Computational Neuropsychology and Bayesian Inference

Why Psychotropic Drugs Don't Cure Mental Illness-But Should They?

While pharmacological treatments for psychiatric disorders have offered great promise and have provided clinically meaningful symptom relief these treatments have had less effect on altering the course of these disorders. Research has provided many new insights about the effects of different psychotropic agents on the functions of various brain systems as investigators have embraced the "translational research model." However, this theoretical approach of deconstructing complex behaviors into smaller measurable behavioral units and targeting brain systems that are hypothesized to underlie these discrete behaviors has offered little of practical clinical relevance to significantly improve the treatment of psychiatric disorders in this century. Radical new treatments have not emerged, and available treatments continue to provide symptom relief without resolution of the underlying conditions. Recent publications on the subject have attempted to identify the barriers to progress and have pointed out some of the limitations of the translational approach. It is our position that, given the present limitations of our therapeutic arsenal, both researchers and clinicians would be well-advised to pay closer attention to human specific factors such as the role of language, the creation of personal narratives, and how factors such as these interface with underlying biological diatheses in mental illness. These interactions between pathophysiology and intrapersonal processes may be critical to both the in vivo expression of the underlying biological mechanisms of psychiatric disease states, and to the development of enhancements in therapeutic efficacy. Lastly, we discuss the implications of more coherently integrating neuroscientific research and clinical practice for more effectively addressing the challenges of understanding and treating mental illness.

Visual statistical learning and integration of perceptual priors are intact in attention deficit hyperactivity disorder

Background

Deficits in visual statistical learning and predictive processing could in principle explain the key characteristics of inattention and distractibility in attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Specifically, from a Bayesian perspective, ADHD may be associated with flatter likelihoods (increased sensory processing noise), and/or difficulties in generating or using predictions. To our knowledge, such hypotheses have never been directly tested.

Methods

We here test these hypotheses by evaluating whether adults diagnosed with ADHD (n = 17) differed from a control group (n = 30) in implicitly learning and using low-level perceptual priors to guide sensory processing. We used a visual statistical learning task in which participants had to estimate the direction of a cloud of coherently moving dots. Unbeknown to the participants, two of the directions were more frequently presented than the others, creating an implicit bias (prior) towards those directions. This task had previously revealed differences in other neurodevelopmental disorders, such as autistic spectrum disorder and schizophrenia.

Results

We found that both groups acquired the prior expectation for the most frequent directions and that these expectations substantially influenced task performance. Overall, there were no group differences in how much the priors influenced performance. However, subtle group differences were found in the influence of the prior over time.

Conclusion

Our findings suggest that the symptoms of inattention and hyperactivity in ADHD do not stem from broad difficulties in developing and/or using low-level perceptual priors.

Active inference on discrete state-spaces: A synthesis

Active inference is a normative principle underwriting perception, action, planning, decision-making and learning in biological or artificial agents. From its inception, its associated process theory has grown to incorporate complex generative models, enabling simulation of a wide range of complex behaviours. Due to successive developments in active inference, it is often difficult to see how its underlying principle relates to process theories and practical implementation. In this paper, we try to bridge this gap by providing a complete mathematical synthesis of active inference on discrete state-space models. This technical summary provides an overview of the theory, derives neuronal dynamics from first principles and relates this dynamics to biological processes. Furthermore, this paper provides a fundamental building block needed to understand active inference for mixed generative models; allowing continuous sensations to inform discrete representations. This paper may be used as follows: to guide research towards outstanding challenges, a practical guide on how to implement active inference to simulate experimental behaviour, or a pointer towards various in-silico neurophysiological responses that may be used to make empirical predictions.

Cortical Oscillatory Signatures Reveal the Prerequisites for Tinnitus Perception: A Comparison of Subjects With Sudden Sensorineural Hearing Loss With and Without Tinnitus

