The relation between acquisition of a theory of mind and the capacity to hold in mind

Theory of mind and relational complexity

Cognitive complexity and control theory and relational complexity theory attribute developmental changes in theory of mind (TOM) to complexity. In 3 studies, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds performed TOM tasks (false belief, appearance-reality), less complex connections (Level 1 perspective-taking) tasks, and transformations tasks (understanding the effects of location changes and colored filters) with content similar to TOM. There were also predictor tasks at binary-relational and ternary-relational complexity levels, with different content. Consistent with complexity theories: (a) connections and transformations were easier and mastered earlier than TOM; (b) predictor tasks accounted for more than 80% of age-related variance in TOM; and (c) ternary-relational items accounted for TOM variance, before and after controlling for age and binary-relational items. Prediction did not require hierarchically structured predictor tasks.

The relationship between theory of mind and episodic memory: evidence for the development of autonoetic consciousness

The study investigated a link between theory of mind and episodic memory involving autonoetic consciousness (). Eighty-nine Japanese 4- to 6-year-olds received two versions of a false belief task, a task of aspectuality or knowledge origins, and four memory tests. After controlling for age, most theory of mind abilities showed no interrelations, and own and other's belief understandings in deceptive appearance tasks were solely related to source memory, but not to free recall, temporal ordering, or working memory. Moreover, even when age and verbal intelligence were controlled, the association between representational change and source memory was highly significant in 6-year-olds but not in 4- and 5-year-olds. Results suggest that during development only a particular kind of theory of mind ability is integrated with episodic memory.

Five-year-olds' handling of reference and description in the domains of language and mental representation

Children's concurrent success on false belief tasks and their handling of two labels for one object (e.g., bunny/rabbit) has been interpreted as demonstrating understanding about the essential features of representation. Three experiments reveal the limitations in 5-year-olds' understanding for both mental and linguistic representations. We report relatively poor performance on a task involving two labels for one object (e.g., dice/eraser) which required children to treat another's knowledge as representing only some of the feature of its real referent: Dice but not eraser. Five year olds who made errors also had difficulty handling the fact that a written word 'dice' referring to such a dice/eraser, can also be applied to a standard dice but not to a standard eraser. These children lacked metalinguistic awareness of words as entities that both refer and describe.

The Flexible Item Selection Task (FIST): a measure of executive function in preschoolers

Abstraction and cognitive flexibility were assessed in 197 preschool children at 2, 3, 4, and 5 years of age using the Flexible Item Selection Task, a task adapted from the Visual-Verbal Test (Feldman & Drasgow, 1951). On this new inductive task, children were shown a set of 3 cards and required to select 2 cards that matched each other on 1 dimension (Selection 1) and then to select a different pair of cards that matched each other on another dimension (Selection 2). Thus, 1 of the 3 cards always had to be selected twice according to different dimensions. Two-year-olds failed to understand basic task requirements as assessed by a criterial measure. Three-year-olds did more poorly on Selection 1 than 4- and 5-year-olds (who performed near ceiling), suggesting that 3-year-olds had difficulty with the abstraction component of the task. Four-year-olds did worse than 5-year-olds on Selection 2, suggesting that they had difficulty with the cognitive flexibility component (i.e., difficulty selecting the same card on more than 1 dimension). Results are discussed in terms of the development of executive function.

Studies of altered social cognition in neuropsychiatric disorders using functional neuroimaging

In this paper, we review studies using functional neuroimaging to examine cognition in neuropsychiatric disorders. The focus is on social cognition, which is a topic that has received increasing attention over the past few years. A network of brain regions is proposed for social cognition that includes regions involved in processes relevant to social functioning (for example, self reference and emotion). We discuss the alterations of activity in these areas in patients with autism, depression, schizophrenia, and posttraumatic stress disorders in relation to deficits in social behaviour and symptoms. The evidence to date suggests that there may be some specificity of the brain regions involved in these 4 disorders, but all are associated with dysfunction in the amygdala and dorsal cingulate gyrus. Although there is much work remaining in this area, we are beginning to understand the complex interactions of brain function and behaviour that lead to disruptions of social abilities.

Young children's performance on the balance scale: the influence of relational complexity

Three experiments investigated the effect of complexity on children's understanding of a beam balance. In nonconflict problems, weights or distances varied, while the other was held constant. In conflict items, both weight and distance varied, and items were of three kinds: weight dominant, distance dominant, or balance (in which neither was dominant). In Experiment 1, 2-year-old children succeeded on nonconflict-weight and nonconflict-distance problems. This result was replicated in Experiment 2, but performance on conflict items did not exceed chance. In Experiment 3, 3- and 4-year-olds succeeded on all except conflict balance problems, while 5- and 6-year-olds succeeded on all problem types. The results were interpreted in terms of relational complexity theory. Children aged 2 to 4 years succeeded on problems that entailed binary relations, but 5- and 6-year-olds also succeeded on problems that entailed ternary relations. Ternary relations tasks from other domains--transitivity and class inclusion--accounted for 93% of the age-related variance in balance scale scores.

Video reminders in a representational change task: memory for cues but not beliefs or statements

Two experiments investigated the effect of video reminders on 3-year-olds' performance in a representational change task. In Experiment 1, children in a video support condition viewed videotapes of their initial incorrect statements about a misleading container prior to being asked to report their initial belief. Children in a control condition viewed an irrelevant videotape. Despite reporting what they had said on the videotape, children in the video support condition typically failed the representational change task. Experiment 2 replicated the main findings from Experiment 1 and also revealed that a video reminder failed to increase the likelihood that children would correctly report what they had said about the object. Results are discussed in terms of the processes whereby mnemonic cues might affect performance on tasks assessing theory of mind.

Photographic cues do not always facilitate performance on false belief tasks in children with autism

Previous studies have indicated that a pictorial representation of a prior belief can help 3-year-old children (Mitchell & Lacohee, 1991) as well as children with autism (Charman & Lynggaard, 1998) to pass false belief tasks that used the deceptive box or "Smarties" paradigm. The studies reported here attempted to replicate these findings using the unexpected transfer or "Sally-Anne" paradigm, which requires children to predict the actions of a protagonist on the basis of a false belief. Results showed no facilitative effect on "Sally-Anne" task performance for the children with autism or for comparison children of either representational or nonrepresentational cues. This effect was found even in children who benefited from the intervention with the deceptive box paradigm. The findings raise issues regarding the way false belief tasks are conceptualized by experimenters and the demands different false belief paradigms make on children.

Development of theory of mind and executive control

Several recent studies have demonstrated a developmental link, in the age range of 3-5 years, between the acquisition of a 'theory of mind' and self control. In this review, we consider the existence of such a link in assessing five competing theoretical hypotheses that might help us to understand the nature of this developmental advance: (1) executive control depends on theory of mind; (2) theory of mind development depends on executive control; (3) the relevant theory of mind tasks require executive control; (4) both kinds of task require the same kind of embedded conditional reasoning; (5) theory of mind and executive control involve the same brain region. We briefly describe these theoretical accounts and evaluate them in the light of existing empirical evidence. At present, only account (3) can be ruled out with some confidence.