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia: a critique

Respect for autonomy is typically considered a key reason for allowing physician assisted suicide and euthanasia. However, several recent papers have claimed this to be grounded in a misconception of the normative relevance of autonomy. It has been argued that autonomy is properly conceived of as a value, and that this makes assisted suicide as well as euthanasia wrong, since they destroy the autonomy of the patient. This paper evaluates this line of reasoning by investigating the conception of valuable autonomy. Starting off from the current debate in end-of-life care, two different interpretations of how autonomy is valuable is discussed. According to one interpretation, autonomy is a personal prudential value, which may provide a reason why euthanasia and assisted suicide might be against a patient's best interests. According to a second interpretation, inspired by Kantian ethics, being autonomous is unconditionally valuable, which may imply a duty to preserve autonomy. We argue that both lines of reasoning have limitations when it comes to situations relevant for end-of life care. It is concluded that neither way of reasoning can be used to show that assisted suicide or euthanasia always is impermissible.

The practice of continuous deep sedation until death in Flanders (Belgium), the Netherlands, and the U.K.: a comparative study

CONTEXT

Existing empirical evidence shows that continuous deep sedation until death is given in about 15% of all deaths in Flanders, Belgium (BE), 8% in The Netherlands (NL), and 17% in the U.K.

OBJECTIVES

This study compares characteristics of continuous deep sedation to explain these varying frequencies.

METHODS

In Flanders, BE (2007) and NL (2005), death certificate studies were conducted. Questionnaires about continuous deep sedation and other decisions were sent to the certifying physicians of each death from a stratified sample (Flanders, BE: n=6927; NL: n=6860). In the U.K. in 2007-2008, questionnaires were sent to 8857 randomly sampled physicians asking them about the last death attended.

RESULTS

The total number of deaths studied was 11,704 of which 1517 involved continuous deep sedation. In Dutch hospitals, continuous deep sedation was significantly less often provided (11%) compared with hospitals in Flanders, BE (20%) and the U.K. (17%). In U.K. home settings, continuous deep sedation was more common (19%) than in Flanders, BE (10%) or NL (8%). In NL in both settings, continuous deep sedation more often involved benzodiazepines and lasted less than 24 hours. Physicians in Flanders combined continuous deep sedation with a decision to provide physician-assisted death more often. Overall, men, younger patients, and patients with malignancies were more likely to receive continuous deep sedation, although this was not always significant within each country.

CONCLUSION

Differences in the prevalence of continuous deep sedation appear to reflect complex legal, cultural, and organizational factors more than differences in patients' characteristics or clinical profiles. Further in-depth studies should explore whether these differences also reflect differences between countries in the quality of end-of-life care.

Attitudes towards end-of-life decisions and the subjective concepts of consciousness: an empirical analysis

Background

People have fought for their civil rights, primarily the right to live in dignity. At present, the development of technology in medicine and healthcare led to an apparent paradox: many people are fighting for the right to die. This study was aimed at testing whether different moral principles are associated with different attitudes towards end-of-life decisions for patients with a severe brain damage.

Methodology

We focused on the ethical decisions about withdrawing life-sustaining treatments in patients with severe brain damage. 202 undergraduate students at the University of Padova were given one description drawn from four profiles describing different pathological states: the permanent vegetative state, the minimally conscious state, the locked-in syndrome, and the terminal illness. Participants were asked to evaluate how dead or how alive the patient was, and how appropriate it was to satisfy the patient's desire.

Principal Findings

We found that the moral principles in which people believe affect not only people's judgments concerning the appropriateness of the withdrawal of life support, but also the perception of the death status of patients with severe brain injury. In particular, we found that the supporters of the Free Choice (FC) principle perceived the death status of the patients with different pathologies differently: the more people believe in the FC, the more they perceived patients as dead in pathologies where conscious awareness is severely impaired. By contrast, participants who agree with the Sanctity of Life (SL) principle did not show differences across pathologies.

Conclusions

These results may shed light on the complex aspects of moral consensus for supporting or rejecting end-of-life decisions.

Continuous palliative sedation for cancer and noncancer patients

CONTEXT

Palliative care is often focused on cancer patients. Palliative sedation at the end of life is an intervention to address severe suffering in the last stage of life.

OBJECTIVES

To study the practice of continuous palliative sedation for both cancer and noncancer patients.

METHODS

In 2008, a structured questionnaire was sent to 1580 physicians regarding their last patient receiving continuous sedation until death.

RESULTS

A total of 606 physicians (38%) filled out the questionnaire, of whom 370 (61%) reported on their last case of continuous sedation (cancer patients: n=282 [76%] and noncancer patients: n=88 [24%]). More often, noncancer patients were older, female, and not fully competent. Dyspnea (odds ratio [OR]=2.13; 95% confidence interval [CI]: 1.22, 3.72) and psychological exhaustion (OR=2.64; 95% CI: 1.26, 5.55) were more often a decisive indication for continuous sedation for these patients. A palliative care team was consulted less often for noncancer patients (OR=0.45; 95% CI: 0.21, 0.96). Also, preceding sedation, euthanasia was discussed less often with noncancer patients (OR=0.42; 95% CI: 0.24, 0.73), whereas their relatives more often initiated discussion about euthanasia than relatives of cancer patients (OR=3.75; 95% CI: 1.26, 11.20).

CONCLUSION

The practice of continuous palliative sedation in patients dying of cancer differs from patients dying of other diseases. These differences seem to be related to the less predictable course of noncancer diseases, which may reduce physicians' awareness of the imminence of death. Increased attention to noncancer diseases in palliative care practice and research is, therefore, crucial as is more attention to the potential benefits of palliative care consultation.

Continuous deep sedation, physician-assisted suicide, and euthanasia in Huntington's disorder

AIM

To investigate the attitudes among Swedish physicians and the general public towards continuous deep sedation (CDS) as an alternative treatment for a competent, not imminently dying patient with Huntington's disorder requesting physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and euthanasia.

DESIGN

A questionnaire was distributed to 1200 physicians in Sweden and 1201 individuals in Stockholm. It consisted of three parts: 1) A vignette about a competent patient with Huntington's disease requesting PAS. When no longer competent, relatives request euthanasia on behalf of the patient. Responders were asked about their attitudes towards these requests and whether CDS would be an acceptable alternative. 2) General questions about PAS and euthanasia. 3) Background variables.

RESULTS

The response rate was 56% (physicians) and 52% (general public). The majority of the general public and a fairly large proportion of physicians reported more liberal views on CDS than are expressed in current Swedish and international recommendations.

CONCLUSION

In light of the results, we suggest that there is a need for a broader discussion about the recommendations for CDS, with a special focus on the needs of patients with progressive neurodegenerative disorders.

Continuous Deep Sedation Until Death: Palliation or Physician-Assisted Death?

Published literature have not discerned end-of-life palliative versus life-shortening effects of pharmacologically maintaining continuous deep sedation until death (ie, dying in deep sleep) compared with common sedation practices relieving distress in the final conscious phase of dying. Continuous deep sedation predictably suppresses brainstem vital centers and shortens life. Continuous deep sedation remains controversial as palliation for existential suffering and in elective death requests by discontinuation of chronic ventilation or circulatory support with mechanical devices. Continuous deep sedation contravenes the double-effect principle because: (1) it induces permanent coma (intent of action) for the contingency relief of suffering and for social isolation (desired outcomes) and (2) because of its predictable and proportional life-shortening effect. Continuous deep sedation should be distinguished from common sedation practices for palliation and characterized instead as physician-assisted death.