Just as the human brain works in a Bayesian manner to minimize uncertainty regarding external stimuli, a deafferented brain due to hearing loss attempts to obtain or "fill in" the missing auditory information, resulting in auditory phantom percepts (i.e., tinnitus). Among various types of hearing loss, sudden sensorineural hearing loss (SSNHL) has been extensively reported to be associated with tinnitus. However, the reason that tinnitus develops selectively in some patients with SSNHL remains elusive, which led us to hypothesize that patients with SSNHL with tinnitus (SSNHL-T) and those without tinnitus (SSNHL-NT) may exhibit different cortical activity patterns. In the current study, we compared resting-state quantitative electroencephalography findings between 13 SSNHL-T and 13 SSNHL-NT subjects strictly matched for demographic characteristics and hearing thresholds. By performing whole-brain source localization analysis complemented by functional connectivity analysis, we aimed to determine the as-yet-unidentified cortical oscillatory signatures that may reveal potential prerequisites for the perception of tinnitus in patients with SSNHL. Compared with the SSNHL-NT group, the SSNHL-T group showed significantly higher cortical activity in Bayesian inferential network areas such as the frontopolar cortex, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and pregenual anterior cingulate cortex (pgACC) for the beta 3 and gamma frequency bands. This suggests that tinnitus develops in a brain with sudden auditory deafferentation only if the Bayesian inferential network updates the missing auditory information and the pgACC-based top-down gatekeeper system is actively involved. Additionally, significantly increased connectivity between the OFC and precuneus for the gamma frequency band was observed in the SSNHL-T group, further suggesting that tinnitus derived from Bayesian inference may be linked to the default mode network so that tinnitus is regarded as normal. Taken together, our preliminary results suggest a possible mechanism for the selective development of tinnitus in patients with SSNHL. Also, these areas could serve as the potential targets of neuromodulatory approaches to preventing the development or prolonged perception of tinnitus in subjects with SSNHL.

Minds and Brains, Sleep and Psychiatry

Objective

This article offers a philosophical thesis for psychiatric disorders that rests upon some simple truths about the mind and brain. Specifically, it asks whether the dual aspect monism—that emerges from sleep research and theoretical neurobiology—can be applied to pathophysiology and psychopathology in psychiatry.

Methods

Our starting point is that the mind and brain are emergent aspects of the same (neuronal) dynamics; namely, the brain–mind. Our endpoint is that synaptic dysconnection syndromes inherit the same dual aspect; namely, aberrant inference or belief updating on the one hand, and a failure of neuromodulatory synaptic gain control on the other. We start with some basic considerations from sleep research that integrate the phenomenology of dreaming with the neurophysiology of sleep.

Results

We then leverage this treatment by treating the brain as an organ of inference. Our particular focus is on the role of precision (i.e., the representation of uncertainty) in belief updating and the accompanying synaptic mechanisms.

Conclusions

Finally, we suggest a dual aspect approach—based upon belief updating (i.e., mind processes) and its neurophysiological implementation (i.e., brain processes)—has a wide explanatory compass for psychiatry and various movement disorders. This approach identifies the kind of pathophysiology that underwrites psychopathology—and points to certain psychotherapeutic and psychopharmacological targets, which may stand in mechanistic relation to each other.

The ‘mind’ emerges from Bayesian belief updating in the ‘brain’

Psychopathology can be read as aberrant belief updating.

Aberrant belief updating follows from any neuromodulatory synaptopathy

Green D. Neuromodulatory Control and Language Recovery in Bilingual Aphasia: An Active Inference Approach

Understanding the aetiology of the diverse recovery patterns in bilingual aphasia is a theoretical challenge with implications for treatment. Loss of control over intact language networks provides a parsimonious starting point that can be tested using in-silico lesions. We simulated a complex recovery pattern (alternate antagonism and paradoxical translation) to test the hypothesis-from an established hierarchical control model-that loss of control was mediated by constraints on neuromodulatory resources. We used active (Bayesian) inference to simulate a selective loss of sensory precision; i.e., confidence in the causes of sensations. This in-silico lesion altered the precision of beliefs about task relevant states, including appropriate actions, and reproduced exactly the recovery pattern of interest. As sensory precision has been linked to acetylcholine release, these simulations endorse the conjecture that loss of neuromodulatory control can explain this atypical recovery pattern. We discuss the relevance of this finding for other recovery patterns.

Determinants of primate neurogenesis and the deployment of top-down generative networks in the cortical hierarchy

What I cannot create I do not understand - Richard Feynman 1978 Because primate cortical development exhibits numerous specific features, the mouse is an imperfect model for human cortical development. Expansion of supragranular neurons is an evolutionary feature characterizing the primate cortex. Increased production of supragranular neurons is supported by a germinal zone innovation of the primate cortex: the Outer SubVentricular Zone, which along with supragranular neurons constitute privileged targets of primate brain-specific gene evolution. The resulting cell-type diversity of human supragranular neurons link cell and molecular evolutionary changes in progenitors with the emergence of distinctive architectural features in the primate cortex. We propose that these changes are required for the expansion of the primate cortical hierarchy deploying top-down generative networks with potentially important consequences for the neurobiology of human psychiatric disorders.

State anxiety biases estimates of uncertainty and impairs reward learning in volatile environments

Clinical and subclinical (trait) anxiety impairs decision making and interferes with learning. Less understood are the effects of temporary anxious states on learning and decision making in healthy populations, and whether these can serve as a model for clinical anxiety. Here we test whether anxious states in healthy individuals elicit a pattern of aberrant behavioural, neural, and physiological responses comparable with those found in anxiety disorders-particularly when processing uncertainty in unstable environments. In our study, both a state anxious and a control group learned probabilistic stimulus-outcome mappings in a volatile task environment while we recorded their electrophysiological (EEG) signals. By using a hierarchical Bayesian model of inference and learning, we assessed the effect of state anxiety on Bayesian belief updating with a focus on uncertainty estimates. State anxiety was associated with an underestimation of environmental uncertainty, and informational uncertainty about the reward tendency. Anxious individuals' beliefs about reward contingencies were more precise (had smaller uncertainty) and thus more resistant to updating, ultimately leading to impaired reward-based learning. State anxiety was also associated with greater uncertainty about volatility. We interpret this pattern as evidence that state anxious individuals are less tolerant to informational uncertainty about the contingencies governing their environment and more willing to be uncertain about the level of stability of the world itself. Further, we tracked the neural representation of belief update signals in the trial-by-trial EEG amplitudes. In control participants, lower-level precision-weighted prediction errors (pwPEs) about reward tendencies were represented in the ERP signals across central and parietal electrodes peaking at 496 ms, overlapping with the late P300 in classical ERP analysis. The state anxiety group did not exhibit a significant representation of low-level pwPEs, and there were no significant differences between the groups. Smaller variance in low-level pwPE about reward tendencies in state anxiety could partially account for the null results. Expanding previous computational work on trait anxiety, our findings establish that temporary anxious states in healthy individuals impair reward-based learning in volatile environments, primarily through changes in uncertainty estimates, which play a central role in current Bayesian accounts of perceptual inference and learning.

Degeneracy and Redundancy in Active Inference

The notions of degeneracy and redundancy are important constructs in many areas, ranging from genomics through to network science. Degeneracy finds a powerful role in neuroscience, explaining key aspects of distributed processing and structure-function relationships in the brain. For example, degeneracy accounts for the superadditive effect of lesions on functional deficits in terms of a "many-to-one" structure-function mapping. In this paper, we offer a principled account of degeneracy and redundancy, when function is operationalized in terms of active inference, namely, a formulation of perception and action as belief updating under generative models of the world. In brief, "degeneracy" is quantified by the "entropy" of posterior beliefs about the causes of sensations, while "redundancy" is the "complexity" cost incurred by forming those beliefs. From this perspective, degeneracy and redundancy are complementary: Active inference tries to minimize redundancy while maintaining degeneracy. This formulation is substantiated using statistical and mathematical notions of degenerate mappings and statistical efficiency. We then illustrate changes in degeneracy and redundancy during the learning of a word repetition task. Finally, we characterize the effects of lesions-to intrinsic and extrinsic connections-using in silico disconnections. These numerical analyses highlight the fundamental difference between degeneracy and redundancy-and how they score distinct imperatives for perceptual inference and structure learning that are relevant to synthetic and biological intelligence.

Paradoxical lesions, plasticity and active inference

Paradoxical lesions are secondary brain lesions that ameliorate functional deficits caused by the initial insult. This effect has been explained in several ways; particularly by the reduction of functional inhibition, or by increases in the excitatory-to-inhibitory synaptic balance within perilesional tissue. In this article, we simulate how and when a modification of the excitatory-inhibitory balance triggers the reversal of a functional deficit caused by a primary lesion. For this, we introduce in-silico lesions to an active inference model of auditory word repetition. The first in-silico lesion simulated damage to the extrinsic (between regions) connectivity causing a functional deficit that did not fully resolve over 100 trials of a word repetition task. The second lesion was implemented in the intrinsic (within region) connectivity, compromising the model's ability to rebalance excitatory-inhibitory connections during learning. We found that when the second lesion was mild, there was an increase in experience-dependent plasticity that enhanced performance relative to a single lesion. This paradoxical lesion effect disappeared when the second lesion was more severe because plasticity-related changes were disproportionately amplified in the intrinsic connectivity, relative to lesioned extrinsic connections. Finally, this framework was used to predict the physiological correlates of paradoxical lesions. This formal approach provides new insights into the computational and neurophysiological mechanisms that allow some patients to recover after large or multiple lesions.

Towards a computational psychiatry of juvenile obsessive-compulsive disorder

Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) most often emerges during adolescence, but we know little about the aberrant neural and cognitive developmental mechanisms that underlie its emergence during this critical developmental period. To move towards a computational psychiatry of juvenile OCD, we review studies on the computational, neuropsychological and neural alterations in juvenile OCD and link these findings to the adult OCD and cognitive neuroscience literature. We find consistent difficulties in tasks entailing complex decision making and set shifting, but limited evidence in other areas that are altered in adult OCD, such as habit and confidence formation. Based on these findings, we establish a neurocomputational framework that illustrates how cognition can go awry and lead to symptoms of juvenile OCD. We link these possible aberrant neural processes to neuroimaging findings in juvenile OCD and show that juvenile OCD is mainly characterised by disruptions of complex reasoning systems.

Why Brain Criticality Is Clinically Relevant: A Scoping Review

The past 25 years have seen a strong increase in the number of publications related to criticality in different areas of neuroscience. The potential of criticality to explain various brain properties, including optimal information processing, has made it an increasingly exciting area of investigation for neuroscientists. Recent reviews on this topic, sometimes termed brain criticality, make brief mention of clinical applications of these findings to several neurological disorders such as epilepsy, neurodegenerative disease, and neonatal hypoxia. Other clinicallyrelevant domains - including anesthesia, sleep medicine, developmental-behavioral pediatrics, and psychiatry - are seldom discussed in review papers of brain criticality. Thorough assessments of these application areas and their relevance for clinicians have also yet to be published. In this scoping review, studies of brain criticality involving human data of all ages are evaluated for their current and future clinical relevance. To make the results of these studies understandable to a more clinical audience, a review of the key concepts behind criticality (e.g., phase transitions, long-range temporal correlation, self-organized criticality, power laws, branching processes) precedes the discussion of human clinical studies. Open questions and forthcoming areas of investigation are also considered.

Hallucinations in posttraumatic stress disorder: Insights from predictive coding

Although hallucinations are not one of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-Fifth Edition (DSM-5) criteria for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), they are increasingly documented in PTSD. They are noted in the absence of clear delusions, formal thought disorganization, disorganized speech, or behavior, ruling out a comorbid psychotic disorder like schizophrenia as a better explanation for these hallucinations. Hallucinations in both PTSD and schizophrenia share phenomenological features. We propose that hallucinations in PTSD, like those in schizophrenia, might be explained in terms of aberrant predictive coding, specifically the misapplication of strong prior beliefs that vitiate perceptual inference. This approach highlights the broader relationship between trauma and psychosis. Under predictive coding, the nervous system organizes past sensory data into an internal model of the world. Under stress, the brain prioritizes speed over accurate encoding. However, memories for traumatic experiences are typically strongly consolidated, to avoid similar experiences in future. In PTSD, this could lead to a world model comprised of inaccurate but overly precise prior beliefs, that can be triggered by stimuli tangentially related to the index trauma, resulting in hallucinations. Crucially, this evidence accumulation depends upon the relative precision of prior beliefs and sensory evidence (supplied in the form of prediction errors). Our basic argument is that stressful situations induce belief updating, in terms of precise prior beliefs, that are difficult to undo. These unduly precise, trauma-related beliefs then constitute perceptual hypotheses, memories, or narratives that bias subsequent experience. This prior bias may be so severe that sensory evidence is effectively ignored; that is, treated as very imprecise, in relation to prior beliefs. Such an account may lead to cognitive therapies for hallucinations aimed at strong prior beliefs, and the exciting prospect of combining such therapies with drugs that modulate neuroplasticity and enhance the adaptive consolidation of more appropriate priors. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Information Theoretic Characterization of Uncertainty Distinguishes Surprise From Accuracy Signals in the Brain

Uncertainty presents a problem for both human and machine decision-making. While utility maximization has traditionally been viewed as the motive force behind choice behavior, it has been theorized that uncertainty minimization may supersede reward motivation. Beyond reward, decisions are guided by belief, i.e., confidence-weighted expectations. Evidence challenging a belief evokes surprise, which signals a deviation from expectation (stimulus-bound surprise) but also provides an information gain. To support the theory that uncertainty minimization is an essential drive for the brain, we probe the neural trace of uncertainty-related decision variables, namely confidence, surprise, and information gain, in a discrete decision with a deterministic outcome. Confidence and surprise were elicited with a gambling task administered in a functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment, where agents start with a uniform probability distribution, transition to a non-uniform probabilistic state, and end in a fully certain state. After controlling for reward expectation, we find confidence, taken as the negative entropy of a trial, correlates with a response in the hippocampus and temporal lobe. Stimulus-bound surprise, taken as Shannon information, correlates with responses in the insula and striatum. In addition, we also find a neural response to a measure of information gain captured by a confidence error, a quantity we dub accuracy. BOLD responses to accuracy were found in the cerebellum and precuneus, after controlling for reward prediction errors and stimulus-bound surprise at the same time point. Our results suggest that, even absent an overt need for learning, the human brain expends energy on information gain and uncertainty minimization.

Alien limb syndrome: A Bayesian account of unwanted actions

An alien limb is a debilitating disorder of volitional control. The core feature of alien limb is the performance of simple or complex semi-purposeful movements which the patient reports to be unintentional or unwanted, or occasionally in opposition to their intentions. Theories of the mechanism of alien limb phenomena have emphasised the role of disinhibition in the brain, and exaggerated action ‘affordances’. However, despite advances in cognitive neuroscience research and a large public and media interest, there has been no unifying computational and anatomical account of the cause of alien limb movements. Here, we extend Bayesian brain principles to propose that alien limb is a disorder of ‘predictive processing’ in hierarchical sensorimotor brain networks. Specifically, we suggest that alien limb results from predictions about action outcomes that are afforded unduly high precision. The principal mechanism for this abnormally high precision is an impairment in the relay of input from medial regions, predominantly the supplementary motor area (SMA), which modulate the precision of lateral brain regions encoding the predicted action outcomes. We discuss potential implications of this model for future research and treatment of alien limb.

Questions and controversies in the study of time-varying functional connectivity in resting fMRI

The brain is a complex, multiscale dynamical system composed of many interacting regions. Knowledge of the spatiotemporal organization of these interactions is critical for establishing a solid understanding of the brain's functional architecture and the relationship between neural dynamics and cognition in health and disease. The possibility of studying these dynamics through careful analysis of neuroimaging data has catalyzed substantial interest in methods that estimate time-resolved fluctuations in functional connectivity (often referred to as "dynamic" or time-varying functional connectivity; TVFC). At the same time, debates have emerged regarding the application of TVFC analyses to resting fMRI data, and about the statistical validity, physiological origins, and cognitive and behavioral relevance of resting TVFC. These and other unresolved issues complicate interpretation of resting TVFC findings and limit the insights that can be gained from this promising new research area. This article brings together scientists with a variety of perspectives on resting TVFC to review the current literature in light of these issues. We introduce core concepts, define key terms, summarize controversies and open questions, and present a forward-looking perspective on how resting TVFC analyses can be rigorously and productively applied to investigate a wide range of questions in cognitive and systems neuroscience.

Generalised free energy and active inference

Active inference is an approach to understanding behaviour that rests upon the idea that the brain uses an internal generative model to predict incoming sensory data. The fit between this model and data may be improved in two ways. The brain could optimise probabilistic beliefs about the variables in the generative model (i.e. perceptual inference). Alternatively, by acting on the world, it could change the sensory data, such that they are more consistent with the model. This implies a common objective function (variational free energy) for action and perception that scores the fit between an internal model and the world. We compare two free energy functionals for active inference in the framework of Markov decision processes. One of these is a functional of beliefs (i.e. probability distributions) about states and policies, but a function of observations, while the second is a functional of beliefs about all three. In the former (expected free energy), prior beliefs about outcomes are not part of the generative model (because they are absorbed into the prior over policies). Conversely, in the second (generalised free energy), priors over outcomes become an explicit component of the generative model. When using the free energy function, which is blind to future observations, we equip the generative model with a prior over policies that ensure preferred (i.e. priors over) outcomes are realised. In other words, if we expect to encounter a particular kind of outcome, this lends plausibility to those policies for which this outcome is a consequence. In addition, this formulation ensures that selected policies minimise uncertainty about future outcomes by minimising the free energy expected in the future. When using the free energy functional-that effectively treats future observations as hidden states-we show that policies are inferred or selected that realise prior preferences by minimising the free energy of future expectations. Interestingly, the form of posterior beliefs about policies (and associated belief updating) turns out to be identical under both formulations, but the quantities used to compute them are not.

Tonality Tunes the Statistical Characteristics in Music: Computational Approaches on Statistical Learning

Statistical learning is a learning mechanism based on transition probability in sequences such as music and language. Recent computational and neurophysiological studies suggest that the statistical learning contributes to production, action, and musical creativity as well as prediction and perception. The present study investigated how statistical structure interacts with tonalities in music based on various-order statistical models. To verify this in all 24 major and minor keys, the transition probabilities of the sequences containing the highest pitches in Bach's Well-Tempered Clavier, which is a collection of two series (No. 1 and No. 2) of preludes and fugues in all of the 24 major and minor keys, were calculated based on nth-order Markov models. The transition probabilities of each sequence were compared among tonalities (major and minor), two series (No. 1 and No. 2), and music types (prelude and fugue). The differences in statistical characteristics between major and minor keys were detected in lower- but not higher-order models. The results also showed that statistical knowledge in music might be modulated by tonalities and composition periods. Furthermore, the principal component analysis detected the shared components of related keys, suggesting that the tonalities modulate statistical characteristics in music. The present study may suggest that there are at least two types of statistical knowledge in music that are interdependent on and independent of tonality, respectively.

Introducing a Bayesian model of selective attention based on active inference

Information gathering comprises actions whose (sensory) consequences resolve uncertainty (i.e., are salient). In other words, actions that solicit salient information cause the greatest shift in beliefs (i.e., information gain) about the causes of our sensations. However, not all information is relevant to the task at hand: this is especially the case in complex, naturalistic scenes. This paper introduces a formal model of selective attention based on active inference and contextual epistemic foraging. We consider a visual search task with a special emphasis on goal-directed and task-relevant exploration. In this scheme, attention modulates the expected fidelity (precision) of the mapping between observations and hidden states in a state-dependent or context-sensitive manner. This ensures task-irrelevant observations have little expected information gain, and so the agent - driven to reduce expected surprise (i.e., uncertainty) - does not actively seek them out. Instead, it selectively samples task-relevant observations, which inform (task-relevant) hidden states. We further show, through simulations, that the atypical exploratory behaviours in conditions such as autism and anxiety may be due to a failure to appropriately modulate sensory precision in a context-specific way.

Reframing PTSD for computational psychiatry with the active inference framework

Introduction: Recent advances in research on stress and, respectively, on disorders of perception, learning, and behaviour speak to a promising synthesis of current insights from (i) neurobiology, cognitive neuroscience and psychology of stress and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and (ii) computational psychiatry approaches to pathophysiology (e.g. of schizophrenia and autism). Methods: Specifically, we apply this synthesis to PTSD. The framework of active inference offers an embodied and embedded lens through which to understand neuronal mechanisms, structures, and processes of cognitive function and dysfunction. In turn, this offers an explanatory model of how healthy mental functioning can go awry due to psychopathological conditions that impair inference about our environment and our bodies. In this context, auditory phenomena-known to be especially relevant to studies of PTSD and schizophrenia-and traditional models of auditory function can be viewed from an evolutionary perspective based on active inference. Results: We assess and contextualise a range of evidence on audition, stress, psychosis, and PTSD, and bring some existing partial models of PTSD into multilevel alignment. Conclusions: The novel perspective on PTSD we present aims to serve as a basis for new experimental designs and therapeutic interventions that integrate fundamentally biological, cognitive, behavioural, and environmental factors.

Socio-Emotional Concern Dynamics in a Model of Real-Time Dyadic Interaction: Parent-Child Play in Autism

We used a validated agent-based model-Socio-Emotional CONcern DynamicS (SECONDS)-to model real-time playful interaction between a child diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) and its parent. SECONDS provides a real-time (second-by-second) virtual environment that could be used for clinical trials and testing process-oriented explanations of ASD symptomatology. We conducted numerical experiments with SECONDS (1) for internal model validation comparing two parental behavioral strategies for stimulating social development in ASD (play-centered vs. initiative-centered) and (2) for empirical case-based model validation. We compared 2,000 simulated play sessions of two particular dyads with (second-by-second) time-series observations within 29 play sessions of a real parent-child dyad with ASD on six variables related to maintaining and initiating play. Overall, both simulated dyads provided a better fit to the observed dyad than reference null distributions. Given the idiosyncratic behaviors expected in ASD, the observed correspondence is non-trivial. Our results demonstrate the applicability of SECONDS to parent-child dyads in ASD. In the future, SECONDS could help design interventions for parental care in ASD.

Increased weighting on prior knowledge in Lewy body-associated visual hallucinations

Hallucinations are a common and distressing feature of many psychiatric and neurodegenerative conditions. In Lewy body disease, visual hallucinations are a defining feature, associated with worse outcomes; yet their mechanisms remain unclear and treatment options are limited. Here, we show that hallucinations in Lewy body disease are associated with altered integration of top-down predictions with incoming sensory evidence, specifically with an increased relative weighting of prior knowledge. We tested 37 individuals with Lewy body disease, 17 habitual hallucinators and 20 without hallucinations, and 20 age-matched healthy individuals. We employed an image-based learning paradigm to test whether people with Lewy body disease and visual hallucinations show higher dependence on prior knowledge. We used two-tone images that are difficult to disambiguate without any prior information but generate a strong percept when information is provided. We measured discrimination sensitivity before and after this information was provided. We observed that in people with Lewy body disease who experience hallucinations, there was greater improvement in discrimination sensitivity after information was provided, compared to non-hallucinators and controls. This suggests that people with Lewy body disease and hallucinations place higher relative weighting on prior knowledge than those who do not hallucinate. Importantly, increased severity of visual hallucinations was associated with an increased effect of prior knowledge. Together these findings suggest that visual hallucinations in Lewy body disease are linked to a shift towards top-down influences on perception and away from sensory evidence, perhaps due to an increase in sensory noise. This provides important mechanistic insights to how hallucinations develop in Lewy body disease, with potential for revealing new therapeutic targets.

With an eye on uncertainty: Modelling pupillary responses to environmental volatility

Living creatures must accurately infer the nature of their environments. They do this despite being confronted by stochastic and context sensitive contingencies—and so must constantly update their beliefs regarding their uncertainty about what might come next. In this work, we examine how we deal with uncertainty that evolves over time. This prospective uncertainty (or imprecision) is referred to as volatility and has previously been linked to noradrenergic signals that originate in the locus coeruleus. Using pupillary dilatation as a measure of central noradrenergic signalling, we tested the hypothesis that changes in pupil diameter reflect inferences humans make about environmental volatility. To do so, we collected pupillometry data from participants presented with a stream of numbers. We generated these numbers from a process with varying degrees of volatility. By measuring pupillary dilatation in response to these stimuli—and simulating the inferences made by an ideal Bayesian observer of the same stimuli—we demonstrate that humans update their beliefs about environmental contingencies in a Bayes optimal way. We show this by comparing general linear (convolution) models that formalised competing hypotheses about the causes of pupillary changes. We found greater evidence for models that included Bayes optimal estimates of volatility than those without. We additionally explore the interaction between different causes of pupil dilation and suggest a quantitative approach to characterising a person’s prior beliefs about volatility.

Humans are constantly confronted with surprising events. To navigate such a world, we must understand the chances of an unexpected event occurring at any given point in time. We do this by creating a model of the world around us, in which we allow for these unexpected events to occur by holding beliefs about how volatile our environment is. In this work we explore the way in which we update our beliefs, demonstrating that this updating relies on the number of unexpected events in relation to the expected number. We do this by examining the pupil diameter, since—in controlled environments—changes in pupil diameter reflect our response to unexpected observations. Finally, we show that our methodology is appropriate for assessing the individual participant’s prior expectations about the amount of uncertainty in their environment.

Dynamic Causal Modelling of Active Vision

In this paper, we draw from recent theoretical work on active perception, which suggests that the brain makes use of an internal (i.e., generative) model to make inferences about the causes of sensations. This view treats visual sensations as consequent on action (i.e., saccades) and implies that visual percepts must be actively constructed via a sequence of eye movements. Oculomotor control calls on a distributed set of brain sources that includes the dorsal and ventral frontoparietal (attention) networks. We argue that connections from the frontal eye fields to ventral parietal sources represent the mapping from “where”, fixation location to information derived from “what” representations in the ventral visual stream. During scene construction, this mapping must be learned, putatively through changes in the effective connectivity of these synapses. Here, we test the hypothesis that the coupling between the dorsal frontal cortex and the right temporoparietal cortex is modulated during saccadic interrogation of a simple visual scene. Using dynamic causal modeling for magnetoencephalography with (male and female) human participants, we assess the evidence for changes in effective connectivity by comparing models that allow for this modulation with models that do not. We find strong evidence for modulation of connections between the two attention networks; namely, a disinhibition of the ventral network by its dorsal counterpart.

SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT This work draws from recent theoretical accounts of active vision and provides empirical evidence for changes in synaptic efficacy consistent with these computational models. In brief, we used magnetoencephalography in combination with eye-tracking to assess the neural correlates of a form of short-term memory during a dot cancellation task. Using dynamic causal modeling to quantify changes in effective connectivity, we found evidence that the coupling between the dorsal and ventral attention networks changed during the saccadic interrogation of a simple visual scene. Intuitively, this is consistent with the idea that these neuronal connections may encode beliefs about “what I would see if I looked there”, and that this mapping is optimized as new data are obtained with each fixation.

Depth and the Uncertainty of Statistical Knowledge on Musical Creativity Fluctuate Over a Composer's Lifetime

Brain models music as a hierarchy of dynamical systems that encode probability distributions and complexity (i.e., entropy and uncertainty). Through musical experience over lifetime, a human is intrinsically motivated in optimizing the internalized probabilistic model for efficient information processing and the uncertainty resolution, which has been regarded as rewords. Human's behavior, however, appears to be not necessarily directing to efficiency but sometimes act inefficiently in order to explore a maximum rewards of uncertainty resolution. Previous studies suggest that the drive for novelty seeking behavior (high uncertain phenomenon) reflects human's curiosity, and that the curiosity rewards encourage humans to create and learn new regularities. That is to say, although brain generally minimizes uncertainty of music structure, we sometimes derive pleasure from music with uncertain structure due to curiosity for novelty seeking behavior by which we anticipate the resolution of uncertainty. Few studies, however, investigated how curiosity for uncertain and novelty seeking behavior modulates musical creativity. The present study investigated how the probabilistic model and the uncertainty in music fluctuate over a composer's lifetime (all of the 32 piano sonatas by Ludwig van Beethoven). In the late periods of the composer's lifetime, the transitional probabilities (TPs) of sequential patterns that ubiquitously appear in all of his music (familiar phrase) were decreased, whereas the uncertainties of the whole structure were increased. Furthermore, these findings were prominent in higher-, rather than lower-, order models of TP distribution. This may suggest that the higher-order probabilistic model is susceptible to experience and psychological phenomena over the composer's lifetime. The present study first suggested the fluctuation of uncertainty of musical structure over a composer's lifetime. It is suggested that human's curiosity for uncertain and novelty seeking behavior may modulate optimization and creativity in human's brain.

Composite Pain Biomarker Signatures for Objective Assessment and Effective Treatment

Pain is a subjective sensory experience that can, mostly, be reported but cannot be directly measured or quantified. Nevertheless, a suite of biomarkers related to mechanisms, neural activity, and susceptibility offer the possibility-especially when used in combination-to produce objective pain-related indicators with the specificity and sensitivity required for diagnosis and for evaluation of risk of developing pain and of analgesic efficacy. Such composite biomarkers will also provide improved understanding of pain pathophysiology.

Neuronal message passing using Mean-field, Bethe, and Marginal approximations

Neuronal computations rely upon local interactions across synapses. For a neuronal network to perform inference, it must integrate information from locally computed messages that are propagated among elements of that network. We review the form of two popular (Bayesian) message passing schemes and consider their plausibility as descriptions of inference in biological networks. These are variational message passing and belief propagation - each of which is derived from a free energy functional that relies upon different approximations (mean-field and Bethe respectively). We begin with an overview of these schemes and illustrate the form of the messages required to perform inference using Hidden Markov Models as generative models. Throughout, we use factor graphs to show the form of the generative models and of the messages they entail. We consider how these messages might manifest neuronally and simulate the inferences they perform. While variational message passing offers a simple and neuronally plausible architecture, it falls short of the inferential performance of belief propagation. In contrast, belief propagation allows exact computation of marginal posteriors at the expense of the architectural simplicity of variational message passing. As a compromise between these two extremes, we offer a third approach - marginal message passing - that features a simple architecture, while approximating the performance of belief propagation. Finally, we link formal considerations to accounts of neurological and psychiatric syndromes in terms of aberrant message passing.

The Anatomy of Inference: Generative Models and Brain Structure

To infer the causes of its sensations, the brain must call on a generative (predictive) model. This necessitates passing local messages between populations of neurons to update beliefs about hidden variables in the world beyond its sensory samples. It also entails inferences about how we will act. Active inference is a principled framework that frames perception and action as approximate Bayesian inference. This has been successful in accounting for a wide range of physiological and behavioral phenomena. Recently, a process theory has emerged that attempts to relate inferences to their neurobiological substrates. In this paper, we review and develop the anatomical aspects of this process theory. We argue that the form of the generative models required for inference constrains the way in which brain regions connect to one another. Specifically, neuronal populations representing beliefs about a variable must receive input from populations representing the Markov blanket of that variable. We illustrate this idea in four different domains: perception, planning, attention, and movement. In doing so, we attempt to show how appealing to generative models enables us to account for anatomical brain architectures. Ultimately, committing to an anatomical theory of inference ensures we can form empirical hypotheses that can be tested using neuroimaging, neuropsychological, and electrophysiological experiments.

Active Inference, Novelty and Neglect

In this chapter, we provide an overview of the principles of active inference. We illustrate how different forms of short-term memory are expressed formally (mathematically) through appealing to beliefs about the causes of our sensations and about the actions we pursue. This is used to motivate an approach to active vision that depends upon inferences about the causes of 'what I have seen' and learning about 'what I would see if I were to look there'. The former could manifest as persistent 'delay-period' activity - of the sort associated with working memory, while the latter is better suited to changes in synaptic efficacy - of the sort that underlies short-term learning and adaptation. We review formulations of these ideas in terms of active inference, their role in directing visual exploration and the consequences - for active vision - of their failures. To illustrate the latter, we draw upon some of our recent work on the computational anatomy of visual neglect.